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
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
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


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**AUGUST 1986**

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**THREAT RECOGNITION  
AND RESPONSE  
(VOLUME 2)**

**BY**

**A.T. ROSS**

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
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CENTRAL STUDIES ESTABLISHMENT



THREAT RECOGNITION AND RESPONSE  
(VOLUME 2)

A.T. Ross

SUMMARY

*This note is published as two Volumes. Volume 1 describes a model of threat recognition based upon patterns and trends discerned from a study of major international crises and conflicts which occurred in the period 1938 to 1973.*

*It also describes, in broad terms, the diplomatic and defence preparation activities which national governments undertook in response to their threat perceptions.*

*Finally, Volume 1 records and discusses the durations of the various threat recognition phases defined in the threat recognition model, and lists in Annex A the primary national interests identified by governments in the conflicts studied and for which they ultimately fought.*

*Volume 2 documents the historical analysis of the case studies of international conflicts between 1938 and 1973 upon which the model and results of Volume 1 are based.*

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Department of Defence, Canberra, A.C.T. 2600

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VOLUME 2

CASE STUDIES OF GOVERNMENTAL THREAT RECOGNITION AND RESPONSE  
IN CONFLICTS AND CRISES 1938-1973

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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO VOLUME 2

A number of different authors have contributed to the writing of the case studies in Volume 2 of this study; and their experience and backgrounds consisted of political science, international relations, economics, military operations, intelligence, and military history. It has been to the study's advantage to have such variation for this has tended to promote an interdisciplinary approach to the problem of threat recognition and response. The case studies and their respective authors are now listed:

| <u>CASE STUDY</u> |      |             | Author           |
|-------------------|------|-------------|------------------|
| Munich Phase 1    | 1938 | Germany     | A.T. Ross        |
| Munich Phase 2    | 1938 | Britain     | Dr T.J. O'Rourke |
| Danzig Phase 1    | 1939 | Poland      | A.T. Ross        |
| Danzig Phase 1    | 1939 | Germany     | A.T. Ross        |
| Danzig Phase 2    | 1939 | Germany     | A.T. Ross        |
| Danzig Phase 2    | 1939 | Britain     | Dr T.J. O'Rourke |
| Norway            | 1940 | Norway      | A.T. Ross        |
| Norway            | 1940 | Germany     | A.T. Ross        |
| Norway            | 1940 | Britain     | A.T. Ross        |
| Berlin Blockade   | 1948 | USA         | A.T. Ross        |
| Berlin Blockade   | 1948 | USSR        | A.T. Ross        |
| Kashmir           | 1948 | Pakistan    | Dr E.A.J. Duyker |
| Kashmir           | 1948 | India       | Dr E.A.J. Duyker |
| Korea Phase 1     | 1950 | South Korea | A.T. Ross        |
| Korea Phase 2     | 1950 | USA         | A.T. Ross        |
| Korea Phase 3     | 1950 | China       | A.T. Ross        |
| Korea Phase 3     | 1950 | USA         | A.T. Ross        |
| Suez Phase 2      | 1956 | France      | J. Popple        |
| Suez Phase 2      | 1956 | Egypt       | J. Popple        |

| <u>CASE STUDY</u> |      |           | Author                  |
|-------------------|------|-----------|-------------------------|
| Suez Phase 3      | 1956 | Britain   | J. Popple               |
| Suez Phase 3      | 1956 | Egypt     | J. Popple               |
| Sino India        | 1962 | China     | Dr E.A.J. Duyker        |
| Sino India        | 1964 | India     | Dr E.A.J. Duyker        |
| Confrontation     | 1963 | Britain   | Lt Colonel W. D. Thomas |
| Confrontation     | 1963 | Indonesia | Lt Colonel W. D. Thomas |
| Vietnam           | 1964 | USA       | Commander B. Ledlie     |
| Kashmir           | 1965 | Pakistan  | Dr E.A.J. Duyker        |
| Kasmir            | 1965 | India     | Dr E.A.J. Duyker        |
| East Pakistan     | 1971 | Pakistan  | Dr E.A.J. Duyker        |
| East Pakistan     | 1971 | India     | Dr E.A.J. Duyker        |
| Korea             | 1950 | Australia | J. Popple               |
| Confrontation     | 1963 | Australia | J. Popple               |
| Vietnam           | 1964 | Australia | J. Popple               |

The editor also wishes to acknowledge the contribution of:

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Mr R. Fennessey

Mr A.V. Butler

Mrs B. Ross

Ms D. Flynn

in the preparation of Volume 2

## INTRODUCTION

1. Volume 2 of this study is a collection of discrete case studies of governmental recognition of, and response to, the emergence of threats to their Primary National Interests. Over 30 case studies are listed, and they are presented in chronological order. Such case studies summarize the research completed in this study.

2. The choice of case studies was guided by:

- a. the need to ensure a balance between contingency situations;
- b. the requirement that the individual studies should, as often as possible, have some comparative value to Australian experiences;
- c. the requirement that data on the conflicts studied was available; and
- d. the requirement to consider circumstances which occurred in recent history and not in the distant past.

3. The case studies span a time period of 1938-1973. At the time this Volume was written (1981) there was insufficient reliable information available on more recent conflicts which would allow case studies to be completed to the standard desired by the editor of this volume. Preliminary research on these more recent conflicts does not indicate any major differences from the patterns noted in the case studies.

4. The purpose initially behind the collection of the case studies was to provide a data base from which insight could be gained in understanding the process of threat recognition and response followed by governments. This led to the formulation of the Threat Recognition Model. Subsequent research on the case studies was done in order to test the ability of the Model to fit, in detail, the particular facts of each study. The case studies in Volume 2 have been written to reflect this situation, and readers may judge for themselves the robustness of the model. Footnotes have been provided in all case studies, and will assist any reader who wishes to explore the subject matter of case studies further.

5. Research into the case studies also served another purpose in that it began to indicate the scale and character of defence activities associated with each of the threat recognition phases outlined in the Threat Recognition Model. Even though there is not the same wealth of data presented as for the Threat Recognition Model, such data as are presented nevertheless support the arguments advanced for the general structure of defence activities in Volume 1 of this study.

6. One Case Study (No. 2) was done in more detail than any of the others, to see if this raised any problems for the Threat

Recognition methodology. Increased detail became more manageable with the methodology rather than making the methodology more difficult to apply.

CASE STUDY 1MUNICH 1938 PHASE 1 - GERMANY

1. Czechoslovakia inherited no immediate enmity from Germany when the state was founded in 1918 because it incorporated basically the old Austro-Hungarian provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, and made no claims for German territory. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 added part of Austrian Silesia, Slovakia and Ruthenia, none of which were at the expense of the former German Empire. However, this action led to Czechoslovakia inheriting the animosity of the rump states of Hungary and Austria<sup>1</sup>.

2. The consequence of this was that the Czechoslovak Government was quick to form defence alliances with the enemies of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire (and German Empire) i.e. Rumania, Yugoslavia (The Little Entente). The value to the Czechs was that Rumania and Yugoslavia gave them some defence security from an attempt by their former rulers to reassume their former positions. Since any attempt by Hungary and/or Austria to revise the post-war settlement could well be assisted by Germany, which also had an interest in this general objective, Czechoslovakia needed a balance to Germany. This was supplied by an alliance with France which was eager to conclude an understanding with the most economically powerful state in Central Europe. Czechoslovakia became the lynchpin of the French strategy to ring Germany with defence alliances to ensure that Germany could not break the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty<sup>2</sup>.

3. The Czechs did not intend that their alliance with the French should have anything but a defensive impact, i.e. to guarantee their continued independence. Indeed, the Czechoslovak Government did not see Germany as a serious threat until November 1933. Czech military intelligence did not bother to even establish the composition of basic German military units, and had only the vaguest idea of the German order of battle. Its prime interest was to watch Austria and Hungary. Indeed, from the Czech point of view, relations with Weimar Germany had been good, and economic contacts proliferated between the two nations, the volume of trade increasing dramatically. Germany initiated no customs or tariff war against the Czech state, in contrast with its relationship with Poland<sup>3</sup>.

General Capability

4. Despite the defensive nature of the Czech alliance with France, it had an effect on a National Interest of Germany - the removal of the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Among other things, these provisions banned the German possession of military aircraft, and only allowed seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry. The problem thus presented for the Weimar Governments was that such forces were barely enough for internal security, and were too small to deter attempts at diplomatic blackmail by smaller states of Europe with larger armed

forces. Poland was active in this diplomacy and, until 1934, was the chief worry of the German Army which feared that Poland would invade successfully the Eastern Provinces. Any open or significant attempt by German Governments to ignore the military provisions of Versailles was, in the German view, certain to provoke a French and Polish reaction, and probably also one from Czechoslovakia which would be compelled to join France because of alliance obligations as well as security fears. Czechoslovakian standing armed strength represented a General Capability to thwart German attempts to escape or evade the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty. With full mobilization, such forces in combination with France would become a Specific Capability capable of overcoming the German advantage of superior communications and possibly able to seize a large part of South-East Germany<sup>4</sup>.

#### General Hostile Intent

5. The solution adopted by most Weimar Governments for this difficult problem was to counter Polish strength and intransigence by good relations with Russia, and to avoid war in the West at all costs, until Germany was able to regain her armed strength. The most important way to avoid war in the West was to avoid any open or significant attempt to evade the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty. This was tantamount to delaying the resurgence in German military strength indefinitely. Clandestine rearmament took place throughout the period of the Weimar Republic, but (of necessity) was of such a small scale that practically nothing that the Versailles Treaty had expressly forbidden, was operational by 1933. German Governments realized that the level of Hostile Intent from Czechoslovakia was correlated to the level of German rearmament. While this was insignificant, there was no cause to recognise a General Hostile Intent from the Czechs<sup>5</sup>.

6. With the advent of Hitler and the Nazi Party to power in Germany, new National Interests were defined. The first of these remained the removal of the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty. The second was the unification of Greater Germany, i.e. the joining to Germany of Austria, Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig and the lost German territories in Poland (eg. Silesia). The third was to gain Lebensraum in the East<sup>6</sup>.

7. Of these three National Interests, only the last was totally unacceptable to the then prevailing international morality as typified by the League of Nations. The ability of all nations to be free to defend themselves was something the League accepted although this was to be achieved largely through Collective Security. In principle, if Germany could give suitable guarantee of peaceful intent, the League was bound to concede to it eventually the right of limited rearmament for self defence. This was the case that Hitler chose to argue to justify his rearmament programs in the mid 1930s. The second National Interest was also something the League had to concede in principle if it was to be consistent in its support for the concept of self determination; something which had been denied to German minorities at the end of the First World War as the Western Allies were not anxious to create a powerful new



Germany having had such trouble in defeating the Second Reich. As long as this goal was pursued peacefully and gradually in accordance with League principles, there was no outright rejection by the international community of the second National Interest. Hitler quickly assumed the mantle of the traditional German statesman to pursue this objective, which had been an aim of the Second Reich, and so was not unfamiliar to European statesmen<sup>7</sup>.

8. The third National Interest envisaged the military extinction of existing states in Central and Eastern Europe and their annexation by Germany. Even though Hitler continued through the 1930s to make intermittent statements on the need for living space in the East, the concept had something of the characteristic of a distant and, in the short term, largely unattainable goal. This was because it could not be attained without the achievement of the first National Interest (removal of the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty), and the major reason for obtaining Lebensraum was the achievement of the second National Interest (unification of greater Germany).

9. On 4 February 1933, soon after becoming Chancellor, Hitler met the senior commanders of the German Armed Services. He announced his intention of negating the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty and expanding the Wehrmacht to a level which gave Germany equality of rights with the other major powers (e.g. Britain and France) at the disarmament conference at Geneva. He acknowledged, amongst other things, that his course of action might provoke the intervention of France and her eastern satellites. Initially this danger was to be offset by concealing the limited rearmament until such time as the armed services could be made to appear sufficiently strong to deter enemy reactions<sup>8</sup>.

10. The statement acknowledged implicitly that the determined course of action would probably provoke Czechoslovakia (in support of France) when the rearmament became too large to conceal properly. Thus Hitler was in effect recognizing a General Hostile Intent from Czechoslovakia to threaten the National Interest of removing the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Thus began the German Notional Threat Phase.

11. For the next two years the seven division infantry force was increased towards 21 infantry divisions (which was still much less than the standing forces of France). The air force was expanded towards two fighter and five bomber groups. By 31 December 1934 it had reached 532 aircraft, whereas just before Hitler's rise to power the unofficial air force had totalled 274 aircraft of which almost 200 were convertible civilian planes. The reason for this expansion was that Germany had been disarmed by the victorious Western Allies after the First World War. The approved forces were much lower than the levels considered by other European nations to be minimally necessary to provide a measure of security during the relatively peaceful period 1919-33. Thus the Germans had a large margin of strength to acquire before they could talk on equal terms with the other powers at Geneva<sup>9</sup>.

12. The need for expansion also meant that much new equipment had to be acquired. The military assets which Hitler began to give priority to, were those which supported his policy of Blitzkrieg (short quick wars consisting of a limited number of sudden massive blows on the enemy). These were tank units, fighter, dive bomber and bomber squadrons, etc; none of which had been allowed by the Versailles Treaty. Thus there was very little equipment and trained manpower for such key military assets and their operational readiness was consequently very low. Support units to such key military assets were sparse and poorly equipped, while stocks of spare parts were very small. Consequently the sustainability of operations was also very low<sup>10</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

13. In early 1935, Hitler and his government decided that it was no longer possible to conceal the level of rearmament which was now taking place in Germany, particularly in regard to aircraft. On 9 March 1935 Goering announced publically the creation of the Luftwaffe and pointed to the Anglo-French proposal for a European air defence treaty as necessitating a German air force so that Germany could enter the agreement as an equal partner. Having received no formal protests from either Britain or France, Hitler announced on 16 March the introduction of conscription to facilitate an expansion of the army to 36 divisions<sup>11</sup>.

14. These acts were a deliberate and open challenge to the Versailles Treaty provisions. The chief power able to enforce them was France. The Germans recognized that if France eventually moved, she would probably be assisted by Czechoslovakia - but Poland was expected to remain quiescent having been satisfied with a non-aggression treaty with Germany in 1934. The Germans had always recognized that a major possibility of war with Czechoslovakia was likely to be related to German attempts to escape from Versailles. Their actions in early 1935 openly courted this possibility. The German Government recognized that the consequence of its actions forced it to recognize a Specific Hostile Intent from the Czechs to threaten this National Interest. This started the Perceived Threat Phase, for Germany of war with Czechoslovakia<sup>12</sup>.

15. The German Government understood the grave risks it was provoking in respect of France and Czechoslovakia; and contrived to reassure both nations, as well as Britain, by talking of Germany's peaceful intentions, and at the same time to deter them by exaggerating the strength of the newly revealed Luftwaffe, exploiting the British and French fear of bombers. Britain was particularly concerned that the bomber would always get through, and the Air Ministry predicted huge losses in civilian personnel during the first days of the initiation of a bombing campaign against London<sup>13</sup>.

16. German force levels for the key military assets (tank units, fighter and bomber units) continued to rise for the next two years. So did the number of infantry units as the German Army attempted to reach the peacetime strength of the French. The

overall force structure was not finalized as the German Government continued to maintain options for the development of a long range heavy bomber force, and for the development of light tank divisions and motorized infantry divisions<sup>14</sup>.

17. Contingency planning mainly concerned the possibility of French intervention, as the non-aggression treaty of early 1934 between Germany and Poland had removed Poland as the major concern of the armed services. However, Czechoslovakia also received some serious attention for the first time. On 30 March 1935 the attempt was begun to define the strategic operational roles which might have to be adopted by key military assets, should Czechoslovakia enter into conflict with Germany. The German Government had insufficient forces to resist an attack by both France and the Czechs, so the idea was canvassed inside the army, of a surprise attack on Czechoslovakia, as soon as she mobilized, in the hope of knocking her out of the war before French strength was mobilized fully. Staff discussions took place during April, and on 2 May 1935 the German War Minister (Blomberg) directed the Chief of the German General Staff (Beck) to prepare an appropriate operation. The latter pointed out that the operation was a military impossibility given the existing state of German rearmament, and the matter was allowed to drop for a while. If circumstances could have been assured where Germany only fought Czechoslovakia, the existing German forces probably could have protected most of South-East Germany, as the Czech Army was not well configured for offensive operations without the assistance of the French Army. The German Army returned to its planning for a defensive war against Czechoslovakia in the early part of 1937.<sup>15</sup>

18. Operational readiness began to improve in key military assets as trained manpower and equipment began to flow towards them, and large scale exercises proliferated. However, the sustainability of operations remained low mainly because of the lack of support infrastructure occasioned by the rate of expansion. The expansion was unbalanced in that it outstripped the growth of support facilities. This was deliberate government policy, for it was judged to be more important to present the image of much stronger forces than really existed in order to continue to deter Britain and France i.e. expansion in breadth was preferred to that in depth<sup>16</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

19. It was not until late 1937 that Germany recognized a Specific Capability from Czechoslovakia. The National Interest had previously been the removal of the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty. The Czechs did not have a clear cut military capability to threaten this as it envisaged the invasion of Germany. Czech forces were defensively oriented to protecting Czech territory. Such forces only became potentially offensive when acting in concert with the French who would draw the major German forces to the Franco-German border. However, the successful declaration of rearmament in March 1935, and the failure of the French to react to the re-militarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 meant that the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty had

been totally overthrown. The new National Interests now became the unification of Greater Germany, and Lebensraum in the East.

20. Hitler first gave notice that he had elevated the new National Interests to the level of active government policy at a conference held on 5 November 1937 with his armed service Chiefs and Foreign Minister. He also indicated that he appreciated that the Czechs had a Specific Capability to threaten such interests. Hitherto, the German National Interest could only be threatened by offensive actions by the Czechs in conjunction with the French. Now the elevation of new National Interests meant that such National Interests could only be achieved and protected by offensive action against Czechoslovakia. The Czech Armed Services had a good defensive capability, and were the best equipped forces in Central Europe. They were in a position to deny Sudetenland to Germany, to threaten the flank of any German operation into Austria, and to block the most direct route to Central and Eastern Europe (and Lebensraum)<sup>17</sup>.

21. Hitler decided that Czechoslovakia had to be dealt with as soon as international circumstances allowed. The plans completed in the first part of 1937 for defence against Czechoslovakia in a general war were now modified to conform to Hitler's new policy of pre-emptive surprise attack on that state. The revisions were placed before Hitler on 13 December 1937 and approved. Following the unexpectedly easy annexation of Austria in March 1938, to which the Western Powers had made little or no reaction, Hitler returned to the Czechoslovak problem convinced that the time was approaching when direct action would become possible. On 28 May, to an assembled group of senior leaders of state and Party, Hitler announced that the international circumstances he had been expecting were beginning to materialize:

- a. Britain and France did not want war; and so would probably not move to support Czechoslovakia.
- b. Russia would not participate because of weakness caused by the recent army purges, and fear of Japan.
- c. Poland and Rumania would not be able to oppose Germany out of fear of the Russians.
- d. Yugoslavia had disengaged itself.
- e. Hungary would join Germany.
- f. Italy was not interested except to make claims against France, distracting effectively French attention from Czechoslovakia<sup>18</sup>.

22. Without the assurance of support from at least France, and desirably Britain also, Czechoslovakia was isolated, and surrounded by enemies (i.e. Germany, Poland and Hungary). On the same day as his new announcement, Hitler signed new orders for an attack on Czechoslovakia. They began:

'It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia in the near future by military action'.

Two days later these orders were qualified by Hitler's statement to army leaders that he intended to deal with the Czechs by 1 October 1938.<sup>19</sup>

### Operational Response

23. The Operational Response began on 9 September 1939 when German forces deployed to the Czech frontier to save the avowedly persecuted German minority in Czechoslovakia. Thus began the Munich Crisis, which lasted until 30 September when France and Britain persuaded Hitler to accept the Sudetenland instead of risking the possibility of general war. This at least partially satisfied one of Hitler's National Interests.

24. As the necessity to actually fight a war began (through German actions) to be more probable, the requirement to provide what amounted to a viable fighting force also grew. Hitler appreciated this, and initiated expansion of support units and the closer organization of industry. Thus depth began to be added to what had hitherto been a very broad but shallow expansion of the armed services. Resource and manpower controls began to be imposed progressively throughout industry, although the decision to develop a full war economy was delayed until 1942. Until this time the German Government continued to follow the theory of Blitzkrieg. By 1942 Hitler had acknowledged that he was involved in a prolonged and very intense conflict in which Blitzkrieg was no longer appropriate<sup>20</sup>.

25. Military planning was also advanced during the Specific Threat Phase to the stage of producing operational orders and directives down to the tactical level for all units earmarked for the operation against Czechoslovakia. Surprise was to be utilized to strike a lightning blow which would render the Czech military situation hopeless within four days, and so discourage other powers from intervening. Supported by air strikes, the army's assault columns were to break through the Czech fortifications at numerous points. Motorized units were then to pass through these gaps with the utmost speed in order to prevent the Czech Army from withdrawing into Slovakia, and to destroy it quickly in Bohemia and Moravia<sup>21</sup>.

26. More equipment and trained manpower also began to flow to the front line units of key military assets. The Luftwaffe began to receive increasing numbers of advanced fighters, dive bombers and medium bombers. It began to perfect its role of ground support of the army. In this the Luftwaffe was aided by extensive operational experience in the Spanish Civil War. Meanwhile, the army was receiving increasing numbers of new tanks, so that the composition and organization of the tank divisions could begin to be finalized. The experience of the movement into Austria exposed that much of the front line tank equipment was still not reliable enough to withstand the rigors of sustained route marches. This was useful experience and vigorous maintenance and design action was initiated to correct

the faults to avoid the reoccurrence of the embarrassing spectacle of a line of broken down tanks stretching from the German frontier to Vienna. The operational readiness of the key military assets of the Luftwaffe and army began to rise in 1938<sup>22</sup>.

27. The sustainability of operations also grew although this was limited to some extent by the concept of Blitzkrieg. The Luftwaffe began to receive increasing numbers of mechanics and other technical personnel to complete the support units for front line units of key military assets. These had been conspicuously absent during the earlier Perceived Threat Phase, where numbers of poorly supported front line units had been flown around to confuse the British and French Governments into believing the German rearmament was more advanced than it really was. The Specific Threat Phase led to the partial correction of this situation which had occurred because of the lack of trained personnel within German industry, and the need to produce speedily a veneer of armed strength to deter France and Britain from intervening. Luftwaffe infrastructure also grew with an increase of operational and reserve airfields around the borders of Germany. The army had similar problems to the Luftwaffe in regard to the support units for such units as the tank and motorized infantry divisions. However, German industry provided a pool of motor mechanics more readily than it provided aero-engineers and aero-mechanics. The growth of such support units meant that armoured operations could be sustained over longer periods of time (from a few weeks to about one month), but it also began to result in operations being sustained at increasing distances from major bases. Long range strategic penetration as envisaged by B.H. Liddell Hart and General Heinz Guderian was becoming a reality<sup>23</sup>.

28. The Munich Agreement was shortlived in its impact on Hitler. One or two days after he had signed the Agreement he sent for General Keitel and inquired as to the strength and dispositions needed to break the much reduced Czech state. Keitel replied on 11 October that few troops were required as resistance would now be low to any German attempt at annexation. A new directive was issued to the German Armed Services on 21 October 1938 which among other things called for the liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. This was supplemented on 17 December 1938 with a new order directing the army to continue its preparations against the victim on the assumption of little resistance. On 15 March 1939, the German Army marched into Prague, opening the door to the achievement of Hitler's most important National Interest - Lebensraum<sup>24</sup>.

| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Feb 1933  | 16 Mar 1935                | 5 Nov 1937               | 9 Sep 1938              |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 2.1 years   | 137.9 weeks                | 44.0 weeks               |                         |

NOTES

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CASE STUDY 2MUNICH 1938 - PHASE 2 - BRITAINGeneral Hostile Intent

1. The Treaty of Versailles fell between two stools. It was neither sufficiently harsh to permanently reduce German power and the threat of that power to the victors in World War I, nor sufficiently mild to permanently win Germany's voluntary cooperation with the victors. Rather, the Treaty penalized Germany materially and morally just enough to light and keep burning the flame of a national desire for rectification of perceived injustice<sup>1</sup>.

2. The military clauses of the Treaty were designed, mainly on French insistence, to make it impossible for Germany to transform her overwhelming strength in people and industry into the equivalent in military capability. But the clauses would not enforce themselves. The ability of the treaty to prevent a revival of German power in the future depended entirely on the readiness of the victors to enforce it to the letter<sup>2</sup>. The French were aware that their population did not have the growth potential of Germany's<sup>3</sup>, that in nearly all the indicators of modern industrial and military strength Germany was superior or potentially superior, and that in World War I Germany had nearly bested France even when she had the assistance of both the British Empire and America on the Western Front.

3. An effective counterbalance to Germany would have been a close Anglo-American-French alliance as the French suggested and seemed to secure in 1919, but the vagaries of the American congressional system of government intervened. The U.S. Senate refused to endorse President Woodrow Wilson's promise to the French; and the British offer, which had been made contingent on fulfilment of the American promise, also lapsed.

4. The French thereupon resolved to stand rigidly upon every clause of the Versailles Treaty, to oversee German fulfilment of the terms to the letter, and to mount guard on the Rhine in absolute earnest virtually as if the war continued. The Germans had little actual military capability in the 1920s to threaten the French, but the French were under no illusions concerning the German intentions to reverse the result of World War I. The French assumed as self-evident that the Germans were bound to attack again if they thought they had a chance of winning, and in a straight fight they would have every chance<sup>4</sup>. Thus what the French perceived as an ineradicable General Hostile Intent allied with Germany's incipient General Capability was sufficient to allow Paris to treat Germany as a Notional Threat of the clearest and most serious kind.

5. During World War I British attitudes towards Germany were violent, even hysterical, the mirror image of those sentiments summed up in the German hymn of hate against England. These

feelings reached their zenith in the immediate aftermath of World War I with calls to hang the Kaiser and his henchman, and make Germany pay 'till the pips squeak'. But this moral zeal for the punishment of 'the unregenerate Hun' quickly subsided. Traditional British sentimentality towards the underdog soon worked in Germany's favour as Germany presented a spectacle of defeat and ruin prostrate before the 'hard-hearted' French<sup>5</sup>.

6. British sympathy for Germany was reinforced by the British belief that European and British recovery after the war depended on a functioning and vigorous German economy. Thus the restoration of German self-confidence and economic power was seen not as a dangerous portent for the future, but as a necessary prerequisite for that general European stability and peace which the British so desired. The British fervently believed that if the Germans were treated with respect, and on a basis of equality, there would be no grounds for treating Germany as a hostile power, let alone for anticipating that Germany would seek to plunge the world into another great war<sup>6</sup>.

7. French policy towards Germany in the 1920s was based squarely on military strategy. The French believed that, in view of their estimation of Germany's General Hostile Intent, and General Capability, a German military capability would be developed if the Germans were given half a chance. Therefore the French concentrated on maintaining the status quo, which meant keeping Germany down by all possible means. The French viewed the League of Nations, not as a genuine collective security system, but purely as an anti-German combination, and worked to perfect the League as a mechanism for ensuring German compliance with the Versailles Treaty. Thus the French sought to prevent German membership of the League until the Germans had given proof of good intentions and good conduct for a number of years. The French also sought to encircle Germany with a series of old-style balance of power military alliances<sup>7</sup>.

8. Enchanted with the prospect of general reconciliation, the British disdained to discern that the Germans might harbour any hostile intent towards Britain or British interests. The wish for reconciliation grew as the memory receded of how narrow had been the margin between victory and defeat. German goodwill became an increasingly treasured commodity in Britain<sup>8</sup>, and German attempts to avoid strict fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty by, for example, postponing reparation payments, were viewed sympathetically, unlike in France where such attempts were seen as evidence that the Germans wished to prepare for a war of revenge<sup>9</sup>.

9. The French were unimpressed by the 'democratic' transformation which Germany had undergone with the establishment of the Weimar Republic. Rather they took note of the continuing force of nationalism and militarism in German life, the power wielded by the same great industrialists who had backed Germany's pre-war plan of expansion, and the control of the Army maintained by the Junkers<sup>10</sup>.

10. The views of Britain and France towards Germany diverged even further during the Ruhr crisis of 1923-24. Exasperated by what was seen as Germany's deliberate attempts to evade treaty obligations to pay reparations, the French proposed to squeeze the Germans by occupying the Ruhr industrial region. Denouncing such action as illegal and imprudent, the British unavailingly tried to convince the French Premier, Raymond Poincare, that the proposal was unmitigated folly. As a result only the Belgians marched off with the French into the Ruhr. The British correctly suspected that the French aims were far wider than merely the exaction of reparations. The French proceeded to institute measures aimed at wrecking the German economy and German political unity. British opinion was outraged, and Britain sought to bring France before the World Court. The French eventually agreed to a new plan for Germany's reparations payments, and ceased their overt interference in Germany's economic and political life<sup>11</sup>.

11. The Ruhr crisis served to reinforce British sympathy towards Germany and increase distrust of their erstwhile ally - France. To Britain, Germany again appeared to be a persecuted victim, and France assumed the role of a militaristic, irresponsible aggressor. It seemed that if there was any kind of a threat to European stability and peace it came from Paris, not from Weimar. New impetus was given to British attempts to right Germany's wrongs and to assuage her grievances<sup>12</sup>.

12. The principal milestone in an era of all-round 'good feeling' which developed in the aftermath of the Ruhr crisis were the Locarno Treaties. This was the consummation of previous unsuccessful efforts to satisfy French demands for security. It was made possible by the exhaustion and despair which followed the Ruhr crisis in both France and Germany, and by the coincident arrival in power of three statesmen who appeared prepared to subordinate national feelings to the establishment of a new order, based on harmony and common sense. These men were, in Britain, Austen Chamberlain; in France Aristide Briand; and in Germany, Gustav Stresemann<sup>13</sup>.

13. Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary and a Francophile, thought the main European problem was not the existence of any German Notional Threat to European peace, but the French 'security psychosis'. Chamberlain believed this psychosis could be alleviated substantially by a direct British defensive alliance with France. Lord D'Abernon, the British Ambassador to Germany and a representative of that mainstream of British opinion which viewed the danger of French hegemony on the Continent as rather more real in the 1920s than the danger of German hegemony, prompted the Germans to pre-empt such an alliance. The German Foreign Minister, Stresemann, revived previous German proposals for a Rhineland non-aggression pact, an arbitration agreement between France and Germany and a guarantee of Rhineland frontiers by interested states<sup>14</sup>.

14. Briand, the French Foreign Minister, took the proposals seriously, but Paris noted that they pointedly omitted any guarantee of Germany's frontiers in the East. Since they held that peace was indivisible, at least in Europe, the French were hesitant. They viewed German expansion eastward as merely a prelude to an attempt to recover the military hegemony of Europe. Consequently, they felt that only if France could prevent such German expansion eastward could German expansion westward also be prevented. France now had Eastern European allies whose security she held to be part of her own, and these allies shared French apprehensions<sup>15</sup>.

15. The British, however, saw no National Interest in guaranteeing Eastern European frontiers which they viewed as inherently unstable and possibly unjust. As Chamberlain wrote to Sir Eyre Crowe<sup>16</sup>, 'no British Government ever will and ever can risk the bones of a British grenadier' for the Polish Corridor. Britain's national security interests were focused on the Channel and North Sea ports. Britain had no desire to become involved in the general political structure of Europe. Any agreement would have to be limited in extent. The Rhineland pact was attractive to the British since by guaranteeing the security of Western, but not Eastern Europe, Britain's liability would be limited to the defence of an area in which she perceived a National Interest. The Stresemann proposal was also attractive to the British in another sense: it offered them the role they preferred, that of being friends with both sides - Germany and France. Nevertheless, Chamberlain and other friends of France could console themselves that the only possible aggressor would be Germany, and thus the Anglo-French alliance would be effectively concluded<sup>17</sup>.

16. The French pressed for a single homogeneous pact by linking the arbitration treaties which Germany indicated she was prepared to sign with Poland and Czechoslovakia, with the Rhineland security pact. Britain was to be a guarantor of both. The British Government demurred. Chamberlain informed Briand that the British Government considered any new obligations had to be specific and limited to the maintenance of existing territorial arrangements on Germany's western frontiers. The British Government would not assume fresh obligations elsewhere. Briand, faced with the possibility of no British participation in any pact at all, (and hence no British guarantee of the French frontier with Germany), reluctantly agreed to the British conditions<sup>18</sup>.

17. On 16 October 1925 the collection of agreements which together constituted the Locarno Treaties were initialled at the Swiss lakeside resort of Locarno, and on 1 December 1925 a grand formal signing ceremony was held in London. The Locarno agreements comprised:

- a. a treaty of mutual guarantee of the Franco-German and Belgo-German frontiers between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy;
- b. arbitration conventions between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France;

- c. arbitration conventions between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France; and
- d. a Franco-Polish and a Franco-Czechoslovak treaty for mutual assistance in case of aggression by Germany<sup>19</sup>.

The main Locarno treaty, the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, was a non-aggression pact between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France, guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy. Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France also undertook to settle their disputes by peaceful means. As a last resort a question could be brought before the League Council which was to determine the aggressor and recommend appropriate action in case of violation or breach of the treaty. The pact was registered with the League and was to remain in force until a year after the Council decided that the League ensured sufficient protection to the high contracting parties. The treaty was not to come into force until Germany had become a member of the League. A letter handed to the Germans by the British and the French gave assurances, in effect, that Germany could enter the League practically on her own terms. Other concessions to Germany were made at the expense of the small Eastern European powers<sup>20</sup>. The sacrifices of the small powers contributed to the amity of the proceedings between the great Powers at Locarno.

18. Locarno, according to a Foreign Office Memorandum, marked 'the triumph of the British idea of compromise and conciliation over the continental idea of compulsion'<sup>21</sup>. The guarantee of Western European frontiers was actually 'a bogus commitment, a fraudulent IOU' that was given only because the British Government did not think for a moment that it would ever have to be fulfilled<sup>22</sup>.

19. The Locarno Pact may have stabilized the status quo in the West, over which at that time there was no quarrel, but it hardly contributed to any improvement in the Eastern 'powder box'. The fact that the pact emphasized British opposition to pledges in Eastern Europe equal to those in Western Europe, and permitted Germany to give more binding promises in regard to her western than her eastern borders, was anything but a solution to the problems which faced France and her Eastern Allies<sup>23</sup>.

20. Germany joined the League of Nations in 1926. Through the Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed in 1928, the nations renounced war as an instrument of national policy, and as the decade closed, impetus was again being given to the realization of the vision of world wide disarmament. In this Locarno era the British clung to the hope that a revival of the 'Concert of Europe' was possible, the assumption being that the European Great Powers had only limited conflicts of interest which would be adjusted around the conference table<sup>24</sup>. Solution of European political problems by a process of give and take in private discussions, was carried out in meetings of the Locarno Powers. Germany now appeared to be a full member of the European club, and the British assumed that any vague inclination the Germans might have harboured for a war of revenge against the victor powers, had now been completely submerged.

21. With stability seemingly assured by Locarno, the worst of Germany's economic problems soon were overcome. American loans poured in and were spent enthusiastically. Germany began to reorganize, reconstruct, and regroup, on the most up-to-date lines, an industrial machine which had in any case been the most powerful and modern in Europe. The augmentation of German national power became increasingly awesome. Consequently, it became even more important for the French who continued to suspect German intentions, to maintain their advantage in forward positions and forces in being<sup>25</sup>.

22. But it became the object of British policy to terminate the Allied military occupation of the Rhineland, and to put an end to French military superiority. The British Labour Government, led by Ramsay MacDonald, was merely taking previous British policy which had emphasized the winning of German cooperation by treating her as a fully equal member of the human brotherhood, to its logical conclusion. At the Hague Conference in 1929 the British summoned up their reserves of willpower to browbeat the French into accepting further major reduction in German reparations, and a rapid evacuation of the Rhineland rather than delaying it until scheduled in 1935. The French, eager to retain what they could of British goodwill, succumbed to this pressure. The last British troops returned home in time for Christmas in 1929 and the French were all out by June 1930<sup>26</sup>. The integrity of the demilitarized zone, upon which the security of both France and the Low Countries depended, upon which, in turn, the British perceived that their own security depended, now rested upon Germany's good faith.

23. In the early 1930s the British Government found that its efforts to reduce German grievances had not succeeded in eliciting German gratitude. German diplomacy became increasingly strident and Germany nationalism assumed violent and hysterical forms. The German democratic constitution - a child of the German defeat in the great war - came under attack from both left and right - from the Communists and from the Nazi Party<sup>27</sup>.

24. Economically, Germany was at a low ebb in 1930-31. It was the midst of the world depression and Germany was hit particularly hard. The Nazi programme which promised jobs and the restoration of German prestige and power by the destruction of the Versailles Treaty system, gained an increasing appeal<sup>28</sup>.

25. The British Government, disturbed by the trend of events in Germany, was confronted in 1930 by evidence that the Germans were systematically evading the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty<sup>29</sup>. However, British Governments, both Labour and National, tended to excuse such German 'aberrations'. The British had a guilty conscience, Germany had been forcibly disarmed, but other nations had not lived up to the ideals of the grand new era by themselves disarming.

26. The British Labour Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, refused openly to admit that the European situation was worsening, but by 1931 he was beginning to accept that the trend of events in

Germany was menacing. However, both Henderson and his National Government successor, Sir John Simon, concentrated on disarmament rather than the building up of British power as the solution to the problem of Germany<sup>30</sup>.

27. German demands for revision of the peace settlement were not backed by sufficient power at this stage to warrant a deferential British attitude on military grounds alone. In March 1931 the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff reported that the French Army remained the most formidable military machine in the world, and that France with the aid of her allies should have no difficulty in defeating Germany<sup>31</sup>.

28. The British, although concerned, could discern no General Hostile Intent on the part of Germany which might presage a German assault on British interests. Despite their anxieties, members of the British Government still regarded the pessimistic French diagnosis of German intentions as misguided. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, could declare that it was 'obviously quite wrong' of French public opinion to be more alarmed about a revived Germany than about a bankrupt Germany. Suspicion of the French and their anti-German schemes lingered in British minds<sup>32</sup>.

29. The British believed they could afford to view and should view the European situation in terms of moral justice rather than grand strategy. At the Geneva Disarmament Conference Simon aimed 'at getting rid of a series of merely legal propositions in order to insist that the principal issue is a moral and not a legal one'<sup>33</sup>. Germany was seen as aiming at equality of status, in arms as in other areas - presumably not a dishonourable objective, and not one suggesting the development of a hostile intent towards Britain. At the Disarmament Conference the British endeavoured to satisfy both France and Germany by juggling the technical formulae so that Germany might approach equality of status in armed forces, while at the same time France might be reassured that she did not lose her military security<sup>34</sup>.

30. The initial impetus to British rearmament came not from a reassessment of the European situation, but from a reassessment of the Far Eastern situation. The suddenness with which Japan launched its assault on China in Manchuria, during September 1931 and the realization in the light of Japan's military actions around Shanghai early in 1932, that Britain was wholly unprepared to defend her Far Eastern Empire, led to the abandonment of the Ten Year Rule in March 1932, and a review of Imperial Defence. The German situation did not figure greatly in this review, which focussed not on the existence of any German General Hostile Intent, or even any Japanese General Hostile Intent but rather on Britain's lack of general defence capability for use in diplomatic manoeuvring<sup>35</sup>.

31. After Hitler's accession to power in January, 1933 the British Government was faced with a German Government which publicly and persistently denigrated the fundamental beliefs which the British people had come to cherish. The British Governments of the 1930s often lacked precise intelligence about the political state of Germany, but accurate information about the character of the Nazi movement and Hitler was conveyed to London. However, British leaders, although repelled by Nazi brutality, could not bring themselves to accept what the evidence portended. German evasions of the Versailles Treaty limitations continued and multiplied under Hitler, but the British had previously decided to turn a blind eye to such German attempts to build up their armed forces<sup>36</sup>.

32. British foreign policy was conducted much as before. The British Government and the British public continued to sympathize with Germany, and to regard France as the stumbling block in the disarmament. German policy was regarded in London as aimed at achieving natural justice denied to Germany by a harsh and rigorously imposed treaty. No German General Hostile Intent was perceived; rather it was accepted in London that the remedying of German grievances would ensure that the new Nazi regime would become a good neighbour<sup>37</sup>.

33. The withdrawal of Germany from the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, announced in October 1933, was a disturbing development from the British Government's point of view. A Chiefs of Staff Report of November 1933 pointed to Germany's continuing rearmament and predicted that Germany would have a strong military capability in a few years. The Chiefs of Staff also pointed to German General Hostile Intent, not directly against Britain, but perhaps directed against British interests in Europe, which might have to be defended by British intervention on the Continent<sup>38</sup>.

34. The evidence of Germany's growing General Capability and General Hostile Intent in the context of her public abandonment of the ideals of disarmament and peaceful cooperation through the League, so cherished in Britain, evoked a response in the defence area from the British Government. A sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), the Defence Requirements Committee (DRC) was set up to enquire into Imperial Defence<sup>39</sup>.

35. The DRC effectively concluded in its report of 28 February 1934, that Britain had to take account of a German General Hostile Intent. Germany was to be regarded as Britain's ultimate potential enemy for long-range defence planning purposes. However, the Government had not been overwhelmed by any sense of a German threat, and the DRC had not been specifically asked to address such a threat. Instead, the DRC had been instructed to prepare a programme for meeting the worst peacetime defence deficiencies, bearing in mind the likely sources of conflict as they were perceived at the time<sup>40</sup>.



### General Capability

36. A dominant theme of British foreign and defence policy in the period 1919-39 was encapsulated in the simple phrase: 'Never Again'. The British people yearned for peace, and in international forums the British Government advocated disarmament and peaceful co-operation through the League of Nations<sup>41</sup>.

37. The British for most of the 1920s and 1930s refused to play the balance of power game and refused to align themselves with one set of nations against another. Balance of power alliances were denigrated as an important part of the process which had led to the outbreak of World War I, and consequently it was argued that such procedures had to be eschewed<sup>42</sup>.

38. Britain's security was still, perhaps even more so, linked to Europe, but the British became more inward-looking and sought to avoid security commitments. While disinclined to bolster their security by participating in balance of power alliances, the British were also disinclined to give real backing to the new collective security system enshrined by the League of Nations. The British foresaw that a total commitment to collective security could result in police action against recalcitrant nations which would be indistinguishable in fact, if not in form, from a great war. 'Never again'<sup>43</sup>.

39. The British people earnestly desired a return to normalcy after the sacrifices of World War I. Public expenditure and taxes were to be reduced to help restore the economy. As a contribution to this policy, the Armed Services were ordered in August 1919 to draft their estimates on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next 10 years, and that consequently, no expeditionary force would be required<sup>44</sup>.

40. The German Army and Navy were strictly limited by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles so the British Armed Services did not have to consider any German military or naval capability as a threat to Britain or British interests. With no sizable naval threat from Germany or any other power in Europe, the new British one-power standard fleet, formally accepted at Washington in 1921-22, was deemed sufficient to meet the contingency of a Japanese threat in the Pacific<sup>45</sup>.

41. Since the Versailles Treaty forbade a German military air force, Germany had no capability to threaten Britain in the air. However, the Royal Air Force pointed to the French Air Force's capability to bomb British cities and argued for a strong air force to counter the French. Few British politicians took the threat of a French air attack very seriously, despite the strains in Anglo-French relations in the years immediately following World War I. However, German air raids during World War I, although miniscule in scale, had given indications of the devastating potential of massed bomber missions, and the vulnerability of Britain to them. In August 1922 the British Government approved a scheme to develop the Royal Air Force's general capability for air defence and capacity to act as a deterrent force<sup>46</sup>.

42. The small British army in the 1920s was geared solely to the defence of India against possible Russian attack, and to Imperial policing duties. The vast corpus of experience of fighting in Europe was allowed to melt away; not until 1932 was a committee set up to study lessons of World War I. The British experimented only half-heartedly with the new theories of armoured warfare (which the Germans began to master in secret) and abandoned them with little reluctance<sup>47</sup>.

43. No measures were taken to ensure that the British Services were placed in a position to carry out a Locarno role. The British forces were so reduced and ill-equipped as to be wholly incapable of military operations to fulfil the British guarantee. The Chiefs of Staff in their 1926 Annual Review reflected the politicians' line when they claimed that there were no specific military commitments in the Locarno Guarantee. They went on to declare that it would be impossible to honour any such commitments, and argued for the release of forces for Imperial Defence<sup>48</sup>.

44. The 1920s were, from the British point of view, a 'No Threat' era. Spending on the armed services was maintained at a low level. The Services were geared for no particular types of threats. Even the construction of the Singapore base was a token gesture at most, made on the basis of the existence of a General Capability for the Japanese to threaten British National Interests seriously.

45. One of the most obvious features of the 'No Threat' era in the 1920s in Britain was the existence of the 10 Years' Rule. After its formulation in August 1919 the rule was made self-perpetuating in 1928. The 10 year period without war automatically advanced every day. Refusal to contemplate the possibility of future danger and the necessity to prepare against such danger had been erected into a formal guiding principle of British defence policy. In London the Foreign Office, and the Treasury in particular, looked upon the end of any 10 year period not as a deadline but rather as a symbol of virtually unlimited optimism. The Covenant of the League, the Washington Treaties, the Locarno Pact and the Kellogg-Briand Anti-War Treaty (1928), were seen as the main pillars in this edifice of abounding hopefulness<sup>49</sup>.

46. The Japanese intervention, subsequently amounting to a massive invasion, in Manchuria in 1931, challenged the basis of the whole postwar international system. Even if collective security was a workable concept, it now became clear that it required arms in the last resort to enforce it as the Japanese ignored imprecations from the League of Nations to honour their international obligations and desist in Manchuria. As Churchill pointed out in The Second World War, 'the moral authority of the League was shown to be devoid of any physical support at a time when its activity and strength were most needed'<sup>50</sup>.

47. Britain which had limited her military ability to affect the Far Eastern situation in accordance with the Washington Treaties, now found she had not the means to defend her interests in the area. But, apart from brief and limited incursions in the Shanghai area in 1932, the Japanese action was not seen to threaten Britain's Asian National Interests. Yet the Japanese war with China did begin a cycle of events which led the British Government eventually to adopt rearmament. For years, British governments had sought to escape the crushing expense of acquiring and maintaining the armaments commensurate with British interests and position in the world. Since the end of the First World War, all British governments had attempted to achieve this by encouraging activities and institutions which reduced the need for armaments in the world. Hence, British governments supported the League of Nations and the principle of Collective Security, engaged in disarmament agreements such as the Washington Treaties, and attempted to reduce tension in Europe by conciliation and negotiation - the Locarno Treaties. The Japanese example showed that there were some issues which would not or could not be resolved by the then accepted rules of international behaviour and arbitration. Some elements in the British government recognized that the moral force of British diplomacy needed to be strengthened to handle this type of development. This could only be achieved if backed up with a measure of armed strength, and this Britain did not have, for the armed services had been allowed to decline to the extent that they were no longer a plausible asset in the support of British foreign policy.

48. The Foreign Office had given a moderate warning on the effects of the 10 Year Rule in 1931. The Chiefs of Staff gave an even more compelling warning in their Review of Imperial Defence in 1932. This review analysed at great length the various deficiencies of the British armed forces, both in size and in the quality of their equipment, that had resulted from cumulative neglect since 1918, and placed these deficiencies in the context of the worsening world situation. The Chiefs of Staff declared that the Empire was unprepared everywhere. They pointed to the barrier of the 10 Year Rule and expressed astonishment that 'we alone among the Great Powers should have neglected our defences to the point of taking serious risks'. The Chiefs of Staff recommended cancellation of the 10 Year rule, commencement of defensive preparation for fulfilling commitments, including the defence of bases<sup>51</sup>.

49. After the Committee of Imperial Defence expressed no disagreement with these recommendations, the Cabinet met to consider the Chiefs of Staff Report. On 23 March 1932, after much debate, Cabinet agreed to rescind the 10 Year Rule. Nothing was actually set in motion to immediately repair the defence deficiencies. Rather Cabinet simply asked the CID to embark on a general review of Imperial Defence. There was no sense of urgency. In the depths of economic depression it was still felt that the financial and economic situation should be accorded top priority<sup>52</sup>.

50. But Germany was evading the Versailles Treaty limitations on her armed forces. She was forming the Reichswehr into a highly trained cadre, and intended to resurrect her former military strength. German industry, reorganised and re-equipped, was

developing an enormous war potential, and the basis was being systematically laid for a large German air force, although military aviation had been totally prohibited by the Versailles Treaty<sup>53</sup>.

51. By mid-1933 Germany's rearmament was public knowledge in Britain. In October of that year Germany walked out of both the General Disarmament Conference and of the League of Nations. In November the Chiefs of Staff formally confirmed to the British Government that Germany was rearming, and that within a few years hence, she would again have to be reckoned with as a formidable military power. As soon as she felt strong enough she would possibly then obtain her ends in a war of offence in the East, combined if necessary, with a defensive in the West. The Chiefs of Staff warned that at any time within the next three to five years, Britain might be faced with demands for military intervention on the Continent. They lamented that no guiding principle had replaced the 10 Year Rule, and that deficiencies in the armed services had not been made up<sup>54</sup>.

52. Shortly after this the British Government appreciated that Germany was developing a General Capability potentially harmful to British Vital National interests, and took action. On CID advice, it appointed a Committee. This Committee - the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC) of the CID was composed of the Chiefs of Staff sub-committee, representatives of the Foreign Office and the Treasury, and the Secretary of the CID charged with examining and reporting on Imperial Defence, it produced a report on 28 February 1934<sup>55</sup>.

#### The Defence Reaction to Notional Threat

53. The DRC's terms of reference focused on the preparation of a programme for meeting the worst deficiencies in the defences of the Empire. The British armed services were on a downward spiral of decay and mass equipment obsolescence - the result of British governments seeking to avoid what they saw as the crushing financial burden of supporting armaments commensurate with maintaining Britain's real strategic position in the world. The DRC recommendations therefore amounted to a moderate plan for remedying the worst deficiencies. There was no intention of launching a programme of new and competitive rearmament. Germany was expected to need to least five years of rearmament before she could definitely menace Britain<sup>56</sup>.

54. Starved of resources for years, uncertain of their ability to recruit the manpower and obtain the armaments base for moderate expansion, the Service Chiefs' proposals in the DRC were consequently moderate in the extreme. Thus the Chief of the Air Staff pressed for completion of the 1923 programme, which had been planned for a No Threat Phase to protect only London and South-East England against France. He acknowledged that the increase of 40 squadrons would not defend the Midlands and the North against a hypothetical attack by Germany. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff requested that an expeditionary force of five divisions should be prepared for European conditions. This represented the smallest

practical force capable of rendering any assistance to Britain's Continental allies. Hitherto British land forces were configured and equipped exclusively for the much lighter operational role of Imperial Defence. The First Sea Lord wanted the existing naval bases and shipping to be modernised<sup>57</sup>.

55. On 7 March 1934 the Cabinet first considered the DRC report. Still committed to disarmament, Cabinet members decided to delay formal consideration of the Report. They had had a highly visible warning of the fate which might await a British Government which attempted to stray too far from the path of disarmament. At a by-election in October 1933 in East Fulham the Conservatives lost a safe seat in a wave of pacifist and pro-disarmament popular emotion<sup>58</sup>.

56. Cabinet eventually returned to the Report, when the Service ministers complained at the delay on 20 April. It was immediately confronted with the fact that the armed services had been allowed to run down so much during the period of disarmament (1922-1933), that even the fulfillment of programs authorized in the early stages of that period would have required the expenditure of what appeared to be quite large sums of money<sup>59</sup>. The moderate five year programme proposed by the DRC cost even more.

57. British ministers, impressed by the need for financial stability, immediately sought to justify avoiding the authorization of what was viewed as an enormously expensive programme. Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, led the attack. He believed that the program could not be implemented without a special loan, and that the raising of this would undermine Britain's precarious financial stability. No existing threat was serious enough to warrant taking this risk. The program had to be cut. He recommended giving priority to measures which the public would understand and approve - those related directly to the defence of the United Kingdom. The best value in terms of money and public acceptance lay according to Chamberlain in an air deterrent force. If Britain concentrated on Germany as the real potential enemy, much of the DRC programme, including Britain's Singapore policy which concentrated on remedying Britain's Far Eastern defences, could be cut. Germany constituted, according to the terms of the DRC report, a fairly remote menace so any realignment of forces to meet such a menace would not have to be very far-reaching<sup>60</sup>.

58. Chamberlain's air deterrent force was not designed to actually fight (it had no reserves) Germany, but was an attempt to demonstrate to the world, British determination to make some response in the face of the new style of diplomacy. It recognized that the threshold of armament, required to give diplomacy credibility in the world, had risen since the collapse of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, and the Japanese actions in Manchuria. The British had more ground to make up than most. Chamberlain believed that if the air force succeeded in deterring Germany, Japan would also be deterred, for it would not move against British interests unless Britain was tied down in Europe<sup>61</sup>. Thus

the so called air deterrent force was an effective general deterrent, was cheap, and acceptable to the British public as it could be justified as protecting them against German bombers.

59. Chamberlain's plan to in effect scrap the Singapore policy was not approved by Cabinet, but otherwise he won most of his arguments. On 18 July 1934, Cabinet endorsed a rearmament programme which was only 2/3 of the size proposed by the DRC, and so altered in distribution that the air component gained disproportionately at the expense of the Army and Navy, for reasons which were not all that convincing on military grounds alone, however much they might appeal to the British public. No start was authorized on the preparation of the Army's five division expeditionary force, and no modernization was ordered for the Navy. The whole issue of preparing realistically for the slowly emerging threats in Europe was not thought to be important. The Cabinet did not believe there was a serious threat from Germany; and what very limited rearmament had been approved was to build a limited deterrent for general use in British diplomacy, and not a serious attempt to rebuild the services and/or prepare for war<sup>62</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

60. The pattern set in 1932 was to change little over the next six years. The Treasury's preoccupation with Britain's financial stability was shared by most Cabinet members, and this preoccupation imposed on the services such restrictions that one senior officer declared that the Government seemed less concerned to set the national defences in order than to have enough money to pay an indemnity to a victorious enemy after the war had been lost. One defence review seemed to eschew the idea of bringing the defences of the Empire up to the level of the threat in favour of reducing the threat to the level of Imperial Defence through appeasement and disarmament<sup>63</sup>.

61. On 20 November 1934 the CID informed the Cabinet that Britain's belated and modest rearmament measures were being swiftly overtaken by German rearmament. The German Army would soon number 300 000 men, a three-fold increase over the Versailles authorized figure, and within a year Germany would have an air force as big as the Royal Air Force. This growing German capability could hardly be ignored. If the British theory of general deterrence was to be maintained, and its diplomacy strengthened, the Royal Air Force would have to be strengthened once once. Cabinet decided on 26 November 1934 to speed up the creation of new air squadrons for home defence and the Fleet Air Arm. But no German Specific Capability was identified. If it had, the Navy and Army would have been strengthened and an expeditionary force for Europe prepared. The situation was not sufficiently worrying to the Cabinet to compel a review of the other Services' positions. Nothing was to be done for the Army and nothing was to be done for the Navy, apart from the Fleet Air Arm. No strong pressure was brought to bear on the Germans to cease and desist in their violations of the Versailles Treaty. Rather, diplomatic efforts were set in train to encourage Germany to return to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and to agree to some limitation on her rearmament. Strong pressure was reserved

for the French who were warned not to obstruct Britain's courting of a German agreement<sup>64</sup>.

62. On 4 March 1935 the British Government issued a White Paper on Defence. This move, novel at the time, was designed partly to reinforce the general deterrent and partly to advertise to the British public the value of the rearmament programme as a deterrent against the outbreak of war (wherever that might be). The cautious programme of moderate rearmament was denounced in Parliament by the Opposition as a return to the old methods of preparing for war. Stanley Baldwin, in replying for the Government, did not argue that Britain was faced with a serious situation. He pointed out that the Government was merely attempting to make the existing armed forces more efficient<sup>65</sup>. They were in fact climbing out of a black hole of decay and obsolescence.

63. On 9 March 1935 Hermann Goering announced the existence of the Luftwaffe; and on 16 March, the Nazi Government announced the introduction of conscription and the creation of an army of 36 divisions. Both announcements embodied outright breaches of the Versailles Treaty, but the Germans correctly felt that they possessed the psychological initiative. Bold and resolute action by Britain and France to counter this challenge to the postwar system they had presided over was conspicuous by its absence. The British contented themselves with a polite diplomatic protest which held out the hope for 'a general settlement freely negotiated between Germany and the other Powers'<sup>66</sup>.

64. When the British Foreign Secretary, John Simon, and his Under-Secretary, Anthony Eden, visited Hitler in late March 1935, Hitler showed no enthusiasm for British ideas of general cooperation between nations. Hitler's offer of an exclusive alliance between Germany and England was politely turned down because the British wanted to be 'loyal friends to all'. The British had a tough time making any impression on Hitler; but before they left, they themselves were shocked by Hitler's claim that the Luftwaffe had already reached parity with the Royal Air Force, and was aiming for parity with France. The British Government immediately authorized enquires into the German claim, but there was to be no change in British grand strategy: no line-up against Germany but a continued effort to induce the Germans to participate in a conference aimed at securing a negotiated arms agreement. The British agreed with the French and Italians at Stresa in April 1935 that violations of the Versailles Treaty could not be accepted, but the British had no inclination to undertake to withstand a breach of the peace anywhere<sup>67</sup>.

65. The British Chiefs of Staff in their 1935 Annual Review pointed to German rearmament as a factor which was increasingly disturbing the existing balance in Europe. The Chiefs reminded the Government about Britain's Locarno obligations, which made British participation in a European war more likely without in any way reducing Britain's Far Eastern responsibilities. Yet the Army was at a size which was hardly sufficient for the internal security of the Empire and for a Far Eastern Field Force. The Chiefs stressed the

need for allies if Britain had to contemplate a simultaneous war with Germany and Japan<sup>68</sup>.

66. On 8 May 1935 the Government learned that Britain was estimated to be already inferior to Germany in the air by 370 aircraft. Germany's front line strength by April 1937 was expected to be 1512 aircraft. On 21 May 1935 Cabinet, seeking numerical parity, authorized a home defence force for the R.A.F. of a front line strength of 1512 aircraft by 31 March 1937. The deterrence policy had now reached its Zenith. The perceived need for diplomatic weapons and for some military capability to give credibility to foreign policy initiatives, outweighed the need for a means of self-defence; and consequently the imbalance between the Services now became very marked. The new two year programme called for the delivery of a total of 3800 aircraft by April 1937. In contrast, preparedness to equip the Army's Field Force were now on a nine-year basis, and there were no long term plans for the Navy at all<sup>69</sup>.

67. Such were the straits in which the Royal Navy was placed that a combination of Admiralty advice aimed at securing some limitation of a potential enemy's naval power, and the sympathetic attitude of British leaders towards German complaints about Versailles instituted arms inequality resulted in the conclusion of an Anglo-German naval agreement. This agreement of June 1935, which allowed Germany to build up to 35 percent of the Royal Navy's surface strength, contravened the Versailles Treaty and was concluded without consultation with the other naval powers. It led to a rift in the Stresa Front which Britain had established with France and Italy only two months earlier. The incipient anti-German coalition was thus in some disarray even before the Ethiopian crisis emerged in mid 1935<sup>70</sup>.

68. After a clash between Ethiopian and Italian forces at Wal Wal in the disputed borderland between Ethiopia and Italian East Africa in December 1934, the Italians began openly to prepare for war against Ethiopia. British public opinion viewed this Italian activity as an abomination which would culminate in a crime against humanity. The British Government was at a loss for a policy. In order to save the League and the notion of collective security, any Italian aggression would have to be resisted. On the other hand a British clash with Italy was bound to drive Mussolini into the arms of Hitler, and would dash any hopes for a three-power (Britain, France and Italy) containment of Germany. The British Government desired to avoid making such a choice but, with one eye on enhancing its electoral prospects, it allowed public opinion, especially after the publication of the results of the Peace Ballot, to manoeuvre it into a League of Nations Policy<sup>71</sup>.

69. The British Government had nailed its colours to the League of Nations mast, while being only dimly aware of the strategic dangers for the Empire that a League of Nations policy involved. These dangers were made crystal clear by a Chiefs of Staff Report on 9 August 1935. The Chiefs of Staff warned that while the Royal Navy could no doubt deal with Italy, the price of



naval victory in the Mediterranean might be four capital ships, with the consequence that Britain would be critically weakened in the event of trouble with Germany or Japan. The despatch of air reinforcements to the Mediterranean would weaken Britain vis-a-vis Germany, and effect the attainment of air parity with Germany by April 1937. The Chiefs stressed that 'any idea that (League) sanctions can be enforced whenever diplomatically desirable is highly dangerous from the point of view of the Services ...'<sup>72</sup>.

70. In July 1935 the DRC had been re-established and a new Ministerial Committee, the Defence Policy and Requirements Committee (DPRC) was set up to take the place of the old Disarmament Committee. The DRC was charged with examining current programmes for the Navy, Army and Air Force and making recommendations for the future. The DRC viewed Japan's attitude as no more reassuring than in 1934, and warned that Britain should be prepared from a military point of view, for war with Germany by 1 January 1939<sup>73</sup>. This was not based on any certainty that war was inevitable, but on the fact that German rearmament would have reached an advanced stage, and Britain's ought to have an effective military balance by then. This of course ignored financial considerations, and the problem of convincing the British public of its necessity.

71. The DRC's request for authority to make plans 'on the basis that they are to be completed as early as possible' was granted. Financial considerations were to be of 'secondary importance to the earliest possible security'. Originally Japan had been seen as the notional near menace and Germany as the notional long-term threat, but two revised air programmes had been based on the menace from Germany, and the balance between the three arms had been distorted. Now no distinction was to be made between the Services, which would all remedy their deficiencies 'as fast as physical conditions allowed, under normal peacetime conditions'<sup>74</sup>.

72. The phrase 'under normal peacetime conditions' was a reflection of continuing Treasury concern for sound finance as an essential ingredient of the nation's security. It appears doubtful, however, that these principles were fully accepted by the DPRC which reviewed the DRC's interim report of 24 July 1935. The DPRC's conclusions were cautious but it was nevertheless clear that a sense of urgency was creeping in, however slowly. Defence programmes were now passing into the early stages of genuine rearmament<sup>75</sup>.

73. The DRC was asked to work out fresh and detailed proposals for rearmament five years after the obsolescence and deficiency of the Army, Air Force and Navy had first been listed to the Government. Now the D.R.C was asked to investigate the question of industrial development for defence material production five years after it became known that German industry was fully equipped to undertake such large-scale production<sup>76</sup>.

74. On 21 November 1935 the D.R.C submitted its report. The D.R.C referred to the Italo-Abyssinian conflict as a complicating factor which had not been foreseen, and stressed the suddenness of

emergencies particularly in view of Britain's League involvement. The Committee emphasized that Germany posed the biggest threat to Britain's security. In view of German danger the D.R.C suggested that Britain should attempt to avoid the hostility of Japan and a Mediterranean Power in order to preclude British involvement in a war on three fronts. British armaments, according to the DRC Report, needed to be raised to a far more effective standard. DRC recommendations were for a Navy large enough and modern enough to provide a defensive fleet in Far Eastern waters and simultaneously meet the German threat in home waters; a Field Force for continental service, five regular divisions strong, with a follow-up force of 12 Territorial Divisions to reinforce it; an increased Air Force of 1736 first line aircraft, including nearly 1000 bombers with adequate reserves; and the creation of a shadow armaments industry - new factories built with public money and managed by existing industrial firms<sup>77</sup>.

75. The process of defence planning was still sluggish. The DRC report was considered at length by the DPRC which eventually agreed with the general thrust of the proposals and submitted its report to the Cabinet on 12 February 1936. The Cabinet approved the various DPRC's recommendations by 25 February 1936 - seven months after the DRC had broadly suggested the need for general rearmament and expansion of the armed forces, and three months after it had submitted detailed proposals<sup>78</sup>.

76. The DPRC recommendations left the Royal Air Force in a pre-eminent position in relation to the other Services, but it already had more aircraft on order than British industry could supply. The Navy was not allowed its Two Power standard, but a lesser yet very significant '70 cruiser scheme' was approved. The Two Power standard was not accepted officially until after the outbreak of war. Until then the financial burden it promised was considered too great. Ministers realized that Britain was over-committed strategically, and placed their hopes in diplomacy to reduce the potential threats to Britains widespread National Interests<sup>79</sup>.

77. The Army's request for a Field Force with its train of Territorial reinforcements to take part in a Continental campaign proved too much for Ministers to stomach. Chamberlain was in the van of the opposition to a Field Force and Cabinet endorsed the view of the DPRC that only the five division regular force should be authorized. Furthermore, it was decided that the regular force would not be equipped specifically for intervention in Europe. Cabinet did not challenge the political or military arguments of the Chiefs of Staff relating to the necessity of providing a strong Field Force for Europe. Cabinet members simply declared that the British public would not stand for it. Ministers, themselves, however, were also unwilling to accept the full implications of sending an expeditionary force once again to Europe<sup>80</sup>.

78. There is no doubt that the Cabinet decisions of February 1936 were based on a recognition of a German Specific Capability to menace British National Interests. These were not yet seen to

include Eastern Europe, but concerned the Channel Ports and Britain itself. The decision to prepare a Field Force, no matter how tentative, and the large increases in the home Air Force and Navy, were a sign that Britain's general deterrent posture had become directed predominantly at Germany and to a lesser extent at Italian naval strength. The original single air deterrent of 1934-35 may have been good at defending Britain, but it did not allow the defence of British National Interests in Western Europe against Germany, without a Field Force and well-tuned Navy to support it. This had not mattered as the purpose of the air deterrent had been to act as a general deterrent and indication of resolve against no particular threat. It was Chamberlain's cheap way of halting the collapse into obsolescence of British military strength at a time when Britain faced several Notional Threats. The February 1936 rearmament programme went further than this. It was not merely an exercise in equipment replacement to repair the damage of the disarmament years, but Primary Expansion directed mainly against one clearly identified Specific Capability. Even though it moved slowly, the British government was from this time on moving steadily towards the creation of a Perceived Threat deterrent force in an effort to dissuade Germany from risking war. During the next two years, the British expansion was to exhibit most of the characteristics and suffer most of the problems outlined in the Defence Activities Model for the Perceived Threat Phase.

#### The Defence Reaction to Perceived Threat

79. The British Government saw no threat of hostilities in the German military reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 and no need for British and French counteraction. In any event, the military and naval commitments relating to the Italo-Abyssinian crisis paralysed the British Armed Forces. The Chiefs of Staff warned the Cabinet that a war with Germany would be 'a disaster for which the Services with their existing commitments in the Mediterranean are totally unprepared.' The lessons of the Rhineland, according to the Chiefs of Staff, clearly brought out the dangers of commitment to collective security. The British Joint Planners saw Britain as particularly vulnerable to an air attack if she went to the assistance of France and Belgium, according to her Locarno obligations. The strategic advice of the leaders of the British Armed Forces might well have restrained a bellicose and impetuous Cabinet from demanding German withdrawal from the Rhineland. As it was, this advice was perfectly in harmony with the direction the British Cabinet and the country as a whole wished to follow - no semblance of action which might provoke Germany over a matter deemed to be of insignificant importance<sup>81</sup>.

80. The 'business as usual' attitude permeated the rearmament programmes despite the fact that Britain was at least six years behind Germany in developing her industrial capacity for war production, and at least three years behind in creating a modern air force. The modernization and expansion of British sea power was being conducted on an ad hoc basis four years after the Chiefs of Staff and the Admiralty had first pointed to the weakness of the Navy and its inability to defend the Empire. Six years after the Chiefs of Staff had warned that the Army could not fulfil Britain's

treaty obligations or protect her strategic interests in Europe, and three years after it had become known that the German Army was being transformed into a mighty military machine, very little extra was to be spent on the British Army. The reasons for this lack of concern by the British Government was that it did not believe that the Germans held any Specific Hostile Intent to any British National Interests costs and damage to the British economy which a full rearmament scheme would have brought<sup>82</sup>.

81. The stress on the necessity for financial constraints on the rearmament programme after a great depression was understandable. The Treasury concern expressed consistently and persistently for the economic health of the country as the first priority was not completely unreasonable. Ever since 1931 the British balance of payments had been highly precarious, and rearmament with its demand for highly advanced technology, competed with the export trade for the scarce resources of Britain's small modern industries. Chamberlain and the Treasury did correctly perceive that Britain no longer enjoyed the economic strength to support her Imperial pretensions or even her pretensions as a great power. The running down of the armed forces in the heyday of the disarmament era meant that all three Services now simultaneously needed huge programmes of re-equipment and enlargement. Whereas, for Germany rearmament appeared to be the foundation for expansion which would dramatically augment the German economic base, for Britain, on the the other hand, rearmament appeared to hold out the prospect of eventual financial ruin<sup>83</sup>.

82. There were other, technical, restraints on the British rearmament program. Specialized industrial resources, and skilled manpower in sufficient quantities, were simply not available as a result of the Defence run down since the early 1920s. Specialist armaments firms were backward not only in equipment and techniques but in the design field as well. The management of British industry found it difficult to adapt to the needs of large-scale production for the armed forces, and trade unions objected to any organization and direction of labour which smacked in any way of regimentation<sup>84</sup>.

83. The British aircraft industry which received the bulk of new equipment orders, in view of the priority given to the Royal Air Force, was unable to swiftly give credibility to the concept of the air component of the perceived threat deterrent force. Throughout 1937 the air rearmament programme was plagued by muddles, delays and disappointments. The munitions crisis of 1914-15 had given ample warning of Britain's advancing industrial senility, and extraordinary measures had been taken at the time to meet the crisis. But in the postwar period the British reverted to laissez-faire individualism. The wartime measures were seen simply as 'wartime' measures of no relevance to peacetime<sup>85</sup>.

84. The biggest failure of British rearmament during 1937 (and 1938) was not so much its scale, as the lack of balance it achieved between the Services. The key area was the Army; for if British National Interests in Western Europe were to be protected, a

Field Force was needed to complement British air and sea power - Germany was after all predominantly a land power. The British government refused primarily on financial grounds to allow a proper development of such a Field Force. It believed that to some extent, British air power could act as a substitute. There was also the belief that any ground commitment to Europe was the beginning of massive commitments like those of World War I, and a return to its horrors.

85. The limited liability policy towards European commitments became even more limited in 1937. The question of whether British interests could be defended adequately by primary reliance on air power was addressed by the Chiefs of Staff who argued in January 1937 that they could not. But the politicians, with Chamberlain in the forefront, refused to accept such advice<sup>86</sup>.

86. In February 1936 the British Government had approved a five division regular Field Force for continental service, but had rejected the concept of a train of 12 territorial divisions as reinforcements. In December 1936 the War Office pointed to the illogicality of providing a Field Force but no reserves to back it up. Chamberlain quickly moved to head off this attack on the limited liability policy. In a memorandum from the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer argued that national resources were insufficient to provide for a continental Army as well as a powerful Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, the air defence of Great Britain and the defence of Imperial interests<sup>87</sup>. He further argued that:

'we should not lose sight of the fact that the political temper of people in this country is strongly opposed to Continental adventures ... they will be strongly suspicious of any preparation made in peacetime with a view to large-scale military operations on the Continent, and they will regard such preparations as likely to result in our being entangled in disputes which do not concern us'.

87. Chamberlain's financial and political arguments were so persuasive, and his enhanced influence after his succession to the Prime Ministership in May 1937, was so great, that by the end of the year Cabinet had decided that not only the Territorial Army but also the Field Force should not be equipped for continental service. Within a month of becoming Prime Minister, Chamberlain, working in close cooperation with Simon, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Sir Thomas Inskip, the new Minister for Defence Co-ordination, began to remould the whole financial structure of the rearmament programme by instituting a system of rationing<sup>88</sup>.

88. Whatever the financial exigencies, the Service leaders had been able to argue that since Cabinet laid down their military obligations, the Cabinet had to provide the resources which they as experts indicated were necessary to fulfil these obligations. If the resources could not be provided, then Cabinet had to modify the commitments. Now the resources were to be laid down by the politicians on the DPRC without benefit of expert advice, and the

Services were to be left to do what they could. The abdication of political responsibility by Ministers was thus made easier<sup>89</sup>.

89. The concern for financial stability emphasized by Chamberlain and shared by his Cabinet colleagues was underlined by an increasing awareness of the frailty of the British position. Britain with her large empire, which sprawled across the globe, was vastly overcommitted. The continuing growth of German air power seemed to indicate that there was a need for an even greater diversion of resources to the air defence of the home islands, including military manpower, both to man guns and searchlights, and to preserve order among what the Chiefs of Staff feared might be a panic-stricken public. In the Mediterranean, the Italian absorption of Ethiopia foreshadowed a new threat to Egypt, and that lifeline of Imperial communications, the Suez Canal. The Arab-Jewish disturbances in Palestine after 1936 pinned down 18 battalions of the British Army, and the British peacekeeping presence inflamed anti-British feeling throughout the Arab world with apparently incalculable consequences for Britain's Middle Eastern position<sup>90</sup>.

90. In December 1937 Inskip presented a Defence Report to Cabinet. The Army's primary role was to be 'the defence of Imperial commitments, including defence at home' and only as a last objective which could be provided only after other objectives had been met, did he list cooperation in the defence of the territories of any allies (i.e. a European commitment). Inskip emphasized general financial stability as a deterrent to war: 'the maintenance of economic stability' was not, only the strongest deterrent against aggression but really 'a fourth arm of defence'. The setting of a financial limit, and then tailoring the defence programmes to fit, was criticised by the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Duff Cooper, but Cabinet endorsed Inskip's approach on 16 February 1938<sup>91</sup>.

91. With the Anschluss in March 1938, Germany gained seven million new subjects, and the Austrian Army was merged with the German. Czechoslovakia had been outflanked. Germany now gripped her on three sides. Czechoslovakia's susceptibility to economic pressure had been increased, and her defensive positions in Bohemia could now be easily circumvented through Austria and the Moravian gap<sup>92</sup>. The great improvement in strategic position, from Germany's point of view, meant that the Germans now possessed a potent capability to threaten Czechoslovakia.

92. After the Anschluss the British Government accepted that Austria was the harbinger of things to come. Czechoslovakia was viewed as Hitler's next target and the British Government recognised that a German move against Czechoslovakia could well bring the Eastern European treaty network into operation, resulting in French involvement in war. Since the defeat of France would be highly detrimental to British National Interests in the West, and a decisive German victory would pose a direct security threat to Britain herself, the British Government perceived that it had National Interests in Eastern Europe after all. Britain had been linked through the European treaty network with Czechoslovakia. The

issue now was how to prevent an occurrence in Czechoslovakia of similar events to those surrounding the Anschluss<sup>93</sup>.

93. The British Government understood that Britain's own capability would have to be improved. But the main focus of the British leaders continued to be on the question of the existence of a German Specific Hostile Intent. Since this was considered to be lacking, the British appreciation of German Specific Capability was influenced not so much by the German possession of that capability, as by the consideration that it was likely to be directed, if at all, against Czechoslovakia, not Britain or France or the Low Countries. It would be the French reaction to any German action which might well drag Britain into a war with Germany, which neither Britain nor Germany wanted. Recognition of a threat from Germany to Britain's position was not the primary basis of the British Government's policy. Rather the driving force behind British policy was a desire to bring about the termination of the French guarantee to Czechoslovakia in the belief that it was not a way of deterring Germany from going to war, but had become a trap whereby a local war in Central Europe would be expanded into a General European war<sup>94</sup>.

94. Immediately after the Anschluss the British Services pressed for Cabinet authorization to strengthen Britain's military posture by revising the rationed budget. However, the lack of recognition by the political leaders of a Specific German Hostile Intent, combined with a continuing preoccupation with financial stability, meant that the existing rearmament plans were not greatly changed. Despite the deterioration in the European situation, Chamberlain was keen to play down the effects of the Anschluss. Both he and Halifax refused to accept the pleas of Leslie Hore-Belisha at the War Office for an increase in the manpower and equipment of the Regular Army. He thought that there might not be five years to complete the current programme and that the danger of war was immediate. Senior Ministers would concede only the need for a fresh review. That a review of the defence programme would be made was announced in the House of Commons by Chamberlain on 14 March, 1938. After a depressing summary of the state of British defences by the Chiefs of Staff on 22 March 1938, Cabinet authorized a statement on improvements in British defences with 'full priority for rearmament work.' On 24 March 1938 Chamberlain duly announced in the House of Commons that there would be 'full and rapid rearmament'<sup>95</sup>.

95. 'Full and rapid' rearmament proved to be a pale and sickly thing. Cabinet again postponed serious consideration of the Admiralty's proposed Two Power Standard over the objection of the First Lord, Duff Cooper, who insisted that adequate provision for defence was the first responsibility of the nation, and that rationing was nothing less than a limitation imposed on the nation's ability to defend itself. The Secretary of State for Air, Lord Swinton, was refused authorization of the use of compulsory labour on a double-shift basis in Britain's struggling aircraft factories. Cabinet continued to support Chamberlain's view that no large army was necessary since Britain should not envisage a large ground force commitment to the Continent. Conscription was consequently ruled

out. The rule that rearmament should not be allowed to interfere with normal trade was rescinded, but this proved to be virtually in principle only, as Ministers continued to worry about the adverse effects of rearmament on the economy. The big gainer in the enlarged programme was again the R.A.F. which was now authorized to obtain 12,000 planes instead of 7,500 in the five years programme. The actual excess over the rationed total was limited to two years, and the five year total programme was pegged at £1650 million<sup>96</sup>.

96. The whole 'acceleration' of rearmament after the Anschluss was something of an illusion because the increases were won largely at the expense of the War Office and the principle of rationing clearly remained in force. Rationing would continue to be the theme of British rearmament. Appeasement was flowering, and finance rather than defence remained first in the minds of British policy makers<sup>97</sup>.

### Specific Hostile Intent

97. The German reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 dramatically changed the power situation in Central Europe. German control of the Rhineland meant that German territory could be fortified from attack in the West, thus undermining any French strategy which relied on assisting France's Eastern Allies by relieving attacks into Germany's Western border regions. In London, this was not appreciated, for the British Government did not consider that it had any National Interests in Eastern Europe. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden announced in the House of Commons that the British Government saw no threat of hostilities in the Rhineland occupation, and no cause for immediate concern. The Cabinet actually discounted the Rhineland as a vital strategic interest to Britain and focussed on German intent. The British Government, and public opinion, in general, discerned no German Specific Hostile Intent, but tended to sympathize with Germany: how could there be any hostile intent when a neighbour was merely walking back into his own back-yard<sup>98</sup>.

98. The British ignoring of the significant addition to Germany's military capability, gained through the reoccupation of the Rhineland, was predictable. It was fully in line with British disapproval of the balance of power, and downgrading of the relevance of grand strategy to the European situation. The duplicity shown by Hitler in violating a solemn treaty - the Locarno Treaty (not a Diktat like Versailles but one entered voluntarily by Germany) - might have been expected to arouse a greater measure of British indignation. But British civic morality cut both ways. Germany, it was argued, had been badly treated and there could be no valid objection if the wrong was rectified<sup>99</sup>.

99. By 1936 it was hardly possible for the British Government to harbour illusions about the nature of the Nazi regime. Some British leaders did realize that the dynamism of the Nazi movement made it unlikely that negotiations to limit German ambitions could be successful. Eden argued that Britain must be prepared for the fact that Hitler would repudiate any treaty, even if freely



negotiated, when it became inconvenient, and when Germany was sufficiently strong and the circumstances were otherwise favourable for doing so. Chamberlain suspected that there were no real bonafides in Germany, that she was merely playing for time until she felt strong enough to make her next spring<sup>100</sup>.

100. Even though the British recognized the thrust of Nazi policy and the general nature of Nazi intentions, and perceived the basic hostility of Nazism to all that was treasured in the British way of life, they flinched from acceptance of the implications. Eden could follow his penetrating analysis of Nazi policies and intentions by noting: 'On balance, however, I am in favour of coming to terms with Hitler'.<sup>101</sup> Chamberlain could express his suspicions of German good faith and then declare: 'I am prepared to deal with her on the basis that she means what she says; and, if I could see a prospect of real settlement, I would be prepared to go a long way to get one'.<sup>102</sup>

101. The members of the British Government continued to put their faith in securing the appeasement of Europe by negotiation - in reaching a general settlement of all outstanding European problems with the co-operation and consent of Nazi Germany. Thus the members of the Cabinet were engaging in wish fulfillment since they were pursuing a policy which flatly contradicted their own expressed convictions about Nazi intentions, and about the worth of the Nazi signature on treaties<sup>103</sup>.

102. The Cabinet not only ruled out an anti-German alliance, but also the only strategic alternative - to seek to divert German expansion eastwards. Eden pointed out to the 1937 Imperial Conference that Britain could easily reach an agreement with Germany on the basis of allowing her a free hand in the east of Europe. However, Eden argued that this would be an immoral course to adopt. He also pointed to the strategic drawbacks of such a policy. The danger might be diverted for a time, but an even stronger Germany might later threaten Britain and Western Europe<sup>104</sup>.

103. After the Rhineland crisis, the British Government perception that something had to be done quickly to induce Germany to return to full participation in the European peace system, had faded away. This was due in no small part to the haze of good feeling which appeared to emanate from Germany. A Nazi programme of disinformation was hugely successful since it fitted in so well with British conceptions and preoccupations. Alluring, albeit vague, offers of pacts and treaties came from Berlin. The Nazi leaders toned down the stridency of their speeches which now dilated on the value of all things the British held dear. Prominent British personalities visited Hitler, who impressed them all by his apparent sincerity and goodwill. Polite society in England was abuzz with talk of how Germany would settle down as a good neighbour in Europe, once her legitimate grievances were met<sup>105</sup>. The Treasury, whose influence permeated through the whole British defence programme, was eager to seize on any evidence of Germany's peaceful intentions. A Treasury memorandum of 12 January 1937 argued that Germany should

not be treated as a nation harbouring a hostile intent towards Britain, '.... Was it not most unfair to regard Germany as an aggressive power whose aims are inimical to British interests? ... For all the bitterness left by the war and the not always fortunate treatment of German minorities under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany has committed no aggression since the war unless the reoccupation of her own territory can be so described',<sup>106</sup>.

104. The period of marking time - 'Cunctation' as Vansittart called it - ended in 1937. Two factors contributed to a new, more urgent mood: firstly, signs that the onward march of German ambitions was about to be resumed, and secondly, the coming to power of Chamberlain, a man of energy, despite his advancing years, who was determined to bring about a general European settlement<sup>107</sup>.

105. Chamberlain regarded the Nazi regime as 'the bully of Europe',<sup>108</sup>. In March 1937 he wrote that '... the main source of this fear of war in Europe is to be found in Germany' and that the only thing which would make Germany give up aggressive designs 'would be the conviction that her efforts to secure superiority of force were doomed to failure by reason of the superior force which would meet her if she attempts aggression',<sup>109</sup>. Although Chamberlain was troubled by doubts about German intentions, trust in the reasonableness and good faith of Hitler and Mussolini, was the very foundation of his whole policy. Like most of his colleagues, Chamberlain engaged in wish fulfilment. If the evidence pointed in a direction away from his preconceived assessment of what was required, he subsumed any doubts in a determination to believe that only the best accorded with reality. Thus, after reading 'The House that Hitler Built', a comprehensive, fair and factual account of the Nazi system he wrote: 'If I accepted the author's conclusion, I should despair, but I don't and won't',<sup>110</sup>.

106. Two of Chamberlain's closest confidants were also predisposed to put the best face on German actions. Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's chief industrial adviser, who became a personal emissary, considered that the same arts of round table negotiation which served British employers and trade unions would also serve with Hitler<sup>111</sup>. Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador to Germany from April 1937, admitted in his memoirs that he 'refused to be convinced, until the worst proved me wrong, that the intentions of others were as evil as they seemed',<sup>112</sup>. Actually, Henderson with his pro-German inclinations represented German interests far more eloquently to London than he represented British interests in Berlin<sup>113</sup>.

107. The Foreign Office was inclined to argue, on the basis of its assessment of the German threat, for the strengthening of British military capability and the establishment of close ties with nations such as France and the United States<sup>114</sup>. But Chamberlain was fortified in his resolve by the Treasury, to dismiss any notion of a Specific German Hostile Intent. A Treasury memorandum of 8

November 1937 summed up the view which still dominated in the top levels of the British Government. There was a need to assume that the Nazi struggle was;

'primarily one for self-respect, a natural reaction against the ostracism that followed the war; that its military manifestations are no more than an expression of the militant German temperament (just as our temperament expresses itself in terms of sport); that Hitler's desire for friendship with England is perfectly genuine and still widely shared'<sup>115</sup>.

108. The more likely a German assault on Austria or Czechoslovakia, the more urgent became Chamberlain's desire to meet with the Nazi leaders. He was convinced that 'if we could sit down at a table with the Germans and run through all their conflicts and claims with a pencil, this would greatly relieve all tension'<sup>116</sup>.

109. An opportunity for top level contact came in November 110. Halifax, Lord President of the Council, was invited to an International Hunting Exhibition in Germany and he met Hitler. Halifax raised the issue of Hitler's designs on Central and Eastern Europe. Britain realised, said Halifax, that one might have to contemplate an adjustment to new conditions, a correction of former mistakes and the recognition of changed circumstances. Though insisting upon peaceful methods, he specifically mentioned Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia, as matters for which Britain was not necessarily concerned to stand up for the status quo. In effect, Halifax, although instructed by Eden to keep Hitler guessing, had given the Fuhrer a green light. He had suggested that Britain would countenance German expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, if it were carried out in a decent and orderly fashion<sup>117</sup>.

111. Halifax had obtained the impression that Hitler considered that 'the British Government was still living comfortably in a world of its own making, a fairy land of strange if respectable illusions. It clung to shibboleths - 'collective security', 'general settlement', 'disarmament', 'non-aggression pacts' - which offered no practical prospect of a solution of Europe's difficulties'<sup>118</sup>. Nevertheless, Hitler struck Halifax as 'very sincere'<sup>119</sup>. In reporting to Cabinet, Halifax referred to his assessment of Hitler's success and argued that the Germans had no policy of immediate adventure. While he expected the Germans to display a beaver-like persistence in pressing their aims in Central Europe, he did not think it would be in a form to give others cause - or even occasion to interfere. Chamberlain was delighted with the outcome of the Halifax visit, and thought the atmosphere had been created for a European settlement<sup>120</sup>.

112. The British discussed Halifax's visit with French leaders in London on 29 and 30 November 1937. The British and French Ministers conferred about whether and how to resist German moves in Central Europe. They agreed that a German annexation of Austria should not be resisted but, largely on the insistence of the French

Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos, they accepted that a German attack on Czechoslovakia would involve France in war according to the French-Czechoslovak treaty of 113. The British recognized that Germany's military capacity was sufficient to justify apprehension that France, without British support, might be defeated. Since the British accepted that French defeat would seriously undermine Britain's own security, they recognized that Britain too was faced with war over Czechoslovakia if Germany ignored more peaceful methods<sup>121</sup>.

114. Nevertheless, the British came down strongly against basing policy on any judgement of German Specific Hostile Intent. The German grievances in Central Europe were regarded by the British as just ones deserving a fair settlement rather than preparation for war. Chamberlain believed that the Sudeten Germans were simply standing up for their rights as the British Uitlanders did in the Transvaal. He claimed that the Germans did not seem to be contemplating the use of force at present, as they recognized that they would plunge everyone into chaos. So long as Germany was prepared to use peaceful methods, Britain and France could perhaps do something to see that the steps she took were as little objectionable as possible. The British Government had long ruled out the use of force as unthinkable, and the British and French Ministers decided to put pressure on Czechoslovakia to accommodate German demands relating to the Sudetenland<sup>122</sup>.

115. In December 1937, Eden apparently told the German Ambassador Joachim Von Ribbentrop, that the Austrian question was of much greater interest to Italy than to England, where people recognized that a closer connection between Germany and Austria was inevitable, although they wished force to be avoided. Further encouragement was being supplied by Henderson, whose talk of Germany's right to absorb Austria, and dominate Central and South-Eastern Europe, was widely reported among the diplomatic community in Berlin<sup>123</sup>.

116. Thus by the end of 1937, the British policy of interest without real commitment in Eastern Europe was tantamount to British acquiescence in Germany's expansion to the East as long as the process was peaceful and orderly. Open acts of aggression such as would publicly affront the British conscience would be avoided, and Britain could remain friends with Germany. It appeared the optimum solution to the British dilemma, save for the fact that Europe was one great strategic entity where power equilibrium was about to be massively disrupted by German dynamism<sup>124</sup>.

117. The Anschluss in March 1938 did not engender any drastic reassessment of German intentions. The appearance of a quasi-legal takeover of Austria by 'invitation' which the Germans worked assiduously to achieve, (although they were unable to disguise completely their behind-the-scenes coercion)<sup>125</sup>, was just the sort of thing the British Government could seize upon to avoid any responsibility in the matter.

118. Chamberlain gave more weight to the manner of the German takeover than to its meaning. Conviction that an agreement could and must be reached with Germany was in no way discouraged by Hitler's Austrian coup. However much Chamberlain and his Cabinet might deplore Hitler's method, they could still fit the Anschluss into the belief that Germany had been wronged by the Versailles Treaty, that the prohibition of union with German-speaking Austria was an unnatural affront to the principle of self-determination<sup>126</sup>.

119. When Cabinet met on 12 March 1938, Chamberlain denounced the German move as a typical illustration of the power politics which he abhorred, but he indicated that he would refuse to countenance a revision of basic British policy. International appeasement was not to be abandoned. The Anschluss had only made it more difficult. Chamberlain was prepared to accept the Anschluss as a fait accompli. He felt that it had to come, and it was now out of the way. On 14 March 1938 Cabinet supported the contention of the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, that there was a need to condemn the German action, but also supported Chamberlain's proviso that the condemnation should be confined to the method and shock to public opinion, and should not suggest that events were leading to war. Later that day in the House of Commons, Chamberlain gave his rap over the knuckles to Hitler. The speech did give the impression, true enough in the circumstances, that the British Government deplored the pressure tactics used by the Nazi's rather than the deed itself<sup>127</sup>.

120. Chamberlain acknowledged in the Foreign Policy Committee (FPC) of the Cabinet on 15 March 1938 that 'Hitler's violent action .... had greatly strengthened the hands of those persons in this country who urged that we should cease to have any dealings of any kind with Dictators'<sup>128</sup>. Nevertheless, Chamberlain was adamant that nothing that had happened should cause the Government to alter its present policy. Recent events had confirmed him in his opinion that the policy was the right one. He only regretted it had not been adopted sooner<sup>129</sup>.

121. Halifax presented a Foreign Affairs Memorandum to the Foreign Policy Committee on 18 March 1938. The memorandum assumed that the German Government, by fair means or foul, would work for eventual incorporation of the Sudeten German minority within the Reich. It postulated three courses of action for the British Government:

- a. a Grand Alliance;
- b. a new commitment to France; and
- c. no new Commitment and the peaceful negotiation of a settlement<sup>130</sup>.

Both Halifax and Chamberlain indicated in effect that they saw no need to base British policy on an assumption of a German Specific Hostile Intent towards British interests. Halifax did not accept

the assumption that when Germany had secured the hegemony of Central Europe she would then pick a quarrel with Britain. He did not credit a lust for conquest on a Napoleonic scale. Chamberlain assured his colleagues that it was not in accordance with Hitler's policy to seize the whole of Czechoslovakia: Hitler only wanted Germans in the Reich. A peaceful settlement was possible<sup>131</sup>.

122. Cabinet focussed not on any actual appreciation of danger to Britain from German action, but the danger that Britain would be dragged into war by the French honouring their alliance with Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain acknowledged that Britain could not afford to see France destroyed, but he was uneasy about a situation in which French leaders could decide whether Britain went to war or not. Halifax emphasized the danger of plunging into a war 'in which we might be defeated and lose all'<sup>132</sup>. He accepted that there was much force in the argument that 'unless we make a stand now Germany will march uninterrupted, to hegemony in Europe, which will be but a first step towards a deliberate challenge to the British Empire'. However, he maintained that there was 'at least an element of uncertainty in the diagnosis, and on the strength of that uncertainty we might at least refrain from embarking on the more hazardous course'<sup>133</sup>.

123. No member of the F.P.C. spoke for the Grand Alliance. Only Oliver Stanley and Sir Samuel Hoare wished to give some support to France. The Committee decided against this in favour of trying to impress on the Czechs and the French the necessity of an amicable settlement; and to persuade the Germans to concentrate on achieving an orderly settlement of the Sudeten problem. Thus did the F.P.C lay down the broad lines of policy for the approaching Czech crisis. It was a policy which flatly denied the realities of power and the principles of strategy, and it was decided before the advice of the Chiefs of Staff was considered<sup>134</sup>.

124. On this occasion the Chiefs of Staff advice, contained in a report 'The Military Implications of German Aggression against Czechoslovakia' - a report which was pessimistic in the extreme about resisting such aggression - was exactly what Chamberlain and his supporters needed to justify their views to the full Cabinet. The Chiefs of Staff displayed a not unusual military tendency to emphasize the weakness of their own forces and to emphasize the strengths of their potential opponent's forces. They argued that there was virtually nothing militarily effective, direct or indirect, that Britain or France could do to help Czechoslovakia, but they maintained that Germany might well be capable of delivering a knock-out blow to Britain from the air. The Chiefs of Staff did, however, suggest that a concerted undertaking by France, Britain and a Central European power to resist by force German aggression against Czechoslovakia might have a desired deterrent effect. But Chamberlain and his friends drank deep of the cup of pessimism relating to military capability that the Chiefs of staff had presented to them, and ruled out any attempt to cow Hitler by firm warnings<sup>135</sup>.

125. Appeasement was to continue; it was even to be intensified. Chamberlain saw the effort to satisfy Germany's legitimate demands as a mission and crusade<sup>136</sup>, with the alluring prospect of an all-round settlement of European problems initiating a grand new era of No Threat as the prize.

126. The British almost appeared to enter a Specific Threat Phase on 22 May 1938 with their delivery of a warning to Hitler about intervention in Czechoslovakia. The warning itself, however, was not a firm one, and it was put into effect not to bolster up Czechoslovakia, but to stave off the immediate danger of war. The warning could hardly have been avoided any longer in view of an agreement in late April with the French to make it if Hitler proved obdurate. But it was modified and disowned in practice as soon as possible<sup>137</sup>.

127. From the end of March 1938 onwards, processions and clamorous utterings of alleged wrongs, and consequent demands, proliferated in the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. On 28 March 1938 Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten German Party leader, received approval from Hitler that the Party line should be: 'We must always demand so much that we can never be satisfied'.<sup>138</sup>

128. The British Government continued to focus on the danger of war rather than the extent of German intentions, and sought to decouple Czechoslovakia from the French - and through the French - the British connection. On 13 April 1938, the Foreign Policy Committee of the British Cabinet did accept Halifax's advice to emphasize in Berlin the chances of Britain being drawn in if war broke out, but at the same time Britain was to discourage such an interpretation elsewhere - that is, in Prague and Paris. Apparently the FPC preferred to ignore the fact that the German Ministers were likely to sense the contradiction, and draw their own conclusion even if Henderson did not spell it out for them. On 22 April 1938 R.A. Butler, Halifax's Under-Secretary told the German Charge'd Affaires and Military Attache that England was aware that Germany would attain 'her next goal' but the manner would be decisive for the reaction in England. Chamberlain helped this along by what appeared to be calculated indiscretion when he informed American and Canadian journalists of his readiness to see the Sudetenland ceded to Germany<sup>139</sup>.

129. When the French Prime Minister, Edouard Daladier, visited London on 28 and 29 April 1938 with his Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet, he advanced that truth about German intentions which Chamberlain and Halifax refused to accept:

'I am myself convinced that Herr Henlein is not in fact seeking any concessions, and that his real object is the destruction of the present Czechoslovak state. We are confronted by German policy designed to tear up treaties and destroy the equilibrium of Europe'.<sup>140</sup>

The French leaders pressed the British to make clear their determination to maintain peace. The British, however, preferred to emphasize the need to pre-empt any involvement in war by coercing Czechoslovakia to accept a peaceful settlement. They did, nevertheless, agree to warn Hitler that if Czech concessions were found to be unacceptable, France would be compelled to intervene, and the British Government would not guarantee that they would not do the same<sup>141</sup>.

130. The wording of the proposed warning appeared to be somewhat sharper than the British declaration of 24 March 1938, but French acceptance left the control and timing, and even the delivery of the warning, entirely in British hands. The French leaders were too conscious of French political weakness, of the loss of the overwhelming military superiority France had possessed even as late as 1936, of the disunity of French society and of the strength of pacifism in their country<sup>142</sup>.

131. On 20-21 May 1938 widespread rumours of threatening German troop movements prompted the Czechs to recall reservists and man frontier posts. This Czech partial mobilisation increased tension in the frontier regions. On 21 May 1938 the French reaffirmed their support for the Czechs and a full scale war loomed. The British reacted with alarm. Sharply jolted and faced with the reality of war, British leaders sought a way out. Overt aggression was precisely what Chamberlain could not tolerate. His plan for peace relied on keeping Hitler caught in the cobwebs of negotiated settlement. Thus it was of first importance to Chamberlain to prevent the rumoured invasion. The British were already obliged by their agreement with the French to send a warning to Hitler if the Germans refused a peaceful settlement; so Chamberlain and Halifax took the decision to give that warning<sup>143</sup>.

132. Henderson met Ribbentrop in Berlin on 22 May 1938 and delivered the cautious double-negative warning. He stated that if France fulfilled her obligation to Czechoslovakia, as expected, 'His Majesty's Government could not guarantee that they would not be forced to become involved also'<sup>144</sup>. Ribbentrop blustered about Czech provocation, and then suggested that the British should use their influence with the Czechs. The British warning, so out of character with what had gone before, appeared to astound the Germans. But once that bargain with the French had been kept and the commitment or 'half-commitment' was fulfilled, further messages were despatched from London, virtually nullifying their effect. On 27 May 1938 Halifax told the British Ambassador in Prague to ask the Czech Government to minimize trouble. Henderson was told to utter no more than vague threats in the future. The French Government was warned not to read more into British warnings than was justified by their terms. The French were not to assume that the British Government would at once take military action with the French Government to preserve Czechoslovakia against German aggression<sup>145</sup>.



133. The British thought that their 'firmness' succeeded when the Germans assured the Czech Ambassador in Berlin that Germany had no aggressive intentions<sup>146</sup>. The crisis cooled. Chamberlain believed that the incident showed 'how utterly untrustworthy and dishonest' the German Government was, and it confirmed that the Germans were 'bullies by nature'<sup>147</sup>. However, the British had for a few brief moments peered into the abyss, and soon resolved that steps should be taken to ensure that the action which had almost precipitated war should not be permitted to occur again. Feeling in London against the Czechs increased, and efforts were made to bring the Czechs under tighter control<sup>148</sup>.

134. A visit by Captain Widemann, Hitler's ADC, to London in early July 1938 was a German probe to test the strength of the entente with France, but the British understood it differently. Chamberlain thought the visit was evidence that Hitler realized that he had everything to gain by peaceful means<sup>149</sup>. The alluring vista of a Sudeten settlement leading to an all round settlement and a return to an era of No Threat opened up before the eyes of the British leaders.

135. Chamberlain and Halifax now believed an honest broker might well tidy up the whole Sudeten problem and so Lord Runciman, an elderly millionaire shipowner and a past President of the Board of Trade, was despatched to Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain and various confidants were letting it be known that under no circumstances would Britain fight to defend Czechoslovakia within its existing boundaries. Despite the veneer of impartiality which overlay the Runciman mission, it was intended to weaken Czech resolve, encourage acceptance of German demands, and so prevent the network of treaties and commitments involve Britain in war<sup>150</sup>.

136. In July 1938, Germany was still viewed in London as a power which could be appeased. It was accepted that Germany had the Specific Capability to threaten British National Interests in Europe, but it was believed that she harboured no Specific Hostile Intent towards those interests. Consequently, Germany could be regarded as posing no more than a Perceived Threat, and the indications were, from London's point of view, that the grade of that threat could be reduced in the very near future by diplomatic action.

137. During August 1938, Colonel-General Ludwig Beck, Carl Goerdeler, and a number of officers in the military intelligence organization of Admiral Canaris, did their best to warn London of the scope of Hitler's ambitions, and urged the British Government to stand firm. Chamberlain and his close colleagues discounted much of the information in these warnings on the grounds that the groups were violently anti-Hitler. The idea of an open warning was rejected in London. However, the British leaders felt uneasy and towards the end of August, the volume of alarming intelligence from Germany could no longer be substantially ignored. By the end of August British recognition of a German Specific Hostile Intent was made as Chamberlain and Halifax had come to the conclusion that

Hitler now intended to attack Czechoslovakia within a certain time limit, unless the extreme Sudeten demands were met<sup>151</sup>. German military action against the Czechs would compel France to honour her Treaty obligations, and Britain would then have to act to support France. Britain had entered the Specific Threat Phase.

#### The Defence Reaction to Specific Threat

138. While British leaders accepted that Germany harboured a Specific Hostile Intent towards Czechoslovakia, they still tended to discount warnings of Hitler's wider ambitions, including an assurance by the German military attache in Belgrade that the Sudeten issue was no more than a pretext for the seizure of the whole of Czechoslovakia. The British Government, and the French Government, still sought to find some means of peacefully settling what they saw as basically a local minority problem not worth a great war<sup>152</sup>.

139. When the British Cabinet met on 30 August 1938 Halifax gave a resume of the Intelligence reports, and declared that Germany was now poised to invade Czechoslovakia. Halifax claimed that Hitler was not adamant on settling the Sudeten issue in 1938 but was prepared to do so. Hitler's intentions, were, according to Halifax, primarily defensive. Duff Cooper argued for a demonstrative fleet movement, but Cabinet approved Halifax's rejection of any kind of open warning to Hitler. Halifax's rejection of such a warning was based on doubts that the warning could be backed up, and doubts about whether it was justifiable to fight a certain war now in order to forestall a possible war later<sup>153</sup>. In summing up, Chamberlain stated that no decision would be taken now as to what Britain should do if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia. There should be no pin pricks to Germany in regard to Royal Navy manoeuvres because he 'thought it very important not to exacerbate feeling in Berlin against us'. Thus no resolute action was sanctioned. Hitler was still to be kept guessing<sup>154</sup>.

140. The British Government continued to believe that the Sudeten problem could be localised, and that it should be localized. However, in view of the accepted German Specific Hostile Intent towards Czechoslovakia and the treaties and commitments linking Czechoslovakia, France and Britain, war between Germany and Britain was quite possible in the immediate future. In the plain needs of the state, preparations for a defensive war had to be undertaken. These were typical of defence preparations for a Specific Threat Phase. At the end of August 1938 the War Office took as many preparatory measures as possible without publicity—such as the organization of ground air defence, and the preparation for the despatch of a two division expeditionary force to Europe<sup>155</sup>.

141. Early in September Herr Kordt, accredited Councillor in the German Embassy, warned Britain that she would have to give a clear and unmistakable warning to Hitler if war was to be avoided. Chamberlain found himself in a dilemma. He opposed a warning but was seeking desperately to avoid war. Finally he authorized

preparation of a private warning drafted in insistent language. The warning declared that once France was involved in war on behalf of Czechoslovakia 'it seems to his Majesty's Government inevitable that the sequence of events must result in a general conflict from which Great Britain could not stand aside'. The word inevitable was new in the vocabulary of British warnings<sup>156</sup>.

142. On 7 September there was an outbreak of violence between Czechs and Sudetens in the Sudeten town of Mayrisch-Ostran. This clash gave the Sudeten leaders an excuse to break off negotiations with the Czech Government. A German march into the Sudetenland now seemed very near<sup>157</sup>.

143. On 8 September Inskip attended a conference of senior ministers to consider steps for readiness for war, without giving publicity, and another meeting of the Chiefs of Staff with Chamberlain and Halifax 'called to discuss further measures short of mobilisation'<sup>158</sup>. On 9 September, Henderson was instructed to deliver the warning in Berlin, but Henderson immediately objected and urged the warning be moderated. Henderson received a revised warning and was told to 'hold' on it<sup>159</sup>. The French cancelled army leave and called up reservists on 9 September.

144. On 11 September Britain called up reserve crews for minesweepers and minelayers. British warships were brought out of reserve, and crews of the 7th Destroyer Flotilla were brought to full complement<sup>160</sup>. Despite this activity the British were still far from being resolute. Chamberlain was not prepared to mobilize the fleet, and it appears that he desired to keep not only Hitler guessing, but also the French in order to discourage any rash French action which might precipitate British involvement in war. The British reply to a French enquiry of 10 September as to what the British reaction would be if France assisted Czechoslovakia against a German attack, was a deliberately chilling one to the effect that the British Government could not foretell the future, and that British action would be based on the circumstances. If Britain did decide to render military assistance to France, it would consist only of two divisions not yet motorized and fifty aircraft<sup>161</sup>.

145. The crisis intensified after Hitler's diatribe against the Czechs at the annual Nazi Party Rally at Nuremberg on 12 September. Before Nuremberg, routine preparations for defence in Britain had been speeded up, short of orders for full mobilization, by asking Defence Departments what instructions they required. On 13 September, the British Service Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff met to discuss precautionary measures. Chamberlain was still not prepared to mobilize the fleet without consulting the full Cabinet. Actually Chamberlain had a different course of action to present to Cabinet when it met on 14 September. For some time he had been mulling over a plan to fly to see Hitler in Germany in an attempt to resolve the Sudeten problem peacefully. Cabinet authorized such a visit and deferred consideration of mobilisation of the fleet<sup>162</sup>.

146. Chamberlain was still preoccupied with the thought of the tragedy and futility of going to war with Germany when he perceived no worthwhile issue on which Britain and Germany disagreed. Thus, after announcing his plan for a dramatic flight to Germany (very much a precedent in 1938), he made it clear to his Cabinet colleagues that he was still looking ahead to the fulfillment of his long-cherished dreams, for he argued that the proposed personal negotiations with Hitler offered the chance of securing better relations between Germany and England. Peaceful settlement of the Czech question could therefore be a prelude to an Anglo-German detente. Refusing to give credence to the dire prediction about the extent of German ambitions, Chamberlain was prepared to so weaken the Czech state by pressing it to surrender strategically vital border territories to Germany, as to render it virtually defenceless. Chamberlain appeared to be ready to countenance the disappearance of a well-armed, well-organized Czechoslovakia from the European scene; to see forty divisions and powerful fortifications struck from the balance sheet of allied strength and their first class equipment added to Germany's. Even now Chamberlain allowed his wishes to colour his thinking. He still refused to believe Hitler was irredeemable, and rigidly adhered to his own system of political thought which eschewed consideration of the European situation in terms of conflict, strategy and the equilibrium of power<sup>163</sup>.

147. A chiefs of Staff Report of 14 September covered the same ground as the 21 March Report. But the Chiefs of Staff had not been asked about the fundamental grand strategical questions such as the abandonment of the Czech frontier defences; the disappearance of Czechoslovakia as a factor in the European balance; whether it was better to fight Germany now or later. Chamberlain and his colleagues made up their own minds, unencumbered with professional strategic advice<sup>164</sup>.

148. The three hour talk between Hitler and Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden on 15 September, determined almost all that followed since it convinced Chamberlain that Hitler would fight to get his way, and Hitler that Chamberlain would not fight to prevent it. Chamberlain returned with a formula for the solution of the Sudeten question which he forced first on his Cabinet colleagues, then on the French, and lastly on the Czechs themselves. These Anglo-French proposals, as they were called, involved the cession to Germany of all Sudeten districts with a German population of more than 50 percent. An international body, including a Czech representative, was to arrange for adjustment of frontiers and of possible exchanges of population on the basis of the right to opt. The British Government would be prepared to join in an international guarantee of the new Czech boundaries against unprovoked aggression<sup>165</sup>.

149. In 1934 and 1935 Nazi Germany was regarded by Chamberlain as 'the bully of Europe', and the threat of military action was the only thing Germans' understand'. In May 1938 after the Anschluss, Hitler was still untrustworthy and dishonest: 'After what has happened no one anywhere will feel any confidence as to what Herr Hitler will do next'. And yet after meeting him at Berchtesgaden,

Chamberlain wrote: 'In spite of the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face, I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word'<sup>166</sup>. Chamberlain even went so far as to assure his Cabinet colleagues that Hitler could be trusted to be better than his word. Chamberlain believed that he had established relations which would be useful in the future<sup>167</sup>.

150. Chamberlain was still engaging in wish fulfillment, despite Foreign Office reports concerning the evident direction of Nazi policy, and his own privately expressed mistrust of Nazi leadership at times. Chamberlain did have an immense vested interest in believing well of Hitler. His mission, his crusade for appeasement, depended on the premise that Hitler was honest and reliable, even if a shade rough. Believing that there was no other viable policy, Chamberlain tended to dismiss evidence that the fundamental premise might be unsound<sup>168</sup>.

151. In talks with the French, Chamberlain reversed the British policy of avoiding commitments especially those in Eastern Europe. He considered a guarantee was an evil necessity for Anglo-French accord and Czechoslovak agreement for a Sudeten solution. Risks of immediate war would be reduced, but at the risk of increased likelihood of British involvement later<sup>169</sup>.

152. In the Prime Minister's absence in Germany, British preparations for war continued. By 22 September the Chiefs of Staff had done everything short of mobilisation. Chamberlain decided that no more military measures such as naval mobilisation, which Duff Cooper was urging, should be undertaken<sup>170</sup>.

153. When Chamberlain went to see Hitler again to finalize the Anglo-French plan at Bad Godesberg, everything had changed. Until Berchtesgaden Hitler had not fully appreciated the British horror of war as an instrument of policy - a horror which made his quarrel with Czechoslovakia a British interest, though apparently Czechoslovakia in itself could not become one. When Hitler saw how far Chamberlain was prepared to go, when presented with the fatal personal agreement to partition, he did the obvious thing and raised his demands. The Fuhrer now insisted on a military occupation of the Sudetenland in order to emphasize his triumph. Chamberlain was taken aback and called a halt. He argued that the German demands constituted an ultimatum, not a negotiation<sup>171</sup>. For Chamberlain, not the deed but the method mattered; anything to keep hold of the idea of 'negotiations'.

154. By the time of his return from Godesberg Chamberlain was convinced that Hitler's terms must be accepted. He was satisfied that Hitler had no deep-seated conflict with Britain and her National Interests, and that he wanted no more than racial self-determination. On 24 September Chamberlain reassured his Cabinet colleagues that Hitler was sincere, that he had no more territorial ambitions. It was a turning point in Anglo-German relations and it would be a tragedy to fail to grasp the

opportunity. This was the big thing in the present issue, insisted Chamberlain. He also stressed the danger of the bomber to London and argued that there was no justification for urging a war today, in order to prevent a possible war thereafter. Chamberlain proposed that there be no British decision before French action. There was some verbal criticism of Chamberlain's policy and Cooper urged immediate general mobilisation<sup>172</sup>.

#### The British Operational Response

155. At the meeting of Cabinet the next day (25 September) Halifax voiced doubts about Chamberlain's policy, and it became very clear that the Cabinet was deeply split. Halifax no longer trusted Hitler's promises but he was still unaware of Hitler's long-term aims. Eventually it was agreed that Sir Henry Wilson should take one more message to Hitler. The second half would be to the effect that if a peaceful and orderly solution to the Sudeten problem was unacceptable to Germany, it seemed certain that Britain would be drawn in to any conflict. Cooper wanted a more definite warning. Chamberlain argued against a more definite warning, but finally upgraded it to 'Britain should feel obliged to support France'<sup>173</sup>. On 26 September the British Government finally informed the French Government officially that Britain would support the French if they decided to honour their obligations to Czechoslovakia. A public communique to this effect was issued only in response to pressure from the Foreign Office and Winston Churchill<sup>174</sup>.

156. On the weekend of 24-25 September, Europe prepared itself for war. In London the unemployed hastily dug trenches in the parks to shelter civilians from the expected bomber fleets. Air raid sirens were tested, and gas masks were distributed to regional centres<sup>175</sup>.

157. On 26 September Wilson saw Hitler, but the Fuhrer was in such a fury that Wilson decided against delivering the warning. It was delivered the next day but this was after Hitler had even more clearly nailed his colours to the mast by way of another fiery speech directed against the Czechs. The value of the British warning was reduced by Wilson's responses to Hitler's questioning, and Wilson apparently weakened the warning further by declaring when withdrawing that he would try to make the Czechs amenable<sup>176</sup>.

158. On the afternoon of 27 September 1938, Chamberlain authorized mobilization of the fleet. However it was strange, in view of the fears of Chamberlain and his colleagues concerning the aerial danger from Germany, that there was no general mobilization of the RAF. Chamberlain and his closest colleagues continued to try to avoid for as long as possible, action which might be interpreted in Berlin as especially provocative. Significantly, it was Duff Cooper who actively saw to it that publicity accompanied the fleet mobilization order<sup>177</sup>. The Fleet Mobilization was the last major British defence preparation initiative before the crisis was resolved through 'negotiation' at Munich. It represented the beginning of the British Operational Response.

GENERAL HOSTILE  
INTENT AND  
GENERAL CAPABILITY  
Feb 1934  
NOTIONAL THREAT  
PHASE  
2 years

SPECIFIC HOSTILE  
INTENT  
25 Feb 1936  
PERCEIVED THREAT  
PHASE  
131.0 weeks

SPECIFIC  
CAPABILITY

30 Aug 1938 27 Sep 1938  
SPECIFIC THREAT  
PHASE  
4.0 weeks

OPERATIONAL  
RESPONSE

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Colvin, I., op. cit., p. 114.

Middlemas, K., op. cit., p. 192.

Thorne, C., op. cit., p. 59.

135. Parkinson, R., op. cit., pp. 7-8.

Barnett, C., op. cit., pp. 473, 505-511.

It is interesting to note that the German Army's Chief of Staff, General Beck, emphasized Germany's military weakness in two memoranda in May, 1938. Beck pointed to Germany's unreadiness for war over Czechoslovakia and the superior potential strength of the allies which would spell Germany's ultimate defeat. (Barnett, C., op. cit., p. 511).

136. Parkinson, R., op. cit., p. 9.

137. Middlemas, K., op. cit., p. 238.

138. Thorne, C., op. cit., p. 57.

Barnett, C., op. cit., p. 515.

139. Thorne, C., op. cit., pp. 61-62.

140. Quoted in Barnett, C., op. cit., p. 514.

141. Parkinson, R., op. cit., p. 11.

Middlemas, K., op. cit., pp. 227-228.

142. Barnett, C., op. cit., p. 515.

Daladier had told a confidential agent of the German Embassy in London on the eve of the Staff Talks that his hope was that Chamberlain and Halifax would themselves suggest that pressure should be put on Prague when he could acquiesce without seeming to have taken the initiative in the matter (Thorne, C., op. cit., p. 59).

143. Parkinson, R., op. cit., p. 12.

Lafore, L., op. cit., pp. 211-212.

Middlemas, K., op. cit., pp. 234-236.

Thorne, C., op. cit., p. 63.

Colvin, I., op. cit., p. 128.

144. Quoted in Middlemas, K., op. cit., p. 237.

145. ibid

Colvin, I., op. cit., p. 129.

146. Middlemas, K., op. cit., pp. 239-240.

Colvin, I., op. cit., p. 132.

147. Quoted in Middlemas, K., p. 239.

148. ibid., pp. 238, 248.

Parkinson, R., op. cit., p. 12.

149. Middlemas, K., op. cit., p. 265.

Thorne, C., op. cit., p. 64-65.

150. Lafore, L., op. cit., p. 213.

Barnett, C., op. cit., p. 516.

151. Middlemas, K., op. cit., p. 280.

Colvin, I., op. cit., pp. 138-140.

152. Middlemas, K., op. cit., p. 280.

153. ibid., pp. 310-312.

Parkinson, R., op. cit., pp. 14-15.

154. Barnett, C., op. cit., p. 520.  
Colvin, I., op. cit., pp. 141-142.
155. Middlemas, K., op. cit., p. 327.
156. Parkinson, R., op. cit., p. 147.
157. Barnett, C., op. cit., p. 521.
158. Middlemas, K., op. cit., p. 327.
159. Parkinson, R., op. cit., p. 18.
160. Colvin, I., op. cit., p. 150.  
Barnett, C., op. cit., p. 521.
161. Parkinson, R., op. cit., pp. 18-20.  
Goodspeed, D., op. cit., p. 317.
162. Parkinson, R., op. cit., pp. 20, 22-23.  
Middlemas, K., op. cit., p. 331.
163. Barnett, C., op. cit., pp. 524-545.
164. ibid., pp. 526-527.
165. Department of State (USA) 'Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939', Third Series, Volume II, No. 895, pp. 338-41, No. 941.  
  
Department of State (USA), 'Documents on German Foreign Policy', Series D., Volume II, No. 487, pp. 786-798.
166. Parkinson, R., op. cit., p. 5.
167. ibid., pp. 27-28.  
Lafore, L., op. cit., p. 216.  
Churchill, W., op. cit., p. 270.
168. Barnett, C., op. cit., p. 528.
169. Parkinson, R., op. cit., p. 31.
170. Middlemas, K., op. cit., pp. 344-345, 371.
171. Department of State (USA), 'Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939', Third Series, Volume II, Nos. 1033, 1073, pp. 463-473, 499-508.  
  
Department of State (USA), 'Documents on German Foreign Policy', Series D, Volume II, No. 583, pp. 898-908.

172. Parkinson, R., op. cit., pp. 40-42.  
Middlemas, K., op. cit., pp. 375-376.
173. Colvin, I., op. cit., pp. 163-165.  
Barnett, C., op. cit., p. 539.
174. Thorne, C., op. cit., pp. 79-80.
175. ibid., p. 79.
176. ibid., p. 78.  
Mosley, L., op. cit., pp. 56, 61.
177. Thorne, C., op. cit., p. 80.  
Parkinson , R., op. cit., p. 56.

CASE STUDY 3DANZIG 1939 PHASE 1 - POLANDIntroduction

1. Despite Poland's resurgence as an independent state in 1918, her existence was an extremely precarious one. Wedged between two great powers, she lived under the constant threat of a renewed German-Russian alliance. The maintenance of Polish boundaries as constituted in the west by the Versailles Treaty, plebiscites, and decisions of the League of Nations, and in the east by the Treaty of Riga, was considered by all Polish Governments as the condition of Poland's independence<sup>1</sup>.

2. Poland obtained direct access to the sea through the Free City of Danzig and Polish Pomerania (the Corridor), areas that were essential for the economic development of the new Poland. Ethnically, Germany's claim to Danzig was incontestable. However, the revindiction of Danzig was inseparable from revindication of the Corridor; and such a step would have meant that Poland's access to Gdynia (the main Polish port near Danzig) would also have run through German-held territory. This would have allowed Germany to apply choking economic pressure to Poland. It is only in this light that the Polish attitude toward the Danzig question can be fully understood<sup>2</sup>.

General Capability and General Hostile Intent

3. The new Polish Government appreciated that Germany retained a General Capability to threaten Poland, despite losing the 1914-18 war. This was represented by the Frei Korps; and more importantly, the industrial-military complex typified by such businesses as Krupp. At this time, the Polish Government could recognize no serious German attempt to create a Specific Capability to threaten Poland's National Interests. It had little difficulty in recognizing a General Hostile Intent. The Treaty of Versailles obliged Germany to cede large areas to Poland, including the Danzig Corridor. The German Government did not attempt to hide that it was unreconciled to these measures. The manner in which the future of Upper Silesia was settled further exacerbated the situation, as the German Government saw Polish military acts as exploiting Germany while she was weak. From 1920-21 the German Government began a campaign of disputation and economic disruption designed to unsettle and irritate the Polish Government. Thus the Notional Threat Phase began for the Polish Government in 1920-21.

4. The Polish reaction to this latent threat to the National Interest in Danzig and the Corridor was to conclude an alliance with France in February 1921, which was accompanied by a secret military convention. During the next few years, the Polish Army was equipped generously with French World War I vintage equipment. The latter measure had a dual purpose to the Polish Government as it also afforded some security against Russia with which Poland had already



fought one war in 1919-20<sup>3</sup>.

5. The German Government reacted to the Polish-French alliance with the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 between itself and Russia. However, neither party was strong enough to pose a threat to Polish National Interests, while France remained Poland's ally and was the strongest military power on the continent of Europe. The Polish position appeared to deteriorate slightly in 1925. The Locarno Treaties between France and Germany were an indication of what was to be a gradual French retreat from the grand alliance design of 1921. However, Germany was set on the path of good relations with France and Britain, which diminished the prospect of a close and effective military alliance between Germany and Russia. In essential terms, the Polish position was maintained and the government's perception of the level of threat to National Interests did not change. Indeed, Russia began to stabilize its relations with its neighbours in the last years of the 1920s which resulted in a multilateral declaration, on the model of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, between Russia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Rumania, denouncing war as an instrument of policy. With the Japanese attack on Manchuria in 1931, Russia tried for a secure peace in the West. The Polish Government, led by Marshal Pilsudsky, accepted this opportunity and the two states signed a Non-Aggression Pact in July 1932.<sup>4</sup>

6. This development presented an opportunity for Poland to press for normalisation of relations with Germany. The latter was still engaging in disputation, most notably the customs war, which had continued from 1925 (see Case Study 4). Pilsudsky was looking for a pretext to force the German Government to desist, while Poland still had a military advantage over Germany. He knew this advantage would not last indefinitely as the diplomatic position with Russia could change after a few years and/or Germany could rearm. The pretext was the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of Germany, and the replacement, with German officers, of the 'mixed' harbour police by decision of the Nazi controlled Senate of Danzig. On 6 March 1933, Pilsudsky ordered mobilisation and reinforcement of Polish forces on Westerplatte in Danzig. This was a deliberate attempt to threaten Germany with the possibility of a preventative war. It was backed up by attempts by the Polish Government to mobilize the French. Pilsudsky informed the French Government that German rearmament was progressing more quickly than was generally suspected. Current German actions in Danzig were but the thin edge of the large wedge to be applied in the future. He then informed the French that Poland would support the French Army in crushing Germany<sup>5</sup>.

7. The French were not to be drawn even into a show of strength, but the tactic appeared to achieve its end anyway as, after a few months of negotiations, the Polish-German Declaration of Non-Aggression was signed on 26 January 1934 with a consequential normalization of bilateral relations. Pilsudsky failed to get official German recognition of Poland's western frontier and the status of the Free City of Danzig, but he did receive verbal assurances, and also felt he had averted the possibility of a revision of the situation by international agreement. Poland's diplomatic position now looked stronger than at any previous time since 1920. Hitler's diplomatic position had improved significantly

as well (see Case Study 4<sup>6</sup>).

8. For the next four years, relations between Poland and Germany were stable. In July 1935 the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, made an official visit to Berlin, where the German Government raised the question of the retrocession of Danzig and the Corridor, for which Poland would be amply compensated at the expense of Russia. Beck did not respond and the matter was dropped; but it served to kindle the belief that Poland still faced a General Hostile Intent and a General Capability from Germany<sup>7</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

9. Following the reoccupation of the Rhineland by Germany beginning on 7 March 1936, the Polish Government became seriously alarmed by the inactivity of the Western Powers. Part of Poland's security rested on the French ability to move quickly to menace the Ruhr industrial region of Germany. Thus any threatened move against Poland could bring the threat of a decisive French intervention in the main German industrial area. The re-militarization of the Rhineland now made such French reaction impossible, and gave to Germany the opportunity to prepare defences in depth. There was no evidence of any German move against Poland, but the Polish Government felt that it could not ignore the fact that German military capability had been increased substantially. Furthermore, if France and Britain had not been persuaded to react to protect their own strategic interests in Western Europe, it was unrealistic to expect them to react to German initiatives in Eastern Europe. This increased German military capability even further as German forces could be concentrated in the East without the serious need for large forces in the West. The Polish Government seems to have concluded that Germany now had the Specific Capability to threaten Polish National Interests<sup>8</sup>.

10. During the Perceived Threat Phase the Polish Government thought that it had considerable time before this Specific Capability could perhaps be turned against Poland. They believed that Hitler's expansion was directed towards Austria and Czechoslovakia rather than Poland. Beck did not believe that Hitler wanted war with Poland in the immediate future, but realized that the Danzig question would eventually have to be discussed with Germany. This allowed time for some rearmament. The Polish Government began a Six Year Plan to update the Polish Armed Services. In September 1936 Poland signed the Rambouillet Agreement with France for a loan of 2000 million francs for military equipment<sup>9</sup>.

11. The major thrust of the modernization program was in the areas of motorization, communications, the strengthening of engineering forces, the creation of adequate anti-aircraft and anti-tank defences, and developing the air force. The technology associated with these areas had advanced significantly since World War I. Most of the existing Polish equipment was from that period and was now obsolete. Thus the Polish rearmament programme was not just an update of key military assets, but a major re-equipment programme as well, which had to occur regardless of the threat from Germany, if Poland was to maintain a credible deterrent force. This

explains the very high percentage expenditure for the Six Year Plan, i.e. 33 per cent of state taxation, which appears to be exceptional for a Perceived Threat Recognition Phase<sup>10</sup>.

12. In 1936 Poland was still recovering from the devastation caused by World War I. It had little of the industrial infrastructure necessary to support modern weapons, and this had to be created almost from the ground up for such areas as motorization or communications etc. A major rearmament programme was necessary to make any impact at all. By comparison Czechoslovakia, France and Germany were well off<sup>11</sup>.

13. The Polish Armed Services also began serious operational planning in 1936. Their first attempt to assess the impact of a defensive and offensive war against Germany produced the answer that Polish forces in their existing state of effectiveness would hold out for only six weeks before ultimate destruction by the German Army<sup>12</sup>.

14. Meanwhile throughout 1936 and 1937 Hitler continued to reassure the Polish Government of his good feelings towards Poland. As late as 5 November 1937 he stated that he had no intention of altering the status of Danzig. This strategy continued to be implemented until the last three months of 1938. However, by June 1938, Beck admitted that he believed German friendship to be only temporary, and that Danzig and the Corridor would soon become objectives of German pressure and threat. Hitler had already gained Austria, and the campaign against Czechoslovakia was beginning. Beck felt that the aid of Britain and France represented Poland's only chance in the event of a war with Germany; but the Western Powers showed no desire to become involved in Eastern Europe<sup>13</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

15. This seems to have represented the recognition of a Specific Hostile Intent by the Polish Government, for Beck spoke with complete authority on foreign affairs. It was soon supported by other events, most notably the presentation of demands by Germany on 24 October 1938 to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin. All of these were rejected by Beck. The pattern of German behaviour, which usually followed this type of impasse, was well known to the Polish Government<sup>14</sup>.

16. Polish Armed Services planning now assumed more detail as it was clear that the German objective was Danzig and the Corridor. As relations deteriorated, the Polish Army realised that Germany was actually aiming at the total destruction of Poland as a state, and a general attack had therefore to be expected. Among many things, the development of directives and operational orders revealed grave shortages in ammunition, and that many key industrial areas were indefensible from aerial and long range artillery attack. Preparations were made for fortifications, and the manpower of the nation was mobilized for defence purposes. So was industry, but there was not very much to organize. Defence projects had absolute

priority, and all other governmental activities were subordinated to the national defence requirements<sup>15</sup>.

#### Operational Response

17. On 6 January 1939, the German Foreign Minister repeated German demands, but Beck warned that he considered Danzig to be the touchstone of Polish-German relations, and that any German fait accompli would force Poland to take a firm stand. Beck had in fact decided that if Germany were to pursue her demands, these should be interpreted as pretexts for a serious conflict with Poland and that, in such a case, any hesitation could lead to the loss of Poland's independence, and vassalage to Germany. Following the absorption of Czechoslovakia by Germany in March 1939, Beck confided to the American Ambassador to Poland that he believed Hitler would launch his drive against Poland within six months. The Polish Government ordered partial mobilization of the army during the same month, increasing the numbers on active service from 282 877 to 439 718. The German threat was now seen to be imminent<sup>16</sup>.

18. On 31 March Poland received the British and French guarantee against invasion. However, the diplomatic and military effect of this development was more than offset by the signing of the German-Soviet Non Aggression Pact on 23 August 1939. Germany attacked Poland on 1 September 1939, five months after Beck's prophetic statement in March.

|   |                        |                               |                         |
|---|------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC<br>HOSTILE<br>INTENT | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 1920-21   | Mar 1936               | Jun 1938                      | 1 Sep 1939              |
| NOTIONAL THREAT                                     | PERCEIVED THREAT       | SPECIFIC THREAT               |                         |
| PHASE   | PHASE                  | PHASE                         |                         |
| 16 years  | 117 weeks              | 63 weeks                      |                         |

NOTES

1. Cienciala, A., 'Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939', Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1968, p. 1.
2. ibid., pp. 2-3.
3. ibid., pp. 4-9.  
Peszke, M.A., 'Poland's Preparation for World War Two', Military Affairs, February 1979, p. 19.
4. Cienciala, A., op. cit., pp. 9-10.
5. Wheeler-Bennet, J.W., 'Munich, Prologue to Tragedy', London, Macmillan and Co., London, 1963, pp. 283-285.  
Hildebrand, K., 'The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich', Batsford, London, 1973, pp. 32-33.  
Cienciala, A., op. cit., pp. 11-12.  
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6. Cienciala, A., op. cit., pp. 15-16.
7. Wheeler Bennet., J.W., op. cit., p. 286.
8. Cienciala, A., op. cit., pp. 26-27.  
Rich, N., 'Hitler's War Aims: The Establishment of the New Order', Andre Deutsch, London, 1974, p. 86.
9. Biddle, A.J., 'Poland and the Coming of the Second World War', Ohio State University, 1976, p. 16.  
Cienciala, A., op. cit., pp. 26-28.  
Wheeler Bennet, J.W., op. cit., p. 288.  
Peszke, M.A., op. cit., p. 19.
10. ibid., pp. 19, 21.
11. ibid., pp. 20-21, 23.
12. ibid.,
13. Biddle, A.J. op. cit., p. 21.
14. ibid., p. 24.  
Cienciala, A., op. cit., pp. 178-181.
15. Peszke, M.A., op. cit., p. 20.

16. Cienciala, A., op. cit., pp. 189-191, 208, 221.

Biddle, A.J., op. cit., p. 26.

Peszke, M.A., op. cit., p. 22.

CASE STUDY 4DANZIG 1939 PHASE 1 - GERMANYGeneral Hostile Intent

1. By the terms of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Germany was obliged to cede to Poland the greater part of the provinces of Poznan and West Prussia, and the Danzig Corridor to the Baltic Sea. The German Port of Danzig became a free city to serve as an outlet for Poland. The Treaty also provided for plebiscites to determine the future of Upper Silesia and part of East Prussia. Apart from the loss of territory, German leaders had difficulty in accepting a state which had been created by the Allies to be as large and strong as possible so that it could act as a buffer and threat to German ambitions in Central Europe. This attitude was compounded by the results of the plebiscites in March 1921 (all of which were won by Germany) which the Poles refused to accept, and occupied militarily many of the disputed areas. The League of Nations found in favour of Poland in most cases. Germans were incensed greatly by this Allied hypocrisy; and no German Government during the Weimar Republic felt free to abandon German claims to territories lost to Poland. The re-acquisition of the lost territories became a National Interest<sup>1</sup>.

2. This National Interest was later subsumed by Hitler into that of the unification of Greater Germany (Case Study 1). But throughout most of the period of the Weimar Republic, German Governments attempted to regain the territories through economic pressure on Poland. This strategy envisaged the formation of a customs union between Germany and her main trading partners in Central Europe, e.g. Austria, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states, but excluding Poland. The fate of Poland, with her unstable economic structure, was to be surrounded and held in an economic vice which in the short or long run would make her willing to consider the idea of exchanging political concessions for tangible economic advantages. This strategy was first implemented in 1925, when having gained the Locarno Treaties with France and the other Western Powers, Germany began a customs war with Poland<sup>2</sup>.

3. One of the consequences of these actions was that between 1925-33 Germany was continually in a Notional Threat Phase; throughout this period Poland was seen to be posing a Notional Threat to Germany's National Interest of the security of the eastern provinces. This sometimes rose to more advanced phases of threat recognition. However, initially the German-Russian treaty signed at Rapallo in 1922, served to keep Polish attention and forces divided so that the larger Polish Army was never able to be deployed fully against the very weak German forces. But in the late 1920s, Russia began to stabilize its relations with its neighbours. With the Japanese attack on Manchuria in 1931, Russia tried for a secure peace in the West. The Polish Government led by Marshal Pilsudsky accepted this opportunity, and the two states signed a Non-Aggression Pact in July 1932. No longer distracted by Russia, Pilsudsky with his military strength undivided, now sought a pretext

to force the German Government to desist from its customs war. This was provided by the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of Germany, and the Nazi-controlled Danzig Senate's move to replace the 'mixed' Danzig Harbour Police with German officers. On 6 March 1933 Pilsudski ordered mobilization and reinforcement of Polish forces on Westerplatte in Danzig<sup>3</sup>.

4. Pilsudsky attempted to back up his threat of preventive war by securing French military support for his action. He failed, but found that the German Government was anxious for a peaceful settlement anyway. After some months of negotiations, a joint communique from Hitler and the Polish Ambassador to Berlin was issued on 15 November 1933. Both the German and Polish Governments agreed,

'...to deal with the questions touching both countries by means of direct negotiations and to renounce all application of force in their relations with each other for the consolidation of European peace'.

This understanding brought an end to the crisis in German-Polish relations and an end to the eight year old customs war. Pilsudsky, who had been shaken by the failure of the French to act in support of their Polish Treaty and also the Versailles Treaty provisions concerning the status of Danzig, joined Hitler in a non-aggression pact which was signed on 26 January 1934. As well as securing the German eastern frontier, the pact also achieved from the German point of view, the separation of France from Poland, and undermined other French alliances in Eastern Europe<sup>4</sup>.

5. Hitler had brought about this remarkable reconciliation by removing the issue of the lost territories from Polish-German relations, and by ending the customs war. In the first case the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact was supported by verbal assurances of the security of Poland's western frontier. No Weimar Republic Government had ever felt strong enough to do this. Not even Stresemann, with the success of the Locarno Treaties behind him, had ever felt secure to take the momentous action undertaken by the archnationalist Hitler. In the second case, the removal of customs friction also removed the main reason for Polish action against the eastern provinces of Germany. Although the Germans remained suspicious that Pilsudsky might nevertheless join a French move against Germany, they now believed he would no longer attack by himself. Hitler did not believe that the French could muster the resolve for such an action because of internal divisions in French society and government. By this reasoning, Hitler and his government believed they had removed for the time being, the major issues of dispute between Germany and Poland. Poland had been persuaded of Germany's good intentions and no longer represented a threat to any well defined German National Interest. Only a General Hostile Intent remained; - the legacy of previous history, World War I and the Weimar Republic.

#### General Capability

6. The issue of the lost territories was reintroduced by



Hitler's government in July 1935, during an official visit to Berlin by the Polish Foreign Minister. The government raised the question of the retrocession of Danzig and the Corridor, for which Poland would be amply compensated at the expense of Russia. The temerity of the Germans in taking this action was based on their successful public declaration of rearmament in March 1935, to which the French and British Governments had not responded with any significant measures at all. The resurrection of the lost territories National Interest was unwelcome information for Foreign Minister Beck who chose not to respond<sup>5</sup>.

7. The Poles did respond to the last act of disestablishment of the military provisions of the Treaty of Versailles - the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936. The destruction of the French strategic position menacing the Ruhr convinced the Polish Government that its own position was not secure. Apart from having lost the will to respond to Germany, Poland's ally, France, had now lost the physical means of responding in a timely and effective manner. The German Government could return at any time to the question of Danzig and other territories. The Polish Government resolved to begin a major re-equipment program to replace their obsolete First World War equipment which had previously been donated by the French. The initial outward manifestation of this decision was the signing of the Rambouillet Agreement with France in September 1936 for a loan of 2000 million francs for military equipment<sup>6</sup>.

8. Not unreasonably, the German Government saw this development as representing a General Military Capability to threaten its National Interest of regaining Danzig and other lost territories. Hitherto the Polish forces could not match the quality of forces which were being created from the rearmament initiated by Hitler in 1933. The Luftwaffe in particular represented a strike force which by 1935 was rapidly overhauling the British and French air forces respectively, not to mention the much smaller Polish air force. The Poles had now taken some measures to close the gap, and initiated the Notional Threat Phase for the German Government<sup>7</sup>.

9. There is no evidence that the German Government took at this time any particular defence activities in response to the Polish threat. The main concern of Hitler was the French and Czechoslovakian reactions to his continued rearmament and future designs on Austria and Czechoslovakia. Rearmament did result among other things in the expansion of units cantoned normally on the eastern frontier with Poland, and in East Prussia, but there is no evidence that this was directed at Poland. A normal process of force expansion is to take existing units, and use them as the basis for larger units. Hitler gave no precise orders concerning Poland between 1934 and September 1938, and no armed service planning was conducted which envisaged operating against Poland. This was not the case for Austria and Czechoslovakia which became the focus of attention, with France, from 1935. This disinterest in Poland reflected the realisation of the German Government that Poland's lack of advanced manufacturing and servicing infrastructure made progress in areas such as electronics, aircraft and motor transport,

extremely difficult for many years to come. However, Hitler was careful not to give cause for alarm and he and his government avoided public expressions of hostility towards Poland until 1939. When it suited his purposes, Hitler even laid great stress on German-Polish friendship, and during the Munich Crisis encouraged the Poles to participate in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia<sup>8</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

10. The first signs that the German Government had begun to recognize a Specific Hostile Intent from Poland began to emerge shortly after the Munich Crisis of September 1938. On 24 October 1938 the German Foreign Minister (Ribbentrop) met with the Polish Ambassador and stated that Danzig should revert to Germany. Ribbentrop added that the German Government wished to build a super motor highway and a double track railroad across the Polish Corridor to connect Germany with Danzig and East Prussia. Both nations would enjoy extraterritorial rights. The Polish reply was delivered on 19 November 1938 and refused to countenance any transfer of Danzig to Germany, and stated that any attempt to achieve this end would lead inevitably to conflict between Poland and Germany. The German Government had no difficulty in interpreting this unequivocal statement as a Specific Hostile Intent to its National Interest of regaining Danzig and the other lost territories<sup>9</sup>.

11. The defence activities which resulted from the beginning of the Perceived Threat Phase were more typical of a Specific Threat Phase. Expansion of front line and support units of key military assets had already been initiated, and industry was being organised for war production. Operational readiness of key military assets such as the armoured divisions, dive bomber and fighter squadrons, was at a high level. Sustainability of operations was also increasing rapidly with the development of adequate support units. All of these activities were at this advanced stage because of Hitler's previous operations to escape from the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty, and the seizure of Austria and Sudetenland. Hitler saw no reason to halt his success, and so maintained the rearmament begun for his earlier operations, and incorporated it in his new operations against Poland.

12. In this regard, Hitler ordered on 24 November 1938, the commanders in chief of the armed services to prepare plans for the occupation of Danzig by surprise. These were to be submitted by 10 January 1939. They were to be along the line of fomenting a quasi-revolution amongst German citizens supported by infiltrated German troops. This was not to be achieved by a war against Poland, but by exploiting politically favourable circumstances, and confronting the Polish Government with a fait accompli by the population of Danzig<sup>10</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

13. Hitler's main purpose for avoiding the threat of outright war with Poland was for fear of driving the latter into the arms of Britain. Thus he stated to his army commander in chief that he did

not want Danzig to be the lever with which to destroy Poland. German demands were continued throughout January to late March, but without the direct threat of the use of force. However, the Poles were subjected to a great deal of latent and implied military pressure. Hitler did not have the forces to support such actions as he was concluding his campaign against Czechoslovakia which was seized on 15/16 March 1939, (this was followed with the acquisition of Memel Land on 23 March)<sup>11</sup>.

14. As a direct consequence of the seizure of Czechoslovakia and continued German pressure on Poland, the British and French Governments offered to guarantee Poland against attack. Polish acceptance was announced by the British Prime Minister on 31 March 1939. The Poles had hitherto had no Specific Capability to threaten the German National Interest, but the additions of British and French strength balanced German forces. The need to guard the western frontier with France split German forces with the threat of a two front war - something Hitler had been most careful to avoid. Now the Poles could offer some serious prospect of defending Danzig and the Corridor, thus denying the Germans their National Interest. The German Government recognized the Specific Capability suddenly acquired by the Poles with the Allied guarantees of 31 March and entered the Specific Threat Phase<sup>12</sup>.

15. On 3 April Hitler gave instructions to the German Supreme Command (OKW) to issue its plans for the destruction of Poland, to allow the development of specific operational orders by the armed services. Military preparations were to be complete and plans ready for action by 1 September 1939. Military operations once initiated were to be concluded as speedily as possible to give France and Britain less time to react. The proposed strategy to achieve this was presented by the army to Hitler on 26/27 April, and was approved by him on the same date. The task of diplomacy was to isolate Poland from Britain and France, and to seek a rapprochement with Russia. Any agreement with Stalin would serve to threaten Poland's rear, reducing her Specific Capability, and would also guarantee the supply of vital raw materials should Britain and France blockade Germany. At the same time as the strategic developments in Europe were defining the need for Germany to gain a Russian alliance, the German Government realized that the Russians were possibly interested in the same end. Tentative contacts had been received from Russia before 31 March 1939, but these contacts became much more serious for both parties during April and May. They continued to ripen until a non-aggression treaty was signed on 23 August 1939<sup>13</sup>.

16. The defence activities of the Specific Threat Phase succeeded in lifting the extent of expansion which had existed previously. Hitherto this had been developed as far as was consistent with the economic theory of Blitzkrieg; but the acquisition of Sudetenland and the rest of Bohemia and Moravia added new industrial resources, as well as armaments, which could now support higher levels of expansion. The German Army was the main beneficiary. It gained sufficient booty to equip three new armoured divisions from Czech armaments, as well as heavy artillery and many other equipments. The Czech armament factories at Pilsen and Brno were integrated into the German rearmament scheme, as well as many

sources of raw materials and secondary manufacture. Operational readiness of the German Army and Air Force, as well as their sustainability of operations, improved greatly in the period of the Specific Threat Phase. While these forces were not capable of fighting a sustained war, they were able to conduct continuous operations for some months before running out of ammunition, supplies and spare parts<sup>14</sup>.

17. Hitler was attempting to show that he had the capability to fight a war, and that he would certainly do so unless his demands were met. Indeed, the intransigence of the Poles over negotiations made this development inevitable if Hitler was to continue to pursue his National Interest of regaining the lost territories. His military problem had been complicated by the interference of the British and the French, but he sought to deter them by development of the Luftwaffe's capability for city bombing, and the construction of the West Wall. Hitherto the West Wall had been a creation of German propaganda designed to deter the French from action during the Munich Crisis. Now something more substantial was required. By September 1939 over 10 000 bunkers and strong points had been completed, whereas in September 1938 only 517 existed<sup>15</sup>.

#### Operational Response

18. There is much evidence to suggest that despite the preparations for war, in the short term, Hitler would have been happy if the Polish Government had given in to his demands peacefully. This would have allowed the implementation of a strategy of nibbling away at Poland until it followed Czechoslovakia's fate, without the same risks of intervention by the Western Powers. This did not eventuate, and the German attack began on 1 September 1939. Two days later Britain and France declared war in support of their guarantee to Poland. Hitler had not believed this would happen until the British and French had renewed their pledge to Poland on 25 August, two days after the signing of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. As a consequence he had delayed preparations for the attack for one week in a last effort to preserve British neutrality. The German Foreign Ministry was surprised by the British and French declarations of war, notwithstanding British and French statements. Hitler accepted the risk and resolved to proceed with his attack anyway<sup>16</sup>.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| Sep 1936  | 24 Nov 1938                | 31 Mar 1939              | 1 Sep 1939              |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 2.2 YEARS   | 18.1 WEEKS                 | 22.1 WEEKS               |                         |

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CASE STUDY 5DANZIG 1939 PHASE 2 - GERMANY

1. From 1919 the German Government was aware that any dispute or conflict with Poland could spill over into the West (i.e. involve France and Britain). The National Interest at stake here for the Germans was the Ruhr Valley Industrial Basin. If Britain and France chose to act in support of Poland, the post World War I neutralization of the Rhineland, and disarmament of Germany, made the latter very vulnerable to an Allied move into the Basin. This identified a General Capability for the Western Allies to threaten German National Interests in relation to any dispute between Germany and Poland. A General Hostile Intent was also identified at the same time by the German Government as France and Britain had both been active in the formation of Poland as a state. This had been accomplished at the expense of considerable areas of German territory. France also followed these acts up with a military alliance with Poland in February 1921 which was directed obviously against Germany<sup>1</sup>.

2. This was the beginning of the Notional Threat Phase for the expansion of the German-Poland dispute to the West. The German Government was to be involved in other crises with the Western Powers between 1919-39, but excluding the Danzig Crisis, they did not involve Poland. The most direct means available to the Western Powers of exerting pressure on Germany in all these crises was to threaten the Ruhr Valley. This did not mean there was a continuity of threat recognition from the German point of view. The German Governments of the 1920s and 1930s saw these crises as involving different issues, although they were directed towards the same end - the revision of Germany's political military and economic status in Europe. This meant that each crisis was distinct, and had different threat phases associated with it<sup>2</sup>.

Specific Hostile Intent

3. The Locarno Treaties gave Weimar Germany security in the West for the first time since World War I. They pointedly excluded any understanding involving Eastern Europe, in particular Poland (see Case Study 2). The German Government began a policy of economic confrontation with Poland (see Case Study 4) largely because the prospect of any supportive action for Poland by the Western Powers was now remote. The customs war with Poland dragged on until 1933 when it was resolved harmoniously (see Case Study 4). With Poland now neutralised the German Government turned its attention to the West to deal with problems associated with the Versailles Treaty. Joint action between Poland and Britain/France was not now envisaged by the German Government. There is no evidence in German planning to show that this possibility was even re-considered until September 1938<sup>3</sup>.

4. German foreign policy changed after Munich, and demands began to be made for the return by Poland of Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Hitler and his government knew that by doing this they ran the risk of provoking a crisis with Poland, which could spill over to the West. However, Hitler and his Foreign Minister had concluded from Munich, that the British Government wanted nothing so much as to disentangle itself from all commitments to Central Europe. Chamberlain stated after Munich that there were no outstanding matters of dispute between Germany and Britain. This was taken by the Germans to confirm their impression that they were being given an almost free hand to rationalize the political shape of Central Europe. In any event, Hitler had the Munich experience to reassure him i.e. that the British and French Governments would not commit themselves to the protection of any Central European nation once pressure had been applied, and the threat of war existed<sup>4</sup>.

5. The first major test of the validity of this view was the British reaction to the annexation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia by Germany on 15 March 1939. The British responded on 31 March with an unconditional guarantee to Poland for her security against similar acts of aggression. This was aimed at Germany, and was perceived in this manner by Hitler. The latter saw it as an attempt to encircle Germany with military alliances, and clear evidence of a Specific Hostile Intent towards the German National Interests of revision of the last irksome vestiges of the Versailles Treaty (which had created the Treaty of Danzig and given Poland the Corridor at German expense); and the acquisition of Lebensraum in Eastern Europe<sup>5</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

6. The German Government had difficulty in conceiving the manner in which Britain and its ally France, intended to make the guarantee to Poland effective. The Western Powers had no means of rendering direct assistance to Poland in the event of an attack by Germany. Pressure could be applied on the Rhine to threaten the Ruhr Valley Industrial Basin; but the effectiveness of this was much diminished since Germany had been allowed to reoccupy the neutralized Rhineland in 1936. This removed a natural bridgehead, and gave the German Government the ability to conduct a defence in depth, which hitherto had been difficult. This was complemented by the construction of fixed fortifications - the West Wall. Hitler believed that the fortifications could hold out against Anglo-French attacks until the German armies in Poland were redeployed to the West<sup>6</sup>.

7. The key to the credibility of the Anglo-French guarantee in German perception was the role of Russia. The latter had the Specific Capability to assist the Polish Government, which if utilized, would involve Germany in a prolonged two-front war and ultimately bring about her defeat. The German Government knew from crypto-analysis of British and foreign signals, that Anglo-French attempts to secure agreement with Russia were being hindered by lack of determination from the British Government to ally itself with



Russia, and the Polish refusal to allow any Russian forces to enter Poland. Hitler concluded that the British Government's diplomatic gestures over Poland were bluff and would not be supported by military action<sup>7</sup>.

8. Despite the British difficulties, the German Government recognized that the negotiations might yet succeed if the Russian Government was not given another alternative in its quest for security. During May-June 1939, the German Government intensified its efforts to secure a rapprochement with Russia. By July Russia had begun to respond favourably; and in early August negotiations were moving rapidly towards a political agreement. On 3 August the German Government was satisfied that with the imminent neutralization of Russia, Britain and France would not fight for Poland, or if they did, would be held easily on the western fortifications on the Rhine, until Poland was liquidated. By mid August, Hitler had convinced himself that Britain and France could not possibly choose to fight as he had denied them the Specific Capability to make their guarantee to Poland effective. The survival of Poland was a lost cause. The British leaders he had got to know at Munich were not, in Hitler's opinion, the men to start a new world war<sup>8</sup>.

9. On 23 August 1939, the German and Russian Governments signed a non-aggression pact. This was the fulfilment of the German counter-strategy to British and French diplomatic and economic attempts to restrict German expansion into Central Europe. However, Hitler began to have doubts about the British and French reactions. The previous day the British Government had solemnly reaffirmed its guarantee to Poland, and had stated that the imminent Russo-German Pact would not affect its stand. The British Prime Minister had also communicated directly with Hitler on 23 August making the British position and determination unmistakably clear. The import of this was that the British Government was not as Hitler had thought previously, attempting to define its Specific Capability in terms of aiding Poland, which was no longer possible, but was organizing itself on the basis of fighting a prolonged war with Germany in the West, for which Poland was only a pretext. This envisaged the strategy of a stable defence in the West on the French frontier, and a naval blockade to promote economic collapse in Germany. With the Royal Navy, the French Army and the Maginot Line, and the expanding British Army, the German Government realized that the Specific Capability already existed to implement this strategy<sup>9</sup>.

#### Operational Response

10. This realization by Hitler and his government, and the news that Britain and Poland had signed formally a mutual assistance pact on 25 August, contributed heavily to the postponement of the German attack on Poland which had been scheduled for 26 August 1939. It was now suspended while the German Government considered the implications of British and French involvement. In the end, Hitler decided that the British and French leaders would lose their nerve and back down as they had done before, so he rescheduled the attack for 1 September 1939. However, he was prepared to accept the

risk of general war in order to achieve his objectives in Poland. The German Specific Threat Phase ended on 3 September 1939, when Britain and France declared war on Germany<sup>10</sup>.

| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT                             | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY                               | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
|---|--|--|-------------------------|
| 1919<br>NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE<br>20 years        | 31 Mar 1939<br>PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE<br>21.0 weeks | 25 Aug 1939<br>SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE<br>1.3 weeks | 3 Sep 1939              |

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CASE STUDY 6DANZIG 1939 PHASE 2 - BRITAINSpecific Capability

1. The Munich Agreements were accepted with relief by most members of the British Government and the community<sup>1</sup>. A major war had been averted and Britain sank back into a Perceived Threat Phase with the continuing recognition of a German Specific Capability to menace British National Interests in Western Europe. There was considerable speculation that a return to a really peaceful era was now possible; that the 'Concert of Europe' could be revived to preside over a European peace system; and that Chamberlain's cherished Anglo-German Agreement was the culmination of that detente with Germany which the British Government had so persistently sought. Some of the comments made after Munich gave the impression that Europe had virtually returned to a no threat era. It seems that Chamberlain really believed he had brought back a lasting achievement. Lord Swinton told Chamberlain privately: 'I will support you, PM, provided that you are clear that you have been buying time for rearmament'. But Chamberlain produced the Anglo-German Declaration and exclaimed: 'But don't you see, I have brought back peace'<sup>2</sup>.

2. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that British leaders, while maintaining that the danger of war with Germany over Czechoslovakia was now past, accepted that Britain had to continue to take note of Germany's Specific Capability. But the British Government saw no need to accelerate the rearmament programme. Rearmament continued at a gentle pace. There was no intention of switching to a war footing<sup>3</sup>. Chamberlain and his advisers in no way felt that the recent crisis indicated that there was any need for an increase in the ceiling on defence expenditure. That Chamberlain regarded Munich as a vindication of the policies of rationing and appeasement is readily apparent<sup>4</sup>.

3. This mix of optimism, remedying of defence deficiencies, and opposition to great arms programmes, was epitomized in Chamberlain's declaration to the Cabinet on 3 October 1938. Chamberlain expressed his belief that:

'We were now in a more hopeful position, and that the contacts which had been established with the Dictator Powers opened up the possibility that we might be able to reach some agreement with them which would stop the armament race. It was clear, however, that it would be madness for the country to stop rearming until we were convinced that other countries would act in the same way. For the time being, therefore, we should relax no particle of effort until our defences had been made good. That, however, was not the same as to say that as a thanks offering for the present detente, we should at once embark

on a great increase in our armaments programme'<sup>5</sup>.

4. Conciliation still loomed larger in Chamberlain's mind than did any feeling of a desperate need to rearm. When Halifax suggested it was time to bring some of the opposition and dissident Conservatives into the government, he was rebuffed. Chamberlain strove increasingly to bypass all but the entirely faithful. Halifax himself, however, was not fully convinced that Hitler had hostile intentions towards Britain or its National Interests. He regarded German expansion in Central Europe as 'a normal and natural thing', and, according to the United States (US) Ambassador, Halifax felt that there was no point in fighting Hitler unless he directly interfered with Britain or the Dominions<sup>6</sup>. The basic British indifference towards events in Central Europe again manifested itself. The arrangements for a guarantee of the rump of Czechoslovakia were allowed to degenerate into a farce. Chamberlain believed it was too dangerous for France and Britain to be put in a position of having to go to war because of action on the part of Germany and Italy<sup>7</sup>.

5. On 26 October 1938 the British Cabinet discussed the question of establishing a Ministry of Supply with powers of compulsion. Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of State for War and Ernest Brown, the Secretary of State for Labour, argued in favour of the proposal, but Cabinet supported Chamberlain's and Inskip's contention that it would be premature and counterproductive to institute any such measures of compulsion in peacetime. On 31 October Chamberlain emphasized in the Cabinet that British foreign policy was one of appeasement. Britain had to aim at establishing relations with the Dictator Powers which would lead to a settlement in Europe and a sense of stability. It was false to emphasize rearmament, and it was fallacious to argue that the nature of the Munich Agreements suggested that additional arms programmes were needed<sup>8</sup>.

6. After Munich all the Services demanded large increases in their budgets but Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons on 1 November 1938 that, while acceleration of existing rearmament programmes was permissible, there must be no increase in scope. The defensive balance of the Services did not change either. The old priorities were confirmed by the Defence Policy Requirements Committee (DPRC) on 7 November. The Royal Air Force continued to receive priority with the concentration on defence - fighters to prevent the 'knockout blow'. As few bombers as possible were to be built, so long as the factories and plant were not actually idle<sup>9</sup>.

7. The British Government did not immediately discern that the Munich settlement, by weakening Czechoslovakia and virtually eliminating the Czech Army as an effective fighting force, had drastically altered France's strategic situation. From the French point of view, Munich emphasized the need for a large British European ground force to take the place of the Czech Army<sup>10</sup>. The doctrine of limited British liability on the continent continued to dominate in London for three months after Munich. On 22 November 1938 Chamberlain informed the Cabinet that the French must be told quite firmly about the limits of British military assistance on

land<sup>11</sup>.


8. At a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) on 15 December 1938 Halifax first tentatively suggested that 'a time might come when the French would cease to be enthusiastic about their relations with Great Britain if they were left with the impression that it was they who must bear the brunt of the fighting and slaughter on land'. A week later the British Military Attache in Paris informed London that the time had come already. The French General Staff were looking to Britain to redress the balance by providing the divisions lost to them in Central Europe; while French public opinion was unanimous in demanding from Britain, not simply the distant support of naval and air power, but - a sombre and portentous phase - 'un effort du sang'<sup>12</sup>.

9. The residual confidence of the British Government that Hitler had been appeased at Munich was severely shaken by secret information provided by the Foreign Office in January that Germany was preparing plans to invade Holland and/or Switzerland. The Foreign Policy Committee (FPC) requested the Chiefs of Staff (COS) to report on whether Dutch territorial integrity was so vital a strategic interest as to necessitate intervention in case of a German attack, and if so, what military action could be taken. There was still a reluctance to enter into commitments and an even greater reluctance to declare them, yet also a recognition that these commitments could not be entirely avoided<sup>13</sup>.

10. On 25 January 1939 Halifax gave a resume of the intelligence reports which had come to hand. All suggested the development of a German Specific Hostile Intent to threaten Britain and her National Interests. According to Halifax, there were very definite indications that Hitler might be contemplating an attack on the West during the coming spring but there was no proof that the Fuhrer had definitely committed himself to such action. All that could be said with practical certainty was that an explosion of Germany was likely to come in the comparatively near future and that it was necessary to take immediate measures to guard against the possibility of it being directed against Britain. These were not welcome words to Chamberlain who continued to insist that Germany had no aggressive intentions and could be appeased. He did not accept that the reports were necessarily accurate. However, Cabinet concluded that while there was little scope for acceleration of the Defence programmes over the next two or three months, it was important to take all practical steps to put the armed services into a state of readiness to meet the contingency of a possible emergency in the near future<sup>14</sup>.

11. The COS reported that an invasion of Holland should be regarded by Britain as a 'causus belli'. Chamberlain accepted that Britain would have to intervene but doubted that it was advisable to say so at once. An immediate statement - a binding commitment - might be embarrassing and might provoke Hitler. Thus no public statement was to be made but steps designed to put the Services into a state of readiness to meet any emergency were authorised. The decision to defend Holland raised new problems of military planning. The FPC agreed to open staff conversations with the French on the basis of war against both Germany and Italy





XEROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A



combined<sup>15</sup>.

12. On 26 January 1939 the CID met to consider the question of the establishment of a Ministry of Supply. Inskip who now believed appeasement was a failure, had reversed his position and now advocated the creation of a Ministry of Supply. The CID endorsed Inskip's suggestion but Inskip had already been asked to resign his post by Chamberlain who continued to put his faith in appeasement. Chamberlain felt Inskip's changed attitude threatened his control of Cabinet<sup>16</sup>.

13. On 1 February 1939 Cabinet formally approved the FPC recommendation that Britain should consider 'as a direct challenge' German invasion of Holland or Switzerland on the grounds that such action would be clear evidence of an attempt to dominate Europe by force. Ministers agreed that this was a big step forward ... almost tantamount to an alliance but one which had to be taken<sup>17</sup>. The British Government now recognized that a significant German capability to threaten Britain's National Interests in Western Europe could not be allowed to become even more pronounced. Britain could not stand aside and allow the French strategic position to deteriorate further.

14. Hore-Belisha stated in the Cabinet on 2 February 1939 that the War Office needed £81m more than it had been allotted in the previous year to meet efficiently its recently revived continental responsibility. Even now Chamberlain doubted the wisdom of such a case and did not take very seriously French threats not to fight without adequate British assistance on the ground in Europe. Both Chamberlain and Simon questioned the priority of the army over home air defence and the air raid precautions (ARP)<sup>18</sup>.

15. On 6 February 1939 Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that 'any threat to the vital interests of France from whatever quarter it came would evoke the immediate co-operation of Great Britain'<sup>19</sup>. £64m was eventually granted to the army but the momentum of the change slackened when the reports of an immediate attack on Holland proved to be misleading. Only on 22 February, after private talks between Chamberlain, Simon, Inskip and Hore-Belisha, did Cabinet authorise the army to equip a field force of one mobile division, four regular infantry divisions, and four Territorial Army divisions<sup>20</sup>.

16. All measures instituted by the British Government in response to the January scare can be characterized as tentative contingency moves in case the situation should deteriorate further. They were not serious preparations for war as Chamberlain and the dominant elements in Cabinet were still convinced that the Munich settlement was valid in terms of removing the only serious cause of conflict in Europe. There was no decision to create a Ministry of Supply to coordinate and streamline the supply of new equipment and munitions to the Services. There was no release of additional funds to finance expansion of existing peacetime rearmament programmes. There was no enactment of legislation or promulgation of regulations

to impose compulsory organization and direction of industrial labour for critical armaments industries. There was no enactment of a civil defence bill nor were practical schemes of evacuation of major cities prepared<sup>21</sup>.

17. Even the major initiative taken after the January war scare, the authorization of the nine division field force, was little more than a gesture to stiffen French resolve, a gesture that the British Government would have preferred to avoid, and one that did not really satisfy Paris. The French argued that nothing less than the implementation of military conscription would give a clear indication of genuine British commitment. But the British Government regarded conscription as out of the question. The principle of rationing of the Services was retained, and Simon confessed himself gravely disturbed even at what had been allowed through. Certain elements in the government felt that they had been blackmailed into providing as much for the field force as they had<sup>22</sup>.

18. Despite the alarms of January 1939 Chamberlain was still sure of his mission, his crusade for appeasement, and he was also sure it was succeeding. On 10 March Chamberlain told the House of Commons that Europe was settling down and the British Government was turning its attention to disarmament and to more trade with Germany. Hoare on the same day spoke glowingly of a 10 year peace plan and of new riches, of economic development to be undertaken on a Europe-wide scale, of a new golden age<sup>23</sup>.

19. Five days later German troops entered the Czech capital, Prague. The German action was not really a simple and clear-cut case of aggression. It appeared to be not so much an invasion as an entry into a power vacuum. Hitler's moves ostensibly had been taken in the context of the collapse of the Czech state, and with the concurrence of the Czech and Slovak leaders<sup>24</sup>. Nevertheless, Hitler's action in incorporating non-German citizens into the Reich, especially after his statement at the time of the Sudetenland crisis that the Sudetenland was the last territorial claim he had to make in Europe, seemed clear confirmation that appeasement was a failure. It appeared that Hitler would be bound by no promises, that he would not be satisfied with the granting of legitimate German demands, and that it was his intention not merely to recover those Germans outside the Reich but to dominate Europe.

20. Chamberlain found, in the quasi-legal way Hitler had secured the extinction of the Czech state, an excuse for inaction, and he clung to his appeasement policy. In the days immediately following the fall of Prague he took the position that the event meant nothing and consequently demanded no British response. Chamberlain told the Cabinet on 15 March 1939 that the Czech state had completely broken up. He suggested that there had been no aggression. While it was very likely that the disruption of Czechoslovakia had been largely engineered by Germany, the British guarantee was not a guarantee against the exercise of moral pressure. German actions had all been taken under the guise of

agreement with the Czech Government<sup>25</sup>. In the House of Commons Chamberlain appealed for support for a continuation of the appeasement policy: '...do not let us...be deflected from our course. Let us remember that the desire of all the peoples of the world still remains concentrated on the hopes of peace'<sup>26</sup>. Chamberlain gave an assurance that his government would continue to promote the substitution of the method of discussion for the method of force in the settlement of differences<sup>27</sup>.

### Specific Hostile Intent

21. The lesson of Prague was that there were no racial limits to Hitler's policy. No one was safe. Even if Chamberlain and other political leaders did not at once grasp these implications, the British public did. Chamberlain and his supporters were quickly convinced that their position that Prague meant nothing, was no longer politically viable, and that it was imperative for Britain to take a strong position against further German aggression. The hardening of parliamentary and public opinion in Britain prompted the government to turn reluctantly to preparation for war, and it persuaded Chamberlain to foreshadow a change in British policy in a speech at Birmingham on 17 March 1939. Without making specific pledges, the British Prime Minister implied that Germany's expansionist aims were clear and would have to be resisted. On 18 March Chamberlain assured Cabinet that he had now come definitely to the conclusion that Hitler's attitude made it impossible to continue to negotiate on the old basis with the Nazi regime. The same day Cabinet formally endorsed the new policy. Cabinet Ministers agreed that the next act of German aggression, would mean war<sup>28</sup>. This decision signified that the British Government had recognised a German Specific Hostile Intent. Britain was now entering a Specific Threat Phase.

22. After the pressure of public opinion had forced them to re-examine their assumptions, Britain's political leaders now appeared to accept that German intentions were clearly hostile towards Britain and British National Interests in Europe. Chamberlain's declaration in the Cabinet room on 18 March seemed to reflect the viewpoint of the British people that when, where and how hostilities would begin was a matter of tactical detail<sup>29</sup>. Chamberlain stated that the particular 'causus belli' was not important:

'The real issue is that Germany showed signs that she intended to proceed with her search for world domination, we must take steps to stop her by attacking her on two fronts. We should attack Germany, not in order to save a particular victim, but in order to pull down the bully'<sup>30</sup>.

A week later the Prime Minister stated to the FPC: 'Our objective (is) to check and defeat Germany's attempt at world domination'<sup>31</sup>.

23. Germany's policy in Europe, even in Eastern Europe, ostensibly was now regarded in London as one which Britain could not view with indifference. A press despatch from London dated 19 March

1939 suggested that the British Government no longer believed that aloofness would preserve the British Empire's security, but that the German thrust in Europe was a challenge to the British Empire, which had to be met by all wherever it occurred. Halifax had told the US Ambassador on 12 October 1938 that there was no point in fighting Hitler unless he directly interfered with Britain or the Dominions. That Hitler's policy might conflict with the Empire's interests and consequently require a British response seemed to be the message of a speech by Halifax in the House of Lords on 20 March 1939<sup>32</sup>. In the following months the British Government attempted to obtain assurances from Russia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece and Rumania that they would join with Britain in resisting future German aggression.

24. Poland was emerging as the dominant political force in Eastern Europe. She had a common frontier with Germany; was in a position to assist Rumania; and seemed to Chamberlain particularly, to be the one Eastern European country able to threaten Germany with the prospect of a war on two fronts. When reports (some substantiated by the Secret Intelligence Service as to definite dates fixed for action), relating to German intentions to attack Poland were received in London, Chamberlain secured Cabinet endorsement for a guarantee to Poland. On 31 March Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons an unconditional guarantee to Poland<sup>33</sup>. It seemed evident that the British, for the first time since 1914, had clearly and irrevocably recognised, the strategic unity of Europe, and the need for British participation in the European power struggle in view of the threat that Germany's Specific Hostile Intent posed to Britain's National Interests in Europe and to home security.

25. The guarantee policy was realistic in the sense that it was a policy predicated on power which seemed more likely to have an effect on Hitler than a policy based on words. Chamberlain and his Cabinet colleagues finally had realized what the game of international relations was about, but it did not follow that they could play it well. The British had no power position in Eastern Europe and no means of getting assistance to Poland especially. The change in policy had been hasty and ill-prepared. The guarantee was incautious, unconditional. It was up to the Poles to decide when and whether the time had come to fight. The guarantee was one-sided as Poland was not asked to give a reciprocal guarantee<sup>34</sup>.

26. Cabinet Ministers had made their decision on the guarantee against the best military advice tendered by the Chiefs of Staff. A COS report on 28 March recognized the benefit of threatening Germany with a war on two fronts. However, the COS warned that Poland and Rumania would be easily conquered and pointed to the danger of surrendering the issues of peace and war with Germany to the action of governments over whom Britain had no control, and at a time when the defence program was far from complete. In their general conclusion, the COS protested vigorously against the scope of the contemplated guarantees. Cabinet apparently was not exposed to the full force of the COS criticisms. The COS report appears to have been deliberately suppressed and Lord Chatfield's interpretation of the thrust of their arguments, given to the Cabinet on 30 March, was tendentious and misleading<sup>35</sup>.

27. The announcement of the guarantee of Poland did seem to suggest a tremendous change in attitude and policy on the part of the British Government, at least on the surface. It has even been argued that the guarantee constituted a deliberate open challenge to Hitler. Therefore it marked the abandonment of a peace policy by the British leaders and their acceptance of the probability that Hitler would accept the British challenge and continental war would result. The British leaders, according to this theory, had decided that they could not afford any further loss of British prestige and any further undermining of Britain's power position. Acceptance of the notion of preventive war, in the light of reports from the British Military Attache in Berlin, that Germany would inevitably grow stronger, may have been influential in the British decision<sup>36</sup>.

28. The Polish guarantee was necessary to ensure that Poland did not succumb to German brandishments to make a deal over Danzig and other outstanding German-Polish issues. Thus, so the argument goes, the British were now prepared to fight for Danzig and needed to ensure that Germany was engaged on two fronts. Poland's value lay not in the capacity to launch an offensive against Germany, but in her capacity to absorb German divisions, even after defeat. The guarantee can therefore be seen, in the final analysis, as a pretext for Britain going to war with Germany<sup>37</sup>.

29. However, it is more likely that the British Government had issued its guarantee to Poland as a gesture of deterrence. The British leaders hoped Hitler would not accept their challenge and thus they would not have to fight<sup>38</sup>. It was a means to gain time and to deter Hitler but the time gained was to be used not so much to prepare wholeheartedly for war as to try to lever the Poles into concessions over Danzig: a military promise used as a diplomatic weapon. By giving the guarantee Chamberlain diminished the pressure that he was trying to exert on Poland over Danzig and at the same time deprived himself of his chance of an agreement with Russia. In view of Britain's known determination for a peaceful settlement of the Danzig question the guarantee was weak support for Poland and weak deterrence of Hitler. It combined the maximum temptation with manifest provocation since it incited Hitler to demonstrate the futility of such a guarantee to a country out of reach from the West, while making the Poles even less inclined to consider concessions to Russia, and at the same time making it impossible for Hitler to draw back without losing face<sup>39</sup>.

30. Public opinion was a major consideration in the government's policy-making after the Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia. The guarantee to Poland appears to have been designed partly for public consumption in Britain, to at least give the appearance of a firm policy since such a policy was deemed to be politically necessary<sup>40</sup>. However, Chamberlain had by no means concluded that Britain would need to fight a war against Germany.

31. The Birmingham speech was not so much a revolution as half a revolution - Chamberlain's purpose to lead the world to peace had not changed<sup>41</sup>. He did state in that speech that he was 'not

prepared to engage this country by new unspecified commitments operating under conditions which cannot now be foreseen<sup>42</sup>. In other words, he would continue to avoid specifically anti-German alliances. He would keep his hands free, press on with rearmament and wait for Hitler, in some concrete way, to re-establish the confidence which he had shattered by occupying Czechoslovakia. On 18 March when he informed Cabinet that he no longer believed in negotiations with Hitler on the old basis, he also stated that this did not mean that negotiations with the German people were impossible<sup>43</sup>.

32. In the negotiations for an Anglo-Polish security link, neither Chamberlain nor the Poles wanted to provoke Hitler into violent action. Neither Chamberlain nor the Polish Government wanted to burn all their bridges to Berlin. Both considered caution the best form of defence. The key to an effective counter to Hitler was a partnership with Russia, but neither gave really serious consideration to a pact with that country<sup>44</sup>. In his speech in the House of Commons Chamberlain implied that he was by no means seeking to draw battle lines. He appealed for Hitler to come to his senses and not to force him into a war he did not want:

'I trust that our action, begun but not concluded, will prove to be the turning point not towards war which wins nothing, cures nothing, ends nothing, but towards a more wholesome era when reason will take the place of force and threats will make way for cool and well-marshalled arguments'<sup>45</sup>.

33. The leading elements in the British Government were still hesitant about gearing the country for war after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain and his closest supporters had to be pushed and prodded into taking actions to upgrade Britain's defences to meet the identified specific German threat. Neither national service nor the creation of a Ministry of Supply was announced as a concomitant of the Polish guarantee. Chamberlain still ruled out conscription since he feared that there would be a disastrous effect on relations with the Labour Party and the trade union movement<sup>46</sup>.

34. The raising of the Territorial Army to its war strength, and then doubling its size, was announced as an alternative to conscription. Chamberlain arrived at his decision after heavy pressure. Throughout 28 March, Chamberlain, Hore-Belisha and Wilson exchanged letters and minutes and consulted together over lunch. They were concerned, in the words of the Secretary of State for War, with the 'over-riding political necessity of doing something on an impressive scale'. Hore-Belisha received strong support from Halifax who stressed the need to make an announcement which would impress foreign opinion and Europe as to Britain's military determination<sup>47</sup>.

35. Such combined pressure Chamberlain could not resist. When Simon, who so consistently opted for economic stability rather than

the financial burdens of rearmament, stated he was impressed by Halifax's arguments, the day was won. Simon, reflecting Halifax, emphasized the need to provide 'some impressive evidence of the prompt determination of our people, expressed in some very definite form'<sup>48</sup>. The decision was very much a response to the public mood, a symbolic gesture to shore up France's less than overwhelming resolve to fight Germany, and a deterrent message to Hitler. The decision was taken almost casually without consulting the War Office or even the Chiefs of Staff. The Territorial Army programme was still sketchy and incomplete and the training and equipment lagged far behind manpower. The main military reason for the decision was not to provide a force for Continental service but to provide additional manpower to place the anti-aircraft defences in a state of 24 hour readiness<sup>49</sup>.

36. The increase in the Territorial Army would not provide any sort of short term deterrent because it would take at least 18 months to train and equip the new force, and even longer to create sufficient industrial capacity to support it. The Treasury accepted the need for such steps but raised the continuing question of whether the nation could afford them. When Hore-Belisha argued the case for adding 50 000 men to the regular army, Simon closed the purse strings. The Treasury consistently endeavoured to limit defence spending until the beginning of the war<sup>50</sup>.

37. The French Government continued to press for the introduction of conscription in Britain and the Foreign Office and the War Office also were strongly advocating the move. When the US Government joined in the chorus and Hore-Belisha took his political life in his hands by insisting on conscription, Chamberlain finally gave way. On 26 April Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons the introduction of conscription. It became law on 18 May. The major importance of the conscription measure was as a symbolic gesture to France and Poland and to other nations on whom Britain had lavished guarantees. However, conscription was very limited. It only applied to men of 20 years of age. Very few men were actually called up before the war broke out, in large part because Britain lacked the industrial capacity and training organization to equip and train them. Again the major military reason for conscription was the need to provide support personnel to man the nation's anti-aircraft positions continuously.

38. On 9 April Chamberlain's closest adviser, Sir Horace Wilson, added his authoritative opinion to those who were demanding a Ministry of Supply. He believed it would be advisable to give it a trial run under peace conditions as it would certainly be wanted in time of war. Cabinet discussed the question on 19 April and a decision to establish such a ministry was announced in the House of Commons the next day. However, the Ministry of Supply bill authorized by the Cabinet in May was actually the weakest version it could have gotten away with politically. There was strong sentiment in Parliament that favoured the taking of much more sweeping powers to control both industry and labour, but the government resisted increased powers in order not to alienate either group. Despite the failure of cooperation with respect to profits in key armament industries, the government clung to the policy of cooperation with

industry as the basis of the rearmament programme. To the end the government recoiled from the imposition of compulsory measures, taking up such powers only when forced to do so by political circumstances<sup>52</sup>.

39. In the period from the invasion of Czechoslovakia to the invasion of Poland each of the apparently significant changes were tempered by the same restraints that had been so important in shaping earlier rearmament policy. The expansion of the army was held back by concerns about cost, conscription was limited out of deference to organized labour, and a Ministry of Supply was created with a minimum of powers in the hope that the government could continue to carry out the rearmament programme on the basis of its policy of cooperation with business. Although the circumstances had changed, the political and economic concerns of the Cabinet had not<sup>53</sup>.

#### Operational Response

40. During the months following Prague, the British Cabinet oversaw the preparation of British defences and found allies. Nevertheless, wish-fulfillment and equivocation continued to be dominating features of British policy. Cabinet ministers wrestled with their consciences, had moments of doubt, spells of weakness and disappointed hopes. But they had almost immediately after Prague identified a German Specific Hostile Intent towards British interests and security and they had decided that another act of German aggression could not be countenanced. When the challenge was definitely made by Hitler on 1 September, they decided on war<sup>54</sup>. The Operational Response began on 3 September 1939.

SPECIFIC  
CAPABILITY

2 Oct 1938

PERCEIVED THREAT

PHASE

23.8 Weeks

SPECIFIC HOSTILE  
INTENT

18 Mar 1939

SPECIFIC THREAT

PHASE

24.1 Weeks

OPERATIONAL  
RESPONSE

3 Sep 1939



NOTES

1. However, Duff Cooper, the First Lord of the Admiralty, resigned in protest.
2. Quoted in Colvin, I., 'The Chamberlain Cabinet', London, Victor Gollanz, 1971, p. 168.
3. Between Munich and the outbreak of war British expenditure on armaments was one-fifth that of Germany's. British fighter production was one-half that of Germany's.

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5. Quoted in ibid., p. 233.

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7. Thorne, C., op. cit., pp. 96-97.

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15. Parkinson, R., op. cit., pp. 95-97.
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16. Shay, R., op. cit., p. 263-267.
  17. Parkinson, R., op. cit., p. 98.
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- Gibbs, N., op. cit., p. 655.
18. Middlemas, K., op. cit., p. 5.
  19. Quoted in Aster, S., op. cit., p. 50.
  20. Middlemas, K., op. cit., p. 428.
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  23. Lafore, L., 'The End of Glory: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War II', J.B., Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1970, p. 236.

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CASE STUDY 7NORWAY 1940 - NORWAYGeneral Hostile Intent and General Capability

1. The first formal intimation of the Norwegian Government, of strategic interest in their country, by the major powers involved in World War II, came on 16 September 1939, when the British Government gratuitously guaranteed Norway against attack. This might have been seen as the first sign of competition between Britain and Germany for Norway, and a threat to Norway's National Interests of preserving her neutrality and security, but the Norwegian Government, did not interpret this as being the beginning of a Notional Threat Phase<sup>1</sup>.

2. The Norwegian Government, dominated in foreign policy by its Foreign Minister Dr Koht, believed that Norway was no longer important militarily to Britain or Germany as the increased range of sea and air power had allegedly reduced the strategic needs of these nations for fixed military installations on Norwegian territory. The major powers could strike at each other directly and no longer needed to involve Norway. Norway, by virtue of her geographic position, and recent world developments in weapons technology, lay outside the vortex of international conflict according to Dr Koht. In fact, the German Government still considered Norway as the optimal site for basing submarines and warships for interdiction of British sea lines of communications across the Atlantic. The long Norwegian coastline was impossible to blockade to the same degree of effectiveness as that of Germany<sup>2</sup>.

3. Dr Koht and the Norwegian Government recognised that Norway was an important economic interest to Germany. During winter, German supplies of Swedish iron ore were transported across northern Norway, and down its coast to Germany, to avoid the ice bound Baltic Sea. Being the major source of iron ore for Germany, the German Government was anxious to prevent threatened British interference with this trade route through Norwegian territorial waters. The Norwegian Government realised that this could be the cause of German interference in Norwegian affairs<sup>3</sup>.

4. The Norwegian Government thought that German freedom of action on this matter was severely curtailed, and would only be initiated as a last desperate measure in the face of the complete failure of Norway to protect her neutral status. This comforting thought was based on the assumption that the Royal Navy controlled the North Sea and constituted a credible deterrent to German maritime operations against Norway. If this failed in the first instance, the Norwegian Government was confident that British naval superiority would make a German stand in Norway probably untenable. By denying Germany the ability to act independently, i.e. German reactions were contingent on those of Britain, the Norwegian Government defined its fundamental problem (and National Interest)

as being to preserve Norwegian neutrality from the attempts of Britain and her ally France, to provoke Norway into entering the war on their side<sup>4</sup>.

5. Actually, the German Government did not accept that the Royal Navy was dominant, and looked to its newly developed air power to blunt the effectiveness of surface warships. Not accepting the role of a dependent actor, the German Government began preparations to occupy Norway to protect the ore route, and to gain bases from which to menace British sea lines of communication<sup>5</sup>.

6. Because of the assumptions and preconceived ideas adopted by the Norwegian Government, it did not enter a Notional Threat Phase for the German threat until December 1939-January 1940. During this period Allied pressure on Norway had mounted steadily. Britain and France had attempted to gain transit rights through northern Norway and Sweden, to aid Finland against Russia. This, incidentally, would have placed the Allies across the German ore route. Their requests were refused by the two Scandinavian governments. At the same time, Britain was applying heavy pressure on Norway during the bilateral shipping and trade negotiations in the autumn of 1939, and had also been intercepting Norwegian vessels in the Atlantic and escorting them to Scotland where they were searched. The German reaction was to warn Dr Koht not to give in to Allied pressure over Finland and the iron ore route. The Norwegians had appreciated that Germany had always had a General Capability to threaten Norway, but the German warning now added a General Hostile Intent<sup>6</sup>.

7. The Altmark incident of 16 February 1940 was an embarrassment to the Norwegian Government as it demonstrated clearly that they had been unable to protect Norwegian neutrality, despite having two gun boats present. However, German protests were less extreme than expected, and the government concluded that the situation was still under control. Having re-established its credibility (in its own eyes at least) by again rejecting Allied requests of 2 March for transit rights to Finland, the Norwegian Government remained convinced that Germany would still prefer the status quo and a neutral Norway. This was partly true, but the German Government had interpreted the Altmark incident as probable evidence of collusion between Norway and Britain, and had sped up its contingency planning for a possible occupation<sup>7</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

8. On the last three days of March, Allied newspapers were full of demands for action against the German iron ore route in Norwegian territorial waters. Churchill made a keynote speech indicating a hardening of Allied policy towards the neutrals; and on 2 April 1940 Chamberlain stated that specific measures were under consideration in regard to interference with German ore ships. This outlined a Specific Hostile Intent from the Allies; and according to the Norwegian Government's own logic, also outlined a Specific Hostile Intent from Germany, as the latter would probably attempt to respond to British initiatives in Norway in some way. This began Norway's Perceived Threat Phase of the German attack<sup>8</sup>.



### Specific Capability

9. Allied pressure continued to build up, distracting attention away from German preparations for a pre-emptive operation against Norway. On 5 April 1940, Dr Koht received notes from the British and French envoys, in which it was stated that the Allies considered it within their rights to take such measures as necessary to prevent Germany from obtaining, from Norway and Sweden, resources or facilities which could help her to prosecute the war. On 8 April the Allies informed the Norwegian Government that their naval forces had laid mines at three specified points along the Norwegian coast to stop the German iron ore traffic<sup>9</sup>.

10. This convinced Koht that he was facing a major crisis with the Allies whom he knew had the Specific Capability to carry out significant action against Norway. He was nevertheless certain that if Norway had to join the war, it had to be on the side of the Allies, even though the latter were likely to prove to be the instruments of the destruction of his preferred neutralist policy. In the short term every effort was to be made to preserve this policy, so the German half of the problem was given low priority. The Norwegian Government did not believe that the Germans had the Specific Capability to interfere anyway, especially in the face of the power of the Royal Navy. Since the Allies were being viewed reluctantly as possible future partners, and Germany was thought to lack a credible capability, the Norwegian Government was loath to mobilize its army, to fully man forts guarding harbours, to block airfield runways or to mine the narrow water approaches to the capital and main cities. None of these measures had been carried out when the invasion began on 9 April 1940<sup>10</sup>.

11. Yet by late March and early April there was no lack of information on German activity in north German ports. This was moving swiftly towards creating a Specific Capability for the invasion of Norway. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry had received its first warnings about German naval operations on 23 December 1939, and in January/February 1940. These had come from its envoy in Berlin; but since no German action had eventuated, they were discounted. During March, the Foreign Ministry received a warning from the Swedish Government, about a concentration of troops and naval vessels in the German North Sea and Baltic ports. Further information was received from the Norwegian envoy in Berlin on 29 March, which stated that the iron ore traffic was once again the centre of German attention. This was confirmed by Swedish sources on 3 April, which also noted that German troops were embarking at Stettin and Swinemunde<sup>11</sup>.

12. Dr Koht and the Norwegian Government interpreted these preparations as part of German operations associated with their forthcoming offensive against France; or as a prelude to operations in the East Baltic or Jutland; or as a precautionary measure against pre-emptive Allied action against Norway. The latter was regarded as the least likely as it was expected that British sea power was quite sufficient to impose prohibitive loss on such an operation. The presence of several major warships in the Northern

German ports was seen as the beginning of a major operation to break out into the Atlantic. Thus when some of these vessels were seen proceeding up the Norwegian coast on 7 April, this was taken as confirmation that this operation was under way<sup>12</sup>.

13. Information of a more explicit nature about German activities continued to come in during 4/8 April, but it was rationalized according to the concepts outlined above. The attention of the Norwegian Government was concentrated on the Allied activities which appeared unambiguous, whereas information on German activities appeared to be equivocal. Even when a German steamer was sunk on 8 April 1940 off Kristiansand, and rescued German troops stated they were on their way to Bergen to save it from the British, the Norwegian Government did not conclude that a German operation to seize Norway was underway. There is no evidence to suggest that the Government had altered its view on the existence of a German Specific Capability to implement such an operation until the attack began on 9 April 1940<sup>13</sup>.

#### Operational Response

14. The surprise of the German attack was almost total. The Norwegian Government's identification of a Specific Capability and recognition of the need for an Operational Response were almost instantaneous, occurring early on 9 April. The Norwegian Specific Threat Phase was therefore insignificantly small.

| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Dec 1939/Jan 1940                                   | 29 Mar/2 Apr 1940          | 9 Apr 1940               | 9 Apr 1940              |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 0.3 years   | 1 week                     | 0 weeks                  |                         |

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CASE STUDY 8NORWAY 1940 - GERMANYGeneral Hostile Intent and General Capability

1. The idea of a German occupation of Norway was first proposed seriously by Admiral Wolfgang Wegener in his book of 1929 on naval strategy in World War I. He deplored the German failure to occupy Norway and Denmark and thus gain bases to break the Allied Blockade. With more access to the Atlantic, the tables could have been turned and an effective blockade mounted on the British Isles. Wegener's views had no official status with the German Government and Navy. Partial acceptance had to wait until September 1939 when the outbreak of war and the British Guarantee to Norway, prompted Admiral Rolf Carls, the third ranking officer in the German Navy, to suggest to the Naval Commander-in-Chief the importance of occupying the Norwegian coast in a war with Britain<sup>1</sup>.

2. Admiral Raeder adopted this view and presented it to Hitler on 10 October 1939. The latter accepted the validity of the navy's argument, but preferred in the short term the existing situation, where Norwegian neutrality allowed German iron ore ships to travel to Germany safely, in territorial waters, from the main winter iron ore transit port of Narvik in Northern Norway. The maintenance of this trade route was a National Interest for Germany, as much of the German war effort rested on the iron ore obtained in this manner. As long as the British gave no signs of violating Norwegian neutrality, Hitler was content to ignore the situation while he concentrated on the war in the West<sup>2</sup>.

3. Hitler's interest in Norway remained superficial throughout October and November. However, on 30 November 1939, Russia attacked Finland, provoking a wave of public sympathy in Scandinavia, France and Britain, in support of the Finns. Germany, being bound by the German-Russian Pact, received a backlash of hostility. It did not take the German Government long to realize that a confluence of interest was occurring between the Allies, and Norway and Sweden, which could result in Allied attempts to aid directly the embattled Finns. Such aid, as the German Government knew, could only reach Finland via Norway and Sweden. The most obvious transit route was across the northern wastes of the two nations, which would place, incidently, British and French forces in a position to threaten the German National Interests of the winter and summer iron ore routes from Narvik and Lulea<sup>3</sup>.

4. Further disturbing news came from the Norwegian Nazi Vidkun Quisling who claimed that the Norwegian Government had agreed secretly not to oppose a British invasion, if Norway became involved in war with one of the other Great Powers. On hearing this on 14 December 1939, Hitler concluded that an Allied General Hostile Intent towards German National Interests in Norway existed. This began the Notional Threat Phase for Germany, as the German

Government had always accepted that British sea power dominated the North Sea, which gave the British the General Capability to threaten the long and exposed Norwegian coast<sup>4</sup>.

5. On the same day Hitler ordered the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) to begin preliminary investigations on how to pre-empt a British takeover of Norway. Towards the end of December the OKW staff produced a rough summary entitled Studie Nord, of the main military and political issues relating to Norway. However, Hitler did not release this to the armed services for their views until 10 January 1940. His interest was tempered by the more pressing problems of the forthcoming offensive on the Western Front. Furthermore, he preferred that Norway should remain neutral, and thought that Allied pressure had declined or that Norway would resist it successfully. The Naval staff agreed with him<sup>5</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

6. By 23 January 1940 this view had changed for two reasons. Firstly, predictions of bad weather had forced the postponement of the western offensive until at least March. This gave the Allies time to intervene in Norway. Secondly, the German Government had become aware that the Allies had been exerting great diplomatic pressure on Norway and Sweden throughout late December and the first half of January, in order to gain passage for volunteers to Finland and for British naval forces to operate in Norwegian territorial waters. The Scandinavian nations had rebuffed firmly these muted threats; but the question remained of how long they would have the power and inclination to continue to do this. OKW thought that anti-German opinion was on the increase in Scandinavia<sup>6</sup>. Hitler had no difficulty in recognizing what amounted to an Allied Specific Hostile Intent to the German National Interests in this region. He ordered Studie Nord to be recalled to OKW. On 27 January the armed services were informed that henceforth work on Studie Nord would be carried out under Hitler's direct personal guidance and in the closest conjunction with the overall direction of the war. A working staff would be formed in OKW, which would be the nucleus for the operations staff. Each of the armed services was to provide an officer suitable for operations work, who also, if possible, had training in organization and supply. The operation was assigned the code name of Weseruebung<sup>7</sup>.

7. The beginning of the German Perceived Threat Phase was accompanied by some limited combined operations exercises around German Baltic ports, and some merchant vessels were fitted out for troops and vehicles. A few paratroop units and some transport aircraft were moved into the amphibious training area. On 16 February 1940 the British Navy seized in Norwegian territorial waters, the German ship ALTMARK which had been carrying 299 British seaman captured by the GRAF SPEE. The German Naval Staff interpreted the incident as a warning that Norwegian waters would not be safe for German shipping in the future i.e. the vital Narvik ore route would be interdicted. Hitler drew the same conclusion and also believed that the Norwegian Government had acted as Britain's willing accomplice in the matter. Two Norwegian gunboats were

present at the action, but had declined to intervene. The subsequent Norwegian protest to Britain was seen as a charade. On 19 February, Hitler ordered the speeding up of the operational planning he had initiated on 27 January 1940. On 21 February he appointed a commander for the operation, and directed him to streamline the planning and to determine the general resources he might require should the operation be executed. On 29 February the occupation of Denmark was included in the planning<sup>8</sup>.

### Specific Capability

8. Meanwhile, the German Government was becoming increasingly aware that the Allies were preparing to launch the sort of operation Hitler had feared. German intelligence knew that troops and ships were being gathered in Scotland. German Naval Intelligence was reading British naval codes which gave further insight. The Allied press seemed to be building pressure to launch such an operation in order to aid the Finns. Hitler accepted the import of these developments and thus recognised the existence of a British Specific Capability on 1 March 1940, and issued his directive for the implementation of Weseruebung, authorizing also the start of detailed and specific operational planning<sup>9</sup>.

### Operational Response

9. The beginning of the Specific Threat Phase was followed quickly by other important operational decisions. On 3 March Hitler decided that the operation should precede the attack on France, to protect the northern flank of the German western offensive. He wanted the forces for Weseruebung to be assembled by 10 March and ready for a landing in Norway beginning on 17 March. This deadline was not possible to meet, principally because of the persistence of ice in the Baltic Sea which prevented the assembly and loading of warships and transports. The declaration of peace between Finland and Russia on 12 March also injected a hesitation, for the German Government learnt through British naval signals that the Allies had cancelled their operation on 15 March. This did not delay significantly the German operation which, since Hitler's decision of 1 March, was now scheduled to go ahead regardless of Allied activities. The German Operational Response began on 9 April 1940 at 5.15 am<sup>10</sup>.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 14 Dec 1939   | 23/27 Jan 1940             | 1 Mar 1940               | 9 Apr 1940              |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 0.1 years   | 5 weeks                    | 5.6 weeks                |                         |

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CASE STUDY 9NORWAY 1940 - BRITAINGeneral Capability

1. The first official consideration of the possibility of British operations in and around Norway began on 27 August 1939. It was occasioned by the Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, requesting the Chiefs of Staff to consider the military commitments Britain might be called upon to make as a consequence of the government's proposed guarantee to Norway (this guarantee was extended on 16 September 1939). At this stage there was no consideration of offensive operations, but rather of necessary reactive measures to the possibility of German intervention in Norway. This signified the recognition by Britain of a General Capability from Germany<sup>1</sup>.

General Hostile Intent

2. Shortly after the war with Germany had begun, the British Government began to define more clearly its National Interests in respect of Norway. These fell within the Allied Grand Strategy of Blockade of Germany. This envisaged adopting a defensive posture on the western border of Germany inducing a military stalemate, and denying Germany any imports of food, minerals, or anything which could assist her war effort. The British National Interest in Norway was to prevent the use of Norway, or its territorial waters, by Germany to secure its iron ore routes. The British were also interested in preventing German acquisition of Norwegian ports from which to menace British lines of communication across the Atlantic and North Sea<sup>2</sup>.

3. On 19 September First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill, proposed an operation which involved the mining of Norwegian territorial waters around the port of Narvik. Its objective was to disrupt the German iron ore route which, in winter, came from Sweden to Narvik, and hence down the Norwegian coast to Germany. Churchill had recognized that this route was probably vital to the German war effort, and if the Allied policy of blockade was to be applied seriously, the Germans could not be allowed to avoid it by using Norwegian territorial waters during the winter months when the Baltic iron ore route (from Sweden) was frozen. He was confident that the Royal Navy would prevent the German Government from achieving any success in its intervention. Indeed, there was no where else in Europe where British sea power could be brought to bear on the enemy more effectively. At the end of November 1939, as winter approached in the Baltic, the British Cabinet became more sensitive to Churchill's arguments and ordered the Chiefs of Staff to examine the proposition in more detail. The Cabinet had realized that German shipping would probably begin to use the Narvik trade route once more to avoid the British Blockade, but was uncertain whether Norway would or could protect her neutral status by preventing the use of her territorial waters. This represented the recognition by the British Government of a General Hostile Intent

from Germany in relation to British National Interests in Norway<sup>3</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

4. During the Notional Threat Phase the issue of the Narvik iron ore route became confused with British and French attempts to aid the Finns against Russia. The Russian attack had begun on 30 November 1939, and Britain and France had supported the League of Nations' resolution condemning the attack, and had promised all the aid they could spare. On 19 December the suggestion was made by the French in the Supreme War Council of Britain and France, that military support to the Finns could be most easily extended by an Allied expeditionary force crossing Northern Norway and Sweden. Such a force would need to use the Narvik to Sweden railway and occupy the Swedish ore fields cutting off all supplies to Germany. This idea was discussed along with Churchill's Narvik suggestion, by the British War Cabinet on 22 and 27 December. It was quickly realized that the Narvik idea had to be acted on immediately if it was to be effective as during summer the main Baltic iron ore route would reopen between Sweden and Germany. However, action at Narvik could prejudice the more ambitious Swedish ore field operation, which did not need to begin until March when the Baltic ice broke. The British Government did not make a decision in favour of either idea. Instead it directed its Chiefs of Staff to prepare a more detailed report on the military implications of intervention in Scandinavia<sup>4</sup>.

5. Despite this apparent prevarication, the British Government's perception of the seriousness of the Norwegian problem was changing. By mid-December 1939, the Baltic iron ore route had frozen. German shipping had begun with increasing regularity to use Norwegian territorial waters for the Narvik iron ore route, to avoid the British Blockade. Norway showed no desire to prevent this use of her waters, thus compromising her status of strict neutrality. On 18 December, the Ministry of Economic Warfare had informed the British Government that the Narvik supplies were materially assisting the German war effort for the spring of 1940. Furthermore, two British and one Greek merchant ship had been sunk by German submarines in Norwegian territorial waters. This was an attempt by Germany to abuse Norwegian neutrality in order to secure its iron ore route, while at the same time denying British shipping any rights in neutral waters. These points were understood by the War Cabinet during its meetings on 22 December and 27 December, and were one of the main reasons why the War Cabinet was seriously considering the Narvik and Swedish iron ore field ideas for the first time. The British Government had recognized a Specific Hostile Intent from Germany<sup>5</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

6. While the British Government was unsure of the consequences of initiating military action in Scandinavia and wished to explore this further, it realized that some form of immediate action was still necessary. On 27 December 1939 it decided to join the French Government in a diplomatic offensive to pressure Norway

into defending its neutrality more vigorously against Germany, and to test the receptiveness of both Norway and Sweden to the idea of an Allied expeditionary force crossing their northern provinces to reach Finland. On 28 December Norway and Sweden received aide-memoires stating the Allied determination to do all in their power to help Finland, and by implication requesting conditional transit rights<sup>6</sup>.

7. It is difficult to say how sincere the British and French Governments were about helping Finland militarily, but they certainly recognized that this was the circumstance which was most likely to lead to Norway and Sweden voluntarily accepting the presence of Allied troops on their soil. However, the Swedish and Norwegian Governments rejected these suggestions on 4 January and 15 January 1940 respectively. Both were uncertain of the military reactions of the Russian and German Governments. Meanwhile on 6 January the British Government announced to Norway that because of German actions, it intended to let its warships intercept German merchant vessels in Norwegian territorial waters. Britain did not intend to let Germany benefit from the rules of neutrality which Germans had disregarded. The Norwegians, supported by the Swedish Government, rejected the British statement. This was not unexpected. The British did not intend at this time to act on their threat, but rather to impress on Norway the need to protect her neutrality more scrupulously<sup>7</sup>.

8. On 31 December 1939 the British Chiefs of Staff reported to Cabinet that successful intervention in Scandinavia was militarily viable, subject to Norwegian and Swedish co-operation being forthcoming, and that the interruption of the export of Swedish ore to Germany would be decisive in its impact on the war. The Chiefs also indicated the broad scale of effort which would be required to achieve the projected military operations. Even the Narvik operation required heavy support, for Britain had to be prepared for a German reaction. If this came, British forces would be compelled to seize the ports and airfields of Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim, in order to secure their position at Narvik and Central Norway. The Cabinet met to consider the Chiefs of Staff report on 2/3 January 1940. The result was that it ordered the detailed development of the plans to explore the implications of occupying the aforementioned ports and airfields. This was supported by the French Government which saw the possibility of opening a new front against Germany which could reduce military pressure against France in the West<sup>8</sup>.

9. One of the consequences of the British and French decision was that their armed services began to earmark units with experience in arctic conditions and amphibious operations. Training was begun for ski troops, and preliminary steps were taken to gather appropriate equipment and clothing. Some merchant ships began to be modified. Another consequence was that the Chiefs of Staff had emphasized the need for Scandinavian co-operation, and this probably would not be forthcoming if Britain was the first to take drastic military actions in Scandinavia. This seemed to re-emphasise the need for further diplomatic pressure to gain Scandinavian acceptance

(in principle) of the requirement for an Allied army to pass through Northern Norway and Sweden, to aid Finland, and of the need for Norway to prevent German use of her territorial waters to avoid the British blockade of Germany<sup>9</sup>.

10. On 12 January 1940, the British Government decided to inform Norway and Sweden that recruiting of volunteers for Finland was being conducted and that Britain presumed they would be given passage across Scandinavian territory. Norway and Sweden were nervous of the Russian and German reaction, and would consequently allow only small numbers of volunteers to cross their territories. A few days later these governments showed signs of backing away from even this concession. On 18 January the British raised again with the Norwegian and Swedish Ambassadors in London, the prospect of British action against the Narvik ore route. Once again it became obvious that caution over German reactions prevented Norway from being consistent in its policy of neutrality. It complained of the lack of evidence that German submarines had been active in Norwegian waters, and appealed to Britain to respect the rights of small states. On 26 January the King of Sweden requested that Britain should not proceed with any Narvik operation for it would lead to German reprisals against Sweden<sup>10</sup>.

11. By now the British Government was beginning to realise that there was no chance of gaining Scandinavian co-operation with their objectives until the government could demonstrate that it had some capability to negate the threat of German military actions in the region. The British had indicated their willingness to offer substantial military support before, but could not demonstrate that it could land such support in Norway and Sweden before a German reaction. In this event, the campaign could be over before the British arrived. Having received on 29 January a detailed Chiefs of Staff report on the forces required for various types of operation in Scandinavia, the British Government agreed with the French at the Supreme War Council meeting of 5 February 1940, to begin to create the military capability which would afford Norway and/or Sweden immediate military support. This, they thought would serve to allay Scandinavian fears of German reactions, and provide a basis for them to agree to Allied plans for aiding the Finns and stopping the Narvik iron ore route. The decision to create such military capability, which was expected to be in excess of 100 000 men, was based on the recognition of a Specific Capability from Germany to attack Norway and seize its ports<sup>11</sup>.

12. On 7 February 1940 the British Cabinet approved the creation of a Scandinavian expeditionary force. Despite the preliminary preparations during the Perceived Threat Phase, most of the men for the expedition and their equipment remained to be assembled. Interservice planning only began on 8 February. Added urgency was given by the renewed Russian offensive which began to erode the Finnish military position. The importance of the creation of the expeditionary force was emphasized to the British Government during the ALTMARK affair of 16 February. British intelligence spotted the ship in Norwegian waters and the Norwegian Government was informed that she was carrying 300 British seamen as prisoners

from merchant men sunk by the GRAF SPEE. The Norwegian Government did not feel secure enough to resist German pressure, and failed to release the prisoners. British destroyers were sent into Norwegian territorial waters and released the prisoners themselves<sup>12</sup>.

13. The expeditionary force had been created largely on the assumption that once it existed, the Norwegians and Swedes would gladly accept Allied protection and allow operations at Narvik and the iron ore fields. As the force neared readiness, the British Government discovered that the two Scandinavian nations were still intransigent in their neutralist stances. On 2 March 1940, the British Government stated that an allied force had been prepared for despatch to Finland and that Britain would probably request passage for it and co-operation. If such action should involve Sweden and Norway with Germany, the Allies could afford extensive military support, but to make this effective there had to be staff conversations. Norway and Sweden refused both staff talks and passage to Finland, despite the fact that Finland was now on the verge of military catastrophe. The Scandinavian position was that the actions proposed by the British would not afford complete security from Germany (particularly in regard to bombing attacks) and the result would be the involvement of both nations in war with either the Russians or Germans. In this circumstance they could no longer extend aid to Finland and the position of all Scandinavian nations would be worse than it was before<sup>13</sup>.

#### Operational Response

14. On 12 March 1940 the British Cabinet decided to aid the Finns and made the decision to proceed with the operation without Norwegian and/or Swedish co-operation. It was to begin at Narvik, in order to test Norwegian public acceptance of the Allied attempts to aid Finland. The Cabinet had convinced itself that the Norwegian Government was out of touch with its population, and if the reception of the Allies at Narvik was good, the rest of the operation was to be implemented. The project was postponed on 14 March as the Finns had capitulated on 12 March to Russia; which removed the major purpose for the Allied operation. It was also no longer possible to disguise the ore field operation as aid to the Finns, and expect the Norwegian and Swedish public to accept it<sup>14</sup>.

15. The operation was resurrected fully on 28 March when the Supreme War Council sanctioned immediate action on the Narvik operation. The reason for this was that the Allies decided that they needed to be seen to be taking some offensive action against German interests for reasons of morale, and to draw off German forces from imminent attack dispositions on the border with France. Britain proposed to mine Norwegian territorial waters around Narvik which it was expected would force a German reaction to protect their vital winter ore route. As soon as the Germans set foot on Norwegian soil or gave clear evidence of planning to do so, Allied forces would be unleashed to secure Narvik, Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim. This was expected to gain Norwegian support against Germany, and could be broadened quickly to seize the Swedish ore fields, which would deal a mortal blow to the German war economy<sup>15</sup>.

16. The interesting aspect of this operation was that the British Government believed that it could concede to Germany the first move into Norway, but still prevent a successful occupation. This was based on two assumptions. The first was that British preparations were more advanced than the German, so that large British forces could reach Norway before a significant German presence could be built up. The second was that British sea power could dominate the North Sea, and hence make any German presence in Central and Northern Norway untenable<sup>16</sup>.

17. In fact, by March 1940 the first assumption was no longer completely correct. German preparation for an invasion of Norway had been proceeding with great speed, although this was not recognized by British intelligence and Government. This was not because of a lack of intelligence data. In December 1939 a number of intelligence reports asserted that a German expeditionary force was assembling and carrying out combined operations exercises in Baltic ports, and that some merchant vessels there had been fitted out for the transport of troops and vehicles. During January 1940 similar reports continued to come in; and in March there were reports, some of which came from the Swedish Government, that the objective of this force was seizure of Norwegian ports and airfields under the pretext of responding to Allied intervention. By 3 April information had again been received from the Swedish Government that German shipping and troops were concentrating at Stettin and Swinemunde. There were also unconfirmed reports that ships were loading war material, including tanks at Hamburg<sup>17</sup>.

18. The significance of this data, and more like it, was misjudged because of a preconceived idea. Military Intelligence had concluded in December 1939, that Germany would need 25 to 30 divisions for an invasion of Norway and/or Sweden. It could only trace six divisions in the area to which the intelligence reports had drawn attention. This was the normal peacetime strength of the region. In fact the Germans made do with only six divisions for their operation<sup>18</sup>.

19. While the British Government and its intelligence community accepted this conclusion, they still had to explain why the Germans were concentrating merchant and naval shipping in the northern ports. Initially this was thought to be a preparation for a limited counter stroke to the Allied Finnish expedition, or another German initiative somewhere else in the Baltic. The concentration of German naval vessels was rationalized as another preparation for breakout operations by heavy ships into the Atlantic or against British merchant convoys to Norway<sup>19</sup>.

20. The British mining operation was planned for 8 April 1940; and although information of significant German naval activity came in steadily from 3 April, all of this was rationalized according to the concepts of enemy operations outlined above. The senior British military staff and Government were apparently disinclined to believe that German offensive action against Norway could begin before Britain had begun mining. They had not appreciated that the German Government had created forces with which

it was prepared to accept great risks in order to forestall British action against German interests in Norway. The German operation was already underway when the British began the first stage of their own operation on 8 April. By the next day, German forces had seized all the major ports and airfields in Norway<sup>20</sup>.

21. Nor was the assumption on the effectiveness of British sea power valid. The Royal Navy was not able to redress the surprise; for German air power operating from German and Norwegian bases was able to prevent decisive interference by British warships and amphibious forces in Southern and Central Norway. Events overwhelmed the British Government once its Operational Response began on 8 April. Intelligence of German preparations and military capabilities had little influence on the origin and the evolution of the British operational plans<sup>21</sup>.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 30 Nov 1939   | 27 Dec 1939                | 5 Feb 1940               | 8 Apr 1940              |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 0.07 years  | 5.7 weeks                  | 8.8 weeks                |                         |



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CASE STUDY 10BERLIN BLOCKADE 1948 - UNITED STATESIntroduction

1. The post World War II occupation of Germany was implemented on the basis of the four major powers (United States of America [US], United Kingdom [UK], France and Russia controlling military zones which more or less divided Germany evenly. All major powers also had a symbolic occupation zone in Berlin which lay well within Russia military zone. The long term aim was for all military zones to be reunited, and a German state reformed with greatly reduced military and economic strength. However, the major powers could not agree on the method by which this aim was to be achieved.

2. Russia held fears for its future security from a reunited Germany which was not responsive to Russian influence. Having suffered two invasions within 25 years from Germany, Russia required what it regarded as suitable guarantees of Germany's future good behaviour. Its preferred solution was for a reunited Germany under Russian control. An acceptable alternative was for a permanent joint Four Power neutralization of Germany, after adequate reparations had been made to Russia<sup>1</sup>.

General Hostile Intent and General Capability

3. The Western Allies led by the United States had a separate strategy by which Germany should be reunited. They did not accept either of Russia's proposed solutions. The Western Allies had become increasingly dubious about any significant Russian influence in any reunification. When the British and Americans had arrived in Berlin on 1 July 1945 to occupy their control zones, they found that Russia had filled the local and central city government with communist party members. The police were also under communist party control, as were trade unions and political parties such as the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. All local Berlin newspapers were closely supervised by Russian authorities, as was education. This impression appeared to be supported in the following months by evidence of Russian electoral frauds, political manipulation through front organizations, and/or direct intervention into the politics of Eastern Europe by the Red Army and secret police. The US interpreted these events as having possible implications for Russian behaviour in relation to the reunification of Germany. Such an event could offer Russia opportunities to pursue its own goals without any regard for democratic processes, unless the US could discover some means to limit Russian influence. Such a conclusion was tantamount to recognizing a General Hostile Intent from Russia to the US National Interest of the future control of Germany. Since the end of the World War II the US had recognized that Russia had a General Capability to threaten all of defeated Germany. The recognition of the General Hostile Intent in late July or early August 1945 thus initiated the Notional Threat Phase<sup>2</sup>.

4. Negotiating over the method of achieving the reunification of Germany remained deadlocked through 1946. By early 1947 the US State Department had realized that Western Europe, and particularly Germany, was not recovering from the war, but was sinking further into economic decline. Such developments created conditions for the growth of radical left wing political parties (with the demise of the Nazi and Fascist Parties) rather than liberal democratic parties. The US Government therefore came to the conclusion that the economic decline was favouring the development of communism in Germany, and undermining the development of democratic institutions. Continued stalemate over the future of Germany was thus seen to be serving only the interests of Russia<sup>3</sup>.

5. The Marshall Plan was conceived to promote the economic rejuvenation of Western Europe, as well as to foster European political stability and compatibility to US interests. An integral part of its projected success was the inclusion of Germany, with or without the Russian military zone if necessary. German industrial involvement was seen as vital if a general Western European recovery was to be possible. This meant that a German state had to be recreated involving at least all the Western occupation zones, as well as currency reform to curb inflation. The Plan had emerged in coherent form by June 1947. The US Government was of the opinion that Russia was caught off guard by the Plan, but saw it quickly as a threat to its plans for exploitation of European economic instability<sup>4</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

6. The US Government expected some Russian counteraction to the Marshall Plan and the consequential actions towards creating a new and powerful German state. The earliest recognition that a Specific Hostile Intent existed against the Western Allies' position in Germany, emerged in October 1947, when the US Commanding General in Germany (General Clay) and his political adviser (Murphy), advised the National Security Council that the US must '....be prepared for Russian action to force our withdrawal from Berlin'. It was not thought that a blockade would be the preferred means of pressure. The US Government does not appear to have taken particular notice of this warning<sup>5</sup>.

7. US Government attention was almost certainly distracted by more tangible examples of communist pressure. These included the civil war in Greece, the civil war in China, and Russian threats against Iran and Turkey. There were other trouble spots not obviously involving communist pressure, which included the Partition crisis on the Indian subcontinent, the friction in Indonesia between nationalists and the Dutch, and instability in Palestine. These also distracted attention<sup>6</sup>.

8. The first real evidence that the US Government had begun to fix its attention on Berlin as the site for the next Russian move came in March 1948. On 5 March 1948 the government received a cable from General Clay which conveyed his premonitions of impending Russian action. This time his views were taken more seriously for a

communist coup in Czechoslovakia during February had led to the collapse of democracy in that state. A full intelligence appraisal was carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Shortly after 5 March Russia protested over the conclusions of the London Conference (on the economic reconstruction of Europe) and pointed out that among other things, the decisions undermined the Four Power Control Council and Four Power collaboration, which were the basis of the wartime agreements which gave the Western Powers the right to be in Berlin. On 20 March the Russian delegation to the Four Power Control Council in Berlin walked out. On 31 March, Russia announced the imposition of new checking regulations for Western Power military trains going to Berlin. These events convinced the US Government of Russia's Specific Hostile Intent towards the Western Powers position in Berlin and Germany<sup>7</sup>.

### Specific Capability

9. Even though the US Government was prepared to admit that there was a Specific Hostile Intent from Russia towards the Western Allies position in Berlin, it could not imagine the Specific Capability which would allow the Russians to implement it. This seems to have been because the US Government equated any Russian move against Berlin with a high risk strategy (i.e. high risk of general war), and consequently evaluated the situation in those terms. When the CIA appraised the situation after General Clay's cable of 5 March 1948, it concluded on 16 March, that war was unlikely in the next 60 days (i.e. no evidence of Russia preparing for war around Berlin and Germany). On 2 April, the CIA extended its prognosis and stated that war would not occur in the foreseeable future<sup>8</sup>.

10. In fact, Russia saw a blockade of Berlin as a low risk strategy which would not bring war, but could very easily achieve Russia's political aims. On the other hand, US assessments of possible Russian action in Berlin, tended to over-emphasize the relatively moderate responses that Russia had made to previous Western moves in Germany, and played down the significance of other Russian moves to gain control of Berlin and increase Russian power and influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Such assessments were accepted by the US Government which was thereby encouraged to ignore the very difficult question of what to do in the event of decisive Russian action in Berlin. Consequently, the US Government was caught by surprise by the eventual imposition by Russia of the full surface blockade in Berlin on 24 June 1948. It had interpreted the limited blockade of late March and early April not as a sign of inherent military capability but as just another Russian obstruction which outlined the hostile attitude that Russia had chosen to adopt, even in trivial matters, since 1945. The US President did not even protest to Stalin, nor did his government give clear instructions to General Clay on how to handle the situation. There was no attempt to determine what should be done if the situation reoccurred on a larger scale. Washington did not carry out any contingency planning at this time, because with no clear idea of what to do in the event of decisive Russian action in Berlin, there was no basis for contingency planning. Despite all the elaborate machinery which had been set up to deal with such a situation, the CIA had not foreseen

the crisis in Berlin, and the National Security Council had not established governing policy. When the Berlin crisis emerged, the response was surprise and ad hoc decisions<sup>9</sup>.

#### Operational Response

11. The imposition of the full surface blockade in Berlin on 24 June 1948, confronted the US Government with a Russian Specific Capability, and the immediate necessity for an Operational Response. Consequently the US Government's Specific Threat Phase was insignificantly small.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| Jul 1945  | Mar 1948                   | 24 Jun 1948              | 24 Jun 1948             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 2.7 years   | 14 weeks                   | 0 weeks                  |                         |

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CASE STUDY 11BERLIN BLOCKADE 1948 - RUSSIAIntroduction

1. The post World War II occupation of Germany was implemented on the basis of the four major powers (United States of America [US], United Kingdom [UK], France and Russia) controlling military zones which more or less divided Germany evenly. All major powers also had a symbolic occupation zone in Berlin which lay well within the Russian military zone. The long term aim was for all military zones to be reunited, and a German state reformed with greatly reduced military and economic strength. However, the major powers could not agree on the method by which this aim was to be achieved.

2. Russia held fears for its future security from a reunited Germany which was not responsive to Russian influence. Having suffered two invasions within 25 years from Germany, Russia required what it regarded as suitable guarantees of Germany's future good behaviour. Its preferred solution was for a reunited Germany under Russian control. An acceptable alternative was for a permanent joint Four Power neutralization of Germany, after adequate reparations had been made to Russia<sup>1</sup>.

General Hostile Intent and General Capability

3. The Western Allies (US, UK and France) gave no overt indications of rejection of the Russian options until after 1946, with the advent of the Marshall Aid Plan. However, the Western Allies' inaction in Germany seems to have alerted Russia as early as the beginning of 1946 to the emergence of a General Hostile Intent. The Russian Government and area commanders began to be suspicious that the strategy of the Western Allies, particularly the US, was to rearm Germany as a potential ally, for a future attack on Russia. The Russian Authorities also thought that, in the short term, such action would serve to provide markets for US capitalism to exploit. The Western military zones held most of Germany's industry, and most of the significant mineral deposits and major sources of cheap energy. Thus according to Russian reasoning, the Western Allies did not necessarily require a reunited Germany in order to achieve their apparent aim; which could be satisfied with West Germany alone. Russia had been aware of the General Capability of the Western Allies to menace Russian National Interests in Germany and Eastern Europe since 1945. Thus, the Notional Threat Phase for Russia began in January 1946.

Specific Hostile Intent

4. Russia perceived throughout 1947 mounting evidence of the Western Allies' determination to implement their strategy. Promised Four Power action on decartelization, denazification, and dismantling of industry (including the fulfillment of reparation



agreements on industrial transfers to Russia), was slowed down and finally halted. Underpinning these acts was the Marshall Plan (for European economic recovery) which had emerged in coherent form in the first half of 1947. Ostensibly, the Plan was for the benefit of all Europe; but Russia had sufficient obstacles placed in its way to effectively exclude it from participation. Russia recognized this by 2 July 1947 (when Molotov left the Paris Conference on Marshall Aid), and from then on saw the Plan as an organized attempt to rebuild European (and particularly German) capitalism, so that it would provide markets for the US, and provide military support for US military power in Europe against Russia. If the Plan proved capable of implementation, a new right wing political power would emerge in West Germany, and West Berlin. Russia perceived these developments and consequences as the manifestation of a Specific Hostile Intent from the Western Allies<sup>2</sup>.

### Specific Capability

5. The Marshall Plan was an ambitious concept, and it remained to be seen whether it was capable of being implemented. There were genuine difficulties. The first of these was whether the Western Allies could agree on the future of Germany within the Plan, as well as their own particular national roles. The French Government was suspicious of a resurgent Germany. The second major difficulty was whether the US Congress would approve the finance for the Plan. Suspicion and distrust of Europe and its institutions lingered on from World War I.

6. The Russian Government did what it could to delay or prevent the development of the Marshall Plan which it saw as a major threat. Initially, this involved shoring up the Central European nations, some of which were tempted to accept the invitation to join in the Plan. Large amounts of Russian aid began to flow to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, to push ahead industrialization, and in the process, to increase Russian authority. This became rationalized later as the Molotov Plan. It was complemented with the beginning of a repression of all anti-communist political leaders in Central Europe. This culminated in the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia on 25 February 1948.<sup>3</sup>

7. The second part of the Russian strategy involved offering concessions to the Western Allies over Germany in an attempt to split their unity. In January 1948 Russia proposed currency reforms (which were needed urgently to halt inflation) designed to meet the US economic goals while avoiding political and economic partition of Germany. It also initiated the transfer of small reparations to the West. These gestures were supplemented by the West European communist parties (which until May 1947 had formed part of the governments of France and Italy) putting pressure on existing governments. This eventually involved massive industrial strikes and confrontations with the police<sup>4</sup>.

8. The Russian strategy succeeded in bringing Central Europe into line, but failed to prevent the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe. Both the French and the British Governments were in urgent need of the financial support promised by the

Marshall Plan; and were prepared on that basis to worry less about the possible consequences of a permanently divided Germany and a break with Russia. On 6 March 1948, the London Conference of the West European Powers and the US, accepted that if economic reconstruction of Western Europe was to prove viable, West Germany would also have to be included. To achieve this end, the conference decided that the three Western military zones of occupation should be fused together under a federal form of national government, and that German currency reform should be introduced. During the same month, the US Congress approved the Marshall Plan. Ironically, a decisive factor in producing consensus was the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia<sup>5</sup>.

9. Russia protested that these decisions meant the end of Four Power collaboration and the Four Power Control Council, and also undermined the wartime agreements that were the basis of the Western Allies right to be in Berlin. On 20 March 1948, the Russian delegation to the Four Power Control Council in Berlin walked out. It is clear that Russia saw the Marshall Plan as the first step to the creation of a Specific Capability to threaten Russian National Interests in Germany and Eastern Europe. A successful Marshall Plan meant an industrially powerful West Germany which could supplement the growing US military presence in Europe with its own recreated anti-communist (neo-fascist) forces. The Russian Government had certainly recognized this by the end of March 1948, and probably as early as the London Conference of 6 March 1948. This began the Specific Threat Phase for Russia<sup>6</sup>.

#### Operational Response

10. Russia had few avenues left open to moderate what it regarded as a direct threat to its security. The main one was the blockade of Berlin which might cause the Western Allies to reconsider their acts in regard to West Germany, or force them out of Berlin, removing a potential risk to political and military security far behind the border with West Germany. Russia began to implement this tentatively from 30 March. On 4 June the Western Governments gave the formal green light to the Germans for initiating constitutional processes for the formation of a federal republic. Two weeks later, the Western Powers began issuing new currency in their zones in Berlin. On 24 June 1948, Russia implemented a full surface blockade<sup>7</sup>.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| Jan/Feb 1946  | 2 Jul 1948                 | 6 Mar 1948               | 24 Jun 1948             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 1.4 Years   | 35.2 Weeks                 | 15.7 Weeks               |                         |

NOTES

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5. Lafeber, W., op. cit., pp. 68, 63-64.  
  
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6. Shulman, M., op. cit., pp. 14-15.  
  
Kolko J., and Kolko, G., op. cit., pp. 488-491.
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CASE STUDY 12KASHMIR 1948 - PAKISTANIntroduction

1. In 1947 Kashmir was a princely Indian state of some 84 471 square miles which encompassed not only the 'Vale of Kashmir' but also Jammu, Ladakh, Balistan, Gilgit, Hunza, Nagir, Riasi, Poonch and Mirgur. According to the 1941 Census, the total population of the state was 4 021 616 of which 77.11 per cent were Muslims, 20.12 per cent were Hindus and 1.64 per cent were Sikhs. Ladakh, however, was home to nearly 41 000 Buddhists. Despite the overwhelming preponderance of Muslim inhabitants, the state (since the first half of the 19th century) had been ruled by Hindu maharajas<sup>1</sup>.

2. When British rule in India came to an end, so too did British Suzerainty over Kashmir. With the partition of the 'Raj' and the creation of the Dominions of India and Pakistan, Kashmir could, in effect, have acceded to either Dominion or have remained independent. Spurred on by illusions of grandeur and the dream of an independent Kashmir, the Maharaja attempted to forestall the absorption of his domain by entering into 'stand still' agreements (formally) with Pakistan and (informally) with India on 15 August 1947.<sup>2</sup>

General Capability

3. Even before the Maharaja had entered into the standstill agreement with Pakistan, the Pakistan leadership (the Muslim League) knew that India possessed a General Capability to gain Kashmir by force. The Indian Army would be three times the size of the forces the state of Pakistan would acquire under the Partition Agreement. Furthermore this agreement outlined that Pakistan would only receive company-sized formations from the British Indian Army. Heavy equipment would follow after such units had been organized into battalions and divisions. Initially the Pakistan Armed Forces would remain dependent totally on India for all weapons, ammunition, stores and replacements. As tension with India increased over the communal rioting in the Punjab, and the accession of various princely states, the probability of receiving such equipments and stores decreased. By contrast, the new state of India was to inherit the infrastructure, stores and equipment of the bulk of the British Indian Army which included battalion, brigade and division formations with all ancilliary equipment. The significance of this disparity in strength was probably clear to the Pakistan leadership by June 1947 by which time the British Government had decided in favour of the partition of India, and had set in train most of the necessary administrative actions to make it a reality<sup>3</sup>.

### General Hostile Intent

4. The possibility of Kashmir acceding to India and not to Pakistan - despite its predominant Muslim population - was clearly seen by the Pakistan Government as a threat to one of Pakistan's National Interests. In ideological terms Pakistan was a product of the concept of a 'homeland' for all Indian Muslims. Pakistani nationalism, therefore, was fundamentally opposed to both Hindu and secular Indian nationalism<sup>4</sup>. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League and the foremost Pakistan ideologue, clearly espoused the two nation theory when he wrote:

'... it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and ... will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions.'<sup>5</sup>

5. According to the Pakistani ideologues, therefore, while partition would leave some Muslims stranded in independent India as a minority, those areas where Muslims were in a majority, by definition, constituted the Muslim nation of Pakistan. The accession of Kashmir thus became an essential concomitant of Pakistan itself. Not only did it come to be regarded as an intrinsic part of the Pakistani corporate polity, but its isolation from its contiguous Muslim hinterland was seen to generate a feeling of mutilated national integrity<sup>6</sup>. The emotional, ideological dimension of Pakistan's view of the Kashmir issue is clearly obvious in the comments of M.A. Gurmani, the Pakistan Minister for Kashmir Affairs:

'Kashmir is an article of faith with Pakistan and not merely a piece of land or a source of rivers, ... We are fighting for Kashmir on the same principle as that on which we fought for Pakistan. We took a solemn vow that we would secure for all areas of the sub-continent where Muslims were in the majority, the fundamental right of self-determination...'<sup>7</sup>

6. Pakistan also felt economically threatened by the possibility of Kashmir's absorption by India. With all of her major rivers having their source in Kashmir, Pakistan felt she would have to live in constant fear of the disruption of her waters. Pakistan's development was thus seen to be predicated on the consent of a hostile India committed to reversing partition<sup>8</sup>. The comments of Zafrullah Khan are in this context particularly illuminating.

'The possession of Kashmir can add nothing to the economy of India or to the strategic security of India. On the other hand, it is vital for Pakistan. If Kashmir should accede to India, Pakistan might as well, from both the economic and the strategic points of view become a

feudatory of India or cease to exist as an independent sovereign state'.<sup>9</sup>

7. These views indicate that the Pakistan Government (or rather its precursor, the Muslim League) probably recognized an Indian General Hostile Intent towards Kashmir no later than June 1947, when the British Government announced as part of the partition of India plan, that the princely states (i.e. areas not under direct British administration), would be given a choice of entering into a federal relationship with the successor governments to the British Raj; or failing this, allowed to enter into particular political arrangements with them. This arrangement allowed the new Pakistan and Indian Governments to compete for the princely states. It began the Pakistan Notional Threat Phase<sup>10</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

8. Initially, the Pakistan Government had good reason to believe that the state of Kashmir would accede to Pakistan. The Maharaja decided to enter into 'stand still' agreements with both the Pakistan and Indian Governments on 12 August 1947 (a few days before the official partition of India) pending the final settlement of the issue of the accession of his state. The Indian Government did not respond, and let its disinterest in Kashmir be known through the Viceroy (Mountbatten). The Pakistan Government signed the 'stand still' agreement and consequently in the legal sense, stepped into the shoes of the pre-partition government of India, thereby becoming responsible for the defence, foreign affairs and communications of the state of Kashmir. In pursuance of the agreement, the Pakistan Railways continued to operate the small railway line in Kashmir, and Pakistan personnel took over the states postal and telegraph services<sup>11</sup>.

9. Relations between Pakistan and Kashmir deteriorated with the Maharaja's attempts to suppress an uprising among the inhabitants of Poonch. Although the uprising had begun in July of 1947 over attempts to raise taxes, the overriding issue soon became one of accession to Pakistan. The Maharaja was also clearly engaged in attempting to suppress the newly formed Azad (Free) Kashmir Movement<sup>12</sup>. With the release of Sheik Abdullah (the leader of the pro-Indian Kashmir National Conference) on 29 September the continued imprisonment of the pro-Pakistan Muslim Conference Leader<sup>13</sup>, and the rejection, in early October, of a Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs' delegation to settle outstanding issues, Pakistan became patently aware of the Kashmir Government's recalcitrant attitude to the aspirations of many Kashmiris<sup>14</sup>. The favourable treatment of pro-Indian elements in the state and Kashmir's 18 October warning that she would 'be justified in asking for friendly assistance' should 'unfriendly acts' continue<sup>15</sup>, appears also to have been construed by Pakistan as an indication of both India's and particularly the Maharaja's Specific Hostile Intent towards the Muslim National Movement and thus towards Pakistan's National Interests. Thus Mohammed Ali Jinnah

immediately issued a strong protest that,

'... the threat to enlist outside assistance shows clearly that the real aim of your government's policy is to seek an opportunity to join the Indian Dominion, as a coup d'etat, by securing the intervention and assistance of that Dominion ... This policy is naturally creating deep resentment and grave apprehension among your subjects, 85 percent of whom are Muslims ...',<sup>16</sup>.

10. In retrospect, the Pakistan Government was to favour a conspiracy theory involving the collusion of the Indian Government and the Maharaja of Kashmir. Great significance was placed on a visit by Gandhi to the Maharaja, in early August where it was claimed they planned the subsequent course of Kashmir's accession to India. No matter what the truth of this charge was, it appears to be a post hoc rationalization, and did not influence significantly the Pakistan Governments thinking during the crisis. It would appear that the Pakistan Perceived Threat Phase had begun by 18 October 1947<sup>17</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

11. In response to the threat, Pakistan, whose armed forces were in a state of turmoil after partition, opted for an alternative strategy in her quest to gain control over Kashmir. Pakistan prepared to infiltrate into Kashmir thousands of Pathans (living west of the Durand Line on the North West Frontier), having supplied them with arms, ammunition, fuel and transport; and thus develop a force with which to challenge the Maharaja. On 20 October 1947, some 900 of these Pathans appear to have slipped into Kashmir, while several thousand more crossed the border two days later. After capturing Muzaffarbad the infiltrators advanced towards Srinagar together with a paramilitary force of Azad Kashmiri and Muslim League irregulars. Despite widespread and indiscriminate pillage, loot and rapine, the insurgents were also able to sweep aside the defection-ridden Kashmir State Army within a matter of days<sup>18</sup>. As his army quickly crumbled around him, the Maharaja realized that the only means of defending his state was to request Indian assistance. India, however, insisted on Kashmir's accession before any such assistance could be forthcoming<sup>19</sup>. On 26 October, therefore, the Maharaja duly acceded<sup>20</sup> and India responded with a massive airlift of troops to Srinagar on the following day<sup>21</sup>. By 27 October, Pakistan had become clearly aware of India's Specific Capability in Kashmir. India's acceptance of the act of accession was also seen as proof of India's Specific Hostile Intent toward the aspirations of Kashmir's Muslim majority and the final integration of the Pakistani state. Thus a week after the Indian intervention Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan asserted:

'We do not recognise this accession. The accession of Kashmir to India is a fraud, perpetrated on the people of Kashmir by its cowardly Ruler with the aggressive help of the Indian Government ...',<sup>22</sup>.

### Operational Response

12. Although Pakistan had entered a Specific Threat Phase on 27 October, her army was seriously hamstrung in its ability to respond operationally in support of auxiliary irregulars. This was because of a warning by the British that they would withdraw serving officers from the Pakistan Army if such a response took place<sup>23</sup>. While these irregular forces had been supplied and armed as a credible match for the Kashmir State Army they had not been 'deployed' with the expectation that they would have to tackle the Indian Army. Although Pakistan had warning of India's Specific Hostile Intent, she most certainly had underestimated India's military power and in particular India's logistic and air transport capability. Thus the Specific Threat Phase lasted only a matter of hours since the irregulars (i.e. Pakistan's 'proxy' military force) were engaged almost immediately after the Indians had been airlifted.

13. Although Pakistani regulars did ultimately become involved in the conflict, they largely 'backstopped' irregular operations in Indian-occupied Kashmir and consolidated Pakistani control over Balistan, Muzaffarbad, Gilgit and Chitral. With the eventual stabilisation of the front and the acceptance by both parties, of a cease fire agreement, these northern districts became part of what is now known as Pakistani controlled 'Azad Kashmir'<sup>24</sup>. Despite the 'de facto' division of the former princely state, Kashmir has remained a major area of conflict between India and Pakistan.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| Jun 1947  | 18 Oct 1947                | 27 Oct 1947              | 27 Oct 1947             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 0.3 Years   | 1.3 Weeks                  | 0.07 Weeks               |                         |



NOTES

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2. Noorani, A.G., 'The Kashmir Question' Bombay, 1964, p. 21.  
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4. Sayeed, K.B., 'Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948', London, 1968.
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6. Anon 'Question About Kashmir: Facts and Implications', New York, 1958.
7. Cited by Brecher, M., 'The Struggle for Kashmir', New York, 1953, p. 52.
8. Choudhury, G.W., op. cit., pp. 156-162.
9. Cited by Brecher, M., op. cit., p. 48.
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11. Leis, A.C., and Bloomfield, L.P., op. cit., pp. 217-219.  
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13. Burke, S.M., 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis', London, 1973, p. 23.
14. Leis, A.C., and Bloomfield, L.P., op. cit., p. 223.
15. Cited by Korbelt, J., op. cit., p. 69.
16. ibid.,

17. Korbelt, J., op. cit., pp. 59-61.

Gupta, S., 'Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations', Bombay, 1966, p. 105.

18. Leis, A.C., and Bloomfield, L.P., op cit., pp. 225-226.

19. Brecher, M., op. cit., p. 37.

Menon, V.P., 'The Story of the Integration of the Indian States', London, 1956, pp. 397-400.

20. 'Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir State, 26 October 1947', in Wint, G., (ed.), 'Asia : A Handbook', London, 1965, Appendix, pp. 755-756.

21. Menon, V.P., op cit., pp. 402-403.

Sen, L.P., 'Slender was the Thread : Kashmir Confrontation, 1947-48', New Delhi, 1969, p. 46.

22. Cited by Brecher, M., op. cit., p. 33.

23. According to Lieutenant General L.P. Sen:

'When Mr Jinnah heard, on 27 October, that Indian troops had landed in Srinagar, he ordered General Messervey, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, to rush troops into Kashmir. Messervey contacted the Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Auchinleck, on the telephone, having informed Mr Jinnah that he must have the approval of the Supreme Commander before issuing such an order. On 28 October, Auchinleck flew to Lahore and informed Mr Jinnah that, as Kashmir was now a part of India, if Pakistan troops moved into it every British officer serving in the Pakistan Army would be immediately withdrawn. This would have crippled the Pakistan Army, which could not function without the British officers. Mr Jinnah stormed, but had no option but to rescind his order'.  
Sen, L.P., op. cit., p. 48.

24. Leis, A.C., and Bloomfield, L.P., op. cit., pp. 238-239.

For an excellent account of the fighting see Sen, L.P., op. cit.

CASE STUDY 13KASHMIR 1948 - INDIAIntroduction

1. Until October 1947, the State of Kashmir was one of 562 princely Indian States under the suzerainty of the British Crown. With Indian independence imminent, a British Cabinet memorandum had defined in 1946 the alternative prospects for all such states as follows:

'His Majesty's Government will cease to exercise powers of paramountcy. This means that the rights of the States which flow from their relationship with the Crown will no longer exist and that all the rights surrendered by the States to the paramount power will return to the States. Political arrangements between the States on the one side and the British Crown and British India on the other will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India, or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them'<sup>1</sup>.

2. With the termination of British rule, the partition of India and the creation of the Dominions of India and Pakistan, the Princely States could, in effect, accede to either Dominion or remain independent.

3. Thus, in the south of the sub-continent the Nizam of Hyderabad attempted to maintain the independence of his state<sup>2</sup>, while the vast majority of Indian states promptly acceded to either India or Pakistan. The Maharaja of Kashmir, however, in an effort to forestall the absorption of his domain, entered into a 'stand still' agreement, formally with Pakistan, and informally with India on 15 August, 1947<sup>3</sup>.

4. Although 80 per cent Muslim, Kashmir was ruled by a Hindu who was expected to favour India in the advent of accession. Such an accession was certainly preferable to India. However, so long as the Kashmir Government and the Kashmir State Army were able to preserve the stability of the region and prevent annexation by Pakistan, the 'stand still' agreement did not conflict with Indian interests.

5. Ideologically the Indian nationalists were opposed to the very creation of Pakistan because of its implicit violation of secularism. Nehru, a native Kashmiri, together with the rest of the Indian leadership, was loath to cede any further territory to the newly emergent Islamic state<sup>4</sup>. While there had remained a possibility that Kashmir might be absorbed into any future Islamic state (from the very time that the Muslim League had begun to demand

its creation), a number of factors allayed such fears in the minds of secular Indian nationalists. Firstly, since Kashmir was not actually part of so-called 'British India', it could not legally be automatically allocated to Pakistan under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, despite being contiguous to provinces that were<sup>5</sup>. Secondly, it had a nominally independent army and administration capable of preserving some degree of autonomy. Thirdly, it had a Hindu ruler who was most unlikely to risk privilege and influence by acceding to an overwhelmingly Muslim state. Fourthly, the Kashmir National Conference, under the leadership of Sheik Abdullah and with substantial Muslim support, leaned toward union with India<sup>6</sup>.

#### General Hostile Intent and General Capability

6. With the creation of Pakistan the Muslim nationalists saw themselves vindicated. Partitioning the sub-continent represented a recognition of Muhammed Ali Jinnah's two nation theory, i.e., within undivided India there existed two separate nations (Muslim and Hindu) fundamentally different, and incapable of co-existence<sup>7</sup>. The Indian Government believed that these Muslim nationalists, as the Government of Pakistan, had begun a blockade of Kashmir in late August, early September 1947 (a charge never unequivocally denied) and 'cut off all supplies of food, petrol, salt and other essential commodities on the import of which the State depended'<sup>8</sup>. This event appears to have been identified by the Indian Government as representing a General Hostile Intent. In fact, Moslem Kashmiri rebels appear to have initiated the blockade, and Pakistan authorities were unable or unwilling to do anything about it<sup>9</sup>. Given that the major lines of communication into Kashmir were from Pakistan, the Indian Government had to concede that the Pakistan Army had the ability to open or seal the Pakistan/Kashmir border as it chose. In this it also recognised implicitly that Pakistan had the General Capability to interfere with the internal affairs of Kashmir. This was all the more apparent by the inability of the Kashmir Army to suppress a Moslem peasant rebellion in the Poonch region of Kashmir. The Government of India ultimately linked disturbances on the western border of Kashmir and Pakistan's General Capability, with the hostile motives of the blockade, when it charged:

'... in an effort to coerce the State into accession to Pakistan, the Pakistani authorities cut off supplies to Kashmir of food, petrol and other essential commodities, and hindered the free transit of trade between Kashmir and Pakistan. Economic pressure was thus applied simultaneously with military pressure in the form of border raids'<sup>10</sup>.

The Indian Notional Threat Phase began during Late August, early September 1947.

### Specific Hostile Intent

7. Relations between Kashmir and Pakistan were further aggravated over the issue of the status of the northern districts of Chitral and Gilgit. Although owing nominal allegiance to the Maharaja of Kashmir, both districts had, for strategic reasons, been administered by Britain. With the termination of British rule, both districts were retroceded to Kashmir. However, before the Kashmiri Administration could assert itself in Gilgit, a republic had been proclaimed and Pakistani intervention requested. Shortly after, Pakistan gained control of Balistan, and by 6 October Chitral had also acceded. With the demands for accession to Pakistan voiced by the Poonchi rebels, the emergence of the Azad Kashmir Movement and the progressive disintegration of the Kashmiri Armed Forces, India became aware of Pakistan's Specific Hostile Intent towards the independence of Kashmir<sup>11</sup>.

8. In his account of events in Gilgit, Lord Birdwood writes, that 'Nehru protested' that the Agency 'should have remained with the British to be disposed of between Pakistan and India'<sup>12</sup>. It seems most unlikely that India entered a Perceived Threat Phase any later than 15 October for, according to V.P. Menon, the Kashmiri Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan had on that day complained to the British 'that the whole of the State border from Gudasapur to Gilgit was threatened with invasion and that it had already began in Poonch'<sup>13</sup>. However, since reports of Pakistan's annexation of Balistan and Chitral were published in the New York Times on 7 October<sup>14</sup> it would seem more probable that India had entered a Perceived Threat Phase in the first week of October.

### Specific Capability

9. By the third week of October, Pakistan officials in the Kashmir border regions and the North West Frontier had embarked upon an alternative strategy in their quest to thwart the machinations of the Maharaja of Kashmir. By arming the fierce Mahsuds, Wazirs, Afridis and Mohan and tribals of the North West Frontier, and infiltrating them (in their thousands) into Kashmir, these Pakistani officials had developed a powerful force with which to challenge the Maharaja. It is not clear that this was with the support of the Pakistan Government and could have been entirely on local initiative<sup>15</sup>.

10. On 20 October, some 900 tribesmen appear to have slipped into Kashmir, while several thousand more crossed the border two days later. This infiltration was followed by an advance towards Srinagar (capital of Kashmir) by a para-military force of tribesmen, Azad Kashmiris and members of the Muslim League. They were soon joined by three battalions of Muslim defectors from the Kashmiri State Army<sup>16</sup>. According to Michael Brecher:

'The principal characteristics of the tribal invasion were the surprise tactics of the tribesmen, the absence of the most rudimentary defence by the Kashmir State Army, and the pillage, loot and rapine of the tribesmen inflicted on Hindus and Muslims alike. Many accounts have testified to

the atrocities of the invaders ...<sup>17</sup>.

11. The Commander in Chief of the Indian Army does not appear to have had any firm indication of these incursions until 24 October 1947. According to Lieutenant General L.P. Sen the Indian intelligence failure appears to have been the result of three basic factors. Firstly, the Intelligence Bureau of the Government of India was manned by members of the police service who were seriously hamstrung by the chaos of partition and by a director who was about to opt for Pakistani citizenship. Secondly, the Maharaja, anxious to retain his own sovereignty, was particularly reticent about developments in his state. And thirdly, seconded British officers failed to provide adequate information on developments in the region<sup>18</sup>. Thus according to Sen:

'The bare fact is that at no time before 24 October did Field Marshal Auchinleck call the attention of the Government of India to any untoward developments in Pakistan or in the vicinity of the Pakistan-Jammu and Kashmir border. His report came after the tribal attack on Muzaffarbad'<sup>19</sup>.

12. On the morning of 25 October 1947, the Indian Army was ordered to prepare plans for sending troops to aid Kashmir by air or ground. An infantry battalion was ordered to prepare itself for immediate air transportation to Srinagar. By 26 October the Indian Defence Committee had decided that the Indian Army should intervene provided (for legal and constitutional reasons) Kashmir acceded to India (a plebiscite to confirm accession would be held as soon as law and order was restored)<sup>20</sup>. The above events confirm that the Indian Government had not recognised a Specific Capability from Pakistan to seize Kashmir until 24 October, at the earliest. Thus India entered a Specific Threat Phase on or shortly after 24 October 1947.

#### Operational Response

13. Realising the seriousness of the situation on 24 October 1947, the Maharaja requested Indian military aid. India, however, informed the Maharaja that such aid could only be granted after the State had constitutionally acceded to the Indian Union. Thus, the Maharaja wrote to Lord Mountbatten (the Indian Governor General) on 26 October 1947:

'... with the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally, they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government'<sup>21</sup>.

14. Once Kashmir had formally acceded<sup>22</sup> India was determined to ensure her integration into the Union. On 27 October 1947, the Indian Government's Operational Response began with a massive airlift of troops to Srinagar in order to defend the city from the tribal onslaught, and in order to establish a forward base from which to secure the whole state<sup>23</sup>. From this stage onwards, India's National Interests in Kashmir appear to have been more clearly enunciated.

15. While much of the Indian Government's argument for the strategic importance of Kashmir remained consistent with the most salient features of British strategic perceptions, the spectre of a hostile neighbour in emergent Pakistan appears significant. As one contemporary commentator argued:

'Strategically, Kashmir is vital to the security of India; it has been so ever since the dawn of history. Its northern provinces give us direct gateways to the North-Western Province of Pakistan and Northern Punjab. It is India's only window to the Central Asian Republics of the U.S.S.R. in the North, China on the east and to Afghanistan on the west. Out of the five gateways opening into the geographic entity called India - Quetta, Gumal and Kuram Valleys, Khyber and Chitral - the last one, in Kashmir, is the most easily accessible and at the lowest altitude.'<sup>24</sup>

16. More important, however, appears to be the fact that once accession had actually taken place, Kashmir became something of a litmus of India's resolve to defend her secularism and federal integrity. As Sheik Abdullah argued in February 1952:

'India will never concede the communal principle that simply because the majority in Kashmir are Muslims, they must be presumed to be in favour of Pakistan. If she does that, her whole fabric of secularism crashes to the ground.'<sup>25</sup>

17. Despite serious logistic problems, the Indian Army was able to save Srinagar, then capture Baramulla on 8 November 1947, and one week later take the town of Uri. Although Pakistan continued to supply arms, ammunition and provisions to the irregular forces and soon supported them with the better part of a division of infantry (by May 1948), the front quickly stabilized. Within a year of the commencement of hostilities India had committed three divisions to Pakistan's two, but had made no significant advances other than consolidating her existing control over a large part of western Kashmir. With neither side willing to risk, or able to afford, a serious escalation of the conflict, the military stalemate ultimately led to the observance of a ceasefire agreement<sup>26</sup>. The status of Kashmir, however, has remained the basis of long-standing animosity between the two nations.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| Aug-Sep 1947  | 1-7 Oct 1947               | 24 Oct 1947              | 27 Oct 1947             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 0. Years  | 2.8 Weeks                  | 0.4 Weeks                |                         |



NOTES

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2. In Hyderabad the Nizam faced a very serious communist insurgency in the districts of Telengana and Warangal which was only suppressed after the Indian Army invaded. Bedford, I., 'The Telengana Insurrection', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U.,  
  
Harrison, S.S., 'India: The Most Dangerous Decades', Princeton, 1960.
3. Zuberi, M., 'The Problem of Kashmir', in Wint, G., (ed.), 'Asia: A Handbook', London, 1965, pp. 451-465.  
  
Sharma, S., 'India's Territorial and Border Disputes', Delhi, 1971, pp. 124-127.
4. As Sisir Gupta has argued:  
  
'India's leaders ... did not agree that Kashmir was automatically or would inevitably become a part of Pakistan, just because the State's population was overwhelmingly Muslim. The Indian leaders had never conceded that it was not possible to integrate different religious groups into a single nation-State. They firmly believed that for a large and multifarious State, like India, it was vital to demonstrate that its nationhood was based on secular criteria. It was clear to them that the strength and integrity of new India would largely arise from its capacity to circumscribe sub-national loyalties of caste, language, or religion. It would have been fatal for India to accept religion as the fundamental element of politics: it would threaten not only the welfare of several religious minorities which would continue to remain in India, but destroy the very basis of the State-structure to the building of which the Indian national movement had been dedicated for over fifty years.'  
  
Gupta, S., 'Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations', Bombay, 1966, p. 441.
5. 'Indian Independence Act, 1947' (abridged) in Wint, G., op. cit., Appendix, pp. 739-747.
6. Brecher, M., 'The Struggle for Kashmir', New York, 1953, pp. 1-17.
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11. Birdwood, C.B.B., 'A Continent Decides: Introducing Two New Members in the Great and Diverse Family of the Commonwealth, and Some of the Problems Which They Offer for Our Understanding and Solution', London, 1953, pp. 266-267.  
  
Leis, A.C., and Bloomfield, L.P., op. cit., p. 221.
12. Birdwood, C.B.B., op. cit., p. 266.
13. Menon, V.P., 'The Story of the Integration of the Indian States', London, 1956, p. 396.
14. Leis, A.C., and Bloomfield, L.P., op. cit., p. 221.
15. Leis, A.C. and Bloomfield, L.P., op. cit., pp. 236-237.
16. ibid., p. 226.
17. Brecher, M., op. cit., p. 27.
18. Sen, L.P., op. cit., pp. 19-20.
19. ibid., p. 21.
20. Leis, A.C. and Bloomfield, L.P., op. cit., pp. 227-229.
21. Cited from the 'White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir', pp. 46-47 in Brecher, M., op. cit., p. 37.
22. 'Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir State, 26 October 1947', in Wint, G., (ed.) op. cit., pp. 755-756.
23. Sen, L.P., op. cit., p. 46.
24. Cited from 'Caravan', (New Delhi) February, 1950, No. 41, p. 67 in Brecher, M., op. cit., p. 46.
25. Cited by Brecher, M., ibid., p. 54.
26. For a retrospective personal account of the fighting see Sen, L.P., op. cit.

CASE STUDY 14KOREA 1950 PHASE 1 - SOUTH KOREAGeneral Capability

1. With the ending of hostilities in World War II in August 1945, Korea was occupied by Russian and United States (US) forces. The boundary between the occupation zones was the 38th Parallel with the US holding South Korea. Nominally, the Russian and US forces were holding Korea on behalf of the United Nations (UN) until national elections could be held for a Korean government. Within a few months (October-December 1945) US authorities and UN officials had begun to see the Russian presence no longer as an occupation force, but as a General Capability to threaten the establishment of democratic government throughout Korea. This belief was strengthened with the formation by Russia, in February 1948, of the North Korean Army which took over from Russian forces when the latter allegedly withdrew from North Korea in December 1948<sup>1</sup>.

General Hostile Intent

2. There was no conclusive evidence of a General Hostile Intent from the North to undermine the establishment of democratic government throughout Korea until November 1947. Before this date friction had existed between the occupation zones, but many of the problems could be explained or rationalized as the consequence of post war chaos. On 14 November 1947, the UN established a nine nation UN temporary Commission on Korea to be present in Korea, and to supervise elections of representatives to a national assembly which would then establish a national government. Russia denied the UN Commission permission to enter North Korea, thus preventing that part of the country from engaging in a free election. This was the first clear indication of a General Hostile Intent from Russian and communist forces in North Korea in relation to UN aims for all Korea. It did not indicate that a determined assault would be made on the establishment of democratic government in the South; but with the change of only a few factors, the General Hostile Intent could be transformed towards this end as a Specific Hostile Intent<sup>2</sup>.

Specific Hostile Intent

3. The UN sponsored elections were held in South Korea on 10 May 1948. On 15 August the Government of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was inaugurated, and US military government terminated. On 9 September 1948 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was proclaimed and also claimed jurisdiction over all Korea. Within a few weeks the North Korean Government was attempting to destabilize the southern government by guerrilla warfare, subversion, and limited raids over the border on the 38th Parallel. This indicated to the South Korean Government that a Specific Hostile Intent existed in North Korea, to overthrow democratic government in the South by force. It is not clear

precisely when South Korea reached this conclusion, but it was sometime between the start of the North Korean campaign in September/October 1948 and December 1948 when the internal military situation had begun to deteriorate sharply. This development led the South Korean Government to request a delay in the final withdrawal of US forces from Korea. The withdrawal was delayed for six months until 29 June 1949. This probably means that the recognition of a Specific Hostile Intent was made by the South Korean Government in October/November 1948<sup>3</sup>.

4. The continued presence of US troops in South Korea was intended as a stabilizing measure, until the South Korean Army was judged capable of dealing with any internal threat, and also able to give reasonable security against raids over the border. It deferred any serious consideration by the South Koreans of the growth of a North Korean Specific Capability to launch a conventional invasion over the border. The South Korean Government thought that any invasion would inevitably involve US Armed Services stationed in the South, thereby involving the US. North Korean forces were probably not strong enough at that time to defeat US forces in Korea, and so could not force the US into a larger response. The South Korean Government view appears to have been supported by the very low number of serious border raids from the North, while significant US forces remained in South Korea. Internal subversion was much more easily disowned, and so was continued by the communists<sup>4</sup>.

5. Upon the withdrawal of the last US forces (excepting advisers) from South Korea on 29 June 1949, the US Army had equipped 50 000 South Korean troops with standard infantry weapons and some medium artillery. By the end of 1949 the US Government had supplied similar equipment to arm a further 15 000 men. Such assistance was predicated upon the policy that the South Korean military establishment was essentially an internal security force. Equipment furnished by the US was to permit the development of an organisation that could maintain security within the borders of South Korea, while incidentally deterring raids from north of the 38th Parallel<sup>5</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

6. The first evidence that the South Korean Government no longer regarded this type of force as adequate to deter North Korean attacks occurred in August 1949 when the South Korean Prime Minister requested improved medium artillery, and in October 1949, when the South Korean Defence Minister requested 189 M26 tanks from the US. Other requests for heavy equipment followed. Although the South Korean Army was by this time launching an average of three counter guerrilla actions per day to combat communist insurgents in the interior of South Korea, this does not appear to have been the stimulus behind the request for artillery and tanks. The insurgents were lightly armed, creating little requirement for the use of heavy weapons (such as artillery and tanks) to combat them. What was more important was the rise in the strength of the North Korean forces particularly in tanks, heavy artillery and supporting combat aircraft, and their increased willingness to use that strength around the 38th Parallel. In the six months following the

withdrawal of the majority of US forces from South Korea in May 1949, more than 400 separate engagements took place along the frontier between North and South Korean forces. One of the first significant South Korean responses was to request heavy military equipment from the US, and this represents the earliest and clearest indicator that the South Korean Government had recognised that the North Koreans had, or were rapidly acquiring, a Specific Capability to invade the South<sup>6</sup>.

#### Operational Response

7. All requests for heavy military equipment, for one reason or another, were refused, or acted upon with such slowness by the US, that virtually nothing of any consequence had reached South Korea before the North Korean invasion on 25 June 1950. In the meantime the South Korean Government did the best it could. From late April to early May 1950, North Korean raids into the South dropped from 60 to 70 per month to seven to eight. Together with intelligence of the North Korean build-up on the border, the South Korean Government interpreted these events to mean that an invasion was imminent. On 7 May the South Korean Army was put on full invasion alert. After some weeks, when nothing had happened, and with the dominant US view that North Korea would not attack, the South Korean Armed Services relaxed their tactical vigilance. When the invasion began on 25 June 1950, many of the officers and men of the South Korean Army were in Seoul and other towns on weekend passes; and many of the frontline units were in reserve positions spread out well back from the border. It is doubtful that the ensuing rout could have been prevented anyway, as the superiority of the North Koreans in heavy weapons more or less ensured them initial victory<sup>7</sup>.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| Nov-Dec 1947  | Oct 1948                   | Aug 1949                 | 25 Jun 1950             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 0.8 Years   | 43.4 Weeks                 | 43 Weeks                 |                         |

NOTES

1. Appleman, R.E., 'South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu', Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 1961, pp. 2-7.

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2. Appleman, R.E., op. cit., p. 4.

Schnabel, J.F., op. cit., p. 26.

3. Appleman, R.E., op. cit., pp. 4-5.

Paige, G.D., 'The Korean Decision', Collier-Macmillan, London, 1968, pp. 65-69.

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4. ibid., pp. 36-37, 73.

5. ibid., pp. 96-97.

Schnabel, J.F., op. cit., pp. 34-35.

6. Appleman, R.E., op. cit., pp. 1-18.

Paige, G.D., op. cit., pp. 65-76.

Sawyer, Major R.K., op. cit., pp. 73-74.

Schnabel, J.F., op. cit., pp. 35-36, 38.

7. Paige, G.D., op. cit., pp. 65-76.

Appleman, R.E., op. cit., p. 21.

George, A.L., Smoke, R., 'Deterrence in American Foreign Policy', Columbia University Press, 1974, pp. 166-167.

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CASE STUDY 15KOREA 1950 PHASE 2 - UNITED STATESIntroduction

1. Prior to the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950, the United States (US) Government believed that South Korea was of no military importance to US National Interests. This view had been heralded in 1947 by a US Joint Chiefs of Staff report that South Korea was a liability to the US security posture, and that for reasons of strategy and economy, all US forces should be withdrawn as soon as possible. The conclusion had been reached on the assumption that the next conflict would be a general war in which the decisive area would inevitably be Europe. Victory here meant that Korea would be amongst the spoils. In the meantime, US forces in Korea detracted from US strength in Europe, and could be easily overrun by local Chinese or Russian forces in East Asia. A continued US presence was also a drain on military finance. Funds had been reduced significantly by the US President to balance the budget. The low importance of South Korea to US National Interests was confirmed in January 1950, when the Secretary of State defined the US defence perimeter in the Far East, and excluded Korea from it. Even after the invasion itself, many senior government officials, including Commander-in-Chief Far East, General MacArthur, believed the President would not involve the US in Korea<sup>1</sup>.

General Hostile Intent and General Capability

2. Even though the US Government defined no important military interests in Korea, it did have some political importance to US National Interests. The Truman Administration was committed deeply to upholding the role of the United Nations (UN) and the associated concept of collective security for the free world. The UN had ultimate responsibility for Korea, and was committed to supervising free elections to establish a Korean Government. Russia prevented the UN from fulfilling this aim in North Korea, so free elections were only held in the South. Within this context, the US Government as one of the two major powers in the region and a former occupying nation, accepted responsibility to support UN efforts to establish democratic government in South Korea, especially against external attempts which might be made by Russia and North Korea to interfere. A General Hostile Intent and a General Capability had been identified by late November 1947, or soon after, by US and UN authorities (see Case Study 14).

Specific Hostile Intent

3. This policy soon began to conflict with that outlined for US military strategy. Soon after the formation of a South Korean Government in September 1948, North Korea initiated a campaign of internal subversion and guerrilla activity in the South, as well as raids over the common border on the 38th Parallel. The US State Department had no difficulty during October-November in recognizing a Specific Hostile Intent to the US Government's National Interests

of upholding the role of the UN in its protection of the new nation of South Korea and the establishment of democratic government within its borders. This began the US Government's Perceived Threat Phase. The US Defence Department was indifferent and saw no reason to change its view that Korea was unimportant in the long term, and not worth risking a prolonged military involvement<sup>3</sup>.

4. The solution adopted was to delay the final departure of US forces from South Korea for six months (i.e. until June 1949). During this period of grace, the US forces would act as a stabilizing force to the South Korean Government, and would also train a South Korean Army which would be capable eventually of controlling internal guerrilla subversion and give reasonable security from border raids. A US military advisory team would remain after June 1949. A direct invasion by North Korean and/or Russian forces was discounted by most authorities in Washington on the following grounds:

- a. The North Koreans were seen as being under the direct control of Russia.
- b. An all out invasion by North Korea would create a risk of general war.
- c. Russia was not prepared for this as it had an inferior nuclear stockpile, and would not offset US nuclear superiority until 1954.
- d. Russia would prevent any North Korean invasion of the South<sup>4</sup>.

5. This Russian behaviour theory, (which was consistent with the Chiefs of Staff general war theory), limited US involvement in Korea to a set period of time and scale of activity. In fact, Russia considered that a conventional war could be limited to a particular geographic area and level of intensity, if Russian forces were not involved directly. Korea was viewed favourably in this regard as North Korean forces could act as surrogates for Russia, and could test the determination of the US to respond effectively in support of 'fringe areas' of the non-communist world such as South Korea. If the US Government had viewed the problem in this way, it would have been apparent that this scenario made the survival of South Korea of great military importance to the US in order to thwart this possible Russian global strategy. It also highlighted the political importance of South Korea as it became a test case of what the US, as the major free world power, would do to support the concept of collective security. There were some areas in the US Government which had begun to question the general war theory and to argue that limited conventional wars would become more likely. This had resulted in an important policy document being written for the President. However, it was still being studied when the invasion of South Korea began<sup>5</sup>.



### Specific Capability

6. One event which should have led the US Government to question its prevailing view on South Korea was the build up in offensive strength in North Korea, during the nine month period September 1949 to June 1950. Most of this was known quite well to the US Government, and represented an illogical action for Russia according to the US theory on Russian behaviour. During the early months of 1950, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that a military capability sufficient to invade South Korea was being created in North Korea. In May 1950, the CIA reported that a North Korean build up on the 38th Parallel was taking place. On 19 June 1950, the CIA had information pointing to North Korean preparations for an offensive. This had been underpinned by a report from the US Ambassador to South Korea on 9 June 1950, to the US State Department and US Congress, that the North Korean Army had reached a level of strength (particularly in heavy weapons such as tanks and heavy artillery) which gave it the power to defeat South Korea in an all-out attack across the 38th Parallel<sup>6</sup>.

7. The Ambassador's view was not believed by Congress or the State Department both of whom saw it as a case of special pleading to Congress for more finance for armaments for South Korea. Congress and the President were attempting to balance the US budget and did not welcome such requests, particularly when there seemed no real need for South Korea to acquire such weaponry if there could be no invasion. The US Government's confidence on this matter was shored up by reports from US military intelligence and the US Korean Military Advisors Group (KMAG)<sup>7</sup>.

8. The latter was responsible for continuing the training, begun by the US Army, of South Korean forces. It was the group most capable of giving a professional estimation of the abilities of the South Korean Army. While continuing to train the Koreans to operate light infantry weapons, and being instrumental in the US rejection of the South Korean request for heavier weapons (particularly tanks), KMAG still believed that the South Korean Army was more than a match for the North Koreans in countering subversion and outright attack, as long as there was no active foreign intervention. This encouraged most people, including the Commander-in-Chief Far East (MacArthur), to overestimate the so called South Korean defensive capability. Military intelligence given to the State Department was such that South Korean defensive strength was exaggerated to the point of rendering a North Korean attack unrealistic<sup>8</sup>.

9. This led to the CIA information being devalued, because even though North Korean strength was seen to be increasing, the South Koreans could negate it defensively. Therefore the US Government did not accept that a Specific Capability to threaten South Korea existed in North Korea. This in turn removed the immediate need to question the US theory on Russian behaviour. It undermined attempts by State Department sovietologists to interpret indications of possible communist attack in South Korea. Thus, by late June 1950, the US Government had not been able to visualize any scenario concerning Korea which could involve US interests in

anything more vital than giving continuing limited aid to South Korea to curtail internal subversion. North Korean raids across the border had dropped to insignificant levels. Hitherto, they had been occurring at the rate of 60 to 70 per month, but by 25 April 1950, they had dropped to 7 to 8. This was taken to support the view that the risk of North Korean invasion was low; a fact that the South Korean Government interpreted in a totally opposite way<sup>9</sup>.

10. The US Government's inability to correctly analyse the looming situation in Korea encouraged US military and intelligence analysts to pay more attention to other areas in the world where US National Interests seemed more obviously under threat from Russia. During the first half of 1950, data had been gathered which suggested that some kind of communist military activity (probably subversion) was to be expected at one point or another on the Russian periphery with the free world. As of April 1950, the US Government had 10 'danger spots' under surveillance around the world, one of which was Korea. Berlin, Turkey, Greece, Iran, Finland, Yugoslavia, Formosa and Indo China were deemed officially as much more likely to harbour serious threats, with Iran as the most favoured site for Russian pressure<sup>10</sup>.

11. When the North Korean invasion began on 25 June 1950, the US Government was totally surprised. This act was something which Russia should have prevented according to the US theory. The US President and the US Secretary of State started to re-evaluate the importance of South Korea to US interests according to a much more complex calculus than the previous strategic criterion. The President decided that the survival of South Korea was a clear National Interest of the US as the North Korean invasion was an unequivocal challenge to collective security, and the authority of the UN. Failure of the major Western Powers to respond in support of the principle between 1933-39 had, in Truman's mind, caused World War II. The President felt that failure to respond to the plight of a small nation created by the UN, would undermine the UN, and encourage the communist world to greater acts of aggression against free nations, leading to a third world war. In order to prevent this, the US had to support South Korea to whatever military extent was necessary to ensure its survival, even if this began to compromise the US position in Europe. On 26 June, the President received General MacArthur's report that South Korean forces were close to total collapse; which established unequivocally for the US Government the existence of a North Korean Specific Capability to invade the South successfully. This began the US Specific Threat Phase<sup>11</sup>.

#### Operational Response

12. On 27 June 1950, the President authorized MacArthur to intervene with naval and air forces in support of South Korean forces, below the 38th Parallel. This initiated the formal involvement of US regular forces in the Korean War. US aircraft were in action the same day.

13. Very few defence activities had been initiated by the US Government before the outbreak of war in Korea. Throughout the US Perceived Threat Phase, the Government had persisted in believing that the Korean problem could not extend into a Specific Threat Phase and conventional war involving the US, because of the constraints which US officials believed existed for Russian and North Korean behaviour. Continued subversion, stimulated from North Korea, was admitted as a distinct possibility, but was expected to be controlled steadily by South Korean forces. No US military assets were brought to readiness, nor deployed where they could assist readily South Korean forces in the event of an invasion. No contingency plans had been created for US military operations in aid of South Korea by the US Defence Department. All that existed was an evacuation plan for US citizens, which had been created in June 1949 as a routine part of the tradition of US Government world wide planning for the protection of expatriate US citizens<sup>12</sup>.

14. The very short US Specific Threat Phase saw little improvement in this situation. The closest US ground troops to Korea were the four occupation divisions in Japan. These were 30 per cent under strength in personnel, poorly trained for combat, inadequately armed, being short of recoilless rifles and artillery, and supported by obsolete tanks. Most of the equipment they held had been used in World War II. The divisions were deployed throughout the islands of Japan, creating difficulties in their early despatch to battle areas in Korea. Of 350 combat aircraft in the Far East Command area, only four squadrons could reach the combat zone by the end of the Specific Threat Phase. The only naval vessels of consequence near Korea were one cruiser and four destroyers. Fast reaction forces such as the Marines were all based in the US or in Europe, and did not appear in the Far East until well after the commencement of hostilities<sup>13</sup>.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| Nov-Dec 1947  | Oct-Nov 1948               | 26 Jun 1950              | 27 Jun 1950             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 0.9 Years   | 86 Weeks                   | 0.1 Weeks                |                         |

NOTES

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- De Riveria J.H., op. cit., pp. 53, 29-31.
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CASE STUDY 16KOREA 1950 PHASE 2 - AUSTRALIAGeneral Hostile Intent

1. The Australian Government reaction on 26 June 1950 to the invasion of South Korea was not to perceive a direct threat to Australia's National Interests, but to envisage a general spread of communist influence in the region. Prime Minister Menzies remarked that: 'The Korean incident cannot be looked at in isolation'.<sup>1</sup> It was the spread of communism which was perceived as being a threat to Australia, not the actual invasion of South Korea.

2. The Australian Government had recognised a General Hostile Intent on behalf of the communist powers since 1948 when Russia blockaded Berlin. Australian aircraft took part in the relief operation<sup>2</sup>. The communist-inspired insurgency in Malaya, which also commenced in 1948, demonstrated that communist imperialism was not confined to Europe but that it was also a potential threat in South East Asia. The Labor Party which was in government in Australia in 1948 recognised the intent but not the capability of the communists to threaten Australia. The government was reluctant to get involved in the Malayan Emergency, which they saw as being 'the responsibility of the United Kingdom, and in good measure a result of British imperial policies'.<sup>3</sup> Many on the left wing of the Labor Party actually claimed that the insurgency was really a rural economic movement of wholly reasonable indignation. The government was content to merely supply on request arms, munitions, medical equipment, etc. but not forces.

3. The Liberal and Country Parties government which came to power in December 1949 took the communist threat in Asia more seriously. However, Prime Minister Menzies did not assign much importance to the military capacity of the communist forces in the region. Percy Spender, the Minister for External Affairs in 1950, claimed in his memoirs that 'Menzies did not share my view that Asia was then the area of potential danger'.<sup>4</sup> Menzies focussed his attention principally upon Europe and he felt that Spender was overly concerned with the possibilities of threats to Australia's security developing in Asia. Out of respect for Australia's imperial ties, Menzies finally agreed to British demands and announced that Australia would send a transport squadron to assist in the campaign against the terrorists. It was not however, until the invasion of South Korea that Menzies and his government were awakened to the communist threat. Spender claims that the events in Korea 'sharpened our views of possible threats to the Pacific area'.<sup>5</sup>

### General Capability

4. The invasion of South Korea signified that the communists in South East Asia had the General Capability to threaten Australia's National Interests. This was the first time that a General Hostile Intent and a General Capability were recognised as existing together. Spender's statement on 26 June 1950 signalled recognition of this and the commencement of the Notional Threat Phase. His statement revealed that the government was not concerned about the actual invasion itself but rather that it signified:

'the threat of Communist imperialism in Asia, particularly in South and South-East Asia. If the free people of Southern Korea can be overwhelmed and their freedom destroyed by force, then an urgent question arises for the world, namely, where is this process likely to finish'<sup>6</sup>.

5. Menzies supported this view the following day when he claimed that the Korean incident should not be viewed in isolation and that other potential communist threats existed in the region. The government's view of the Korean incident was demonstrated by their initial reaction to the invasion; they sent an air force squadron of heavy bombers to Singapore to assist the British in their fight against communist guerillas in Malaya.

6. Once Australia entered the Notional Threat Phase its actions were dictated by the government's desire to strengthen its ties with the United States(US) while keeping in time with Britain's actions. Prior to the invasion of South Korea, Spender had been trying to negotiate a Pacific defence pact with the US. The situation in Korea seemed to offer an ideal opportunity for Spender to press for agreement over this pact, and to involve the US more fully in Australia's defence plans. The securing of such a pact with the US was to become in itself a National Interest.

### Specific Hostile Intent

7. On 28 June 1950 the Australian Government was notified that the US President 'will announce this afternoon that he has ordered United States aircraft and the 7th Fleet to provide cover for South Korean Forces'<sup>7</sup>. Now that the United States was committed to military operations in support of South Korea the scope of the war had widened dramatically, and its implications for Australia were becoming more marked. On 28 June the Australian Government, in response to requests from the United Nations(UN) Security Council for assistance, provided two ships, HMAS SHOALHAVEN and HMAS BATAAN, to assist in the evacuation of British and US nationals from Korea.

8. On 29 June, following the British decision to place its ships in Japanese waters at the disposal of the United States (which was directing UN operations in the area), Menzies announced that 'Australian Naval vessels at present in Far Eastern waters are at the disposal of the Security Council in support of the Republic of Korea'<sup>8</sup>. The commitment of the naval vessels was principally a token gesture to fulfill Australia's obligation as a member of the

United Nations, however, it was also seen as a gesture in support of the US. Spender cabled Makin, Australian Ambassador in Washington, about the government's decision and instructed him to convey the information to the US. He also instructed Makin to ascertain the US reaction to the possible commitment to Korea of No. 77 (fighter) Squadron RAAF, presently stationed in Japan.

9. General MacArthur, who was in charge of the UN Forces in Korea, had been publicly pressing for Australian commitment of the squadron since 29 June 1950. The press had taken up MacArthur's appeal for the squadron and the pressure was mounting on the government. On 30 June a significant cable arrived in Canberra from Makin, replying to a departmental query of 27 June about the effect of the conflict on US thinking with respect to a Pacific pact. Makin replied that the situation seemed ripe to present the following views to the State Department:

'that a regional arrangement between the two countries might have been helpful in meeting the sudden crisis; that, without such an arrangement, the United States had to act alone, and then attempt to obtain the backing of allies; and that some consultative machinery linking Australia and the United States might help to meet further crises'.

Makin concluded his report by stating that he had been impressed by the,

'obvious anxiety of the State Department to obtain backing as soon as possible ..., and their genuine gratification at Australia's prompt response'<sup>9</sup>.

10. In light of this report and MacArthur's appeals, further hesitation over the commitment of No. 77 Squadron would have been foolish if Australia wished to achieve an alliance with the US. The government acted quickly following Makin's message, and after consultations with the Departments of Air and Defence, Menzies released a press statement at 7.50 pm on 30 June announcing the commitment of No. 77 Squadron to operations in Korea.

11. The decision to commit naval forces to the conflict on 29 June 1950, and the decision the next day to commit No. 77. Squadron also, was made on the basis that the Australian Government had recognized a Specific Hostile Intent from the communist powers to Australian National Interests, particularly those in South East Asia. The purpose behind such commitments was to further Australian-US ties in the hope of gaining eventually a defence alliance which would then give further security to Australian National Interests in South East Asia and Australia itself. Korea was not at this stage seen by the Australian Government to be important in its own right to Australia, but rather as a means to the end of gaining the defence pact with the USA. Australian forces had not been committed to protect directly any Australian National Interest, and so did not constitute an Operational Response. Such forces represented a diplomatic gesture and were extremely limited in terms of the scale of the conflict; and, unlike a ground troop commitment, could be quickly and unobtrusively withdrawn should the situation change.



### Specific Capability

12. Although the situation in Korea was seen to be deteriorating during early July, the Australian Government did not recognise at this stage that a Specific Capability existed which could threaten Australia's National Interests. A few senior public servants and some politicians, like Spender, did see a threat in the Korean situation for Australia, but on the whole this was not the case. 'The general view in Cabinet, a view supported by the Chiefs of Staff, was that the United States itself should be well able to deal with the situation in Korea'<sup>10</sup>. Consequently defence planning took only a slightly more purposeful note and the Perceived Threat Phase continued. The planned withdrawal of occupational forces from Japan was deferred and Menzies made a public appeal for men to enlist in the armed forces.

13. Against this background Menzies departed on an official five week visit to London, Washington and Vancouver to have discussions with officials on various matters. On 14 July Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the UN, appealed for increased force contributions, particularly ground forces, to support the UN action in Korea. On receipt of Trygve Lie's appeal, Spender cabled Menzies personally in London, stating his belief that 'the heat may be put on us for such further aid'<sup>11</sup> and requesting Menzies' reactions. Spender got no response and on 17 July he again cabled Menzies expressing his concerns. He felt that militarily the US was in 'a very difficult if not desperate position' in Korea. He also felt that any aid we could give to the US 'will repay us in the future one hundred fold....(but)...if we refrain from giving any further aid we may lose an opportunity of cementing friendship with the US which may not easily present itself again'<sup>12</sup>.

14. On that same day Menzies had attended a meeting of the British Cabinet where he deprecated any suggestion that Australia would be sending ground troops to Korea. He saw this view as being in keeping with the mood of the British Government which was also against sending troops. Menzies' reluctance to send troops was endorsed by the Defence Committee on 20 July. It claimed that Australia was not capable of providing ground forces either at that time or in the immediate future. Menzies maintained his stance on the commitment of ground forces throughout his stay in London. On 21 July, the day before his departure for the United States aboard the 'Queen Mary', Menzies replied to Spender's latest telegram by saying he would be holding direct discussions with Truman over Korea.

15. While Menzies was aboard the 'Queen Mary', midway between England and the US, the unthinkable happened. A cable was received in Canberra from the British Government which indicated that the United Kingdom had suddenly, and contrary to a previous determination, decided to commit land troops to Korea. The British Government was going to announce its new decision later that day at 8pm, on 26 July 1950, Eastern Australian Time. Alan Watt, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, upon receiving the cable notified Spender of Britain's decision. Spender felt that Britain's

decision would present her as being a more willing ally of the US than Australia, and would have a detrimental effect upon Australian-US relations. He decided that Australia ought to pre-empt the undesirable effect of the British announcement on Australia's prospects for a Pacific defence pact by announcing a commitment of ground forces first. Since Menzies was unable to be contacted, Spender rang Bruce Fadden, the Acting Prime Minister, and managed to convince him of the need to pre-empt the British announcement<sup>13</sup>. At 7pm 26 July it was announced that: 'In response to the appeal of the United Nations, the Australian Government has decided to provide ground troops for use in Korea'<sup>14</sup>.

16. At a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, on the same day as the government's announcement, it was decided independently, that Australia should provide troops to Korea. This decision was reached after considering reports on the situation in Korea and without knowledge of Britain's decision. The Chiefs decided that, although the battalion in Japan was in an unprepared condition, it should be committed to Korea. The Chiefs of Staff concluded that 'the urgency of the situation in Korea outweighed the deficiencies of the battalion and the difficulties of employing it in Korea'<sup>15</sup>. The Chiefs further concluded that 'refusal to commit the unit in such an emergency could have a detrimental effect on Australian-American relations'<sup>16</sup>. A letter was sent to Fadden conveying the Chiefs of Staff's recommendation that the battalion be sent to Korea, however, the decision to commit troops was made before Fadden had received the letter.

17. Fadden's decision to commit the troops, and the Chiefs of Staff's recommendation, signify the recognition of a Specific Capability which could threaten Australia's National Interests. The Chiefs recognised that the communist forces were able to match the US strength in the region and that if they defeated the US forces, the communists would probably be encouraged to ultimately threaten the security of Australia's region and lifelines. Defeat of the North Koreans therefore did become a National Interest. Fadden's decision to commit troops for diplomatic reasons, among other things, also signified the definition of the new National Interest, for if Australia did not extend herself militarily to aid the US forces in Korea when their need was desperate, there was little chance of concluding a Pacific defence pact which obliged the US to protect Australia and her interests in South East Asia. Since a Specific Hostile Intent had been recognised on 30 June, the recognition of a Specific Capability on 26 July 1950, signalled the commencement of the Specific Threat Phase.

### Operational Response

18. The definition on 26 July of a National Interest in Korea meant that the existing naval and air operations, and the commitment of the infantry battalion became the commencement of the Operational Response. This means that the Specific Threat Phase was of no significant duration and that it coincided with the commencement of the Operational Response on the same day (26 July 1950).

19. The official historian of Australia's involvement in the Korean War, Robert O'Neill, concluded that Australia entered the conflict 'primarily in the interests of Australian-American diplomacy'.<sup>17</sup> Certainly Spender was motivated by a desire to conclude a defence pact with America, and he persuaded Fadden into committing troops by referring to the possible detrimental effects upon Australian-US relations that could occur if Australia failed to pre-empt the British. The Government's and Spender's efforts were rewarded, and the ANZUS Treaty between Australia and America was signed in September 1951. Later this treaty was considered not binding enough and in 1965 Australia again went to war in order to guarantee American participation in Australia's defence plans (Case Study 34).

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 26 Jun 1950   | 30 Jun 1950                | 26 Jul 1950              | 26 Jul 1950             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 0.01Years   | 3.7 Weeks                  | 0 Weeks                  |                         |

NOTES

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3. ibid., p. 238.
4. Spender, Sir Percy, 'Exercises in Diplomacy', Sydney, 1969, p. 54.
5. ibid., p. 54.
6. 'Current Notes on International Affairs', Volume 21, No. 6, June 1950, p. 420.
7. Reprinted in, O'Neill, R., 'Australia in the Korean War 1950-53', Volume 1, Canberra, 1981, p. 49.

On 27 June the Security Council had asked the members of the United Nations to furnish the necessary assistance to the Republic of Korea to repel the North Koreans.

8. ibid., p. 50.
9. ibid., p. 53.
10. Spender, Sir Percy, op. cit., p. 55.
11. O'Neill, R., op. cit., p. 64.
12. ibid., p. 65.
13. For an account of Spender's reaction to Britain's decision and the subsequent phone conversations with Fadden, see Percy Spender, Sir Percy, 'Politics and Man', Sydney, 1972, pp. 281-285.
14. Current Notes on International Affairs, Volume 21, No. 7, July 1950, p. 511.
15. O'Neill, R., op. cit., p. 74.
16. ibid., p. 74.
17. O'Neill, R., op. cit., p. 76.

CASE STUDY 17KOREA 1950 PHASE 3 - CHINAGeneral Capability

1. The end of the World War in Asia in August 1945, saw the stage set for a resumption of the conflict between the Nationalists and Communists in China. To try to prevent this imminent upheaval, the United States (US) Government despatched General G.C. Marshall to act as its agent and special mediator for a more orderly resumption of power from the Japanese. The Chinese Communists recognized from the beginning that the US was now the pre-eminent power in the Pacific, and had large military resources which could be thrown into the balance to favour one or other of the warring factions in terms of manpower and/or equipment. At one stage US occupation forces in China totalled over 100 000 men. The Communists had few illusions that if the US favoured any side, it would be the Nationalists, i.e. they recognized a US General Capability to interfere against them in the Chinese civil war<sup>1</sup>.

General Hostile Intent

2. The Chinese Communists had doubts about the authenticity of US offers to mediate, and suspected that US aims were really to manoeuvre the Nationalists into a position where they could crush communist strength. US planes had transported Kuomintang forces to Manchuria and Northern China after the collapse of the Japanese and withdrawal of Russian forces. However, throughout most of 1946, the Chinese Communists were prepared to acquiesce with the spirit of US proposals. During June the Communists became uneasy about US supply activities in support of the Nationalists. Indeed Lend Lease was specially continued for the Nationalists after 30 June 1946 when it was halted for all other nations. Communist disenchantment grew and was followed in July 1946 with the first isolated attacks on US troops in China. The Central Committee of the Chinese communist party called for the ending of US armed intervention in Chinese domestic affairs. On 29 September 1946 Mao Tse Tung charged the US Government with conspiring and arming the Nationalists. The final break came in December 1946, when the Communists refused to have anything more to do with US attempts at mediation. This was probably the period when the Chinese Communists recognized a US General Hostile Intent, although this might have been as early as June 1946<sup>2</sup>.

3. The Chinese Communist Government, proclaimed on 1 October 1949, retained its suspicion of the US. Many sections of the Chinese communist party saw the US as the inheritor of the imperialism of Fascist Germany, Italy and Japan, and the fortress of world reactionary forces. Much of this new thinking had an ideological basis in that Marxist theory argued that the world's imperialist powers would be driven to commit more and more reckless acts of aggression against the socialist world to prop up the capitalist system against its growing inner economic and social

contradictions. Other aspects were based on first hand experience of the US's limited involvement on the side of the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war. US foreign policy had been working towards non-involvement for some years, but vacillation had led the Chinese Communists to doubt seriously the sincerity of the US objective<sup>3</sup>.

4. However, this pessimistic view of future events, did not necessarily commit the new Chinese Government to a state of active conflict with the US, for the ultimate decay of the capitalist world could be many years away. The US Government was not liked, but was easier to live with in the short term, than to fight. Consequently, the US Government's renunciation on 5 January 1950 of any further indirect involvement in the Chinese civil war was accepted by the Chinese Government. It prepared to finish the civil war with the invasion of Formosa, which was the last Nationalist stronghold<sup>4</sup>.

5. This was a National Interest for the Chinese Government for Formosa occupied a menacing strategic position to China's maritime provinces. A determined enemy could tie down very large forces, and prevent the passage of trade for many of China's main ports. As long as the Nationalists were allowed to remain on Formosa, the civil war could not be concluded decisively. It is not clear when the communist leadership began to consider seriously the unique qualities of the Formosan operation, but it was probably late 1948, when the Communists realized they were going to win the battle for mainland China in the near future, and that Chiang Kai Shek was beginning to transfer Kuomintang forces and arms to Formosa. The most obvious problem with the invasion of Formosa was the long sea crossing which could be prevented easily by the US naval capability. The US statement of 5 January 1950 appeared to remove this possibility, and cut off further US aid to Chiang. Communist preparations were hastened.

6. The Chinese attitude of suspicious ambivalence towards the US lasted until the US Government's action of neutralizing the Formosan Straits on 27 June 1950, thereby preventing the communist invasion. The event which stimulated this change of US policy was the North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. The US President saw some aspects of the invasion as a determined attempt by the world communist movement to push out the boundaries of Communism at the expense of the free world. Seen from this perspective, Formosa was a preventable gain for the Communists which could counterweigh imminent North Korean success in Korea<sup>5</sup>.

7. It is probable that the Chinese Government knew of Russian plans to sponsor an invasion of South Korea for they had released over 12 000 Koreans from their army for integration with the North Korean forces prior to the invasion. However, this act can also be seen as one of demobilization with the end of the major part of the Chinese civil war. Whatever the interpretation, subsequent events were to show that the Chinese were not involved (although interested), and could not be induced to intervene even when the conflict reached stalemate during August 1950. Chinese involvement at this stage, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief Far East (MacArthur), would almost certainly have resulted in the expulsion

of US/United Nations South Korean forces from the Korean Peninsula despite anything the (UN) and US could do<sup>6</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

8. From the outset the Chinese Government saw the direct US military intervention into the civil war in the broad framework of new premeditated aggressions of US imperialism. It threatened the National Interest of the recapture of Formosa. The Chinese Government can be said to have identified a US Specific Hostile Intent on 27 June 1950, or a few days afterwards. At the same time, the government recognized that another Chinese National Interest was being threatened by the US. The beginning of US involvement in Korea was seen as a repetition of Japan's course of aggression against China in the 50 years before the collapse of Japan at the end of the Pacific War. The only difference was that the US did not have to stop to consolidate her gains in Korea for as long as Japan. The Chinese leadership had noted that a close relationship had been developing between the US and Japan since the war, and saw this as an imperialist alliance in which the US had inherited Japan's former position. By this reasoning a US presence anywhere on the Korean peninsula threatened the Chinese Manchurian industrial basin, a Vital Nation Interest. In this way the US Specific Hostile Intent identified over Formosa, was transferred immediately by the Chinese Government to also include the National Interest of Manchuria which was seen to be under threat from US forces involved in Korea. This occurred on 27 June 1950<sup>7</sup>.

9. The beginning of the Chinese Perceived Threat Phase saw the larger part of the communist army, opposite Formosa, in preparation for the invasion. With the US Government's neutralization of the Formosan Straits, and its involvement in the Korean War, 60 000 crack troops were relocated in July in Shantung province where they could alternatively move quickly to the Manchurian/Korean border (to aid the 180 000 garrison forces stationed there), or to the maritime provinces opposite Formosa. A domestic propaganda campaign was begun during August by the Chinese Government, to educate the Chinese to the possibility of war against the US. However, no attempt was made to develop a force capable of conducting a campaign in Korea. The garrison troops in Manchuria were left unreinforced until the second half of September 1950. They continued their duties in construction of civil facilities and did not engage in significant military training<sup>8</sup>.

10. The reason for these marginal preparations was that the Chinese Government did not believe that the US could develop a Specific Capability in time to prevent the total occupation of Korea by communist forces. There had been much public discussion in the US of the weakness of US conventional military strength, particularly in the Far East. The growing US commitment to Europe ordained that it should receive the first priority in such forces and not the Far East. Undue reliance on the US nuclear stockpile as a deterrent had led to insufficient development of conventional strength. This was known to the Russian and Chinese Governments which also knew of the South Korean military weakness, through spies and infiltrators in the South. Neither of the communist governments believed that the US would use its nuclear superiority in Korea, and

even if it did, it would not be effective. This would force a conventional war. The consequent North Korean invasion was therefore expected to succeed quickly, and it was anticipated that the US probably would not, and could not intervene in time to prevent a speedy North Korean victory<sup>9</sup>.

### Specific Capability

11. From the Chinese point of view, this assessment received its first jolt when the US Government reacted to the North Korean invasion with remarkable speed and vigour. Within 13 days of the onset of the conflict most of one US division had been landed with all its equipment in Korea. In just over three weeks, the US had landed a total of three understrength divisions. This represented three quarters of the US occupation force in Japan. These troops had the impact of slowing down the speed of the North Korean advance, gaining time for further reinforcements to arrive from more distant locations. There is plenty of evidence that the Chinese Government understood the general military implications of this development. The expulsion of UN and US forces was unlikely to be achieved immediately, resulting in a stalemate. Public pronouncements in Chinese official organs began to refer to the possibility of prolonged war in Korea. This was seen as generally still favouring communist forces, as the Korean terrain was not appropriate to mobile mechanized warfare<sup>10</sup>.

12. As anticipated, the North Korean advance slowed during August to a virtual halt, and the UN and US forces built up their defences around Pusan in the southern tip of Korea. Russia began to lead efforts in the UN to gain a negotiated settlement before the Korean position became a protracted struggle. This was supported by the Chinese Government which although denied membership of the UN, nevertheless conducted diplomatic moves to acquaint the major Western Powers of its view. At the same time the US Government began to suggest that all Korea should be reunified under the UN, a concept which involved UN and US forces crossing the 38th Parallel and invading North Korea. Alarming as this prospect should have been to the Chinese, it did not provoke any significant military reaction or public statement. This was probably because the military situation in Korea was still stable, and in favour of the North Korean forces which controlled nine-tenths of the peninsula. The Chinese saw no cause to intervene, although US military authorities thought that this act would have driven the UN and US forces into the sea<sup>11</sup>.

13. The imaginative and totally unexpected amphibious riposte at Inchon on 15 September 1950 by US/UN forces, reversed the military situation dramatically. Within a few days the entire North Korean position in South Korea had collapsed, leaving the 38th Parallel virtually undefended. The aftermath of the landing demonstrated dramatically to the Chinese that the US had developed the Specific Capability to not only recapture South Korea, but also to invade the North, thus threatening the National Interest of the Manchurian industrial area. It is believed that the significance of this military operation was clearly understood by the Chinese Government within a few days of its inception on 15 September (i.e. 17/18 September 1950). During the second part of September the



Chinese Government began massive troop movements into Manchuria and up to the border with Korea. Troops were put in war stations and the Chinese people were prepared for the prospect of war<sup>12</sup>.

#### Operational Response

14. By early October the Chinese forces in Manchuria had been increased from 180 000 to at least 320 000 troops. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government attempted to deter the onward march of the US/UN forces into North Korea, and towards the Chinese border. Statements by Communist leaders began to appear in the Chinese Press and diplomatic circles threatening action if US/UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. On 10 October 1950, the country was warned of mobilization. On or around 13 October, Chinese forces began to enter Korea from Manchuria. On 17 October the Chinese Government allegedly decided that deterrence would not succeed and resolved to go to war. From this time until the first contact with US/UN forces on 26 October, the Chinese poured troops and equipment into North Korea under cover of night. This build up continued after the temporary Chinese disengagement on 9 November, and culminated in the major offensive of 27 November 1950<sup>13</sup>.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 1946  | 27 Jun 1950                | late Sep 1950            | 26 Oct 1950             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 3.75 Years  | 13 weeks                   | 4 weeks                  |                         |

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CASE STUDY 18KOREA 1950 PHASE 3 - UNITED STATESIntroduction

1. The United States (US) Government's renunciation on 5 January 1950, of any further indirect involvement in the Chinese civil war, was, amongst other things, a statement of the US Government's belief that the Chinese Communists were unlikely to be able to threaten defined US National Interests in the Far East. These were limited to the Pacific defence perimeter which included Japan and the Philippines, but excluded South Korea and Formosa. However, a re-evaluation of US interests in the Far East began immediately after the communist invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. The US President outlined a new National Interest - the protection of the South Korean state from overt acts of aggression from the communist world<sup>1</sup>.

General Hostile Intent and General Capability

2. Initially, the attention of the US Government was fixed on the threat from the North Korean Government and Army, which were the instruments of attack against South Korea. China was seen to represent a General Hostile Intent to the new National Interest, as it was thought to be part of the Russian communist bloc, and was known to have aided the North Korean Army by releasing 12 000 Korean veterans from the Chinese Army just prior to the invasion of the South. Whatever doubt remained on this matter was removed by the US neutralization of the Formosan Straits by the 7th Fleet on 27 June 1950. This act brought forth a stream of threats and abuse from the Chinese Government which saw it as an intrusion into the Chinese civil war. None of these threats directly threatened South Korea which for the Chinese remained, for the time being, a distinct issue from Formosa. However on 28 June US Far East Command Intelligence recognized explicitly the latent menace of the situation and outlined an understanding of what amounted to the existence of a Chinese General Hostile Intent. At almost the same time, other senior US military authorities recognized what amounted to a Chinese General Capability to intervene successfully in Korea. The Commander-in-Chief Far East, General MacArthur, had realized in early July that only limited Chinese support for North Korea would be enough to drive the disorganized United Nations (UN) and US forces into the sea. There was no convincing evidence to suggest that the Chinese Government was actually creating a Specific Capability to achieve this end, but MacArthur knew that with the change of only a few factors his forces could face a much more serious threat from the Chinese. The US President and his closest advisors had considered Chinese intervention between 25 to 30 June and thought it a possibility. This began the US Notional Threat Phase of Chinese intervention in the Korean War<sup>2</sup>.

### Specific Hostile Intent

3. The destruction of the threat to the US National Interest in South Korea was achieved by the amphibious landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950, which resulted a few days later in the complete collapse of the North Korean military position in the South. The landing also laid open North Korea to invasion. Even before 15 September, US Government officials had begun to discuss the possibility of invading the North. On 17 August the US representative to the UN suggested publicly that the UN objectives should now be the reunification of Korea under UN auspices. Shortly after the Inchon success, the US Government in effect revised its National Interest to now include the unification of all Korea by force if necessary. On 30 September the US representative to the UN called for an advance beyond the 38th Parallel. On 7 October, the UN approved such a measure<sup>3</sup>.

4. The Chinese Government had anticipated these developments soon after Inchon. They threatened the Chinese National Interest in Manchuria in that the Chinese Government did not believe that the pressures of imperialism would allow the US to halt at the Yalu River. Sooner or later it would attack China as had Japan before. The best protection against this eventuality was the maintenance of a communist government in North Korea. The Chinese Government proceeded to issue a series of warnings against the proposed invasion of the North, the more important of which were:

- a. 25 September, the Indian Ambassador to China was informed by the Acting Chinese Chief of Staff of the army that China would not permit the US to come to the Chinese border.
- b. 30 September, the Chinese Foreign Minister warned publicly that China would not tolerate foreign aggression and invasion against its neighbours.
- c. 2 October, the Chinese Foreign Minister in a dramatic night-time meeting, formally informed the Indian Ambassador that, if US/UN troops entered North Korea, China would intervene in the war.
- d. 3 October, the Chinese Government sent messages through third party nations that if US/UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel, China would send troops to aid North Korea, but that this would not happen if only South Korean troops went North.

These messages were received by US embassies in Moscow, Stockholm, London, New Delhi, and other allied and neutral channels<sup>4</sup>.

5. These were categorical statements, backed up with the movement of massive Chinese forces into Manchuria. They were discounted by the US Government as bluff to influence the UN debate on the reunification of Korea. The US Government reasoned in effect that China lacked a Specific Capability because:

- a. The expulsion of the fully deployed US/UN land and air forces in North Korea would require the utmost effort from Peking.
- b. Such effort was not available because of significant suppression campaigns continuing in China against Nationalist Chinese remnants, the beginning of the military re-occupation of Tibet, and latent pressure from Russia in the North.
- c. The presence of 300 000 to 400 000 Chinese troops in Manchuria was not significant as it was matched by US/UN numbers and outweighed by US/UN surveillance and firepower capability which could prevent the Chinese from interfering in Korea even in a small way.
- d. The political and military risks to the Chinese of broadening the conflict threatened to over-extend their army, leading to the possible collapse of political control in China, and therefore would not be countenanced by the Chinese Government<sup>5</sup>.

6. The US Government also held the belief that the Chinese had no Specific Hostile Intent towards the new US National Interest in Korea:

- a. Current Chinese threats of action in Korea were not believed because, firstly, previous threats had not been carried out by the Chinese Government, and secondly the Chinese were thought to be attempting to influence a key UN vote on Korea.
- b. The Chinese attempt to add importance to their warnings on Korea by using dramatic contacts with the Indian Ambassador to China, was discounted because the State Department believed the Ambassador to be a pro-communist and prone to exaggerate the importance of his information.
- c. The US Government had no intention to, or interest in, invading China, and this could only be as obvious to the Chinese Government as it was to most other governments, so that the Chinese had nothing to fear in regard to their National Interests.
- d. The possibility of US friendship and aid to help implement the tremendous reconstruction required in China indicated to the US Government that Chinese interests obviously were best served by non-intervention in Korea<sup>6</sup>.

7. These considerations led the US Government to ignore the Chinese, and to encourage the UN support for crossing the 38th Parallel. US troops were ordered into North Korea on 7/8 October 1950. However, not all authorities accepted the desirability of such US/UN action. The 8th Army Headquarters in Korea concluded from the Chinese threats, and Chinese troop movements towards the

Yalu border with Korea, that China would enter the war to some degree or another. The South Korean Defence Minister drew a similar conclusion and urged that the US/UN advance to the Yalu be halted<sup>7</sup>.

8. US Headquarters Far East Command held the responsibility solely for intelligence acquisition in and around Korea. It agreed generally with the US Government's view on Chinese intentions and capabilities, and had been indirectly responsible for strengthening the view through its own intelligence reports. The latter had diluted or filtered out the doubts of the 8th Army. The other authorities also charged with intelligence assessment around Korea were the Department of Army and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). They were all dependent on the same major source of intelligence from Headquarters Far East Command, although the CIA had some contacts in Hong Kong and Formosa. In the period immediately following the US/UN crossing of the 38th Parallel, all of these authorities gave generally reassuring assessments on Chinese intentions. On 12 October the CIA saw no convincing indication that the Chinese intended to resort to a full scale entry into the war. It concluded that Peking feared war with the US, and thus intervention was not probable in 1950. The next day, Chinese forces began to enter Korea secretly from Manchuria<sup>8</sup>.

9. The CIA modified its view on 20 October to argue that the Chinese were interested in no more than setting up a small buffer area near the Yalu to protect their interest in the hydroelectric dams in the area. This report did not outline a serious threat to the US National Interest of unification of Korea, and did not provoke any changes in US Government policy. On 25 October the Chinese began a series of limited engagements with US/UN forces in Korea, and these lasted until 19 November 1950. By 6 November the CIA intelligence estimate now warned that the Chinese Government had staked its prestige in Asia on action in Korea, and might be capable of stopping the UN advance. MacArthur also conveyed unaccustomed concern in his cables to Washington during 6/7 November<sup>9</sup>.

10. The US National Security Council met on 9 November 1950 to consider the situation in Korea. The recognition of a Specific Hostile Intent from the Chinese to the US/UN presence in North Korea was inescapable. The US Government now entered the Perceived Threat Phase. However, the US National Security Council still believed that Chinese intentions were in practical terms modified by the Chinese weakness in military strength:

- a. China lacked the Specific Capability to push the US/UN forces off the Korean Peninsula without assistance from Russia.
- b. Since Russia would not wish to precipitate a world war, the Chinese would lack the necessary support and would show restraint.

- c. The Chinese probably had the Specific Capability to defend a limited border zone, and could impose sufficient attritional cost on US/UN forces as to make it more worthwhile for the US to bargain with the Chinese Government for this remnant of Korea<sup>10</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

11. As a consequence of these conclusions, the US Government warned MacArthur to exercise caution in his campaign, although it did not alter any of its existing directives which had given the Commander-in-Chief Far East wide discretion. The US Government also attempted to reassure China of the intention to respect the Manchurian border, and a six nation resolution was introduced into the UN to this effect on 10 November 1950. This was followed up by public statements by the Secretary of State and the President on 15 and 16 November respectively, which explored the possibility of allowing the Chinese a buffer zone in the North, or of reassuring them of the US's peaceful intentions towards China<sup>11</sup>.

12. Prior to the onset of the Perceived Threat Phase, steps had been taken to reduce support to the Korean theatre of operations. This also included reducing the contributions from other UN nations. This had been done on the assumption that the war was almost over. Shortly after the first engagements with Chinese forces during late October, Far East Command and the US Department of Army began reappraisals of the existing state of military strength. They determined that the US Government should halt the cut-back trend and approve the return to the original replacement scheme. This had been based on war with only North Korea. Preparations to fight the Chinese had to be on a much wider and balanced scale; but such conflict was not anticipated to occur as the Chinese were expected to give only limited resistance, and withdraw to the Yalu buffer area. The US Government approved these changes on 16 November<sup>12</sup>.

13. Meanwhile, the Chinese forces in Korea disengaged on 19 November and disappeared. This was seen as support for the prevailing US Government view that Chinese intentions were limited by their lack of an adequate Specific Capability to defeat the US/UN forces. In US Government thinking inordinate emphasis was now placed on the superiority of US/UN military strength. This was encouraged by MacArthur who expected no further resistance. He believed that the Chinese had been impressed by US/UN firepower, and by his determination to pursue the US/UN objective. He was convinced that US/UN air power could destroy any Chinese force in Korea or any Chinese force attempting to move into it. The creation of a buffer zone in these circumstances was to him pure appeasement. MacArthur resolved to launch a new offensive to the borders of China in which he would destroy any Chinese forces which cared to remain in his path<sup>13</sup>.

14. The US Government had the option of restraining MacArthur, but by 21 November 1950 saw little reason to do so as most of the senior personnel, including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tended to agree with MacArthur's estimate. The Chinese did not have the Specific Capability to threaten the US National Interest of

unification of Korea, and so would probably not consider it worthwhile to enter the conflict at all<sup>14</sup>. 15. During the Chinese engagement some authorities questioned the effectiveness of US surveillance, air power and fire power to stop the Chinese. In October/November, Far East Command Intelligence had indentified up to 76 800 Chinese troops in Korea, whereas until 25 October it had been unable to identify any. This did not shake confidence in Far East Command or Department of Army over US/UN air surveillance which had been unable to detect this number of Chinese troops being in Korea. Analysts in the Defence Department realised that numerous Chinese troops might have crossed into Korea to hide in the mountains. Some Defence officials felt virtually certain of the real Chinese location, and were becoming worried lest MacArthur fail to concentrate his forces. The Australian Government advised caution, and the British wanted to pull back and consolidate the scattered forces. On 24 November, the CIA stated that, at a minimum, the Chinese would seek to increase their operations in Korea, and had sufficient strength to force US/UN forces to withdraw to defensive positions. In fact, the Chinese forces in Korea by this time were over 300 000 troops, whereas current Far East Command estimates numbered them as 60 000 to 70 000. Most had infiltrated over the border during night when air surveillance was not effective. Aircraft were unable to detect the troops by day as they were too well hidden in the mountains, and under perfect camouflage discipline. On 25 November, 8th Army Intelligence put Chinese strength on its front at 149 000, an increase of 95 000 on the previous day's estimate. Three days later this rose to 200 000. The significance of this information does not appear to have been appreciated by Far East Command which had not bothered to initiate any plans for withdrawal as late as 29 November 1950.<sup>15</sup>

16. On 24 November 1950, MacArthur began the offensive which he believed confidently would result before Christmas, in the destruction of the remnants of the North Korean Army, and the unification of all Korea. His forces were separated dangerously by a gap of over 30 miles down the mountain spine of Korea. On 25 November, the Chinese began their major counter offensive from this region, throwing back and/or surrounding the US/UN forces. The scope and power of the Chinese attack was far beyond anything expected by the US Government. It had not believed that the Chinese could commit such forces without adverse consequences elsewhere in China, and in any eventuality believed that Peking would be restrained by Russia. The final belief was that such forces could not penetrate North Korea without alerting the US/UN forces of their presence. All assumptions were wrong, and the evidence points clearly to the fact that the existence of a Chinese Specific Capability to threaten seriously the US National Interest of unification of Korea, was not accepted by the US Government until late on 27 November, some hours after the Chinese counter offensive had revealed the true Chinese strength and commitment<sup>16</sup>.



Operational Response

17. The length of the US Government's Specific Threat Phase was insignificantly small as the government began to make an Operational Response as soon as the existence of the Chinese Specific Capability had been accepted. In some cases this was after the US/UN forces had begun their own operational responses to the new contingency, and demonstrated the extent to which the US Government and Far East Command had lost touch with the real situation.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 25/30 Jun 1950                                      | 9 Nov 1950                 | 27 Nov 1950              | 27 Nov 1950             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 0.3 Years   | 2.6 weeks                  | 0 weeks                  |                         |

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16. Tang Tsou, op. cit., pp. 583-585.

De Rivera, J.H., op. cit., p. 190.

Schnabel, J.F., op. cit., pp. 274-279.

CASE STUDY 19SUEZ 1956 PHASE 2 - FRANCEIntroduction

1. The objective of French involvement in the invasion of Egypt in 1956 was the crushing of Egypt and Nasser. This was a secondary aim for their British partners whose main objective was to regain control of the Suez Canal, thereby ensuring 'the security of this international waterway'<sup>1</sup>. For the French:

'the target was Nasser; his was the revolution which was setting alight and unifying the Arab world. We must therefore defeat the Egyptian army and go to Cairo. Any more limited operation would leave the dictator's government in being and allow him to rouse world opinion through the radio. Moreover if we did not, directly or indirectly, take over the reins of government in Egypt, a [Algerian] guerrilla resistance movement similar to that which had just driven the British from the Canal Zone would soon make its appearance'<sup>2</sup>.

2. The French National Interest was to maintain French rule over Algeria and crush any nationalistic rebel movements there. Egypt, by offering assistance to the rebels was threatening France's National Interest. By 1956 the French Government under Premier Mollet was under the 'illusion that the Algerian rebellion could be paralyzed by striking at Egypt'.<sup>3</sup> It was also hoped that the crushing of Egypt would result in the suppression of anti-French nationalist movements in North Africa and strengthen France's influence in the region.

General Capability and General Hostile Intent

3. The first indication of an Egyptian threat to French National Interests came with the Algerian revolution of November 1954. Egyptian assistance to the rebels signalled that Egypt had a General Capability which could possibly threaten France's interests, and her unconcealed support of the rebellion demonstrated her General Hostile Intent towards France.

4. Continued French control over the colony of Algeria was seen by the government as being a National Interest, as Algeria was considered by many as being part of metropolitan France. There were nearly a million European colonists, 'colons', in Algeria, many of whom had been there for generations. This resulted in close links between France and Algeria, and naturally this meant that French resistance to nationalist movements in Algeria was far greater than it was in the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco. When the revolution broke out on 1 November 1954, the French Army in Algeria was well established and largely independent of the French Government. The reaction to the revolution was violent. About this time some French officers began to believe 'that the rebellion was

the creature of a militant pan-Islamic movement directed from Cairo, which could be destroyed more easily in Cairo than in Algeria'<sup>4</sup>.

5. Prior to the Algerian revolt a number of Algerian nationalist leaders, including Akmed Ben Bella, had established their headquarters in Cairo and had developed a revolutionary organization. This organization was largely responsible for the November revolution against French rule in Algeria. The rebels worked closely with a special section of the Egyptian Army. The French knew of the existence of the revolutionary organization in Egypt, although the connection with Egyptian military personnel was unknown. The rebels had the general capability to threaten France's interests and therefore Egypt's harbouring of them constituted a General Capability which could threaten France's National Interests<sup>5</sup>. However, it wasn't until the outbreak of the revolt that France recognised that Egypt was exhibiting a hostile intent towards French rule in Algeria.

6. The Algerian revolt broke out at 1 am on 1 November 1954 with the first of some 70 guerrilla attacks which were to occur that day throughout the country. Within hours of the first raid, Cairo Radio was broadcasting 'At one o'clock this morning Algeria began to live a worthy and honourable life'<sup>6</sup>. Egypt's support for the revolt and its willingness to harbour Algerian rebels demonstrated that it possessed a General Hostile Intent towards France's National Interest, French control over Algeria; and that it had the General Capability to threaten that National Interest. The commencement of the revolt on 1 November 1954 signalled the commencement of the Notional Threat Phase. The revolt also sparked off a process which was to eventually result in France's participation in the invasion of Egypt: 'The illusion that a quick solution (to the Algerian problem) could be obtained by striking at Cairo spread from the Europeans in Algeria upward through the Army and Defence Ministry until it captivated Premier Guy Mollet himself'<sup>7</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

7. Nasser further aggravated the French at the Bandung Conference, a conference of 29 independent African and Asian countries in April 1955, when he introduced the resolution in which the 29 nations declared their 'support of the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self determination and independence'<sup>8</sup>. The situation in Algeria was worsening and on 19 May 1955 the French Government announced that 20 000 additional troops would be transferred to Algeria. At the same time arms shipments to Israel were stepped up and the idea began to form that the Algerian rebels would be defeated by crushing Egypt<sup>9</sup>. It was hoped that a well armed Israel would transfer Egypt's attention away from Algeria to Israel.

8. The principal difficulty in determining the threat recognition stages for France lies in the complex nature of French coalition politics and the frequent changes in government<sup>10</sup>. The complex coalition system meant that certain sections of the cabinet could hold views diametrically opposed to those held by other

sections of the cabinet. As well it was very likely that a new government would hold different views from its predecessor and as governments changed frequently this meant that a coherent policy was somewhat lacking. As will be shown, French policy towards Egypt often depended upon who was the Premier at the time. However, throughout this period there was a gradual diffusion upwards of the idea that the solution to the Algerian problem lay in defeating Egypt.

9. New violence broke out in Morocco on 20 August, the second anniversary of the forcible exile of the nationalist Sultan of Morocco. Berber tribesmen slaughtered over 50 Europeans provoking the Foreign Legion and vigilante groups into a massive retaliation. Simultaneously in Algeria, disciplined rebels of the Armee de Liberation Nationale, in league with sympathetic local peasants armed with knives and clubs, killed 71 Europeans. The retaliation was worse than in Morocco and 1273 rebels and sympathisers were killed. The weekend of 20/21 August opened a chasm between the European and Moslem communities of Algeria which was never bridged again, and signalled the beginning of communal civil war in Algeria.

10. Cairo Radio poured forth support for the rebels and condemned the French retaliations. This, along with numerous rumours claiming that the rebels were being trained in Egypt and equipped with Egyptian weapons, particularly mortars, provoked the French into suspending all arms deliveries to Egypt on 2 September, including consignments already paid for. Significantly, 100 AMX-13 tanks which had been consigned to Egypt were sent to Israel instead. The decision on 2 September 1955 to suspend arms deliveries to Egypt signifies recognition of a Specific Capability and signals the commencement of the Perceived Threat Phase. The French realised that Egypt generally supported the rebels and that it had the Specific Capability to train and equip the rebels if it wished to, and therefore it could threaten France's National Interest. At this stage the French Government did not know whether Egypt was actively supporting the rebels and no Specific Hostile Intent had been recognised. The arms ban was revoked in November in exchange for abatement of Cairo's anti-French propaganda. However, no significant amount of French arms ever went to Cairo again and nothing light enough to be transported from there to bases in Algeria<sup>11</sup>.

11. Despite their hostility over Algeria, France and Egypt appeared to agree on joint opposition to the British-inspired Baghdad Pact. The French saw the pact as being an instrument to further Britain's power in the region at the expense of France's. They refused to join the pact themselves because they felt it would stir up further Egyptian opposition to French rule in Algeria. Selwyn Lloyd claims that the French were not prepared to support the pact because, 'French lives and property in the Middle East were nothing like so important as French Algeria'<sup>12</sup>. In March 1956 when the French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, visited Egypt an agreement was made in which the French promised to maintain their opposition to the Baghdad Pact in return for a promise by Nasser to cease aiding the Algerian rebels. In the event both sides broke their promises and relations between the two became even more

sour<sup>13</sup>.

12. French attitudes towards Egypt were to sharpen in February 1956, when Guy Mollet was elected Premier. Mollet swiftly succumbed to the Algerian emotion and stepped up the war effort there. Mollet had been a resistance leader during World War II and he now equated Nasser with Hitler. Under Mollet's direction the informal alliance between Israel and France entered its most fruitful phase, as Mollet saw the arming of Israel to be the best way to wear down Nasser. Mollet raised the level of the alliance from its informal ministerial links to the Premier's office itself. He also multiplied the ministerial links by including in his cabinet men who were partisans of Israel against the Arabs. Mollet, like Eden in Britain, allowed his personal estimates of Nasser to dominate his country's foreign policy<sup>14</sup>.

### Specific Hostile Intent

13. Any reservations Mollet might have had about Egypt's intent towards France were removed by the Arab League meeting in April 1956. On 4 April, under Nasser's guidance, the Arab League offered full support to the Algerian rebels and accused France of atrocities. This brought an angry protest from the French and had the effect of confirming Mollet's views of Nasser. The Arab League's decision also had the effect of bringing moderates, such as Pineau, around to Mollet's thinking that the solution to the Algerian problem lay in the crushing of Egypt. France informed Israel of these views:

'France now saw that the one way to end the Algerian problem was to smash the instigator and agitator, Nasser, who was believed in Paris to be behind the Algerian rebellion. Once he was crushed, the rebellion would collapse; and there was a sure means of wearing down Nasser - by arming Israel'<sup>15</sup>.

The Arab League's decision on 4 April 1956 to support the Algerian rebels constituted a Specific Hostile Intent towards France's National Interest and signalled the commencement of the Specific Threat Phase. French fears were confirmed in late April when a French warship stopped an Egyptian vessel off the coast of Algeria and found it loaded with arms for the Algerian rebels<sup>16</sup>.

14. Following the commencement of the Specific Threat Phase, France instituted a series of defence measures to counter the Egyptian threat. On 12 April, France issued its biggest draft call since World War II to 75 000 young men for service in Algeria. In keeping with its policy of wearing down Nasser by arming Israel, further arms were sent to Israel including an additional squadron of Mysteres. There was also a televised declaration by Mollet of French support for Israel. By mid-April the lines of Franco-Israeli cooperation against Egypt were fixed. The influence of events in the months to come merely speeded the eventual conflict. Pineau later disclosed that, by May, the French leaders 'had already countenanced the idea of an eventual conflict'<sup>17</sup>. The concept of



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
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
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France and Israel each fighting Nasser on a separate front was giving way to the prospect of both allies striking directly at Egypt. 15. Nasser's nationalization of the Canal did not signal the commencement of a new phase, as it did for Britain, but it merely legitimized the coming conflict and brought in an additional ally to assist France in her plans. Nasser's seizing of the Canal did not pose a direct threat to France's National Interests as it did to Britain's. To Britain 'the Canal was a maritime short-cut to the East and the Commonwealth, and she could not afford to lose control of it. [Whereas] France was glad of the opportunity to smash Nasser and eliminate the chief ally of the Algerian Rebels',<sup>18</sup>. France welcomed the seizure of the Canal as it provided the opportunity to involve Britain in the attack on Egypt. The English leaders were aware of the difference in objectives but ignored it. Lloyd realised this difference in objectives; '[France] wanted the destruction of Nasser and the cutting off of arms and other aids from Egypt to the Algerian rebels ..., the French objective was not the same as Britain's',<sup>19</sup>. So despite the protests and public stance of indignation and shock over the seizure of the Canal, it would seem that 'when France talked about Suez, her thoughts were chiefly on Algeria',<sup>20</sup>.

#### Operational Response

16. France's Israeli connections were responsible for the involvement of Israel in the elaborate Anglo-French plan for the invasion of Egypt<sup>21</sup>. France was able to involve both Israel and Britain in her plans for the crushing of Egypt. France's Operational Response began on 29 October 1956 when France provided naval support and air cover for the Israeli invasion of Egypt.

| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY    | SPECIFIC<br>HOSTILE<br>INTENT | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
|---|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1 Nov 1954  | 2 Sep 1955                | 4 Apr 1956                    | 29 Oct 1956             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE      |                         |
| 0.8 Years   | 30.5 Weeks                | 29.7 Weeks                    |                         |

NOTES

1. Lloyd S., 'Suez 1956: A Personal Account', London, 1978, p. 108.
2. Beaufre, A., 'The Suez Expedition 1956', London, 1969, p. 31. General Beaufre was the French 'Task Force Commander' during the Suez operation.
3. Love, K., 'Suez: The Twice-Fought War', London, 1970, p. 145.
4. Love, K., op. cit. p. 135. The French Army in Algeria, mainly Indo China veterans developed an exaggerated esprit de corps. They blamed the defeat in Indo China on politicians and were determined that it wouldn't occur in Algeria, this caused them to harshly suppress any signs of rebellion.
5. Egypt had previously given shelter to Tunisian and Moroccan nationalist rebels, however these protectorates were not as important as Algeria.
6. Love, K., op. cit., p. 135.
7. ibid, p. 135.
8. ibid, p. 149.
9. The first secret arms deal between France and Israel was concluded on 8 August 1954. A second arms deal was concluded in February 1955 for more planes and tanks etc. and in July the Israeli Government asked that her order for Mystere II jet fighters be cancelled and replaced with a order for two squadrons of first line Mystere IV. It must be remembered that, at this stage, France was still supplying arms to Egypt as well, although in lesser quantities.
10. When Mollet became Premier on 1 February 1956, he was the twenty second French premier since the liberation of France from the Nazis.
11. K. Love, op. cit., p. 142.
12. Lloyd S., op. cit., p. 78. See Case Study 20 for information on the origins and progress of the Baghdad Pact.
13. Thomas, H., 'The Suez Affair', London, 1967, p. 19.
14. Love, K., op. cit., pp. 145-146.
15. Bar-Zohar, M., 'The Armed Prophet: A Biography of Ben Gurion', Paris, 1966, p. 210.
16. Dupuy, T.N., 'Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974', London, 1978, p. 138.
17. Love, K., op. cit., p. 151.

18. Bar-Zohar, M., op. cit., p. 218.
19. Lloyd S., op. cit. p. 80-81.
20. Bar-Zohar, M., op. cit., p. 218.
21. See Case Study 21, Suez 1956 Phase 3 - Britain, for information on the Anglo-French plans and the role of Israel in the invasion. French plans for the invasion of Egypt were more ambitious than the British as France wanted the complete destruction of Nasser's Government.

CASE STUDY 20SUEZ 1956 PHASE 2 - EGYPTIntroduction

1. Nasser considered all remnants of European colonialism in the Middle East to be a threat to developing Arab nationalism. Nasser, as the chief exponent of Arab nationalism, was willing to give haven and support to Arab nationalists fighting colonialism throughout the Middle East. This included the Arab nationalists fighting in the French colonies and protectorates of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. Although Nasser detested the French presence in these areas and saw it as being a general threat to Arab nationalism, he did not perceive it as being a direct threat to Egyptian National Interests. Egypt saw its National Interests as being independence from outside influences and powers, and security from Israeli aggression and expansion.

2. As part of his policy to support Arab nationalism, Nasser gave support and assistance to the Algerian nationalist movement, even though Egypt was not directly threatened by the French occupation of Algeria. France was angered by the Egyptian stance, which was construed as constituting a direct threat to French National Interests<sup>1</sup>. In order to counter this threat, France supplied arms to Israel so as to build up Israel's forces and hopefully divert Egyptian attention away from Algeria. In turn, this supplying of arms to Israel was seen by Egypt as constituting a direct threat to Egyptian National Interests. As the Algerian situation worsened there was a growing consensus of opinion in the French Government that the Algerian problem could be best solved by striking at its heart in Cairo. From about April 1956, the French were seriously countenancing the idea of an eventual conflict with Egypt, possibly in conjunction with Israel. In the early stages of the confrontation France posed a threat to Egypt because of its arming of Israel, however in the later stages Egypt became aware of the direct threat posed by France and the possibility of a French invasion.

General Capability

3. The first secret arms deal between France and Israel was concluded on 8 August 1954. It provided for French delivery of Ouragan jets, fast AMX-13 tanks, 75 mm guns, and radar equipment. This agreement had the effect of swinging France towards Israel in counterbalance to Washington's drift toward neutrality in the Palestine dispute, and Britain's considerable Suez base concessions to the Egyptians. It would seem that even at this early stage, certain French officials and politicians were wary of Nasser and his Middle East policies. Moshe Dayan claimed that even from the first agreement France 'had a clear interest in reducing his [Nasser's] stature and opposing his policies ...', this created an identity of interests between France and Israel<sup>2</sup>.

4. It would appear that news of this agreement reached Egypt sometime before the end of 1954<sup>3</sup>, and it would have confirmed the Egyptian assessment of France's military capability. In the 1950s France was a major power and a major arms producer. Nasser would have assumed that France had the General Capability to threaten Egypt's National Interests, both in terms of its own military capability and in its ability to arm Egypt's principal enemy, Israel. News of the Israeli arms deal would have confirmed Egypt's estimate of France's capability; however, it would not have alerted Egypt to any French hostile intent as France was still supplying arms to Egypt. Also France had not armed Israel to the extent of enabling Israel to develop a Specific Capability.

#### General Hostile Intent

5. A second secret arms deal was concluded in February 1955 for more planes and tanks, howitzers, rockets, anti-aircraft guns, ammunition and even some Vautour jet bombers. Shortly following this agreement Moshe Dayan and General Tolkovski, the Israeli Air Force Commander, came to Paris and signed 'certain accords for military co-operation'<sup>4</sup> with the French. They also arranged for France to provide Israel with 15 Mystere II jet fighters.

6. Newspaper reports in March 1955 hinted at the French-Israeli arms deals and the supplying of the Mysteres, however, it was not until early May that the first detailed expose of the agreement appeared in print. Although it is difficult to determine exactly when Nasser learnt of the second arms agreement and the Mysteres, it is certain that he knew of them by 18 May, the day Nasser approached the Russian Ambassador for arms. The earliest Nasser could have learnt of the new arms deal and the jets would have been early March, however, it would seem more likely that he learnt of them in May. In October 1955 when Nasser was justifying his arms deals with Czechoslovakia, he cited an article in the bulletin of Edovard Sablier's Centre d'Information du Proche - Orient as being one of the intelligence reports which had revealed the arms deal to him<sup>5</sup>. This was not available until early May. The safest date to use would seem to be 18 May 1955 because it is certain that Nasser knew of the arms deal by then<sup>6</sup>.

7. Nasser would have regarded news of the second arms deal much more seriously than the first, and he would have seen it as representing a possible threat to Egypt's interests. A second secret arms deal suggested that France was intent on arming Israel to a significant degree. Such arming, in the light of the acrimony which now existed between Egypt and France over Algeria, and France's closer relationship with Israel<sup>7</sup>, would have indicated that France possessed a General Hostile Intent towards Egypt. Egypt's recognition of France's General Hostile Intent on 18 May 1955, signals the commencement of the Notional Threat Phase.

#### Specific Capability

8. Throughout most of the Notional Threat Phase France was still supplying arms to Egypt, albeit not in the secret way nor in such large quantities as those supplied to Israel. The supply of

arms to Egypt by France was temporarily halted in September 1955, following Egyptian support of the violent revolt in Algeria over the weekend of 20/21 August. The French Government believed that Egypt had assisted the rebels, so France placed a ban on all arms sales to Egypt, including consignments already paid for. Although this would have caused some apprehension in Egypt about France's intentions, its effect was only temporary as the ban was rescinded soon afterwards in return for an abatement of Egypt's anti-French propaganda<sup>8</sup>. The relationship between the two countries actually improved, as far as Egypt was concerned, following the rescinding of the ban. The French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, visited Cairo in March 1956 and left with a favourable impression of Nasser<sup>9</sup>. While there, Pineau agreed to support Egypt's opposition to the Baghdad Pact in exchange for Egyptian promises of non-involvement in the Algerian rebellion. The goodwill generated by the visit was quickly ruined by the failure of both sides to keep their promises and by the disclosure of new French arms sales to Israel<sup>10</sup>.

9. In July 1955, Israel asked that her orders for Mystere II jet fighters be cancelled and two squadrons of first line Mystere IV, each of 12 planes plus three spares, be delivered instead. These ultra modern aircraft were more than a match for the planes then in the Egyptian Air Force and were the equals of the Russian planes that were later delivered. During the talks with Pineau, Nasser questioned him about rumours of Mystere IV being delivered to Israel. Pineau's assurances proved to be false, when on 16 April 1956 reports of the extent of the Mystere IV deal reached Cairo<sup>11</sup>. On the same day the first shipments of the jets, 'actually arrived in Israel and provoked angry anti-French outbursts from Nasser'<sup>12</sup>. The delivery of these jets, in such considerable numbers, to Israel, demonstrated that France had created a Specific Capability to threaten Egypt's National Interests. These jets were far superior to anything in the Egyptian Air Force at that stage, and they gave Israel the potential to expand its territories. Egyptian recognition of France's Specific Capability on 16 April 1956 signalled the commencement of the Perceived Threat Phase.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

10. Egypt reacted to the arming of Israel by trying to obtain more weapons from Russia. On 16 May Egypt recognised Red China in an attempt to get arms from there should Russia comply with the UN embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East. Even though Egypt realised that France had a Specific Capability, (by arming Israel) to threaten its interests it had not recognised a Specific Hostile Intent from France. Egypt remained oblivious to France's bitterness over Algeria and to French plans to solve its Algerian problem by striking at Cairo. Nasser was surprised by France's reaction to the nationalizing of the Canal, he felt that France would not side with Britain:

'France was against the Baghdad Pact. There were other contradictions in this area between France and Britain. We were not completely aware of the French bitterness over Algeria'<sup>13</sup>.



11. At the time of the nationalization of the Canal, Nasser felt that France did not have the Specific Hostile Intent to contemplate action against Egypt over the Canal. This misconception of France's hostile intent did not last long,, as French leaders reacted violently to the nationalization. The French Premier, Guy Mollet, called Nasser a new Hitler, and he protested to the Egyptian Ambassador in France about 'the "spoilation" of the canal by a dictator who broke his promise not to train Algerian rebels'.<sup>14</sup> French politicians began to threaten the use of force to make Nasser give up the Canal. These utterances must have made Nasser realise that France did possess specific hostile intentions towards Egypt. This perception of a Specific Hostile Intent from France, is revealed in a speech Nasser made on 28 July 1956, to crowds outside the Presidency. He attacked the reaction of the French to the Canal's seizure and the insulting way they treated the Egyptian Ambassador:

'The French Foreign Minister was rude to the Egyptian Ambassador in Paris yesterday - I shall leave it to the struggling Algerians to teach France a lesson in behaviour.'<sup>15</sup>

This speech signals the commencement of the Specific Threat Phase.

#### Operational Response

12. Following the commencement of this phase Egypt nervously watched the build-up of British and later French forces in the Mediterranean. Egypt took steps to counter these movements<sup>16</sup>. By September it became obvious that France not only had the Specific Capability to support an Israeli attack on Egypt, but also that it had the military capacity to complement Britain in an invasion of Egypt. On 29 October 1956, the French commenced an Operational Response against Egypt by providing naval support and air cover for the Israeli invasion.

|   |                           |                               |                         |
|---|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY    | SPECIFIC<br>HOSTILE<br>INTENT | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 18 May 1955   | 16 Apr 1956               | 28 Jul 1956                   | 29 Oct 1956             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE      |                         |
| 0.9 Years   | 14.7 Weeks                | 13.3 Weeks                    |                         |

NOTES

1. Case Study 19 should be read prior to this one, as it covers many of the events in greater detail.
2. Love, K., 'Suez: The Twice-Fought War', London, 1970, p. 139.
3. Moncrieff, A., (ed), 'Suez: Ten Years After', London, 1967, p. 38. Due to the lack of sources on the Egyptian perception of the Suez Crisis, it is difficult to be accurate as to when news of the arms sales reached Cairo. As with Case Study 21 it is difficult to determine exactly when Egypt recognised a military capability or a hostile intent, because of the dearth of material on what Nasser and his governmental officials were thinking at the time.
4. Love, K., op. cit., p. 140.
5. ibid.,
6. Nasser revealed in a interview that he knew about the new French arms deal with Israel before he commenced negotiations with the Russians for arms. Moncrieff, A., op. cit., p. 38.
7. The French Ambassador to the United Nations stated on 29 March 1955, that France was a friendly ally of Israel, Love, K., op. cit., p. 140.
8. ibid., p. 182
9. Moncrieff, A., op. cit., pp. 35-36.
10. Nasser claims that he never promised to cease his support for the rebels but he merely said 'that there were no Algerians then training in Egypt and no Egyptians fighting in Algeria'. Thomas, H., 'The Suez Affair', London, 1967, p. 19. Whereas France shortly stopped their criticism of the Baghdad Pact and allied themselves with Britain following the sacking of General Glubb.
11. Hofstadter, D., (ed), 'Egypt and Nasser: Volume 1, 1952-1956', New York, 1973, p. 119.
12. Moncrieff, A., op. cit., p. 37.
13. Love, K., op. cit., p. 336.
14. ibid., p. 368.
15. ibid., p. 373.
16. See Case Study 22.

CASE STUDY 21SUEZ 1956 PHASE 3 - BRITAINIntroduction

1. In 1954, Britain and Egypt concluded a treaty which provided for the withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal Zone by June 1956. Following Egyptian President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 Britain and Egypt entered a period of open hostility which culminated in the Anglo-French seizure of Port Said in November 1956. In examining the threat recognition stages leading up to the British Operational Response, two main points emerge: first, that the leading British decision maker Prime Minister Eden, on at least one occasion perceived a threat from Egypt where perhaps none existed; second, that this misinterpretation of events led to a personal animosity between Eden and Nasser, which was to have a significant bearing on Britain's actions.

2. When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Britain (Eden) seized upon the canal as being 'vital to the free world (particularly Britain)',<sup>1</sup>. In this later stage of the conflict Britain's National Interest was to be the maintenance of the international ownership of the canal and more importantly to keep the canal out of Nasser's sole control. It is, however, more difficult to define Britain's National Interests in the period prior to the nationalization because they tend to be somewhat vague. Britain's National Interests in this period centre around the concept of maintaining a British presence or influence in the Middle East. Partly this was due to the illusion of Empire, which still persisted in 1955; 'for Britain still stood astride much of the African continent even though the ground under her feet was somewhat shaky';<sup>2</sup> and partly it was due to the concern to keep secure Britain's oil supply. In April 1956, Eden told the Russian leaders, Khrushchev and Bulganin, that 'the uninterrupted supply of oil was literally vital to our economy..., (and that) we would fight for it'.<sup>3</sup> This concern to maintain a British influence in the Middle East was manifested in the British bases in the region, defence treaties (such as the Baghdad Pact), British military advisers in several Middle East armies, and the concern to maintain international ownership of the Suez Canal.

General Hostile Intent

3. At the signing of the Heads of State Agreement between Britain and Egypt in October 1954, which ensured the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone by June 1956, relations between Egypt and Britain were quite amicable. The first signs of discontent between the two countries began to emerge in February 1955. On 24 February 1955, Iraq and Turkey concluded a mutual security and defence treaty, the Baghdad Pact, and invited other countries with interests in the region to join. Despite Egyptian

opposition to the pact, Britain gave it her full support and became a member of the Baghdad Pact on 5 April 1955. Eden felt that the pact would greatly increase Britain's influence in the region<sup>4</sup>. In September, Pakistan and in November, Iran also joined, giving the pact a lengthy frontier. Egypt's fears over increasing British power in the region were aroused by the pact and following the Iraq-Turkey initiative in February, Egypt launched a propaganda campaign against it. However, Britain managed to arrest Egyptian fears with a secret moratorium, in which Eden promised to freeze Arab membership in the Baghdad pact in return for Nasser ceasing his anti-pact propaganda.

4. The peace resulting from the moratorium was endangered by the British, when in November 1955 they entered into secret negotiations with the Jordanian Government to obtain Jordanian participation in the pact. As public signs began to emerge in December of British attempts to persuade Jordan to join the pact, Cairo Radio and the other organs of Egyptian propaganda, formerly under official restraint not to criticize the Baghdad Pact, launched a virulent campaign against Jordan and the Pact. By 14 December Egyptian propaganda was operating at full blast, decrying the negotiations as being 'a Zionist-Imperialist plot to drag Jordan into the network of foreign alliances'<sup>5</sup>. On 16 December, in response to Cairo Radio broadcasts and Egyptian agitators, rioting against the Baghdad Pact broke out in Jordanian cities. During six days of disturbances 41 persons were killed, 150 were injured and two more Jordanian cabinets formed and fell<sup>6</sup>. By 18 December King Hussein was forced to drop his support for Jordanian inclusion in the pact, and Britain realised that it was pointless to continue negotiations at this time. The rioting was still occurring spasmodically in January, and the new cabinet announced that Jordan would not join the pact.

5. The British Government felt that Jordanian membership of the pact would strengthen it and thus reinforce Britain's influence in the region. Britain's National Interests in the Middle East centred around the maintenance of a considerable influence in the region and the preservation of British interests, such as the Suez Canal. The Egyptian anti-pact propaganda which led to the subsequent withdrawal of Jordan from negotiations with Britain, constituted a General Hostile Intent towards British influence in the region. Eden felt that Nasser's reaction to the Jordanian negotiations demonstrated that 'he [Nasser] was already working against us as hard as he could'<sup>7</sup>. Nasser's reaction to the Baghdad Pact resulted in a hardening of attitudes towards him within the Foreign Office:

'Within the Foreign Office there had been a growing recognition that somehow and at some time Nasser would have to be restricted, isolated, and brought down, perhaps by his people through his own follies. More particularly after his personal reaction to the Baghdad Pact did a mere understanding become a set policy'<sup>8</sup>.

Britain recognised a General Hostile Intent towards her interests by Egypt when King Hussein dropped his support for Jordanian membership of the Baghdad Pact on 18 December 1955. Prior to the recognition of a General Hostile Intent Britain had become aware of Egypt's increased military capacity.

### General Capability

6. On 26 July 1955 a secret shipment of arms left Prague for Cairo. This consignment of arms was the first instalment of an extensive arms deal between Russia and Egypt. Following British and United States (US) refusal to sell arms to Egypt, Nasser turned to the Russians who proved to be very willing to supply arms. The arms deal provided for the supply of substantial numbers of Russian-built T-34 tanks, SU-100 self-propelled guns, artillery pieces, rocket launchers, Czech-built rifles, mortars, MIG-15 jet fighters and Ilyushin IL-28 jet bombers. The bulk of the arms arrived in October, and by December Egypt had absorbed them, forming among other things, two MIG-15 squadrons. The arms deal was officially announced on 27 September, and on 1 October the British Ambassador in Egypt conveyed 'London's grave view of the arms deal'<sup>9</sup> to Nasser. The recognition on 18 December 1955 that Egypt was displaying a General Hostile Intent towards British interests signalled the commencement of the Notional Threat Phase as a General Capability had been recognised since September 1955. Nasser's promotion of Arab nationalism and his dislike of British imperialism seemed to threaten Britain's interests in the region. Eden concluded that:

'Our general policy in the Middle East was founded on the need to protect British interests in Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The main threat to these interests was the growing influence of Nasser with his anti-Western ideology and collusion with Russian Russia, especially in arms supply.'<sup>10</sup>

### Specific Hostile Intent

7. Although Britain recognised the potential danger posed by Egypt it initially sought diplomatic rather than military measures to preserve British interests. One such measure was the combined Anglo-American offer to pay the foreign exchange costs of Nasser's pet project: the building of a new dam high up the Nile above Aswan. Nasser felt that the dam was vital for Egypt and Britain saw the offer of assistance as being a way to draw Egypt back into the Western camp. 'Britain had doubts about the economic value of this project and knew that it would bring difficulties with the Sudan but agreed, as Eden says in his memoirs, specifically to keep Russia out of Africa'<sup>11</sup>. Russia had hinted previously that it would be prepared to pay for the dam. Although Nasser resented the restrictions placed on the loan and the fact that if the West financed the dam, the Egyptian economy would largely be controlled from Washington, he still preferred Western assistance to Russian. However, the whole situation was to change dramatically on 1 March 1956.

8. On 1 March, King Hussein dismissed General Glubb, Lawrence's heir and commander of the Arab Legion, the British-trained force which made Jordan the strongest Arab country, militarily, after Egypt. Glubb was the last symbol of the old British paternalist hegemony in the Middle East. Glubb's summary dismissal with only twenty-four hours notice was a blow to British prestige and had implications for future British influence in the region. Hussein's dismissal of Glubb was a personal decision which was primarily motivated by the young King's desire to assert himself against an altogether too experienced counsellor<sup>12</sup>. However, this wasn't how Eden viewed the dismissal. Eden claimed in his memoirs that he always felt that the dismissal was the result of jealousy. However Anthony Nutting, at the time Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, disputes this:

'as one who spent the evening and half of the night after Glubb's dismissal arguing with Eden, I can testify that, at the time, he put all the blame on Nasser and brushed aside every argument that more personal considerations had in fact influenced Hussein's arbitrary decision. And on that fatal day he decided that the world was not big enough to hold both him and Nasser. The 'Egyptian dictator had to be eliminated somehow or other, else he would destroy Britain's position in the Middle East'<sup>13</sup>.

9. Although Nasser actually had nothing to do with Glubb's dismissal, Eden believed that he was solely responsible for it. Eden believed that 'Nasser was our Enemy No. 1 in the Middle East and (that) he would not rest until he had destroyed all our friends and eliminated the last vestiges of our influence'<sup>14</sup>. What Eden believed was important; because as Prime Minister and a renowned international statesman, he was able to dominate cabinet. His personal opinions and decisions became British policy. So Glubb's dismissal on 1 March 1956 was seen as clear evidence of Egypt's Specific Hostile Intent towards British interests and therefore signalled the commencement of Britain's Perceived Threat Phase. Nutting claims that Eden may have come to realise that Nasser might not have been behind the dismissal, but this made no difference. Eden felt that 'even if Nasser were not responsible for Glubb's removal, he would not rest until he had done Britain some other injury, perhaps more critical still. Therefore the declaration of war stood and Eden only awaited a pretext to put it into effect'<sup>15</sup>.

This did not entail any noticeable defence preparations, as the British Government did not believe that Egypt had many options which could not be covered by standing armed services. This did not apply to the Suez Canal. But the British Government did not believe that Nasser would dare to touch the Suez Canal as this would bring down onto his head the wrath of the international community and the major maritime powers.

### Specific Capability

10. Nasser did not immediately provide such a pretext, and the three months after Glubb's dismissal passed somewhat uneventfully<sup>16</sup>. The withdrawal of the last British forces from the Canal Zone took place on 13 June, five days ahead of schedule. Negotiations over the financing of the dam stalemated as Nasser tried to get a better deal over the loan, preferably one which didn't involve Western control of Egypt's economy. Nasser tried playing off the hinted Russian offer against the Western Powers, but this did not succeed. On 19 July the US announced that they were backing out of the Aswan Dam loan<sup>17</sup>. Eden promptly followed suit on behalf of the British Government. The Russians also seemed to lose interest in financing the dam. On 26 July 1956, Nasser announced to an exultant crowd that the Suez Canal was to be nationalized and that its 35 million pound annual revenue would be devoted to building the Aswan Dam. While Nasser was making his speech, armed men were taking control of the offices and installations of the Suez Canal Company.

11. The British Government had not anticipated this Egyptian reaction. The canal was regarded as having an international sanctity which Nasser would not dare to violate. This belief helped to obscure the fact that the Egyptian Armed Services were not constrained to defence of Egypt, but could move to directly threaten the British National Interest of security of the oil supplies, and the maintenance of the international ownership and control of the Suez Canal. The importance of the canal had greatly increased in the 1950s with the development of the Middle Eastern oilfields, and the dependence of Western Europe, particularly Britain, upon them. Belatedly, the British Government now recognized a Specific Capability. Eden described the seizure in terms of Nasser having 'his thumb on our windpipe'<sup>18</sup>. Harold Macmillan, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, claimed that strong action was needed because it was 'not a question of honour only but of survival'<sup>19</sup>.

12. Nasser's nationalization of the canal had wider implications for the British Government as well, for it demonstrated that Egypt now could undermine Britain's presence and influence in the region. 'Failure to keep the canal international would inevitably lead to the loss one by one of all our interests and assets in the Middle East'<sup>20</sup>. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, in a letter to the British Ambassador in Washington, outlined the ominous consequences of Nasser's coup as they were seen at the highest level in London:

'If we all sat back while Nasser consolidated his position and gradually got control of the oil-bearing states, he could wreck us. If Middle East oil were to be denied to us for a year or two our gold reserves would disappear and the sterling area would disintegrate..., and we should not be able to pay for the minimum defence which we required. A country which cannot provide for its defences is finished'<sup>21</sup>.

The British Government felt that if they allowed Nasser to seize the Canal unopposed it would only be a matter of time before Britain lost all her interests and influence in the Middle East. When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 he demonstrated that Egypt had the Specific Capability to destroy Britain's position in the Middle East, and wreck her vital oil supply lines. The seizure of the canal signified the commencement of the Specific Threat Phase on 26 July 1956.

#### Operational Response

13. Following the commencement of the Specific Threat Phase Eden initiated his campaign of economic and military pressures against Egypt. On 28 July, the Treasury ordered that all Egypt's sterling balances and assets should be frozen. Over the following three days France and then the US copied Britain's decision. On 30 July Eden ordered a ban on the export of all further war material to Egypt, and four days later military initiatives were commenced. 20 000 British army reservists were called up, and naval, military and air reinforcements were despatched to the Eastern Mediterranean. The Chiefs of Staff were instructed to prepare a military plan for the take-over of the Canal Zone. Eden despatched to President Eisenhower a very secret message saying that 'the only way to break Nasser would be to resort to force without delay and without attempting to negotiate'<sup>22</sup>.

14. Despite Eden's call for immediate action, negotiations were entered into, mainly because of US refusal to resort to force. Britain showed little interest in achieving an amicable solution, and a negotiated solution was not achieved<sup>23</sup>. While the negotiations were taking place, Britain and France were busily preparing to invade Egypt. Britain faced considerable operational problems. This stemmed initially from the change in defence philosophy adopted by the British Government before the Suez Crisis had begun to emerge. It had decided to rely on its thermo-nuclear weapons to deter aggression against British National Interests. The large standing British armed forces had been drastically reduced. This had left barely enough men to meet NATO requirements and to maintain small garrisons in Cyprus, Malaya, Hong Kong and a few other scattered possessions. By 26 July 1956 the one parachute brigade of the British Army had not jumped in more than a year, was poorly equipped, and could only be provided with obsolete transport aircraft. Most of the Royal Marine Brigade was fighting terrorists on Cyprus and had not taken part in an amphibious exercise for more than a year. The closest base for practical joint operations was Malta, 935 miles West of Port Said. Cyprus was only 225 miles from Port Said, but lacked the airfields, ports and support infrastructure for large scale operations. Only one British aircraft carrier was fully operational at the beginning of the British Specific Threat Phase. Subsequent military preparations revealed the weaknesses of the British Armed Services, and the contingency was not able to be met without significant mobilization of reserves and moth-balled equipment. Many of the early plans of attack were discarded because they were not feasible in terms of British capability<sup>24</sup>. Finally it was decided that Britain and



France would seize Port Said<sup>25</sup>. On 31 October 1956, British aircraft bombed Egyptian airfields, this signalling the commencement of the British Operational Response.

|   |                            |                        |                         |
|---|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 18 Dec 1955   | 1 Mar 1956                 | 26 Jul 1956            | 31 Oct 1956             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT                                     | PERCEIVED THREAT           | SPECIFIC THREAT        |                         |
| PHASE   | PHASE                      | PHASE                  |                         |
| 0.2 Years   | 21.0 Weeks                 | 13.9 Weeks             |                         |

NOTES

1. Eden, A., 'Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden', Boston, 1960, p. 427.
2. Jackson, R., 'Suez 1956: Operation Musketeer', London, 1980, p. 8.
3. Eden, A., op. cit., p. 358.
4. ibid., pp. 219-23. The pact also provided for greater permanency of British influence in the region. The British Undersecretary, Evelyn Shuckburgh, said of the pact, '...that its benefits were entirely political: although Great Britain's bilateral treaties with Iraq and Jordan might not be renewed, the pact offered a means of maintaining British bases and troops in both countries'. Eveland, W., 'Ropes of Sand', London, 1980, p. 158.
5. Love, K., 'Suez: The Twice-Fought War', London, 1970, p. 204.
6. The first Cabinet had fallen two days before the rioting commenced, as a result of the bribing of several Jordanian Ministers by the Egyptian Government.
7. Eden, A., op. cit., p. 345.
8. Love, K., op. cit., p. 215
9. ibid., p. 286
10. Eden, A., op. cit., p. 352.
11. Thomas, H., 'The Suez Affair', London, 1967, p. 17.
12. For the reasons behind Hussein's decision to dismiss General Glubb see Love, K., op. cit., pp. 206-213 and Nutting, A., 'No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez', London, 1967, pp. 30-32.
13. Nutting, A., op. cit., p. 18.
14. ibid., p. 27.
15. ibid., p. 32.
16. Even though Britain had entered the Perceived Threat Phase no defence activities were undertaken. This reflected the new British 'doctrine of reliance upon the nuclear deterrent'; Eden, A., op. cit., p. 372. Instead of maintaining a large standing army Britain relied on its thermo-nuclear weaponry to deter aggression. The Suez Crisis was to show up the limitations of this policy.

17. The US decision to renege on the loan offer was based on a combination of domestic political considerations and Egypt's anti-West foreign policy. Fullick, R. and Powell, G.,  
     'Suez: The Double War', London, 1979, pp. 10-11.  
     Love, K., op. cit., pp. 316-320.
18. Eden, A., op. cit., p. 426.
19. Reprinted in Kedourie, E., 'The Entanglements of Suez', Times Literary Supplement, 30 November 1979, p. 67.
20. Eden, A., op. cit., p. 426.
21. Lloyd, S., 'Suez 1956: A Personal Account', London, 1978, p. 130-131.
22. Nutting, A., op. cit., p. 48.
23. Love, K., op. cit., pp. 391-476.  
     Nutting, A., op. cit., pp. 60-113.
24. Eden, A., op. cit., p. 372.  
     Polmar, N., 'Aircraft Carriers: A Graphic History of Carrier Aviation and its influence on World Events', MacDonald, London, 1969, pp. 575-576.
25. The actual plan involved an Israeli 'attack through Sinai that evening (29 October) and the following morning we and the French will issue our ultimatum to her and Egypt to clear the Canal Zone for us to move our troops in. Egypt will, presumably, refuse, and directly she does so we shall start bombing Egyptian airfields, (as a prelude to) the seizure of Port Said', by Anglo-French forces. Eden to Nutting, in Nutting, A., op. cit., p. 105.  
     See also Thomas, H., op. cit., pp. 81-120 and Love, K., op. cit., pp. 433-476.

CASE STUDY 22SUEZ 1956 PHASE 3 - EGYPTIntroduction

1. Egypt under President Nasser was a strong supporter of Arab nationalism and so it viewed all countries with colonial interests in the Middle East, including Britain, as being potentially hostile powers. Despite this, relations between Britain and Egypt were quite amicable at the time of signing of the Heads of State Agreement on the return of the Canal Zone in October 1954. Nasser felt that Egypt could benefit from close ties with England and he tried to sponsor an amicable relationship between the two countries, as long as it did not clash with his plans to promote and preserve Arab nationalism<sup>1</sup>.

2. Although Nasser was probably the keenest supporter of Arab nationalism he saw Egypt's principal National Interest as being the independence of Egypt from outside control and influence. He wanted Egypt to be both militarily and economically independent of the Great Powers. This is demonstrated in his concern over the Aswan Dam loan. Here he wanted the contract covering the loan to be 'free of any passage indicating that they [United States and Great Britain] would dominate our policy or sovereignty or economy and any passages representing domination over Egypt's independence'<sup>2</sup>. To achieve this independence Nasser pursued a foreign policy of 'positive neutralism', accepting both Russian and Western aid but becoming a puppet of neither. Nasser felt that Egyptian independence would be assisted by promoting Arab nationalism, and by the establishment of a 'defence system built on the Arab Collective Security Pact under Egyptian leadership and in a relation of benevolent neutrality to the West'<sup>3</sup>. The build-up to the Suez Crisis can be seen in terms of Egypt reacting to what Nasser perceived as being a British threat to Egypt's independence.

General Hostile Intent and General Capability

3. The first incident to promote friction between Egypt and Britain was the signing of the Baghdad Pact between Iraq and Turkey, on 24 February 1955. Britain strongly supported the pact and became a full member of it on 5 April 1955. Nasser was against the vestiges of Western military and political control in the Arab countries, and he suspected the Baghdad Pact of being a new means to maintain Western hegemony in the region. Also, the pact was in direct opposition to Nasser's vision of a system based on the Arab Collective Security Pact. Nasser claimed that the Baghdad Pact seemed to 'originate from the strategic interests of the Western Powers' and therefore it was less palatable than 'a system which gave primacy to an Arab grouping'<sup>4</sup>.

4. Egyptian fears of the Baghdad Pact were temporarily lulled following a secret agreement between Eden and Nasser. Sir Ralph Stevenson, on Eden's instructions, assured Nasser in April 1955 that no attempt would be made to extend the Baghdad Pact to Arab states other than Iraq. In reply to this assurance, Nasser told Stevenson 'that he would not regard it as an action hostile to Egypt if non-Arab states, such as Britain, joined Iraq and Turkey as members of the pact'<sup>5</sup>. In return for Britain freezing the Arab membership of the pact, Nasser agreed to cease Egypt's propaganda and diplomatic campaign against the Baghdad Pact. The tranquillizing effect of this understanding did not last long.

5. Contrary to the agreement, Eden despatched Sir Gerald Templer to Jordan in November 1955 on a secret mission to obtain Jordanian participation in the pact. The final steps towards bringing Jordan into the pact began on 6 December and at this stage, Egypt still refused to believe what was obviously happening, although Israel broadcasted it plainly the following day. By 12 December Cairo Radio was beginning to express concern about the Templer Mission. Two days later, as the Jordanian cabinet fell apart, Egyptian propaganda opened up full blast against the Templer Mission, decrying it as being a 'Zionist-Imperialist plot to drag Jordan into the network of foreign alliances'<sup>6</sup>. Nasser felt that the Templer Mission was a betrayal of a trust and a sign that Britain had hostile intentions towards Egypt. 'From the time of the Templer Mission onwards, Nasser began to believe that the British Government was pursuing a hostile policy towards him by trying to isolate Egypt and make her once again dependent on Britain'<sup>7</sup>.

6. The commencement by Cairo Radio of the full scale propaganda campaign directed by Nasser, on 14 December, against the Templer Mission, signalled that Egypt realised the true purpose of the mission and therefore recognized Britain's General Hostile Intent towards Egypt. This recognition on 14 December 1955 signals the commencement of the Notional Threat Phase, as Egypt would have assumed that Great Britain had the General Capability to threaten it. At this stage Britain was still considered one of the main world powers and it was recognized that Britain possessed a considerable military force which could be tailored into a potential invasion force. Elements of this force were still stationed in the Suez Canal Zone. However as later events revealed, Nasser realised that at this stage Britain did not possess the Specific Capability to immediately threaten Egypt.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

7. Relationships between the two countries were not irreversibly damaged by Eden's betrayal of the secret agreement, and by 1 March 1956 Nasser was again willing to revive the Baghdad Pact moratorium. Unfortunately the talks coincided with King Hussein's sacking of General Glubb. This event was the turning point in Britain's relations with Egypt for although Nasser had nothing to do with the sacking (he thought that the step to sack Glubb was taken by the British to gain favour with the Arabs)<sup>8</sup>, Eden blamed him for it<sup>9</sup>. Nasser remained unaware of the extent of Eden's hostility towards him. So far as Nasser was concerned, his renewal with

Britain of the moratorium on the Baghdad Pact was valid. On 4 April 1956, having waited in vain for a British announcement freezing the Arab membership of the Baghdad Pact, Egypt nevertheless went ahead with the agreed abatement of anti-British propaganda. In May Nasser received the British Ambassador warmly and in his Independence Day speech, Nasser expressed the wish for better relations with Britain. At this stage, relations between the two countries though cool, were not openly hostile. This was soon to change.

8. On 19 July 1956, the US announced that it was pulling out of talks on the financing of the Aswan High Dam. Britain quickly followed suit. Nasser was furious, not because the US reneged on the loan but because of 'the insulting attitude with which the refusal was declared'<sup>10</sup>. Most of Nasser's anger seemed to be directed at the US not Britain. He claimed that in refusing to lend the money the US slandered the Egyptian economy: 'Washington shamelessly and without any basis in truth, aims to cast doubt on the Egyptian economy'<sup>11</sup>. On 23 July, in response to the renege on the dam, Nasser decided to nationalise the Suez Canal in two days, so as to gain the necessary money to finance the dam. At that time Nasser still had not recognised a Specific Hostile Intent from Britain and he did not until after the nationalisation of the canal. Years later when asked in a interview whether he was surprised at the violence of the reaction in the West, Nasser replied:

'I was surprised by the reaction of Britain. I was waiting for reaction from Britain. I was surprised by the amount of the reaction of Britain'<sup>12</sup>.

9. By nationalizing the canal, Nasser was hoping to ensure the independence of Egypt. After compensating the Suez Canal Company shareholders, the canal would give Egypt the money to finance the dam which was seen as being vital for Egypt's future development. Nasser's action was also in effect a statement that Egypt's economy would not in the future be dictated by outside powers. The days following the nationalisation saw Eden announce his country's hostile intent towards Egypt as he decried the nationalization. Threats to Egypt emanated from Britain and it seemed to Nasser that the British Government favoured forcible intervention which threatened Egypt's National Interest: total independence. On 28 July 1956 Britain made evident its Specific Hostile Intent towards Egypt's independence by freezing all Egypt's sterling balances and assets. This signalled the commencement of the Perceived Threat Phase.

#### Specific Capability

10. In planning the seizure of the canal, Nasser felt that it would be some months before Britain could compile a force capable of attacking Egypt. Egyptian liaison officers working secretly in Cyprus, Malta and Aden provided Nasser with the following information:

'it was clear to us that Britain would not be ready to have any military movement before three or four months. We thought at that time that it would be possible to reach

a sort of a settlement during these three months'<sup>13</sup>.

Following the commencement of the Perceived Threat Phase Egypt instituted some minor defence activities. The National Guard (the Egyptian part-time militia) was partially mobilized following the nationalization, and some army units were moved from the Sinai to the Canal Zone in case of an Anglo-French reaction. At this stage Nasser, although of the belief that Britain would use force to thwart the nationalization, of the Suez Canal, still doubted that Britain had the force to react immediately.

11. During August 1956 large numbers of British troops and great quantities of military material were transferred to the British base on Cyprus. On 12 August Britain launched an airlift of 5 000 troops to the Mediterranean. As well, two troopships and two cargo vessels were reported moving troops to Cyprus and transferring vehicles from British units in Germany to the Mediterranean bases. Earlier in August Eden had ordered that 20 000 British Army reservists be called up. By late August there was a concentration of British amphibious craft and assault troops on Malta and airborne assault troops in Cyprus. This concentration would have been observed by the Egyptians. It now appeared obvious that Britain, aided by the French, had the capability to launch a substantial invasion against Egypt. The first sign that Egypt had recognised a British Specific Capability came on 25 August 1956, when Egyptian Government officials began 'canvassing UN officials on the possibility of a special Security Council session to take up British and French military moves in the Mediterranean'<sup>14</sup>. Egypt recognized that Britain now had the Specific Capability to threaten Egypt's National Interest : its independence : for an invasion of Egypt could possibly result in Egypt once again coming under British rule or at least under British influence. The canvassing of United Nations (UN) officials on 25 August 1956 signals Egyptian recognition of a British Specific Capability and the commencement of the Specific Threat Phase.

#### Operational Response

12. Relations between Egypt and Britain deteriorated further after the commencement of this phase, and Britain stepped up its planning for an Anglo-French invasion. On 24 October, Britain, France and Israel signed a secret accord at Sevres. The plan was for Israel to initiate a war with Egypt in the Sinai. With Israel advancing towards the canal, Britain and France would issue ultimatums to both Egypt and Israel requiring them to withdraw from the Canal Zone to enable Anglo-French forces to occupy the canal on the pretext of preventing war damage to it. The British and French could then claim to be separating the combatants' while actually taking full control of the canal. Egypt's rejection of the Anglo-French ultimatum would lead to Anglo-French 'police action' being taken against Egypt. On 24 October the two ultimatums which were to be used on 30 October were drafted<sup>15</sup>.

13. Following the commencement of the Specific Threat Phase Egypt instituted some more defence activities. All Egyptian Army reservists were now called up, plans were made to develop the National Guard militia into an 'Army of National Liberation', and more troops were moved from Sinai (possibly half of the force

usually there) into the Canal Zone. As well, Nasser tried to keep the border with Israel quiet and all fedayeen raids were called off for the time being. This redeployment of forces made it easier for the Israelis to launch their invasion on 29 October. Two days later (31 October) British bombers commenced their attacks on Egyptian airfields, following Egypt's rejection of the Anglo-French ultimatum, thus signalling the commencement of the Operational Response.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 14 Dec 1955   | 28 Jul 1956                | 25 Aug 1956              | 31 Oct 1956             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 0.62 Years  | 4.0 Weeks                  | 9.6 Weeks                |                         |



NOTES

1. To get a full picture of Egyptian-British relations prior to the Suez Crisis, Case Study 21 should be read first as many of the events briefly referred to in this case study are considered in greater detail there.
2. Love, L., 'Suez: The Twice-Fought War', London, 1970, p. 314.
3. Stephens, R., 'Nasser: A Political Biography', London, 1971, p. 148.
4. ibid., p. 148.
5. ibid., p. 151.
6. Love, K., op. cit. p. 204.
7. Stephens, R., op. cit., p. 175.
8. Moncrieff, A., (ed), 'Suez: Ten Years After', London, 1967, p. 34.
9. Case Study 21: Suez 1956 Phase 3 - Britain.
10. Moncrieff, A., op. cit., p. 42. Nasser, despite his claim that Russia was willing to finance the dam, did not want Russian aid because it would involve him too heavily with the Russians, since they already supplied arms to Egypt, and would therefore be contrary to his policy of positive neutralism.
11. Stephens, R., op. cit., p. 194.
12. Moncrieff, A., op. cit., p. 44.
13. ibid., p. 44.
14. Hofstadter, D., (ed), 'Egypt and Nasser: Volume 1 1952-1956', New York, 1973, p. 158.
15. Love, K., op. cit., p. 465.

CASE STUDY 23SINO-INDIA 1962 - CHINAIntroduction

1. Between 1954 and 1957 the Chinese Government surveyed and constructed a 1200 kilometre long road linking Sinkiang with Tibet, which crossed the Aksai Chin, an area associated with Ladakh and claimed by India. The Indian Government appears to have been unaware of this project until its completion was officially announced in 1957. The Chinese, however, did not give precise details of the road they had constructed until its route was marked on subsequent editions of national maps<sup>1</sup>.

2. The Aksai Chin road (i.e. the Sinkiang-Tibet all weather highway) appears to have been of particular strategic importance to the Chinese for a number of reasons. Since the reassertion of Chinese control over Tibet in 1950, the Chinese Government had faced recurrent rebellions sponsored and organized by the United States (US) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Nationalist China. By May 1960 the CIA and Nationalist Chinese had supplied over 42 000 Tibetan insurgents with arms, through air drops conducted by the CIA airline Civil Air Transport (later replaced by a new CIA sponsored airline China Airlines). Such actions had encouraged and maintained the Khampa rebellion of 1956-60 which involved most of Tibet and created a grave security problem for the Chinese Government. The most reliable and important communications route from China to Tibet during the later stages of the conflict was the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway. Indeed, the highway represented the improved access to Tibet which the Chinese Government had to have if it was to maintain effective control of this rugged and isolated region<sup>2</sup>.

General Hostile Intent and General Capability

3. Although China occupied the Khurnak Fort in July 1958, and arrested an Indian patrol in the northern Aksai Chin in September<sup>3</sup>, India waited until 18 October 1958 to protest about the construction of a Chinese road through ostensibly Indian territory. In December 1958 the Chinese Government suggested negotiations to clear the matter up<sup>4</sup>.

4. While both governments remained committed to a peaceful settlement of the border issue, the Chinese held that the border had never been delimited (by both the Indian and Chinese governments), and that disagreements could only be resolved by negotiation and joint survey<sup>5</sup>. Concurrently the rejection of the McMahon Line (in the eastern sector) implicit in Chinese maps (published in 1954) was also raised. In a letter to Nehru on 23 January 1959, Chou En-Lai dismissed the McMahon Line as a product of British imperialist aggression 'against the Tibet Region of China' yet went on to say that,

'... the Chinese Government on the one hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line and, on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter. All this I have mentioned to you on more than one occasion. However, we believe that, on account of the friendly relations between China and India, a friendly settlement can eventually be found for this section of the boundary line'<sup>6</sup>.

Since Chou En-lai had, in 1956, indicated that China was (for pragmatic reasons) prepared to recognise the McMahon Line, it would seem that the re-introduction of the eastern border issue - by means of a circumlocutory rejection of its validity - was an attempt to raise a counter bargaining point. Seeking a comprehensive delimitation of the borders, China appears to have hinted that it would be 'realistic' about the McMahon Line if India would be 'realistic' about the 'Aksai Chin'.

5. The Indian Government did not accept the Chinese view that the northern borders needed redefinition, and although interested in negotiation, insisted that Chinese forces should first withdraw from the Aksai Chin. Chinese emphasis on 'prudence' and need for 'time', with respect to the McMahon Line stirred Indian suspicions and stimulated the view in New Delhi that re-negotiation was tantamount to ceding territory south of the McMahon Line rather than an opportunity to settle finally outstanding differences as the Chinese intended. In fact, Chinese withdrawal from the Aksai Chin was unrealistic as it would have exposed a significant section of the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway to interdiction by Tibetan rebels<sup>7</sup>.

6. In August of the same year, the Indians made their own unilateral adjustments to the McMahon Line by advancing the border to the Tsari River and thereby absorbing the hamlet of Longju. This immediately provoked a clash between Indian and Chinese troops at Longju on 25 August 1959. Another followed at the Kangka Pass on 20 October<sup>8</sup>. It is probable that the Chinese Government had already recognized a General Hostile Intent from the Indians in the first half of 1959, by which time the obstructive Indian attitude to negotiations on the two northern borders had manifested itself clearly. The significance of the new Indian policy, and the military clash which followed it at Longju, was that it confirmed for the Chinese the existence of an Indian General Capability. For some time the Chinese had been suspicious of covert Indian assistance to Tibetan rebels. This had first been hinted in a communication to the Indian Government in July 1958<sup>9</sup>. In April 1959 the Dalai Lama had fled to India, followed by many thousands of refugees, who gained great public sympathy and support. Indians began to aid the rebels more openly without interference from the Indian Government. The use of the Indian Army at Longju indicated that such public antipathy to China had some official support. Although insignificant in its size, use of the army in this manner represented a new Indian

capability in the disputed regions. The Chinese Government responded to the Longju incident with the following words on 1 September 1959:

'... the Chinese Government emphatically urges the Indian Government to adopt measures at once to prevent Indian troops from committing any new violation against Longju. Otherwise the Indian side must bear full responsibility for all serious consequences arising therefrom. The Chinese Government must also point out that some remnant Tibetan rebel bandits are still using areas under Indian administration as bases to carry out harassment against Migyitun, Longju and other places. The Chinese Government asks the Indian Government to take effective measures also to put a stop to this ...'<sup>10</sup>.

7. The tone of the letter and the allusion to 'serious consequences' would suggest that the Chinese had entered a Notional Threat Phase between 25 August and 1 September 1959.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

8. Although Nehru and Chou met in Delhi, in April 1960, in order to seek a peaceful solution, their sole achievement was an agreement that officials of the two nations should meet and examine all relevant documents pertaining to the boundary. While the Indian Government contented itself with extensive historical research (on the northern boundaries) together with publication of ongoing diplomatic exchanges<sup>11</sup>, in April it had also begun to evolve an ancillary strategy which was to become commonly known as the 'Forward Policy'. Neville Maxwell has summarised the objectives of the 'Forward Policy' as follows:

'... first, to block potential lines of further Chinese advance; secondly, to establish an Indian presence in Aksai Chin which would make Indian participation in the joint withdrawals proposed by Nehru more than theoretical, and thus give strength to that diplomatic lever for getting the Chinese out of the area. Beyond that, implicit at the outset, was the intention to undermine Chinese control of the disputed areas by the interposition of Indian posts and patrols between Chinese positions, thus cutting their supply lines and ultimately forcing them to withdraw'<sup>12</sup>.

9. All this was to be achieved by establishing forward posts, by despatching regular patrols, and without actually attacking Chinese positions! Although details of troop deployments and 'rules of engagement' were formulated as early as May 1960, the Indian Army lacked adequate logistic support to effectively implement the government's policy. Nevertheless, the Indian Army reluctantly commenced forward patrolling by late 1960 although it could only maintain a very thin line of unsupported piquets and posts in the remote and rugged northern border areas<sup>13</sup>. Within the context of the Sino-Indian border, these moves had no serious military

significance for the Chinese as they had more forces, better communications and better positions. Much of the Chinese communication system was on the Tibetan Plateau, from which it was comparatively easy to develop feeder roads to Chinese positions in more rugged areas. By contrast, the terrain which confronted the Indian Army on its side of the border, particularly on the McMahon Line, was riddled with steep valleys and high ridges, and deep fast flowing rivers. There were no reliable road systems, and the difficulties of constructing one, were much more difficult than for the Chinese. Yet the Chinese did begin some significant defence preparations in response to the weak Indian initiative. In January 1961 the Chinese army was ordered to strengthen its border capabilities. Among other things this involved the construction of new feeder roads to the Western Aksai Chin, and the establishment of a new post there in the Chip Chap Valley<sup>14</sup>. Evidently the Chinese Government saw more significance in the Indian moves than was indicated in military terms alone.

10. The Chinese Government viewed the Indian Governments actions in a much broader context than just the Sino-Indian border regions. This included the struggle with the US and Nationalist Chinese, the Sino-Russian dispute and the economic disaster which followed the Great Leap Forward. In 1959 the Chinese Government began the most massive economic experiment of modern times. More than 600 million persons experienced a year of total economic reorganization in all aspects of daily life. By mid 1959, the economic dislocation caused by the Great Leap Forward was spreading across the countryside which was also hit by a bad harvest. An ideological polemic initiated by Mao Tse Tung against Russia in April 1960 in defence of the Great Leap Forward, prompted the Russian leader Khrushchev to withdraw all Russian technical assistance that August. Apart from declaring the Sino-Russia dispute this brought key industrial projects to a halt at a time when there was another bad harvest as well as floods and droughts. These disasters stimulated a significant rise in internal insurgency against the Communist regime especially in border areas (i.e. Kansu, Ching Hai, Szechuan, Tibet and Yunnan), and increased worries for the regime in regard to the morale of some elements of its army and party<sup>15</sup>.

11. At this time of internal weakness (which was to grow worse in the next two years) the Chinese Government also had to contend with the US and Taiwan. It knew of the collusion of the two nations in interfering with Tibet since 1950. They had fostered and sustained the great Khampa rebellion between 1956-60 and were still supplying arms to insurgents in the region. The CIA and Nationalist Chinese were also active in Laos and Burma conducting raids into nearby Chinese provinces. The threat of direct invasion from Taiwan had always been present, and known by the Chinese Government to be being considered by the Nationalists in the context of the economic chaos in China<sup>16</sup>. The action of the Indian Government in initiating the Forward Policy seems to have been seen by the Chinese Government as the first step towards a much more vigorous policy of confrontation, in which the Indian Government would become one of a number of great powers attempting to take advantage of China in her

time of weakness and insecurity. Indian actions were seen as representing a Specific Hostile Intent to the Chinese National Interests of the security and control of Tibet, and the national security of China as a whole. The Chinese appear to have reached this conclusion during December 1960-January 1961.

### Specific Capability

12. Apart from strengthening its border capabilities, the Chinese Army was also ordered to maintain a low posture of '... reconciliation with the reactionaries ...'. Chinese diplomatic and military actions on the Sino-Indian border were quite consistent with this policy until April 1962. Having realized the ineffective implementation of the Forward Policy by his own forces, the Indian Prime Minister reaffirmed the policy on 2 November 1961, and ordered the army to implement it vigorously<sup>17</sup>. On 5 December 1961, the Indian commanders on both the eastern and western sectors were ordered to:

'... patrol as far forward as possible from our present positions towards the International Border as recognised by us. This will be done with a view to establishing additional posts located to prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also to dominate any Chinese posts already established in our territory... This 'Forward Policy' shall be carried out without getting involved in a clash with the Chinese unless it becomes necessary in self-defence'<sup>18</sup>.

13. The Indian Army was seriously handicapped by its limited logistic support infrastructure and took until March/April of 1962 before it began to have some impact. The number of posts was increased and the army began to move positively to cut off Chinese posts in order to force them to retire. This immediately provoked a clash in the Chip Chap Valley (and was followed some months later with another in the Galwan Valley of the Aksai Chin). The tone of Peking's notes to New Delhi changed during April to vehement complaints of Indian military actions and threats of dire consequences if the Indians continued on their provocative path. For the Chinese Government the forward patrolling and establishment of posts were:

'.. deliberate attempts to realise by force the territorial claims put forward by the Indian Government'<sup>19</sup>.

The Chinese, however, appear to have taken a holistic view of the strategic implications of the 'Forward Policy'. As Allan Whiting points out, the Chinese had a very real fear of imminent invasion from Taiwan and viewed Indian military capability within the context of the Specific Capability of the 'imperialist camp' as a whole.

'... the continued C.I.A. - Nationalist activity in Tibet could be logically linked with increased Indian activity on the Himalayan border as part of an overall design to increase pressure on the mainland from two fronts'<sup>20</sup>.

14. With major deterioration in Sino-Russian relations and subsequent US/Russian military aid to India, China appears to have become particularly concerned by the marked enhancement of Indian air power. Whereas China had previously enjoyed a distinct communications and logistic advantage, increased Indian air capability meant increased ability to support Indian troops. Between 6 March and 30 April 1962, 67 airspace violations took place over Chinese border territory. Not only could India better supply her forces on the border than before, she could also deploy more of them. This provided India with an improved capability to sever Chinese supply lines and possibly interdict the Aksai Chin road itself. Without an adequate air defence system, Western Tibet lay vulnerable to penetration<sup>21</sup>. There seems to be little doubt that China had recognized an Indian Specific Capability by April 1962.

#### Operational Response

15. Still seriously threatened by the possibility of a Nationalist invasion, China was only able to fully implement effective defence measures in response to the Indian threat, once the US had made assurances that it would not sponsor such an invasion. The prelude to this was that high officials from the US Government conferred with the Nationalist Chinese Government in Taiwan during early 1962. At the end of March the Nationalists made their most direct public call for many years for invasion of mainland China. Preparations were begun on a big scale and were almost certainly monitored by Peking through its spy network in Taiwan. There was an increase in Nationalist raids from Nationalist controlled off shore islands. The Chinese thought that this was the beginning of a US backed invasion, which appeared to be corroborated during May 1962 when some minor Pathet Lao successes in Laos triggered a major US display of force in Thailand. In fact, US officials were attempting to dissuade the Nationalists from invading, and the show of strength was not related to China at all. During 1 to 20 June the Chinese Government concentrated 100 000 troops opposite Taiwan to counter an invasion<sup>22</sup>. In the same month a People's Daily editorial confirmed the Chinese Government's perceptions of possible Indian-Nationalist collusion.

'... It should be pointed out that in particular the number of invasions and provocations by Indian troops has increased steadily in the past few months and this is by no means fortuitous. The Hindustan Times in an article on June 8, revealed that the recent intensified Indian intrusions into China were connected with Chiang Kai-Shek gang's preparations, with the support of the U.S. imperialism, to invade the mainland. The paper had the effrontery to declare that China must be made to understand that it might have to face prospects of war on two fronts simultaneously'<sup>23</sup>.

16. On 27 June the US President affirmed publically his opposition to any Taiwan attack on China. Subsequent actions convinced the Chinese that the US was genuine in its statement, and the crisis with Taiwan passed. The lesson the Chinese allegedly drew from this experience was that forceful military measures proved effective in ending the crisis. The Chinese now proposed to solve the problem with India in the same manner. The evidence indicates that the transfer of reserve divisions to the Sino-Indian border began in July. Following the Galwan Valley clash, preparations were increased to improve roads, communications and to stock-pile supplies<sup>24</sup>. Until her forces were properly deployed in the Himalayan frontier, China seems to have steadily avoided any escalation of the conflict. The Indians however, do not appear to have been convinced of China's resolve to achieve her political objectives in the region. When Chinese forces crossed the Thag La Ridge in western North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and threatened another Indian post (at Dhola on the Namka Chu River) on 8 September, India seems to have been convinced that the same 'forward' tactics could again be effectively applied to expel the Chinese. By deploying a full brigade for this operation (code-named 'Leghorn') the Indians faced the Chinese for the first time with a tailored military force<sup>25</sup>.

17. As an Indian force under Lieutenant General B.N. Kaul approached Yumtso La in an attempt to outflank the Chinese, it was surprised by a full battalion of Chinese infantry which poured heavy mortar fire on Tseng Jong and after a number of determined attacks forced its Punjabi garrison to withdraw<sup>26</sup>.

18. Despite having been forcefully resisted by the Chinese, and having had their positions attacked with massive force, the Indians continued to reinforce their emplacements on the Namka Chu and in particular their garrison at Tsangle. Thus the Chinese Government's warnings that if India persisted with its forward probings China would retaliate (in force), had still not been taken seriously<sup>27</sup>.

19. The Chinese could not let the issue drag on. As part of the 'vanguard' in the struggle against 'imperialism' they could not be seen to be coerced into acceptance of an 'imperialist border' imposed under unequal terms. The very act of surrender to such pressure was anathema to a leadership which argued that in revolution China had 'stood up' and would never again return to the position of 'injured old China'. While China had, in effect, accepted the McMahon Line (with minor variations) after 'equal' negotiations with Burma, it had done so after the British imposed demarcation had initially been nullified. Similarly, in the west it was simply not prepared to accept the limits of Ladakh as the British had defined them - just because the Republic of India saw its borders as consistent with those of the British Raj<sup>28</sup>. Thus China found itself in a position whereby she had no alternative but to deal India a blow so potent that the issue would be resolved forever. In the short conflict which ensued - after China's attack on 20 October 1962 - the Indians were decisively defeated in NEFA



and completely expelled from the Aksai Chin<sup>29</sup>.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 25 Aug 1959   | Jan 1961                   | Apr 1962                 | 20 Oct 1962             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 1.3 Years   | 65 Weeks                   | 29 Weeks                 |                         |

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CASE STUDY 24SINO-INDIA 1962 - INDIAIntroduction

1. On a visit to Tibet in the summer of 1957, the Head Lama of Ladakh, Kushak Bakula, took note of a major road building project between Sinkiang and Tibet. Not long after, the Chinese officially announced the completion of this road, but without providing exact details of its route. Indian curiosity was sufficiently aroused to warrant patrols to be despatched to the Aksai Chin - located to the east of Ladakh and bordering both Sinkiang and Tibet. It was soon found that the Chinese-built road did, in fact, traverse the Aksai Chin and thus crossed territory long considered Indian<sup>1</sup>.

General Hostile Intent and General Capability

2. Although the Chinese secured their first emplacement west of the Aksai Chin road when they occupied the Khurnak Fort in July 1958, and had challenged and arrested Indian patrols as early as September<sup>2</sup>, it remains unclear why India waited until 18 October to register her,

'...surprise and regret that the Chinese Government should have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory ...'<sup>3</sup>.

3. The ensuing correspondence between Nehru and Chou En-lai would certainly appear to indicate that China regarded the Aksai Chin as an integral part of Tibet and that India regarded such an attitude as indicative of a General Hostile Intent towards an area which had been 'part of the Ladakh region of India for centuries'<sup>4</sup>. Concurrently, India was aware of China's strategic advantage and General aCapability (as evidenced by the Korean and Tibetan campaigns)<sup>5</sup>. Thus, it is likely that India had entered a Notional Threat Phase by October 1958 despite the aura of Sino-Indian friendship<sup>6</sup>.

Specific Capability

4. While both nations appeared committed to a negotiated settlement, the exchange of notes between the respective governments throughout 1959-60 became more astringent. With China's further challenge to the validity of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) boundary and the so-called McMahon Line<sup>7</sup>, (see Case Study 22) the issues remained far from static and began to encompass small border clashes and airspace violations on both wings of the Himalayas.

5. From April 1960, the Indian Government began to evolve an ancillary strategy to the negotiating table; known as the 'Forward Policy', it was seen as a means of checking the Chinese advance and undermining Chinese control of disputed areas. In May 1960, the

Indian Defence Department drew up details for troop deployments, while the Indian Foreign Secretary outlined the 'rules of engagement' required to achieve foreign policy objectives. The Indian Army lacked the necessary logistic support to effectively implement the Forward Policy, but Indian implementation appears to have been aimed at establishing a counter-presence to the Chinese - with patrols and a scattering of small outposts in isolated parts of the rugged northern border<sup>8</sup>.

6. With the 'strengthening of PLA (border) capabilities' (ordered in January 1961), the discovery of new feeder roads to the westernmost Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) positions in the summer of the same year, and the establishment of a new PLA outpost in the Chip Chap Valley, India realized in October 1961 that China had the Specific Capability to occupy all of the disputed areas unless challenged by an active Indian counter-presence<sup>9</sup>. Having realized the ineffectiveness of the Forward Policy as currently implemented, the Indian Prime Minister reaffirmed the policy on 2 November 1961. This was followed by a categorical order from the Indian Army Chief for a more vigorous implementation of the Forward Policy, despite the serious logistic problems which the army had been unable to solve. The policy now required the Indian Army to penetrate into territory behind the Chinese positions in an attempt to force advanced Chinese posts to withdraw, while increased Indian patrols and posts blocked areas of potential Chinese advance<sup>10</sup>. This modified strategy could not of itself guarantee Indian success, for as the Indian Government knew, the Chinese had far greater forces at their disposal than India could bring to bear. However, by escalating the crisis, the matter would be exposed to world scrutiny more obviously. The Indian Government believed that the Chinese would not have the Specific Hostile Intent to respond to the new situation for the following reasons:

- a. India's size and strategic position made it very important to the Great Powers, and the latter would take effective steps to prevent her falling under foreign domination.
- b. India's position as the (supposed) leader of the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement would bring severe international recriminations upon any nation attacking her.
- c. The dispute with China was clearly over 'Indian' territory and thus any Indian action would be perceived as defensive while Chinese reactions would be seen as aggressive.
- d. The Chinese would not resist any determined Indian move against their actions on the northern frontier because of the moral bankruptcy of their territorial claims, and the latent threat of Great Power support for India.

- e. The Chinese would not allow conflict with India to jeopardize Indian support and sponsorship for their membership in the United Nations<sup>11</sup>.

By introducing these broader issues into the crisis on the northern frontier, the Indian Government felt that it could restrain Chinese hostile intentions, and yet use controlled armed force against an opponent with an obvious Specific Capability

#### Specific Hostile Intent

8. While the Indians (like the British before them) undoubtedly felt more comfortable with the Chinese on the crests of the Himalayas rather than on their foothills, the most basic reason for the Indian counter-challenge to the Chinese in the Aksai Chin was one of national ideology. Since India had never had a united political identity until the advent of British rule, Indian nationalism developed within the geographical parameters of British India. The Satyagraha strategy of the Congress nationalists was aimed at a peaceful and legal transfer of British power and the implicit inheritance of the boundaries of this power - less concessions to the Muslim state of Pakistan<sup>12</sup>. S.P. Sharma has expressed the legal implications of the succession to autonomy as follows:

'Under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the precise incidents of the change of governments were specified at length. India was to be considered as continuing its membership in international organizations and the treaty rights and obligations of undivided India. Recognizing this fact, India at once made it clear that it would abide by all pre-existing treaty rights and obligations. India's explicit acknowledgement of treaty obligations and the acceptance of its treaty partners, including Tibet and China, establish the fact beyond reasonable doubt that independent India was the same state as pre-partition India, and its northern border therefore survives intact',<sup>13</sup>.

9. Thus India also asserted that Sir Henry McMahon's demarcation of NEFA as set down at the Simla conference of 1913, was the legal boundary between India and Tibet/China. The strategic issues in NEFA, however, were probably more acute than in the west, since Chinese control of the sub-Himalayan escarpment could provide access to Assam (and its oilfields) and to the plains of West Bengal. This, combined with overt influence in Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan could seriously threaten Indian communications (through the narrow Darjeeling corridor) to the whole land-locked eastern wing of the Indian Republic. Control of NEFA could also enable China to provide more effective support to existent separatist elements in the rugged Naga and Mizo hill-tracts and thereby catalyze further security problems.

10. Despite these National Interests, India continued throughout 1961 and most of 1962 to believe that China did not have a Specific Hostile Intent. In May 1962, for example, when Chinese troops advanced in 'assault formation' on a newly established Indian

post in the Chip Chap valley, the rationale of the Forward Policy was held to have been vindicated when the 'attack' was broken off and the Chinese 'bluff' called<sup>14</sup>. In the following month Lieutenant General B.N. Kaul reported:

'It is better for us to establish as many posts as we can in Ladakh, even though in penny packets, rather than wait for a substantial build-up, as I am convinced that the Chinese will not attack any of our positions even if they are relatively weaker than theirs'<sup>15</sup>.

Similarly, in July when the Chinese threatened and then withdrew from the Galwan Post, the basic logic of the Forward Policy was again seen to have been confirmed. Neville Maxwell has argued that the Indian Government firmly believed that if the 'Indian troops were resolute, the Chinese would do no more than huff and puff; and that in the arena of the Aksai Chin, as on the level of governments, the Chinese would swerve away before impact'<sup>16</sup>. Nevertheless, India remained well aware of China's Specific Capability. In the same month General K.S. Thimmayya, for example, noted:

'Whereas in the case of Pakistan I have considered the possibility of a total war, I am afraid I cannot do so in regard to China. I cannot even as a soldier envisage India taking on China in an open conflict on its own. China's present strength in manpower, equipment and aircraft exceeds our resources a hundredfold with the full support of the U.S.S.R. and we could never hope to match China in the foreseeable future. It must be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security ...'<sup>17</sup>.

11. When, on 8 September 1962, the Chinese crossed the Thag La Ridge in western NEFA and threatened another Indian post (at Dhola on the Namka Chu River) India obviously felt that the same seemingly effective 'forward' tactics could again be applied to expel the Chinese. In this the Indian Government had the assurance of the Director of the Intelligence Branch (DIB), B.N. Mullik, that the Chinese would not retaliate strongly against such a projected move<sup>18</sup>. The operation was code-named 'Leghorn' and was carried out under the leadership of Lieutenant General B.N. Kaul<sup>19</sup>. However, as Kaul's force approached Yumtso La in an attempt to outflank the Chinese, it was surprised by a full battalion of Chinese infantry which rained heavy mortar fire on Tsengjong and after a number of determined attacks forced its Punjabi garrison to withdraw<sup>20</sup>.

12. Nevertheless, India continued to reinforce positions on the Namka Chu and in particular built up the indefensible garrison at Tsangle, thereby stretching lines of communication and logistic support to the limit. The peculiar ascendancy of India's Intelligence Branch over Service Intelligence not only resulted in the Director of the Intelligence Branch effectively echoing the political and ideological convictions of the Prime Minister and both the Departments of Defence and External Affairs, but also led to a

failure to appreciate the dramatic change in Chinese tone - from compromise to threats of military action, (see Case Study 22). The joint opinion on 22 September 1962, was that a hard and demonstrative blow at the Chinese beneath Thag La ridge would not only see the latter retreating, but thereafter taking a more acquiescent line in the face of Indian moves elsewhere. For reasons of prestige, the Chinese might feel compelled to compensate for their reversal by a few token actions on the northern frontier somewhere. China would not risk the odium of publically assaulting a country as closely identified with peace as was India. On 3 October 1962 the Indian Prime Minister repeated his belief that the Chinese would not take strong counter action. Thus, the Indian Government expected no massive Chinese counter-moves against either Ladakh or NEFA in the wake of 'Operation Leghorn'. The operation was easily thwarted by the Chinese on its first day of implementation (10 October). On 12 October the Indian Prime Minister made a public statement reaffirming that the armed services had been ordered to evict the Chinese from Thag La<sup>21</sup>.

13. For the Chinese, their means of deterrence apparently exhausted, there seems to have remained no alternative to a full scale coordinated attack in order to achieve their political objectives<sup>22</sup>. Thus the Chinese responded with attacks on both the eastern and western fronts on 20 October 1962. With this attack, India finally realized that Chinese rhetoric was far from mere bluster and that the Chinese Government had a Specific Hostile Intent.

#### Operational Response

14. The Specific Threat Phase for the Indian Government lasted only a few hours, because a full scale Operational Response had to be mounted on 20 October 1962 to counter Chinese attacks. In NEFA the Indians were to be thoroughly routed, while in Ladakh, they were forced into retreat. The Chinese, however, ultimately declared a unilateral cease fire on 21 November and began to withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the November 1959 lines of actual control, thereby effectively ending the conflict in their favour<sup>23</sup>. It would seem abundantly clear that the reason for India's failure in 1962 was, as K. Subrahmanyam has put it:

'... not lack of resources, but lack of threat perception and adequate planning to meet alternative threats. It is difficult to believe that there was any plan because it is established that no systematic assessment of the threat was presented to the government. Various individual officials could have put forward original ideas and their personal assessments, but none of these ideas and assessments seems to have been fed into the decision-making machinery which was available'<sup>24</sup>.



GENERAL HOSTILE  
INTENT AND  
GENERAL CAPABILITY  
Oct 1958  
NOTIONAL THREAT  
PHASE  
3 Years

SPECIFIC  
CAPABILITY  
Oct 1961  
PERCEIVED THREAT  
PHASE  
55 Weeks

| SPECIFIC<br>HOSTILE<br>INTENT | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 20 Oct 1962                   | 20 Oct 1962             |
| SPECIFIC THREAT               |                         |
| PHASE                         |                         |
| 0.02 Weeks                    |                         |

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5. 'Large forces had been stationed in Tibet for years, a good proportion of them on active service against the Khampa rebels: the troops were physically attuned to living and fighting at high altitude, and were suitably clothed and equipped. The situation on the Indian side of the crest line was cruelly different'. Maxwell, N., 'India's China War', London, 1971, p. 301.
6. 'Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China: September-November 1959', White Paper No. II, New Delhi, 1963.  
  
'Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China: November 1959 - March 1960', White Paper No. III, New Delhi, 1965.
7. For an excellent historical study of the 'McMahon Line' see: Lamb, A., 'The McMahon Line: A Study in Relations Between India, China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914,' Volumes I and II, London, 1966.
8. Maxwell, N., op. cit., pp. 199-200.
9. Whiting, A.S., 'The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indo-China', Michigan, 1975, pp. 45-46.
10. Maxwell, N., op. cit., pp. 221-223, 235-239.

Whiting, A.S., op. cit., pp. 46, 42.

On 5 December 1961, commanders on the eastern and western sectors were ordered to '... patrol as far forward as possible from our present positions towards the International Border as recognized by us. This will be done with a view to establishing additional posts located to prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also to dominate any Chinese posts already established in our territory... This Forward Policy shall be carried out without getting involved in a clash with the Chinese unless it becomes necessary in self-defence'. Cited by Maxwell, N., op. cit., pp. 222-223.

11. Maxwell, N., op. cit., pp. 173-179, 313.
12. Spear, P., 'India: A Modern History', Michigan, 1961, pp. 277-407.  
  
Panikkar, K.M., 'The Foundations of New India', London, 1963, pp. 143-152.
13. Sharma, S.P., op. cit., p. 36.
14. Maxwell, N., op. cit., p. 237.
15. Cited by Maxwell, N., ibid., p. 254.
16. ibid., p. 239.
17. Thimmayya, K.S., 'Adequate Insurance', Seminar, July 1962, p. 14.
18. Hoffman, S.A., 'Anticipation, Disaster, and Victory: India 1962-71', Asian Survey, November 1972, Volume XII, No. 11, pp. 960-979.
19. Kaul, B.N., 'The Untold Story', Bombay, 1967, pp. 353-380.
20. ibid., pp. 380-384.
21. Hoffman, S.A., op. cit.  
  
Maxwell, N., op. cit., pp. 176, 313, 325, 338-340  
  
Dalvi, J.P., 'Himalayan Blunder', Bombay 1969, pp. 213-214, 292-294.
22. Whiting, A.S., op. cit., pp. 216-221.
23. Maxwell, N., op. cit.  
  
Bhargava, G.S., 'The Battle of NEFA', Bombay, 1964.  
  
Dalvi, J.P., 'Himalayan Blunder', Bombay, 1969.
24. Subrahmanyam, K., '1962: The Causes and Lessons', International Studies, Volume II, No. 2., October 1969, pp. 149-166.  
  
'...there was no long-term appreciation of the Chinese threat and possible Chinese reactions. Mr Nehru did not link border incidents with aggressive Chinese intentions. Right up to 1962, the Prime Minister treated recurring Chinese aggression as isolated incidents, and no serious military response was contemplated or ordered. He did not link them with the overall boundary dispute, China's territorial claims or her ideological differences with India. In the circumstances he could not formulate any National Policy worth the name'. Dalvi, J.P., 'Himalayan Blunder', Bombay, 1969, pp. 41-42.

CASE STUDY 25CONFRONTATION 1963 - MALAYSIA (BRITAIN) AND INDONESIAHistorical Background: Pre-World War II

1. The boundary between present day Malaysia and the Indonesian archipelago was largely the result of negotiations between the European Powers who exploited the area in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Ethnically the Malays and Indonesians are closely related. Islam is the predominant religion in both countries. There are however significant cultural differences between the two nationalities - differences as important as, say, those between the British and the French.

2. The consolidation of British and Dutch interests tended to accentuate these differences as did the contrasting styles of government by the colonial powers. As a result, militant nationalism did not manifest itself in Malaya to any great extent whereas in Indonesia the first nationalist movement 'Saraket Islam' was formed in Java as early as 1912. The Perserikatan Kommunisti di Indonesia (PKI), the Indonesian Communist Party, was formed in May 1920<sup>1</sup>. The PKI was thus the first communist party in Asia. An abortive uprising against the Dutch was led by the PKI in November 1926 in Sumatra, and early in 1927 in Java. The failure of this affair led to eclipse of the PKI and the growth of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), led by Sukarno, which became the most militant of the Indonesian parties.

3. The Indonesian struggle against the Dutch appealed to a minority of young Malays who in 1937 formed the Kesatuan Melaya Muda (KMM) which preached expulsion of the British and union with the, yet to be realized, independent Indonesia<sup>2</sup>.

Impact of World War II

4. In Malaya the victorious Japanese released from prison the leaders of the KMM, notably Ibrahim Yaacob, and gave them special duties. Malays in government posts, in the main, co-operated with the Japanese and so gained valuable administrative experience. As the war progressed Japan encouraged Asian nationalist movements and in September 1943 announced that Indonesia would be granted independence. Yaacob requested that Malaya, too, be granted independence, as part of Indonesia. In July 1945, shortly before the Japanese collapse, Yaacob played an important part in creating KRIS a pan-Malaysian movement sanctioned by the Japanese. Yaacob claims that on 12 August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta discussed the inclusion of Malaya in the soon to be proclaimed Republic of Indonesia. Sukarno is reported as saying 'let us form one single Motherland for all the sons of Indonesia'<sup>3</sup>. KRIS collapsed with its Japanese sponsors and Yaacob fled to Jakarta. The Malayan Nationalist Party (MNP) became the successor to the KMM maintaining links with both the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and Indonesia.

5. During the war, the Japanese in Indonesia released from prison Sukarno and Hatta who collaborated with them. Sjarifuddin and Sjahrir opposed the Japanese but maintained liason with Sukarno and Hatta, thus, whatever the outcome of the war, one group of nationalists would have backed the winner. The Japanese offered Indonesia independence in mid-1945. In drafting the constitution of the proposed republic the question of whether Malaya and British Borneo should be included was raised and debated in the Investigating Committee for Preparation of Indonesia's Independence on 11 July 1945. Sukarno stated 'I am convinced that the people of Malaya feel themselves as Indonesians, belonging to Indonesia and as one of us'<sup>4</sup>. The vote was for inclusion. However when Indonesian independence was proclaimed by Sukarno and Hatta on 17 August 1945 more pressing problems had to be faced.

#### Post-War Developments

6. Indonesia's path to independence was not smooth. Two Dutch 'Police Actions', July 1947 and December 1947-May 1948 were countered, and another abortive revolt by the PKI which attempted to seize Madiun in September 1948 led to the installation of a strongly anti-communist caretaker regime. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malay conservative anti-colonialist leader of the Alliance Party was invited to pay an official visit to Indonesia to demonstrate anti-colonial solidarity in 1955, although Yaacob was still actively lobbying for Indonesia's support for the Pan-Malaysia state.

7. Malaya became independent in 1957 and although relations with Indonesia were outwardly cordial several issues caused friction, particularly Malaya's neutral stance in regard to the Permesta rebels to whom it gave asylum.

8. In 1958 the Indonesian Consulate carried out military espionage and established the basis for a future Indonesian intelligence organization within Malaya and Singapore<sup>5</sup>.

#### Creation of Malaysia

9. On 27 May 1961 Tunku Abdul Rahman, the new Prime Minister of Malaya, proposed a 'closer understanding' with Britain and the peoples of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. This move towards a 'Malay Empire' was prompted by fears that Singapore, which had been enjoying limited self-government since 1958, would become independent in 1963<sup>6</sup> and develop into a communist bastion. The Borneo states were included to counterbalance the potential Chinese majority an alliance of Malaya and Singapore alone would create.

10. The announcement had a catalytic effect on the politics of the territories mentioned and within three months the proposal was being discussed as an objective to be achieved in 1963<sup>7</sup>. Despite later Indonesian allegations to the contrary, British and Australian attitudes to the proposed union were not too enthusiastic. Malaya was not a member of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the inclusion of Singapore in the proposed new state could possibly have prohibited its use as a SEATO base and staging area<sup>8</sup>.

Political opposition to the proposal in Malaya and Singapore was muted and centred on the Socialist Front which, in January 1962, at a conference in Kuala Lumpur, issued a joint communique expressing 'concern and regret'. However Boetstaman's Party Rakyat put forward a strong resolution couched in pro-Indonesian and anti-colonialist terms.

11. This was soon followed by a declaration by the PKI (again in the ascendancy) of their opposition to the scheme (see paragraph 15).

12. Indonesian opposition to the Malaysian proposal was initially deflected by the campaign to gain West Irian which although successful in August 1962 had brought about serious economic and political consequences. The Indonesian Army had grown to more than 300 000 and was receiving Russian military assistance and equipment. The Permesta rebels had been defeated in mid 1961, and the insurgents in Sulawesi and West Java were put down by 1962. The army was a nation-wide organization which was in a position to exercise great political power. They did so with restraint under General Nasution. Sukarno, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, replaced Nasution as Chief-of-Staff with Lieutenant General Yani in 1962 and thereafter the army was more tolerant of PKI moves.

13. The PKI recovered from the failure of the Madiun revolt by identifying its aims with those of Sukarno and by virtue of its large disciplined structure. Aidit, the PKI leader, was able to use the West Irian campaign to mobilize the people in mass-organization for the national cause.

14. Sukarno's rule was therefore as much dependent upon his maintaining the balance between the army and the PKI and to a lesser extent, other less well organized political parties, as it was on his personality and popularity with the masses.

15. The first indication of Indonesian objections to the formation of Malaysia was the resolution of the Central Committee of the PKI on 30/31 December 1961 denouncing Malaysia as a form of neo-colonialism (nekolim). On the official level Lord Selkirk the British Commissioner General for South East Asia had visited Jakarta in August 1961 to inform the Indonesian Government of the plans to form Malaysia and in November 1961 Dr Subandrio, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, had addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) wishing Malaysia 'success with this merger so that everyone may live in peace and freedom'.

#### The Brunei Revolt

16. During 1962 Azahari, the leader of the Brunei Party Rakyat, made several visits to Jakarta and urged support for his scheme to establish a state of North Borneo. A base was established in Malinau, in Indonesian Kalimantan, to train the nucleus of a guerilla army<sup>9</sup>. Azahari also made visits to the Philippines which had publically stated its claim to North Borneo in June 1962.

17. The rebellion occurred on 8 December 1962. Within five days British troops flown from Singapore had quashed the revolt in the major towns. Some of Azahari's followers escaped into the jungle to the south. The revolt ended when Yassin Affendi, the military commander, was captured by British troops on 18 April 1963. Azahari, who had remained in Manila during the revolt, later sought asylum in Jakarta.

18. Initial official Indonesian reactions to the revolt were sympathetic towards Azahari but it was not until the Tunku's reference to Indonesian aid to the rebels made in a speech to the Malayan Parliament on 11 December 1962 that a war of words really began. By 20 January 1963 Dr Subandrio proclaimed 'We cannot but adopt a policy of confrontation against Malaya because at present they represent themselves as accomplices of the neo-colonialists and neo-imperialists pursuing a policy hostile to Indonesia'. When questioned shortly after this speech Subandrio said that Indonesia was not contemplating war over the issue<sup>10</sup>.

19. On 13 February 1963 the Tunku announced the expansion of Malaya's Armed Forces in response to Indonesia's attitude<sup>11</sup>.

20. On 12 April 1963, 30 Indonesian raiders attacked the police station in Tebedu. This raid was followed by a series of incursions designed to establish permanent bases in the remote jungle areas, to recruit sympathisers and to intimidate the local inhabitants.

21. Malaysia's inauguration was initially set for 31 August 1963 but, following a complicated series of diplomatic manoeuvres, the heads of the three governments involved in the dispute (Sukarno, Macapagal and the Tunku) met in Manila from 30 July to 5 August 1963. They finally agreed that Indonesia and the Philippines would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories was ascertained by an impartial authority<sup>12</sup>.

22. The UN was asked to head an international commission to ascertain whether the recent elections in the Borneo territories had accurately indicated the wishes of the majority. The three leaders also approved a proposal to establish a confederation of Malay nations comprising the three nations and to be called Maphilindo.

23. It was understood that because of the time the UN mission would need to finish its enquiry, the formation of Malaysia would be delayed until after their findings had been published. The mission conducted its survey from 16 August to 5 September and the report was released on 14 September. They concluded that 'there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizeable majority of the peoples to join in the Federation of Malaysia'<sup>13</sup>.

24. During the enquiry there was no cessation of guerilla activity in Borneo. Both Indonesian and the Philippines were critical of the conduct of the enquiry, Indonesia at one time boycotting the proceedings, claiming a violation of the Manila Agreement. On 29 August (that is, before the mission had completed

its investigation) the Malayan Government announced that Malaysia would come into being on 16 September 1963. On 15 September Indonesia refused to accept the UN mission report, and on 17 September formally severed diplomatic relations with Kuala Lumpur. British forces, deployed to counter the Brunei revolt, were too small to counter the initial Indonesian incursions, but by September 1963, seven battalions were deployed in Borneo.

25. As confrontation escalated further attempts were made to mediate in the dispute. Senator Robert Kennedy met Sukarno in Tokyo in mid-January 1964, and later flew to Kuala Lumpur for discussions with Tunku Abdul Rahman. A foreign ministers' meeting in Bangkok in February was largely deadlocked on the terms of a cease fire which Malaysia insisted upon as a prerequisite for negotiations.

26. During March and April, efforts were made by Japan, Thailand, Pakistan and the Phillipines to re-open diplomatic negotiations. After many false starts a token withdrawal of 32 Indonesian guerillas from Sarawak enabled a meeting between the Tunku, Macapagal and Sukarno to be held in Tokyo in June 1964. No agreement was reached. In August a substantial group of Indonesian guerillas landed near Pontian and on 1 and 2 September about 100 paratroops were dropped in Labis. These were the first attacks in the Malay Peninsula.

#### MALAYSIA (BRITAIN)

27. Indonesia, although superficially friendly towards the newly independent Malaya, was known to be carrying out subversive activities against the new state in 1958. Yaacob and his fellow exiles enjoyed Indonesian hospitality. The CPM had links with the PKI. But Indonesia was preoccupied with domestic rebellions and the struggle to gain West Irian, and so although a General Hostile Intent was recognised from Indonesia, there was no further deterioration in relations because of the sympathetic ties of ethnic kinship and a common bond of anti-colonialist sentiment. Malaya (and therefore Britain by virtue of the 1957 Defence Agreement) recognised this threat but also recognised the inability of Indonesia to materially affect the situation at this time. In any case the Malayan/British energies were absorbed in countering the local communist terrorist threat, and the establishment of an independent Malaya. The powerful Indonesian armed services represented a General Capability although they were employed in the campaign for West Irian and in coping with the domestic rebellions. Malaysia therefore entered the Notional Threat Phase with regard to Indonesia in 1958.

28. Knowledge that Indonesia was helping to train the Brunei rebel army had been accumulating for some time before the revolt<sup>14</sup>. This did not immediately, nor necessarily, signal either a Specific Hostile Intent or the preparation of a Specific Capability against Malaysia. The commander of East Kalimantan, Colonel Suharjo, could have been taking action on his own initiative with the encouragement of the PKI. It is probable that he had official blessing from General Nasution who had been in contact with Azahari at least twice



during 1962. It would seem that the Tunku's Government, which was less tolerant of communism than Sukarno's, had identified an Indonesian Specific Capability by 11 December 1962 although it was not until March 1963 that the Indonesian Army began to recruit and organize 'volunteers' in West Kalimantan.

29. The war of words, which intensified following the Tunku's 11 December 1962 speech, marks the growing emergence of a Specific Hostile Intent on the part of Indonesia. On 17 December Subandrio replied to the 'offensive statements' from Kuala Lumpur linking Indonesia with the rebellion<sup>15</sup>; he cited British Army reports from Brunei that no evidence of Indonesian military intervention had been found. On 8 January 1963 Sukarno rejected the Malaysia concept. On 20 January Subandrio made his 'confrontation' speech which was greeted by the Tunku as 'a virtual declaration of cold war'<sup>16</sup>. On 1 February General Yani expressed moral support for the Brunei rebels and averred that the army only waited the order to move<sup>17</sup>. That these statements were recognized by Malaya as marking a Specific Hostile Intent is evidenced by the announcement on 13 February 1963 of expansion of the Malayan Armed Forces.

30. Threat Recognition Phase durations for Malaya and the British can be summarised as follows:

|   |                           |                               |                         |
|---|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY    | SPECIFIC<br>HOSTILE<br>INTENT | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 1958  | 11 Dec 1962               | 13 Feb 1963                   | 12 Apr 1963             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE      |                         |
| 5 Years   | 9.1 Weeks                 | 8.3 Weeks                     |                         |

INDONESIA

31. It is clear that Sukarno regarded the establishment of a Pan-Malaysian nation as an ideal to be achieved under Indonesian leadership from before the formation of an independent Indonesia. His contribution to the Investigation Committee for Preparation of Indonesia's Independence reveals his philosophy in this regard as does his later harbouring of Yaacob and Azahari.

32. It is unlikely however that any grand strategy to achieve this ideal was ever framed. Indonesia was too preoccupied with her struggle with the Dutch and her internal problems to do more than pay lip-service to the idea. Nevertheless the concept plays an important part in setting the scene for the confrontation.

33. Indonesia's relations with Malaya prior to the announcement of the formation of Malaysia were superficially good, although Malaya was seen to be acting against Indonesia's interests by remaining neutral to the Permestian rebels, and in not suppressing the smuggling activities across the Straits of Malacca which were damaging to Indonesia's shaky economy. Indonesian subversive activities within Malaya from 1958 can be explained as precautionary measures, but during the subsequent conflict, were seen as part of an overall pattern of confrontation; particularly the recruitment of Malay volunteers to fight for Indonesia in West Irian, who were later used to form the basis for a fifth column within Malaysia. Thus the Notional Threat Phase for Indonesia begins in 1958.

34. The announcement of the plans to form Malaysia did not immediately attract hostile comment from all parties involved in the Indonesian Government. Only the PKI was initially hostile. However the army, which under Nasution was suspicious of the PKI, stood to gain from a military campaign, and under Yani was sympathetic to the communists' ambition. From the formation of the Indonesian Republic, Malaya was regarded as potentially hostile, particularly by the PKI whose influence under Aidit was waxing in 1963. This study seeks to identify the stage at which the Indonesian Government identified a Specific Hostile Intent from Malaysia. Because of the nature of the Indonesian Government at this time the problem is not an easy one. Under Sukarno's guided democracy, policy evolved by consensus - in effect consensus between the PKI, the Army and Sukarno.

35. The first of these three to perceive a threat to a National Interest was the PKI which denounced Malaysia on 30/31 December 1961.

36. During 1962 the army may have supported this view. The formation of the training base at Malinau could indicate the army's support for the PKI.

37. However, it was not until the Tunku's speech on 11 December 1962 alleging Indonesian support for the Brunei revolt, that the Indonesian consensus was reached. The beginning of the Perceived Threat Phase can therefore be taken as being marked by Dr

Subandrio's speech on 20 January 1963.

38. On 13 February 1963, the Malay Prime Minister announced the expansion of Malaya's Armed Forces. The Indonesian Government recognized this as the first step in the creation of a Specific Capability. The Indonesian Army began to recruit and organize 'volunteers' for service in Kalimantan in March, indicating that the Indonesian Government had already entered the Specific Threat Phase. On 12 April hostilities were initiated with the attack on Tebedu.

|                    |                  |                 |             |
|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE    | SPECIFIC HOSTILE | SPECIFIC        | OPERATIONAL |
| INTENT AND         | INTENT           | CAPABILITY      | RESPONSE    |
| GENERAL CAPABILITY |                  |                 |             |
| 1958               | 20 Jan 1963      | 13 Feb 1963     | 12 Apr 1963 |
| NOTIONAL THREAT    | PERCEIVED THREAT | SPECIFIC THREAT |             |
| PHASE              | PHASE            | PHASE           |             |
| 5 Years            | 3.4 Weeks        | 8.3 Weeks       |             |

NOTES

1. McLane, C.B., 'Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin', Princeton U.P., Princeton, N.J., 1966, p. 81.
2. Means, G.P., 'Malaysian Politics', London, 1970, p. 23.
3. Yaacob quoted in Mackie, J.A.C., 'Konfrontasi: the Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966', 1974, pp. 13, 20.
4. Mackie, J.A.C., op. cit., p. 22.
5. James, H. and Sheil Small, D., 'The Undeclared War: The Story of the Indonesian Confrontation, 1962-1966', Leo Cooper, London, 1971, p. xv.  
Mackie, J.A.C., op. cit., p. 30.
6. Means, G.P., op. cit., p. 292.
7. Mackie, J.A.C., op. cit., p. 41.
8. However the existing defence agreement with Malaya was to be extended to the other territories with the stipulation that the bases in Singapore would be retained 'for the purpose of assisting in the Defence of Malaysia and for Commonwealth Defence and for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia', Mackie, J.A.C. op. cit., p. 44.
9. Grant, B., 'Indonesia', Melbourne, 1966, p. 152.  
Mackie, J.A.C., op. cit., p. 120.
10. Mackie, J.A.C., op. cit., p. 125.
11. 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', 23 February-2 March, 1963, p. 19263. In 1962 the Royal Malay Regiment comprised eight battalions. Two more were activated. Four battalions of Malaysian Rangers were raised after the formation of Malaysia between September 1963 and 1966. The Royal Malaysian Navy expanded significantly in 1963.
12. Means, G.P., op. cit., p. 316.
13. Mackie, J.A.C., op. cit., p. 176.  
Means, G.P., op. cit., p. 317.
14. Mackie, J.A.C., op. cit., p. 120-121.
15. The Tunku's speech put more emphasis on the communist aspect of the assistance given than to the Indonesian, Mackie, J.A.C., op. cit., p. 123.
16. Brackman, A.C., 'South-East Asia's Second Front', London, 1966, p. 149.
17. Mackie, J.A.C., op. cit., p. 126.

CASE STUDY 26CONFRONTATION 1963 - AUSTRALIAIntroduction

1. A state of tension existed between Australia and Indonesia, in varying degrees of intensity, from the mid 1950s to the end of Confrontation in 1965. Australia's concern over Indonesia was largely based upon the perpetual fear of invasion from the north by the 'teeming Asian Hordes' (a fear that had been accentuated by the recent Japanese experience). The Australian Government was concerned about the expansionist policy being adopted by Indonesia towards areas considered as being vital to Australia's security. Although Australia was worried by this policy, it sought to maintain good relations with its nearest large neighbour. In this period Australia's relations with Indonesia were strained by the dispute over West Irian and Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia. It is possible to view these two disputes as constituting a single threat, for although they are separate disputes, the Australian Government saw them as being manifestations of the overall threat posed by Indonesia.

2. The main obstacle encountered in examining the Australia/Indonesia clash was the reluctance of Australian politicians in the period to make public comment upon the situation for fear of exacerbating it. Throughout the crises, Australia still wished to maintain good relations with Indonesia. Clashes between Indonesian infiltrators and Australian troops received little public comment from politicians. When Menzies announced that Australia was going to assist Malaysia in its confrontation with Indonesia, he did not specify Indonesia as the attacker, but rather referred vaguely to attack 'supported or directed or inspired from outside Malaysia'.<sup>1</sup>

3. In the years following the end of World War II the Australian Government increasingly supported the Indonesians in their struggle with the Netherlands for independence. This initiative was undertaken by the Labor Government; however, it was the Liberal/Country Party Government which recognised Indonesian independence in December 1949 (Indonesian independence coincided almost to the day with the change of government in Australia). The Indonesians were very appreciative of Australia's support during their struggle for independence, and the prospects seemed good for friendly relations to exist between the two countries. Unfortunately this was not to be the case as firstly the West Irian dispute and later confrontation with Malaysia were to strain Australian/Indonesian relations throughout the following decade and a half.

4. Under the terms of Indonesia's independence, West Irian was to be excluded from the transfer of sovereignty and the Netherlands was to continue to administer the territory pending subsequent negotiations. These negotiations dragged on until 1961.

The Labor Government's attitude had been that the Dutch Government was responsible for deciding whether or not West New Guinea should be transferred to Indonesia. The new coalition government, with Sir Percy Spender as External Affairs Minister, felt differently. Spender informed the Indonesians that Australia was unsympathetic to their claim to West New Guinea, and that Australia had vital interests there, the island being 'an absolutely essential link in the chain of Australian defence'<sup>2</sup>. The Australian Government wanted to take part in any decision on the future of West New Guinea because it saw it as being vital to Australia's defence plans. The government felt that 'if Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea were (sic) conceded, it might only be a matter of time before the claim was extended to the eastern half of the island'<sup>3</sup>.

5. After 1950 the Australian Government's actions were in response to the fear of having a common border with an Asian power and one which could even turn communist. Australia's policy on the West New Guinea issue consisted of three strands: discouraging the Indonesian Government from pressing its claim, in the hope that the claim would fade away; encouraging the Dutch to remain in West New Guinea; and lobbying various countries to prevent the claim being discussed at the United Nations (UN). R.G. Casey, who replaced Spender as Minister, maintained this policy towards Indonesia and in 1955 visited Indonesia to reiterate Australia's stand over West New Guinea. During Casey's tenure of office as Minister for External Affairs, Australia's dual policy towards Indonesia - broad cooperation combined with specific opposition to any unwarranted Indonesian expansionist ambitions - was evolved. This policy was adopted towards Indonesia throughout this period.

#### General Hostile Intent

6. As the decade progressed the Indonesians began to press their claim for West Irian with more vigour. The Indonesians tried to get the matter dealt with in the UN but strong lobbying by Australia and the Netherlands prevented this from occurring. By 1957 President Sukarno in public speeches was imparting a note of urgency and insistence to Indonesia's claim. This tone was repeated by Dr Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, in his speeches at the UN. When seeking inscription of the West New Guinea item on the agenda for the 12th Session on 3 October, 1957 he gave an air of urgency to the proceedings by referring to the 'dangers inherent in the dispute' as a threat to peace. He also alluded to the possibility that if Indonesia received another adverse vote it might 'embark upon another course, even at the risk of aggravating conditions in South-East Asia and perhaps inviting cold war tensions to further muddy the waters of peace in this part of the world'<sup>4</sup>. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, tension was mounting as the three stage 'West Irian Liberation Campaign' got underway.

8. These statements and actions represented a General Hostile Intent towards Australian interests. Australia saw its National Interest, as outlined by Spender in 1950, as being: 'the security of our own homeland and the maintenance of peace in the area in which our country is geographically placed'<sup>5</sup>. The government was mindful of the southward spread of communism, and sought to

establish a buffer zone of friendly countries to the north so as to increase its security and ensure the security of its lifelines:

'It is a matter of vital importance to maintain the gap between Australia and the present high-water mark of the southward flow of communism. Should this gap narrow, the nature and scale of attack on Australia would become intensified as distance shortened'<sup>6</sup>.

The view was reiterated in 1955 by Menzies 'the further north the lines of defence are drawn, the better'<sup>7</sup>. In this overall view, New Guinea was seen as constituting 'the last ring of defence against aggression'<sup>8</sup>.

9. Taken in this light Indonesia's claims on West Irian represented a potential threat to Australia's interests. The Government viewed the whole of New Guinea as being a vital link in Australia's defence. They felt that: 'the Dutch would be like-minded and predictable neighbours, while (it was unknown), what an Indonesian rule led by President Sukarno would mean in West New Guinea'<sup>9</sup>. There was even the possibility that Indonesia could turn communist some time in the future. There was also the fear that if Indonesia got West Irian it would press for the whole of New Guinea. Australia's recognition of a General Hostile Intent was signified by the joint Australian/Dutch announcement on 6 November 1957 of an agreement on administrative cooperation. At this stage while the intent was recognised it was also recognised that Indonesia did not possess the broad military potential to menace Australia's interests.

10. Following this announcement the situation was to worsen. In late 1957 and 1958, the Indonesian Government began to seize Dutch property in Indonesia and it instituted increasingly authoritarian government ('guided democracy') which had direct participation by communist elements. The threats against West New Guinea increased in intensity, and by late 1959 Indonesia was actively infiltrating soldiers into the territory. The Indonesian Government was able to effectively crush the Permesta rebellion of 1958 which enabled Sukarno to consolidate his power and demonstrate that he exercised complete control throughout the country.

11. At the same time Indonesia embarked on a programme of arms buying. At first it bought arms and aircraft from the United States (US) and Britain, much to Australia's despair, but when this source dried up, the Indonesian Government turned to Russia. General Nasution, the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff, visited Russia in early 1960, where an agreement was concluded involving the purchase of heavy arms and materials, estimated to be worth between US\$800 million and US\$1 billion. On 18 December 1961 Sukarno was appointed Commander in Chief of the Forces for the Liberation of West Irian, and the Indonesian Army mobilised.

12. Australia was concerned about the arms build-up in Indonesia, and the deteriorating relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia. In 1959 Dr. Subandrio had visited Australia and gained what seemed to be a major concession from the Australian Government in that Australia announced that it withdrew its claim

that it should have a say in the West Irian negotiations. Later comments in parliament would suggest, however, that this concession was on paper only. The government maintained that it would only recognise an agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands if it was obtained by peaceful means. Sir Garfield Barwick replaced Casey as Minister for External Affairs in December 1961, and adopted a more conciliatory approach towards Indonesia. Barwick felt that Indonesia was not an expansionist power, and that Australia should reverse its policy over West New Guinea. However, there remained in Australia a deep concern over the increasing military strength of Indonesia.

### General Capability

13. On 11 January 1962 a cabinet meeting was convened to discuss the West Irian problem. At the cabinet meeting the possibility was discussed of Australian military intervention, along with the Dutch or alone, to secure West Irian from Indonesian infiltrators and deter any further claims. It was brought home to Cabinet that neither the United States nor Britain would entertain military intervention. The possibility of Australian military action alone was dismissed for 'without United States support which would only be forthcoming in the case of a major overt communist-inspired conflict, any Australian military intervention would be doomed to failure'.<sup>10</sup> This conclusion signifies the recognition of a General Capability, and since a General Hostile Intent had already been recognised, the commencement of the Notional Threat Phase. While Indonesia was considered to possess a general military strength which could offset Australian moves, it was also recognised that Indonesia did not possess the capacity to launch a full scale invasion. This had been revealed in a US strategic assessment of Indonesia: 'This assessment had concluded that Indonesia's potential to mount and sustain an invasion was low'.<sup>11</sup> Four days after the cabinet meeting two Indonesian motor torpedo boats were sunk by the Dutch off West New Guinea.

14. Increased military skirmishes and the worsening political relationship led U Thant, the UN Secretary General, to open a series of discussions with the Netherlands and Indonesian representatives. The military situation was deteriorating rapidly with Indonesian parachute landings on islands off the West New Guinea coast and subsequently within the territory. The Dutch were forced to despatch large numbers of reinforcements which were denied landing and transit rights by Japan and the US, to West Irian. The Netherlands, recognising that active support from its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners or for that matter from Australia, would not be forthcoming, and that the UN would not accept West New Guinea as a trusteeship, reconciled itself to accommodation. It was announced in August 1962 that Indonesia and the Netherlands had reached an agreement and that West Irian after an interim period of UN administration would pass under Indonesian control on 1 May 1963.

15. Australia, while concerned about the changing situation in West Irian, was powerless to do anything about it. Australia's objective for the past 12 years had been to keep Indonesia out of West New Guinea. Viviani concludes that by 1962 'this objective



became unattainable, (because) it lay outside the scope of Australia's diplomatic and military power'<sup>12</sup>. Without US or British support, Australia could not, or would not, oppose Indonesia. Under Barwick's guidance the Australian Government changed the emphasis of its foreign policy with regard to West Irian, as it recognised that it had to adjust to the situation there no matter how unpalatable. However, Australia still recognised the inherent threat posed by the situation, and the fear that Indonesia would expand even further into Eastern New Guinea meant that Australia remained at the Notional Threat Phase. Settlement of the West New Guinea crisis overlapped with increasing Indonesian hostility towards Malaysia.

16. As part of its process of decolonisation, Britain in conjunction with Malaya and Singapore, proposed to create of those two, plus the British dependencies in North Borneo, a new state of Malaysia. The British and Malayan Governments reached an agreement in London on 1 August 1962, which decided that the proposed Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being by 31 August 1963. There appeared to be little opposition to the federation and the initial steps were undertaken to bring it into being. These seemingly favourable circumstances were dramatically changed by the Brunei revolt of 8 December 1962. The revolt was organised by the 'North Borneo Liberation Army' which was seeking to promote an independent union of the British Borneo Territories as the State of North Kalimantan. As a military operation the revolt was of no great significance; it was suppressed within 10 days by British forces brought in from Singapore. However, it was to have great political consequences. The Malayan Prime Minister suspected Indonesian complicity in the rebellion, and shortly afterwards the Indonesian Government proclaimed its opposition to the Malaysian proposal. The Indonesian policy of confrontation got underway<sup>13</sup>.

17. Canberra believed that the establishment of Malaysia was an important aspect of the strategy of 'defence in depth'. Malaya had served as the forward defence perimeter for Australia and hopefully Malaysia would too. Australia's strategy to meet a perceived communist threat emanating from China was to station its troops with British troops at forward bases in Malaysia. Prime Minister Menzies had stressed that 'the use of the Singapore base is very important'<sup>14</sup>. Australian military forces had been active in Malaya since 1955 as part of the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (in February 1963 it was announced that the Australian troops would remain after federation)<sup>15</sup>. Malaysia was also important to Australia because of the British presence there, which was seen as being important for Australia's security. So any threat to Malaysia which would upset the stabilized power configuration in South East Asia was seen as threatening Australia's National Interests in the region.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

18. On 20 January 1963, Dr Subandrio announced that Indonesia had adopted a policy of 'confrontation' against Malaya and Malaysia, on the grounds that Malaya was 'neo-colonialist' and Malaysia an extension of 'neo-colonialism'. In response to Indonesia's attitude, and to the threats being made by Indonesian generals,

Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malayan Prime Minister, announced the expansion of Malaya's armed forces. In Canberra, on 5 March 1963, a cabinet meeting was convened to discuss the dispute. Viviani in her interviews was able to ascertain that two main views dominated the meeting. One maintained that 'the latest acts of Indonesia confirmed that Indonesia was a potential treat to Australian interests in the region, and it probably aimed at expanding its hegemony, if not its territory, at the expense of the new Federation'<sup>16</sup>. Part of Australia's concern was that Indonesia might attempt to expand its hegemony, and eventually its territory, into Eastern New Guinea. The other view at the meeting was a more moderate one which claimed that: 'it was by no means certain that Indonesian policy was set on a military course, although this possibility had to be kept in mind'<sup>17</sup>.

19. It was at this cabinet meeting that a Specific Hostile Intent was first identified. For although the more moderate view was the one that was enunciated in public as being government policy, the defence decisions made by the government would suggest that they had recognised a Specific Hostile Intent. Following the cabinet meeting, Barwick issued a statement which stressed that Australia 'has a direct concern in the stability of the area'<sup>18</sup>. On the following day it was announced that 'one half of the Navy's combat strength would be assigned to the Commonwealth Far Eastern Strategic Reserve'<sup>19</sup>. In this case there was no intention actually to send half the combat strength of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) to the Malaysian area; the assignment of the vessels was made only on paper. The announcement was intended as a warning signal to Indonesia that Australia supported the Federation of Malaysia and was prepared to help defend it. It was also announced that the Australian battalion at Malacca would remain there after the formation of Malaysia. Australia had stated its support for Malaysia, which it saw as being a National Interest, therefore Indonesia's opposition to Malaysia, compounded with its potential capability to threaten Eastern New Guinea, was seen by the Australian Government as clear evidence of the fact that Indonesia had developed a Specific Hostile Intent towards Australia's National Interest s. The cabinet meeting on 5 March 1963 signified the commencement of the Perceived Threat Phase. From this time till the end of Confrontation, Australia's policy towards Indonesia was one of graduated response to the latter's moves against Malaysia<sup>20</sup>.

20. Following the commencement of the Perceived Threat Phase, Australia's armed forces planning assumed a more purposeful nature. On 22 May 1963, a defence review was presented to the House of Representatives. This raised proposed defence expenditure by a total of nearly 200 million pounds in the five year period from 1963-4 to 1967-8. Menzies in a statement to Parliament cited the following reasons for increasing defence expenditure: 'the conflicts which exist over the creation of the new federation of Malaysia, and events in and concerning West New Guinea. It certainly cannot be said that we have entered a period of stability in the area of immediate strategic concern to Australia'<sup>21</sup>. Viviani in her analysis of the decision to increase defence expenditure, concluded that:

'From the emphasis on the defence of Papua New Guinea, the fact that the transfer of administration of West New Guinea had just taken place, it may be inferred that apprehensions of difficulties in New Guinea was a significant factor in this decision. A realisation that if Indonesia remained firmly opposed to Malaysia, Australia might eventually have to contribute to the defence of Malaysia, was also important',<sup>22</sup>.

### Specific Capability

21. Between the beginning of March and the end of September 1963 was a period of extraordinarily complicated diplomatic negotiations which at times seemed to be close to resolving the dispute, but ultimately left the antagonists facing one another in outright political and military confrontation. The mounting tension was heightened by repeated guerilla attacks organised by Indonesia against the Malaysian Borneo States. The increase in military activity led to a build-up of British troops in Malaysia, and a unequivocal declaration from Britain that she would defend the independence of Malaysia. On 16 September 1963 Sukarno launched his 'Crush Malaysia' campaign. The deterioration in the military situation and the forthright British declaration of assistance, forced Australia to the decision which it had hoped to avoid.

22. On 25 September 1963, Menzies made the following statement:

'We are resolved, .... that if, in the circumstances that now exist, and which may continue for a long time, there occurs, in relation to Malaysia or any of its constituent States, armed invasion or subversive activity - supported or directed or inspired from outside Malaysia - we shall to the best of our powers and by such means as shall be agreed upon with the Government of Malaysia, add our military assistance to the efforts of Malaysia and the United Kingdom in the defence of Malaysia's territorial integrity and political independence',<sup>23</sup>.

This statement indicated that Australia had recognised that Indonesia possessed a Specific Capability which could threaten Australia's National Interests in South East Asia, and that by aligning itself with Britain and Malaysia it hoped to offset the threat. Australia recognised that Indonesia was now militarily capable, due to its Russian arms purchases, to threaten Malaysia and the British presence there (both of which Australia considered to be National Interests). The Australian Government considered it necessary to support the British and maintain their presence in South East Asia in case Indonesia turned its military capability against Australia's other National Interest: Papua New Guinea. If this happened Australia hoped it would be able to turn to the British for assistance if Australia was seen to support the British in Malaysia. Australia recognised that Britain could cope with the present low level of Indonesian infiltration, however it was also recognised that Indonesia had the military capability to drastically upgrade the situation at will.

23. Australia's recognition of Indonesia's Specific Capability is reflected in the defence activities which occurred in conjunction with Menzies' statement. The RAAF fighter squadrons at Butterworth were placed 'on operational readiness for air defence', and elements of the Australian Army battalion serving in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve were sent to Malaya's northern border region freeing the Malaysian forces there for more active postings (and thus minimizing the possibility of Australian troops coming into contact with Indonesian forces)<sup>24</sup>. Menzies' statement also revived concern in Australia over the inadequacy of the RAAF's air strike capacity. Critics of the Government claimed that the air force could not launch an air strike against the sophisticated air defences possessed by Indonesia, whereas Indonesia possessed bombers capable of bombing Sydney. The Canberras 'were accurate, sub-sonic light bombers, but no match for the Russian fighters of the Indonesian air force'<sup>25</sup>. Following Menzies' statement, efforts to eliminate this deficiency were stepped up. On 24 October, the Prime Minister announced that two squadrons of the US TFX aircraft (later re-designated F-111) would be purchased; and that the US was prepared to make B-47 bombers available, at no additional cost to Australia, if they were needed before the TFX were delivered in 1967. Menzies' statement on 25 September 1963 signified that Australia recognised that Indonesia possessed a Specific Capability and thus signalled the commencement of the Specific Threat Phase.

#### Operational Response

24. Throughout December and January 1964 the British Government pressed the Australian Government to upgrade its commitment to Malaysia, for although the British were able to cope with the present situation, they felt that Australia should be seen to be actively involved in Malaysia. At this time, however, the Australian Government was still reluctant to commit troops to the battle zone. Nevertheless, it was finding it increasingly difficult to resist British pressure on it to take on its fair share of the burden of defending Malaysia.

25. On 17 March 1964, following a request for military aid from Malaysia, the Australian Government announced that it would provide ammunition, engineering equipment, general stores and various small seagoing craft to the Malaysian Defence Forces, as well as more training courses in Australia for Malaysian Army, Navy and Air Force personnel. In addition, a small number of officers and men of the Australian Services were to be seconded to the Malaysian Armed Forces until the training of suitable Malaysian personnel was further advanced<sup>26</sup>.

26. Soon after this the Malaysian Government requested, among other things, the assistance of Australian forces in various operational tasks both in the Malaysian Borneo States and on the Malay Peninsula. In response, the Australian Government decided that: two RAN coastal minesweepers would be made available at once for patrols off the coast of the Malaysian Borneo States; an army engineer squadron would be provided to construct air strips, roads and bridges in the Malaysian Borneo States; and four Royal

Australian Air Force Iroquois helicopters would be made available for operations along the Thai-Malay border; and some air transport assistance would also be provided. These decisions were announced by the Minister for Defence (Mr Hasluck) on 16 April 1964<sup>27</sup>.

27. In the context of Australia's involvement in the defence of Malaysia during confrontation, the sending of the army engineer squadron to Malaysian Borneo - the area of the main battle zone - was a very significant move. In effect, it meant that 'for the first time, Australian troops could possibly come into direct conflict with Indonesian troops in areas whose ownership might be disputed'<sup>28</sup>. The provision of the two coastal minesweepers to assist in countering the threat of seaborne infiltration of Indonesian insurgents along the coasts of Sabah and Sarawak, was also significant. It meant that, for the first time, Australian naval vessels were being sent specifically to operate in the area of the main battle zone. Before this time, two Australian naval vessels which represented Australia's naval contribution to the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve, had been making routine police patrols only in the Malacca Straits, at no time had they been sent to the main battle zone<sup>29</sup>. Thus, moves announced on 16 April 1964 marked the beginning of Australia's Operational Response.

28. Australia was reluctant throughout confrontation to commit large forces to Malaysia, as it wanted to preserve good relations with Indonesia. Right throughout the three and a half years of confrontation, including the period when Australians were fighting Indonesians in Borneo, the Australian Government did everything possible to keep on good terms with Jakarta. It is somewhat remarkable, and to the credit of the diplomats involved, that good (if occasionally tense) diplomatic relations were maintained. As well, economic and technical aid, for the most part, continued. T.B. Millar concluded that:

'the Australian-Indonesian collision, when it came, was cushioned by the smallness of its scale, by continuing diplomacy, and by the fact that neither country really wanted a war with the other'<sup>30</sup>.

29. Australia was prepared to become involved over Malaysia, albeit reluctantly, partly because one of Australia's 'powerful friends', Britain, was involved. In the case of the West Irian dispute, Australia did not send troops because neither Britain nor the US were prepared to give their support. Australia was reluctant, apart from the Indonesian consideration, to get heavily involved in Malaysia because of the ambivalent attitude of the US towards the conflict. The Australian Government wanted assurances from the US that if the situation got out of control, the security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the US (ANZUS) could be invoked. Australia feared involvement by a major communist power. Australia had failed to get such assurances, (despite Barwick's abortive attempt in April 1964), until 1965<sup>31</sup>. Instead the US kept its options open with Indonesia. Officially, US economic and military aid had been suspended in September 1963, but other forms

of US aid continued to flow into Indonesia. On 17 October 1964 Indonesia achieved its first sustained nuclear chain reaction at Bandung with US technical assistance. This was despite the US Ambassador being told by Sukarno in February to go to hell with US aid. It is significant that Australia did not commit an infantry battalion to Borneo until February 1965, when Australian support for the US involvement in Vietnam had ensured that the US would extend the ANZUS Treaty to cover Australian troops in Borneo.

GENERAL HOSTILE  
INTENT AND  
GENERAL CAPABILITY  
11 Jan 1962  
NOTIONAL THREAT  
PHASE  
1.1 Years

SPECIFIC HOSTILE  
INTENT  
5 Mar 1963  
PERCEIVED THREAT  
PHASE  
29.1 Weeks

|                          |                         |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 25 Sep 1963              | 16 Apr 1964             |
| SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 29.0 Weeks               |                         |

NOTES

1. 'Current Notes', Australian Department of External Affairs, Volume 34, No. 9, September 1963, p. 42.
2. Spender, Sir Percy, 'Politics and Man', Sydney, 1972, p. 290.
3. Millar, T.B., 'Australia in Peace and War', Canberra, 1978, p. 227.
4. Cited in Mackie, J.A.C., 'Australia and Indonesia, 1945-60', in Greenwood G., and Harper N., (eds), 'Australia in World Affairs 1956-1960', Melbourne, 1963, p. 294.
5. 'Current Notes', Volume 21, 9 March 1950, p. 172.
6. McBride, Sir Phillip, Minister for Defence, 'Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates', Volume 5, 28 September 1954, p. 1630.
7. 'Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates', Volume 6, 20 April 1955, p. 46.
8. 'Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates', Volume 206, 9 March 1950, p. 33.
9. Hasluck, Sir Paul, 'A Time for Building', Melbourne, 1976, p. 361.
10. Viviani, N., 'Australian Attitudes and Policies Towards Indonesia 1950 to 1965', Australian National University, PhD thesis, 1973, pp. 204-205. Viviani's conclusions on what took place at cabinet meetings are based on extensive interviews with the participants.
11. ibid., p. 204.
12. ibid., p. 211.
13. This study will not concern itself with the intricacies of the Indonesian/Malaysia Confrontation, but will only refer to those matters which directly concerned Australia.
14. Statement issued 25 November 1959 in Malaysia, 'Select Documents on International Affairs', Canberra, p. 40.
15. Australia made available aircraft to assist in the transporting of British troops during the Brunei rebellion.
16. Viviani, N., op. cit., p. 215.
17. ibid., p. 215.
18. 'Current Notes', Volume 34, No. 3, March 1963, p. 36.

19. Boyce, P., 'Canberra's Malaysia Policy', 'Australian Outlook', Volume 17, No. 2, August 1963, p. 154.
20. Viviani, N., op. cit., p. 216.

King, P., 'Problems of Australian Foreign Policy, January-June 1964', Australian Journal of Politics and History, Volume 10, 1964, p. 286.

When Barwick described the Australian Government's policy as one of 'graduated response', he meant that Australia made limited increases in its commitment to Malaysia in response to Indonesia's provocations.

21. 'Current Notes', Volume 34, No. 5, May 1963, p. 84.
22. Viviani, N., op. cit., p. 220.
23. 'Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives)', Volume 40, p. 1339.
24. See Ministerial Statement by Mr Paul Hasluck, Minister for Defence, on 16 April 1964 in 'Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives)', Volume 41, pp. 1193-1194.
25. Millar, T.B., 'Australian Defence, 1945-1965' in Greenwood, G., and Harper, N., (eds), 'Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965', Melbourne, 1968, p. 291.
26. See Ministerial Statement by Mr Paul Hasluck on 17 March 1964 in 'Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives)', Volume 41, p. 523.
27. 'Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives)', Volume 41, pp. 1193-1194.
28. Millar, T.B., 'Australian Defence, 1945-1965', p. 289.
29. It is believed that the two Australian naval vessels serving in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve only made patrols around the coasts of Malaya and Singapore. In contrast, the two additional RAN vessels (coastal minesweepers) sent after the announcement of 16 April 1964 were not attached to the Reserve, and were sent to patrol the coasts of the Malaysian Borneo States.
30. Millar, T.B., 'Australia in Peace and War', p. 233.
31. For a discussion on Barwick's statement and the importance of Vietnam for Australian-US relations, see Case Study 28 in this Volume.



CASE STUDY 27VIETNAM 1964 - UNITED STATESBackground 1900-54

1. There was little communication or trade between the United States (US) and Indo China during the 19th Century. After the turn of the century there was a gradual increase, and in the 1930s US presence and trading were quite substantial. There seems to have been no discernable French resentment against the size of the US presence in the immediate pre-war years<sup>1</sup>.

2. Nguyen Ai Quoc later to be known as Ho Chi Minh was the founder of Vietnamese Communism. From before World War I to the 1920s he worked and studied in France, Russia and China. However, it was not until January 1930 that he was able to bring together three incipient communist groups to form the Vietnamese Communist Party, the name of which was changed to the Indo-Chinese Communist Party in October of that year. For various reasons, most of which were internal, the party was not a strongly united driving force, despite the charisma of Ho, during the decade leading up to the outbreak of World War II<sup>2</sup>.

3. The Japanese military entered Indo China in 1940, and in collusion with the Vichy French ran Indo China for most of World War II. French concessions to the Japanese originally had US blessing, but by September 1940 the move was seen as altering the status quo in the area. Ironically, on 6 December 1941, President Roosevelt appealed to Hirohito to pull Japanese troops out - but the next day the attack on Pearl Harbour began and the Japanese occupied Hanoi. The period 1940-41 appears to be a point in time when US politico-military interest in Indo China began to emerge. Further, there seems little doubt that the Vietnamese lost confidence in the omnipotence of their Western rulers<sup>3</sup>.

4. In May 1941, Ho founded the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh - League for the Independence of Vietnam - in short the Viet Minh. The league comprised both communists and members from other nationalist parties. Their short term objective was to defeat the Japanese, but with a long term objective of independence. During World War II Minh worked with Chinese and US forces to defeat Japan and thus gained US sympathy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Viet Minh were able to fill the vacuum after the collapse of the Japanese in August 1945. On 2 September, Ho proclaimed Vietnam independent and formed a government with its capital in Hanoi. At the same time the Viet Minh also held sway in the south where the majority of Japanese troops were based. However, at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the US, British and Russian leaders decided to divide Vietnam at the 16th Parallel, with the British in charge in the south and the Chinese in the north. As Draper observes 'ostensibly the Potsdam decision did not prejudice the larger question of who was to hold power in Vietnam. But the influx of new

forces could not fail to impinge on the highly unstable and inflammable political situation'. The British and Chinese troops were in Vietnam to disarm the Japanese and evacuate prisoners. In January 1946, the British handed over responsibility south of the 16th Parallel to the French, and the Nationalist Chinese handed over the northern zone to Ho<sup>4</sup>.

5. President Roosevelt was an anti colonialist, and for this reason he did not want Vietnam returned to the French, but favoured some form of United Nations (UN) trusteeship as an interim measure. China also did not want Vietnam returned to the French. After Roosevelt's death, US policy on post war Vietnam has been described by various authorities as 'loose', 'not purposeful', 'in disarray' and that 'the US did not know whether to support the French in reclaiming Indo China after World War II'. Because of Viet Minh collaboration during the war, Ho felt that he could count on US support in their efforts for independence, but the return of French troops disillusioned him<sup>5</sup>.

6. On 6 March 1946 the French agreed to recognise Ho's Government in the North as a free state but remaining within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union. In the belief that all French troops would be withdrawn within five years, Ho allowed French troops to enter the north. Following various provocations, fighting broke out later in the year between French and Viet Minh forces. The fighting was to last nearly eight years and culminate in the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. Bator explains that the French defeat was due to a choice between two hard options; to fight an all out war, or grant independence, with Ho as head of government. The latter course of action would be seen as a dangerous break in free world solidarity, while the first might have given France over to her own communists. The French chose the worse of two evils and combined political intransigence with half hearted military action. This drove Ho, who was badly in need of military equipment, into a satellite relationship with China and Russia<sup>6</sup>.

7. During the period 1946-49 the US administration had a 'hands off' policy towards the war. It was a French problem which did not directly affect US National Interests. Further, by 1949 the US had become preoccupied with the worsening plight of Chiang Kai-shek. The communist victory in China and the recognition by China and Russia of the government of Ho, removed the war from a colonialist-nationalist struggle to the elevated status of a confrontation between the free world and the communist bloc. This revised appreciation of the war in Indo China paved the way for US military aid in materials and advisers to be given to the French. From 1950 until the end of the war in May 1954, the US provided \$2.6 billion of military aid to the French. The provision of this aid had been stimulated by the Korean War, which broke out in June 1950. President Truman viewed Communist China as a satellite of Russia and as quoted by Draper 'saw Communist moves in both Korea and Indo China, as well as elsewhere, as part of a pattern'. It was in 1950 that President Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson expounded the 'Containment of China' policy. However,

within this policy there was no attributable affect on US National Interests from Vietnam per se. Rather, the US Government perceived a Specific Hostile Intent on the part of Communist China as a major partner in the world communist bloc<sup>7</sup>.

#### General Capability and General Hostile Intent

8. Within days of President Eisenhower's inauguration, the new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles articulated the 'Domino Theory'. This policy was widely accepted by the new Administration. There seems little doubt that President Eisenhower seriously considered the use of US combat troops and air strikes to bolster the French forces in 1953. However, he was constrained by international law, and the political ramifications of any unilateral action. After the French defeat in May 1954, the follow up Geneva Accords of 20-21 July 1954 saw the birth of North Vietnam (NVN) and South Vietnam (SVN) with the 17th Parallel as the dividing line. The so-called success at Geneva was, as stated by Bator '... due to the degrading of the Vietnam area from the hypothetical level of vital, primary importance given to it by the Domino Theory, to its more realistic appreciation as a secondary confrontation between the Free World and the Communist Powers'. However, he stated further that 'the rigidity of US policy in the years 1954-60 upgraded Vietnam again to an area of primary importance'.

9. Ho had beaten the French, albeit with extensive aid from China, and political support from Russia. It can be argued that without outside aid NVN was assessed as having a General Capability against SVN. Further, there is little doubt that the US Administration also perceived a General Hostile Intent to US prestige as the bastion of the free world. Therefore, at the time of the Geneva Accords, 20-21 July 1954, the Notional Threat Phase began. Support for this assessment is seen in the speed with which the US set up the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) - within two months of the Geneva Accords. SEATO was designed to stop communist expansion in the area by a collective umbrella. The US could act under the auspices of the treaty and not be seen as taking unilateral action. Additionally, the US did not sign the Geneva Accords but made a separate declaration to the effect that 'the US would refrain from any threat or use of force to disturb the agreements, but would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreement with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security'. As quoted in the Pentagon Papers, 'in the words of one analyst, SVN was essentially the creation of the US'<sup>8</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

10. Cooper states that 'in 1953 Ngo Dinh Diem was a virtual recluse in Catholic monasteries in the United States. In 1954 he became Prime Minister and a year later was President of SVN'. He had been a good wartime leader: incorruptible, bold, a strong nationalist and fanatical anti-communist. However, in peace, he was autocratic, inflexible, intolerant, but above all, he lacked the

willingness to compromise and any real skill at political manipulation. Most authorities agree that in the period 1955-59 the communist cadres left behind in 1954 tried to undermine the Diem regime in every conceivable way, but without resorting to open violence. During this period Diem's repressive regime alienated the general population who were ready to resist and were thus open to suggestion by the communist insurgents. Reports to the US of Diem's suppression of the insurgents were favourable, and indicated that Diem was in control of the situation. Since 1954 US policy towards SVN had always been carefully worded by the Eisenhower Administration. In essence it conveyed only a limited liability to help achieve stability, with the major onus for action on the people and government of SVN.

11. While the US Administration identified a continuing General Hostile Intent on the part of the insurgents, the favourable reports on Diem's actions encouraged the view in the US Government that the insurgents had not yet developed a Specific Capability. Therefore, as late as 1959, the US had only identified a Notional Threat to its National Interests<sup>9</sup>.

12. The second half of the decade until 1960 saw the gradual erosion of Diem's already narrow political base. He had clamped down on the communist insurgency, but his tactics had alienated a majority of the general population, many of whom were sympathetic to the insurgents. Concomitantly, the communist non-violent subversion had not been successful. There had been sporadic terrorist attacks during the period which cost the lives of several hundred people. Draper explains that 'isolated terrorist attacks were symptomatic of Communist desperation rather than of any massive threat'. The US had provided both economic and military aid to bolster the Diem regime. The latter aid consisted of both equipment and a relatively small band of military advisers.

13. Much has been written about the actual time when the Communists both in NVN and SVN decided to take a harder line and increase both non-violent and violent action. This author sees 1960 as the real turning point. The year brought a marked increase of hard core communist infiltrators from NVN (composed primarily of those who had gone north in 1954); the first, albeit unsuccessful attempt by Diem's own army to topple him; and the formation at the end of the year of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF). The NLF was organised and controlled by the communists but was united in the sense that it also included many non-communist elements. Notwithstanding developments from late 1959, US reports and assessments continued to be misleading. An example, as quoted in the Pentagon Papers, was a letter from General Williams to Senator Mansfield in the spring of 1960, in which he reported that Diem was doing so well that the US could begin a phased withdrawal of US advisers in 1961. Any realistic appreciation of the situation in SVN was also affected by 1960 being an election year in the US. Castro's Cuba, the eroding non-communist position in Laos, and the Chinese Communist claims to the Offshore Islands, pushed the problems of SVN into the background. This was the situation which confronted President Kennedy when he took office in January 1961<sup>10</sup>.

14. Within weeks of President Kennedy's inauguration the first major doubts were expressed about Diem being able to control and stabilize SVN, and the validity of reports describing his various programmes in positive terms. The increase in terrorist attacks throughout 1960 and the many failures of the SVN Army, for whatever reasons, to counter these attacks became apparent. There was still no indication of anything other than a General Capability being attributed to the insurgents. However, there is little doubt that the new administration in January 1961 were alarmed by the events of 1960. There appears to have been some confusion about the ultimate goal of the insurgents. The frequency of these attacks continued unabated, and pressure was put on President Kennedy to commit ground forces to SVN. The Pentagon Papers state that in a report by Secretary of State Rusk and Defence Secretary McNamara to the President on 11 November 1961, they supported an immediate increase of US military involvement, but excluded specifically combat troops. Subsequently, this was supported by a memo from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara on 13 January 1962. This memo identified the consequences following the loss of South East Asia (i.e. it identified the US National Interests);

- a. Indonesia could be dominated by Russia and as a communist base pose a threat against Australia and New Zealand.
- b. A Sino-Russian bloc would have control of the eastern access to the Indian Ocean.
- c. The Philippines and Japan could be pressured to assume at best, a neutralist role and thus eliminate two of the major US bases. This would pull US lines of defence north to Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan and result in the overtaking of US lines of communication in a limited war<sup>11</sup>.

15. The advice from both top civilian and military advisers taken in conjunction with the fear of communist expansion and the 'Domino Theory' inherited from the previous administration can be construed as another major turning point. It is hypothesized that no later than January 1962, the US had identified a Specific Hostile Intent and entered the Perceived Threat Phase. In support of this hypothesis is the marked build-up of military advisers in SVN in 1962-63. Ellsberg quoting from 'The Bitter Heritage' gives the figures of 1364 US military personnel in SVN at the end of 1961, by 1962 it was 9865, and at the time of Kennedy's death in November 1963 it was about 15 000. There is little doubt that the US considered bombing NVN as 1961 drew to a close, to put pressure on Ho to stop giving support to the NLF. However, such action would have widened the war, and world opinion had to be considered. It was, after all, still officially a civil war confined to SVN with the SVN Army trying to gain victory with the US providing logistic and training support<sup>12</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

16. President Kennedy did make efforts to get Diem to reform

his regime, broaden his political base and try to win back the general population which he had alienated, but with no success. Kennedy was no doubt aware, that this was a requirement before any military success could be assured. But in any event, he was virtually forced to support Diem notwithstanding that the US military build-up in 1962-63 seemed to match the deterioration of Diem's regime. Kennedy was further restricted in any alternative action when he gave up backing rightist elements in Laos in 1961. As the Pentagon Papers explain, 'this shift in strategy strengthened US resolve in SVN to reassure allies in Asia and show to the USSR resolve to stand firm'. Most authorities agree that by mid 1963 the US Administration finally admitted that they had backed the wrong horse in Diem. The coup on 1 November 1963 toppled Diem and resulted in the assassination of both Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. There is little doubt that the US knew about the coup and condoned it, but it is highly debatable whether the US actually participated or helped to mastermind it<sup>13</sup>.

17. McNamara personally visited SVN towards the end of 1963. Lewy states 'that on 21 December 1963 McNamara reported to President Johnson that the situation in Vietnam was very disturbing'. The US had continued to rely on situation reports by SVN officials in the period 1961-63. These reports, according to many references, were subsequently discovered to be highly distorted. Lewy goes on to say that in the same month 'the Central Committee of the NVN Communist party met in Hanoi and ordered an offensive strategy for the SVN insurgency. The text of this resolution did not fall into US hands until years later, but evidence of a new aggressiveness on the part of the NLF was all too apparent in early 1964'.

18. The start of 1964 was another critical point in time. The distorted reporting of the previous three years had hidden the successes of the NLF and the ineffectiveness of the SVN military. Additionally, there was the new aggressiveness coupled with an increase in external support to the NLF in direction, men and material. By January these two factors were considered by the US Government as now giving the NLF a Specific Capability; which together with the previously defined Specific Hostile Intent marks the start of the Specific Threat Phase as seen from the US point of view. In support of this hypothesis is the program of covert military operations against NVN and the Pathet Lao in Laos which began on 1 February 1964 and was known as Plan 34A. There is little doubt that the decision to order Plan 34A was taken some time in January 1964. The plan had been drawn up by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station and military command in Saigon. It was described by McNamara as 'presenting a wide variety of sabotage and psychological operations against NVN'. Further, in a report to the President on 2 January 1964 Major General Krulak of the Marine Corps described it as a 'destructive undertaking' which was designed to result in substantial destruction, economic loss and harassment<sup>14</sup>. However, Plan 34A was not an attempt at large scale manoeuvring and/or heavy fighting. It would seem to have been an indicator to NVN that such operations could be undertaken on a larger scale if it did not stop aiding the NLF. Notwithstanding that these operations were against NVN, they are not considered to be an Operational Response by the US. The conflict at this late

stage was still seen as an insurgency endemic to SVN albeit with some external support. The aim of Plan 34A was to exert pressure, by clandestine attacks, in the hope that such attacks might eventually force Hanoi to order the NLF guerrillas in SVN and the Pathet Lao in Laos to halt their insurrection.

#### Operational Response

19. However, because a deterioration of the situation was assessed as likely to continue, the US drew up contingency plans which now included the use of US combat forces. An example is the approval in June 1964 to increase military stockpiles at Korat in Thailand and at Okinawa specifically for use by US troops. Plan 34A operations were stepped up in the spring and summer of 1964 because of continued ground advances by NVN troops and Pathet Lao, and the administration's wish to bring more pressure to bear against NVN. The Pentagon Papers indicate that at this stage, behind foreign policy axioms about domino effects, wars of liberation and the containment of China, there was a deeper perception among the President and his aides. This perception was that the US was now the most powerful nation in the world, and the outcome in SVN would demonstrate the will and ability of the US to have its way in world affairs. Again, the threat to US prestige as leader of the Free World was perceived to be a threat to the National Interests of the US<sup>15</sup>.

20. The latter half of 1964 saw an increase in reports of NVN regular troops infiltrating into SVN. But, there was confusion as to exact numbers and how many were really South Vietnamese who had gone north in 1954. This confusion is well reported by Draper who shows that there were serious doubts about a NVN regular division being entrenched in SVN between December 1964 and January 1965. The Tonkin Gulf clashes on 2 and 4 August 1964 between first the USS MADDOX and then the MADDOX and USS TURNER JOY, and NVN torpedo boats, resulted in the first US combat aircraft strikes on limited but specific military targets in NVN. These attacks were considered to be solely retaliatory in nature in response to the incidents which had reputedly taken place in international waters. The speed of reaction was an indication of the detailed planning that had proceeded apace during 1964. But the major outcome of the Tonkin Gulf incidents was the Joint Resolution of Congress of 10 August 1964. The Resolution authorised US participation in the defence of SVN as essential to its own national security. The apparent loose wording of the Resolution gave President Johnson war-making powers without a declaration of war<sup>16</sup>.

21. Events moved rapidly and SVN forces were continually unsuccessful against the NLF. There is little doubt that the whole US Administration were fully aware of the will and commitment of the NLF and NVN as 1964 drew to a close. The situation continued to be highly political between the US and NVN, but the political instability in SVN as late as the end of November 1964 delayed the implementation of any Operational Response. However, on the 6 and 10 February 1965 attacks were made against a US base at Pleiku, during which a number of US servicemen were killed and wounded. The President immediately ordered the implementation of plan 'FLAMING

DART' which was a series of reprisal air strikes already drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These initial strikes are seen in the context of those after the Tonkin Gulf incidents and were limited in both scope and objectives to military targets. But within days, on 2 March 1965 the reprisal strikes turned into a systematic bombing of selected military and industrial targets in NVN codenamed 'ROLLING THUNDER', and consisted of measured and spaced attacks about a week apart. Notwithstanding that the US was still seeking a political solution, the very nature of the bombing is considered as the start of an Operational Response. All-out bombing was not authorised because of continuing fears that the war would widen and such action by the US might be misunderstood around the world. But the response was intensified when, on 8 March 1965, two battalions of marines landed at Danang. The response was finally set in concrete when, on 28 July 1965, President Johnson approved the deployment to SVN of forces including combat troops totalling 175 000 (later revised to 219 000). As General Westmoreland explained 'explicit in my 44 battalion proposal and President Johnson's approval of it was a proviso for free manoeuvre of US and Allied units throughout SVN. Thus the restrictive strategy with which I had disagreed from the first was finally rejected'. The US was now irrevocably committed<sup>17</sup>.

|   |                            |                        |                         |
|---|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 20-21 Jul 1954                                      | 13 Jan 1962                | Jan 1964               | 2 Mar 1965              |
| NOTIONAL THREAT                                     | PERCEIVED THREAT           | SPECIFIC THREAT        |                         |
| PHASE   | PHASE                      | PHASE                  |                         |
| 7.5 Years   | 104 Weeks                  | 58.4 Weeks             |                         |



NOTES

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4. Draper, T., op. cit., p. 26-27.  
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17. Draper, T., op. cit., pp. 78-85.

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CASE STUDY 28VIETNAM 1964 - AUSTRALIAIntroduction

1. When considering Australia's reaction to the Vietnam conflict, in terms of the Threat Recognition Model, several key issues emerge. Firstly, there is the problem of ascertaining what can be considered as Australia's National Interest in this matter. Was it the preservation of South Vietnam, as part of Australia's forward defence strategy, against the spread of Communism as espoused by Casey as early as 1954? If this was Australia's National Interest, then why didn't Australia send its infantry battalion in 1961 when the threat was as great, if not greater, than it was in 1965 when the battalion was finally offered. Or was Australia's National Interest the maintaining and strengthening of its alliance with US?

2. Secondly, what constituted the commencement of the Operational Response? Was it the initial sending of 30 instructors, or was it the assigning of an enlarged instructor force to an active role, or was it the final commitment of the infantry battalion?

3. Thirdly, there are the problems caused by the long term nature of the conflict in Vietnam and having to determine at what stage it was perceived as being a threat to Australian interests.

4. It is hoped that the following analysis will resolve some of the above issues and that it will provide an outline of the Threat Recognition Phases as experienced in Australia.

General Capability

5. The Australian Government as early as 1950 was concerned about the situation in French Indo-China. The Department of External Affairs kept the government well informed on the occurrences there and would seem to have possessed a realistic assessment of the general situation. R.G. Casey as Minister for External Affairs took active interest in the Indo-China conflict and supported the French and US-aided resistance to communist military action. He advocated, however, that at this stage Australia's role should be restricted to being a spectator only. Australia's attention became more sharply focussed on the Indo-China situation in April 1954 when a Geneva conference was convened to consider the deterioration in events there.

6. In Parliament on 7 April 1954 Casey registered the government's concern over the French Indo-China situation: 'If Indo-China were to fall to the communists, there is no doubt at all that the whole of South East Asia would be threatened'. Although the Australian Government recognised the General Capability of the North Vietnamese, and their intent to threaten South Vietnam, it had not defined Australia's National Interest in this area. This situation soon changed.

### General Hostile Intent

7. Australia, along with seven other countries - the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and New Zealand - attended a conference in Manila during September 1954 to formulate a mutual defence agreement. The resultant document was called the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty; and the organisation established at the same time to facilitate the practical application of the treaty, was called the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). From Australia's point of view the treaty supplemented both the benefits and the commitments of ANZUS (the security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (US), signed in September 1951). Most importantly for Australia, it involved the United States in the defence of mainland South East Asia against communist aggression and it covered subversion as well as overt aggression. The treaty offered Western (especially US) military aid in the event of further communist attacks in Vietnam or Laos, or aggression against Cambodia. The treaty also presented Australia with obligations in the South East Asian area and clarified Australia's responsibilities and interests in Vietnam. Casey followed the signing of the treaty with a speech in Parliament on 27 October 1954, which stated Australia's recognition of the latent menace of the situation in Vietnam and contended that, with the change of only a few factors, it could be transformed drastically into a serious threat to National Interests.

'If the whole of Indo-China fell to the communists, Thailand would be gravely exposed. If Thailand were to fall, the road would be open to Malaya and Singapore. From the Malay Peninsula the communists could dominate the northern approaches to Australia and even cut our lifelines with Europe'<sup>2</sup>.

Since Australia had long recognised the General Capability of the communists to threaten South Vietnam, this speech signified the identification of the National Interest and the recognition of a General Hostile Intent; hence the commencement of the Notional Threat Phase.

8. Casey's speech set out Australia's National Interest in this matter, that is, the creation and maintenance of a situation which would ensure the protection of Australia and her lifelines from attack. As well, Australia's signing of the treaty meant that it now had obligations in the region which it had to fulfil if SEATO was to be effective. The preservation of a non-communist government in South Vietnam was seen as being necessary to check 'the growth of communist tyranny'<sup>3</sup>. The current situation in Vietnam was seen as posing a potential threat to the stability of the region and to Australia's security.

9. In order to preserve this National Interest, Australia pursued a policy of cultivating 'powerful and willing friends to aid Australia if war should come'<sup>4</sup>. In the 1950s and 1960s Australia saw the US as being the ideal power to fulfil the role of being

Australia's protector. The strengthening of ties between Australia and the US became in itself a National Interest for Australia. The situation in Vietnam had the potential to threaten the maintenance of this vital link, but at the same time it offered an opportunity to involve the US more fully in the defence plans of Australia. Any further examination of the conflict in Indo-China must consider the threat it posed to Australia's lifelines and security, to its links with the US, and the opportunity it offered for closer US participation in the South-East Asia region.

10. It would seem that although the Australian Government took seriously the communist military threat in South East Asia, it wanted other people to bear the costs of containing that threat. In 1954-55, Defence expenditure constituted 12.3 percent of the total Government expenditure; in the following financial year it slightly increased to 12.5 percent. It declined over the following years and by 1960-61 Defence expenditure had decreased to 10.2 percent; However, in 1961-62 it increased to 11.8 percent (possibly in response to the deteriorating situation in Vietnam)<sup>5</sup>. Unfortunately for Australia this failure to match words and deeds was very apparent to her allies.

11. The settlement resulting from the Geneva Conference of 1954 on the Indo-China situation failed in the long run. The elections that were planned for July 1956 did not take place, mainly because the Government of South Vietnam (and its Western friends) feared it would lose them. The situation deteriorated and the renewed struggle brought Western intervention (US advisers) in support of the South; and Chinese, Russian and East European intervention (mainly equipment and supplies) in support of the North.

12. In September 1959 Laos appealed to the United Nations for an emergency force to resist aggression by Viet Minh (communist Vietnamese) forces. A United Nations mission was sent to Laos but its final report was inconclusive. When civil war broke out, the United States contemplated and hinted at physical intervention. In response to this the Russian Government suggested that a second and wider Geneva conference to deal specially with Laos be convened. The Conference met intermittently between May 1961 and July 1962 and ended in agreement that Laos would be a neutral state, and thus removed from the ambit of SEATO. Foreign aid from communist powers was equally prohibited.

13. Australia was not a participant at the conference, but it had favoured and pushed for a political solution to the whole Indo-China problem throughout the period. Australia did not want a confrontation with China and avoided any actions which could be construed as being provocative. Its only assistance to South Vietnam was the provision of aid under the Colombo Plan, and some supplementary military supplies such as barbed wire and steel posts for village defences.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

14. By early 1962 the situation in Vietnam had deteriorated seriously. On 31 March 1962 President Diem of South Vietnam sent a letter to the heads of government of 93 non-communist states,

stating that the North Vietnamese had commenced massive subversive actions against his country. This letter was discussed at the ANZUS Council on 9 May and the Australian Prime Minister (Mr Menzies) notified the US that Australia was willing to supply instructors. This decision was approved by the cabinet on 15 May and it was publicly announced on 24 May that Australia would send 30 Australian Army personnel to provide instruction in jungle warfare, village defence and other related activities.

15. The endorsing of Menzies' decision on 15 May 1962 by the Cabinet signifies the governmental recognition of a Specific Hostile Intent and the commencement of the Perceived Threat Phase. By this stage the government had realised that South Vietnam had become the subject of North Vietnamese inspired and sponsored 'infiltration and aggression'<sup>6</sup>. North Vietnam's actions posed a threat to the rest of South East Asia and therefore North Vietnam was demonstrating a Specific Hostile Intent towards Australian National Interests. At the same time Australia's decision to send instructors had the effect of helping 'to make Australia's mark with the United States Administration'<sup>7</sup> and thus maintaining and strengthening Australia's links with her most important ally.

16. The Perceived Threat Phase coincided with armed forces' planning assuming a more purposeful nature. Defence expenditure as a percentage of total Government expenditure was increased to 12.2 percent in 1962-63 and to 13.7 percent in 1963-64. As well, the structure of the armed forces became more pointed with increases in the permanent component of the services but decreases in the part time component (except the air force)<sup>8</sup>. Also, in May 1963, the government decided to implement plans to purchase 18 Caribou transports and to increase the number of air force helicopters. But there were no significant improvements and no primary expansion in this period.

17. This period also saw greater interest being taken by the government in the Vietnam situation. Barwick, as Minister for External Affairs, visited South Vietnam in June 1962 and he expressed great confidence in and admiration for the Diem Government. This confidence must have been shattered when he had to announce on 4 November 1963 that the Diem regime had been overthrown. However, the Australian Government wasted no time in recognising the new government of South Vietnam, which it did on 8 November 1963.

18. In April 1964 Australia attended the SEATO Council meeting in Manila. At the meeting the Vietnam situation was widely discussed, and afterwards a communique was issued which 'expressed great concern about the continuing communist aggression against the Republic of Vietnam'<sup>9</sup>. Following the communique, Barwick, in a statement to the Parliament on 21 April 1964, outlined the seriousness of the military threat posed by the Viet Cong to South Vietnam and therefore to Australian interests:

'there is no disguising the serious and critical nature of the task ahead. There are 20 000 to 25 000 'hard core' Viet Cong guerillas, ruthless and indoctrinated, with locally recruited part time supporters about three times that number'10.

### Specific Capability

19. On 29 May 1964 the Ministers accepted the recommendation that Australia increase its commitment in Vietnam by an additional 30 instructors, some logistic support teams (which were later decided against) and a detachment of six Caribou transport aircraft. These decisions were reached after a 'full and careful review had been made by the government of the military threat to South Viet Nam'11. The decisions signify that the Australian Government recognised that North Vietnam possessed the Specific Capability to threaten South Vietnam and hence Australia's National Interests in South East Asia. The recognition of this military capability signalled the commencement of the Specific Threat Phase.

20. Not only did the Australian Government recognise that the North Vietnamese had the Specific Capability to threaten Australia's National Interests with respect to South Vietnam and South East Asia, but also that this Specific Capability could threaten Australia's relations with the US. If Australia failed to react to the increased build-up in tune with the US's response, then the ties between the two countries could be weakened. This was particularly worrying at a time when Australia was looking to the US for assistance, or, a statement of willingness to assist if needed, in the Indonesian Confrontation. The situation in Vietnam was also seen by some politicians as presenting an opportunity to involve the US more closely in Australia's defence plans.

21. President Johnson had indicated on 6 May 1966, via the US Embassy in Canberra, his desire for Australia to 'show the flag' in South Vietnam, and increase their commitment there. The Australian Embassy in Washington had followed this up by cabling Canberra on 11 May 1966 and recommending that Johnson's request be viewed very favourably:

'Our objective should be to achieve such a habitual closeness of relations with the United States and sense of mutual alliance that in our time of need (the possibility of a crisis in relations with Indonesia) the United States would have little option but to respond as we would want'12.

22. For some time the Australian Government had been anxious to secure from the US a statement that ANZUS would apply if the situation in Malaysia worsened and Australia got heavily embroiled in a conflict with Indonesia. The US was very reluctant to commit herself to such a guarantee. In October 1963 Barwick had journeyed to Washington in an attempt to obtain from the US some assurance on this matter; however, he was unable to extract a firm commitment from them. Barwick's solution to this problem was a public announcement. On 17 April 1964, on his return from a meeting of SEATO in Manila, he announced at an airport press conference that:

'The (ANZUS) treaty covers attacks on Australian military personnel or aircraft or ships in the Pacific Area. Borneo was, for this purpose, in the Pacific Area ... the US is not in doubt about this'<sup>13</sup>.

In Parliament the Labor Party attacked Barwick's statement claiming that Barwick had not received such assurances from the US. Significantly Barwick and Menzies replied equivocally to such attacks and neither would make an explicit statement on the matter. This would suggest that, even if Borneo came under the ANZUS umbrella, the US would not commit troops to the defence of Malaysia at this stage. Sexton claims that, in response to Barwick's statement, the the US let it be known that they were considering a review of ANZUS, obviously to safeguard themselves from being drawn into a conflict not of their choosing in the future. Despite Barwick's statement, Australia had no guarantee that the US would assist in a conflict with Indonesia.

23. This concern dominated thinking in the Departments of External Affairs and Defence. By this stage, the need to involve the US in the South East Asia region and in Australia's defence plans had assumed major importance, and had become in itself a National Interest. It is no wonder that the defence advisers, when recommending an increase in Australia's commitment to South Vietnam, should stress that the increased assistance would 'influence the obligation which the United States might feel to Australia in an emergency'<sup>14</sup>. Australia's decision on 29 May 1964, to take a more active role in Vietnam, was in reaction to the threat posed by the Specific Capability of North Vietnam to Australia's National Interests in the area, and indirectly to Australia's defence ties with the US.

24. Following the escalation into the Specific Threat Phase, defence activities were undertaken to form a force which could help to counter the specific threat posed by the North Vietnamese. Defence expenditure was increased and efforts were made to increase the size of the army. A volunteer emergency reserve from former regular servicemen was introduced and aimed at providing 3 600 recruits. Legislation was passed which enabled the Governor General to call up citizens military forces and reserves to deal with situations of war which could threaten Australia's security. Late in 1964 a system of selective national service with a two year call-up and training period was introduced. It was this last initiative which provided the necessary troops to enable Menzies to commit Australian troops to Vietnam in 1965.

25. Throughout this period Australia tried to increase the US commitment to Vietnam and thus involve it more fully in Australia's defence. It was believed that by increasing the presence of the United States in South East Asia, the arrangements that Australia relied upon for its defence under ANZUS and SEATO, would be strengthened. Australia's aim was:

'ensure that the United States did not waver in its commitment to South East Asia and to support the US presence politically, diplomatically and if necessary militarily. It was believed that only by these methods could real meaning be given to the ANZUS Agreement and



Australia's defence be assured'15.

From January to April 1965 the Australian Government, through diplomatic channels and governmental representation, tried to upgrade and increase US participation in Vietnam, or, as Hasluck euphemistically referred to it; 'bring certainty to US policy and planning'16. During this period Australia pursued a three stage policy; firstly, convincing US to increase its commitment in Vietnam; secondly, obtaining from the US a request for Australia to supply troops; and thirdly, obtaining from South Vietnam an official request to supply troops. This policy was pursued in an attempt to ensure Australia's security and to guarantee US assistance in any conflict with Indonesia. It is significant that Australia did not commit an infantry battalion to Borneo until February 1965, by which time the US was committed to involvement in Vietnam, and the final links in Australian/US cooperation in Vietnam were being forged17.

#### Operational Response

26. The announcement on 29 April 1965 that Australia would provide an infantry battalion represented the Operational Response. The manner in which the announcement was made stressed the National Interests that were at stake in Vietnam. Menzies stated that 'the take over of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia'18 and during the announcement he gave prominence to a cable from President Johnson which acclaimed that 'this action proves again the deep ties between our two countries'19. By committing the battalion to Vietnam the government hoped to ensure Australia's security and involve the US in Australia's defence plans.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 27 Oct 1954   | 15 May 1962                | 29 May 1964              | 29 Apr 1965             |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 7.5 Years   | 106 Weeks                  | 47.8 Weeks               |                         |

NOTES

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2. Hansard, Volume 5, 27 October 1954, p. 2383.
3. ibid.
4. Prime Minister R. Menzies, in April 1955, outlined this policy as being one of the principal objectives of Australian foreign policy; Watt, A., 'The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-65', Sydney, 1965, pp. 168-169.
5. Millar, T.B., 'Australia's Defence', Melbourne, 1965, p. 172.
6. Barwick in a press conference held on 9 May 1962, cited in Watt, A., 'Vietnam: An Australian Analysis', Melbourne, 1968, p. 109.
7. Parliamentary Papers, 'Australia's Military Commitment To Vietnam', Canberra, 1975, p. 6.
8. The Navy's permanent strength component increased from 11 103 in 1962 to 12 569 in 1964, the Army's from 21 623 to 23 493 and the Air Force's from 15 815 to 16 564. Millar, T.B., op. cit., p. 176.
9. Watt, A., 'Vietnam', p. 112.
10. Reprinted in; Department of External Affairs, 'Select Documents on International Affairs', Number 1 of 1964, Canberra, p. 76.
11. 'Current Notes on International Affairs', Volume 35, Number 7, July 1964, p. 50.
12. 'Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam', p. 9.
13. Reprinted in Alan Watt, 'Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy', p. 134. For a discussion on the pre-emptive nature of Barwick's speech, see Michael Sexton, 'War For the Asking', Melbourne, 1981, pp. 45-57, and T. B. Millar, 'Australia in Peace and War', Canberra 1978, p. 244.
14. 'Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam', p. 9.
15. ibid., p. 13.
16. Reprinted in Michael Sexton, op. cit., p. 96.
17. For a detailed description of this period see Michael Sexton, op. cit., pp. 89-107 and 136-172.

18. Hansard, Volume, 45, p. 1061, 29 April 1965.
19. Hansard, Volume, 45, p. 1061, 29 April 1965.

CASE STUDY 29KASHMIR 1965 - PAKISTANIntroduction

1. Just as the 1948 conflict between India and Pakistan had its origins in the status of Kashmir, so too did the conflict of 1965. Although 80 per cent Muslim, the state of Kashmir had been ruled by a Hindu maharaja who, in the turmoil of the partition, opted to accede to the Indian Union. The newly emergent state of Pakistan (which had its 'raison d'etre' in the Islamic faith of its majority) had argued that given a fair election, the overwhelmingly Muslim population of Kashmir would have voted to accede to Pakistan. In the short war that followed, India occupied most of the Maharaja's state and gained firm control of the populous 'Vale of Kashmir' including Srinagar<sup>1</sup>.

General Capability

2. Despite subsequent post war animosity between the two nations, Pakistan had not lost complete international or domestic face so long as there remained the prospect of a United Nations (UN) sponsored plebiscite and settlement. Although Indian occupation continued, so too did negotiations<sup>2</sup>. With the advent of the Sino-Indian border conflict in October 1962, Indian military reversals prompted the United States (US) Government to extend significant military aid particularly in regard to communications and transport equipment. Other Western Powers were also quick to respond; as was the Pakistan Foreign Minister, who on 23 November 1962 complained that such military aid would upset the balance of power between Pakistan and India in the latter's favour. This was a premature observation considering India's defeat at the hands of the Chinese, but it was soon followed by an Indian Government decision to engage in significant rearmament in which indigenous production would be developed, and substantial aid from Russia in regard to the production of advanced weapons such as the MIG-21 fighter would also be received. This was a development which impinged on Pakistan policy. In 1954 Pakistan had become an ally of the US and had joined the Central Treaty Organisation and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation. In return for giving the US Government air bases for strategic bombers and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Russia, Pakistan had received millions of dollars worth of economic and military aid which included modern tanks, aircraft and artillery. This had given Pakistan forces a qualitative advantage over Indian equipment in these critical areas, which helped to offset Indian quantitative superiority. The proposed Indian rearmament of late 1962 was from the Pakistan view, a threat to this balance. Indeed, India was to receive in less than two years some \$80 million in US and \$500 million in Russian military aid. It also received significant non-offensive material from Britain<sup>3</sup>.

3. Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan has summarised Pakistan's assessment of India's changing military capability in the following terms:

'the build-up of Indian Armed Forces had been causing great concern to all thinking people in the Pakistan Armed Forces. Under the guise of preparations against China they had succeeded in securing substantial military aid from the United States and were building up a million-strong army, almost doubling their Air Force, increasing their Naval strength and further enhancing their aircraft and tank production capacities. When it was my turn to speak, I had suggested that the answer was clear. Pakistan was faced with a very dangerous situation. If we did not face up to it and prepare ourselves immediately, the time would come when, having built up her Armed Forces substantially, India would be in a position to achieve her political objectives without recourse to war'4.

Given that the Western and Russian aid response began immediately after hostilities broke out between India and China, it is reasonable to assume that Pakistan had recognized a General Capability by January 1963, when the extent of planned Indian rearmament became obvious.

#### General Hostile Intent

4. Since much of this advanced hardware was to be deployed on the sub-continent's strategic threshold in Ladakh, it must have been obvious to Pakistan that India did not regard withdrawal from adjoining Kashmir as consistent with maintaining defensible borders. It was obvious that Ladakh was one of India's primary lines of defence against China and that, regardless of other issues, India was determined to consolidate her hold over Kashmir to ensure the security of her lines of communication and logistical support. That the Pakistan Government had recognized these strategic implications, in early 1963, is shown by its proposals to India for a joint defence of the frontier region. This was an improbable suggestion as the Pakistan Government knew that India was unlikely to admit Pakistani forces into any area which was in dispute between the two nations and also important for the defence of Kashmir. When India rejected Pakistan's proposals for joint defence of the frontier region, Pakistan recognised India's General Hostile Intent to finally secure the area as a strategic hinterland, regardless of

Pakistan's National Interests5. In consequence, Pakistan decided immediately to seek a compromise by means of a trade-off with China. On 2 March 1963, Pakistan had gained China's tacit recognition of Hunza and Balistan (Azad or Pakistani-occupied Kashmir) in return for an implicit recognition of the existence of Chinese territorial claims in the area. Thus, in issuing their agreement, China and Pakistan specifically noted that they only intended to achieve a provisional border settlement pending negotiations after the settlement of the dispute over Kashmir between Pakistan and India. The agreement also evidenced China's refusal to recognise Kashmir's accession to the Indian Union - an

issue it had hitherto avoided<sup>6</sup>. Thus Pakistan had entered a Notional Threat Phase by January/February 1963.

#### Specific Capability

5. So seriously did the Pakistan Government take the pace of Indian rearmament in regard to Pakistan's military position as a whole, that it sought to gain China as a military ally in order to divide Indian strength and retain some bargaining position in relation to Kashmir. The Pakistan Government followed up its Chinese success in negotiating a trade agreement in January 1963 and a border negotiation agreement in March, by rushing into some military understandings with the Chinese Government. It is not known precisely when these were achieved, but the Pakistan Foreign Minister (Bhutto) gave publically, on 17 July, some very strong hints that Pakistan had reached certain military agreements with China<sup>7</sup>. If this was the case, it would indicate that Pakistan had probably entered the Perceived Threat Phase in mid-July as a result of her recognition of an Indian Specific Capability, and had sought a counterweight in an alliance with India's hostile neighbour, China.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

6. As Pakistan and China continued to forge their alliance through 1963-64, India made plans to formally and 'legally' integrate Indian-held Kashmir into the Indian Union. On 4 December 1964, the Indian Government announced that it had abolished the special status of Kashmir under Article 370 of the nation's constitution, and on 21 December the President of India issued a proclamation 'under which he assumed the powers and functions of both government and legislation in Kashmir'<sup>8</sup>. As G.W. Choudhury, a former Pakistan Government minister and constitutional adviser, put it, this move belied the hope expressed by the UN Security Council in May of the same year that both India and Pakistan 'would abstain from any act that might aggravate the situation and that they would take such measures as would re-establish an atmosphere of moderation'<sup>9</sup>.

7. Pakistan took further exception to two more provisions of the Indian constitution being extended to Kashmir in January and April 1965. These changes included the right of the central government to intervene directly in Kashmir's affairs by means of the imposition of President's Rule, together with the abolition of remaining indigenous titles and symbols of Kashmir sovereignty. To Pakistan it was clear that these constitutional changes meant that:

'New Delhi had no further intention of seriously negotiating a new status for Kashmir. Obviously it would not bargain away a totally assimilated part of the Union. This did not appreciably change the apparent reality of the situation. But it eliminated the last prospect of a diplomatic settlement, a face-saving possibility that quite probably was essential for the Pakistan government'<sup>10</sup>.

8. Born out of the ideological concept of a 'homeland' for all Indian Muslims, Pakistani nationalism is a continuation of the struggle against both Hindu and secular Indian nationalism<sup>11</sup>. Thus the Pakistan ideologues have argued:

'The self-determination of Kashmir is an essential concomitant of Pakistan itself. Pakistan was brought into being as a result of the self-determination of Muslim majority areas in British India. Kashmir is a Muslim-area, unless this area is allowed to decide its future by its own will, Pakistan will be oppressed by a sense of incompleteness and by a feeling that her integrity has been mutilated'<sup>12</sup>.

9. Within the parameters of the Pakistani ideology some Muslims would inevitably be left behind in independent India as a minority, but the 'areas where they were in a majority by definition constituted Pakistan'. Kashmir therefore, was an intrinsic part of the Pakistani corporate polity. So intense was the belief in the 'threat' of Hindu/secular nationalism to Pakistan, that even the possibility of a 'condominium' in Kashmir was seen as a mere pretext to create 'constitutional links' in order to facilitate 'India's persistent desires and plans to undo the partition of 1947'<sup>13</sup>

10. One of the major economic threats to Pakistan's National Interests, caused by the annexation of Kashmir to India, was that the major rivers which flow through West Pakistan had their sources in Kashmir. Pakistan, therefore, had to live in constant fear of the diversion of its waters and disruption of its existing pattern of irrigation and hydrology<sup>14</sup>. Agricultural development was, in their view, predicated by Indian good will and continued observance of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960<sup>15</sup>. Thus, by the mid-sixties, the Pakistani case had changed little from when Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had summarised it in January 1950,

'Geographically, economically, culturally and religiously, Kashmir is part of Pakistan. The overwhelming Muslim character of its population, its strategic position in relation to Pakistan, the flow of its rivers, the direction of its roads, the channels of its trade, the continual and intricate association which binds it to the people of Pakistan from times immemorial link Kashmir indissolubly with Pakistan'<sup>16</sup>

11. The 'legal annexation' of Kashmir by India on 21 December 1964 was seen by the Pakistan Government as evidence of an Indian Specific Hostile Intent. It constituted a specific threat to Pakistan's National Interests which can be defined in both ideological and economic terms. Thus India's bold declaration of unequivocal sovereignty over Kashmir in late 1964 ended 'a period of relative relaxation' in relations between India and Pakistan. In G.W. Choudhury's words, 'All hopes for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue seemed to be doomed for good'<sup>17</sup>.

### Operational Response

12. Pakistan responded by testing Indian military preparedness and moral will in the desolate Rann of Kutch region on India's south-western boundary. By escalating clashes between paramilitary border guards (January to April 1965) in an area of disputed swamp land where, for logistic reasons, India could not assume the offensive, Pakistan 'tried' her previously untested Patton tanks in sharp controlled fighting<sup>18</sup>. Encouraged by the tactical proficiency of her superior armour, Pakistan initiated a limited yet nonetheless offensive military policy towards India, and border incidents began to multiply from April onwards. Russell Brines has argued that:

'It is probably safe to conclude that Rawalpindi up to mid-1965 had no immediate fear of Indian aggression or undue concern over the level of rearmament. The potentialities after completion of Indian rearmament, however, were obviously compelling enough to force them into deciding to embark on what amounted to preventative war'<sup>19</sup>.

13. If this is to be believed, then the chances of fomenting a revolt in Kashmir, with relative impunity, would have appeared most opportune in July 1965. The international reaction to the Rann of Kutch fighting indicated to the Pakistan Government that if war began as a product of internal unrest in Kashmir, Pakistan troops could then be inserted to protect Moslems, and the Great Powers could force India (as in the Rann of Kutch) to accept arbitration, thus opening Kashmir to negotiation once more. With growing opposition to Indian rule catalysed by constitutional changes and the re-arrest of Sheik Abdullah, the living symbol of Kashmiri nationalism, Pakistan decided on a covert operational response to the specific threat posed by India, to Pakistani National Interests<sup>20</sup>.

14. From 5 August 1965, Pakistan began to infiltrate armed 'guerillas' into Indian-occupied Kashmir with the obvious intention of sparking off an anti-Indian 'revolution', which would either bring down the pro-Indian state government or provide an excuse for active Pakistani intervention without major diplomatic repercussions<sup>21</sup>. Pakistan, however, failed to achieve the objectives of its covert operational response; the Kashmiri 'revolution' failed to materialise and the Indian Army quickly responded to the 'insurgency' by crossing the 1948 Cease Fire Line to the north and north-east, and taking strategic points inside Pakistani-held 'Azad' Kashmir. For the first time since 1948, India was poised to capture 'Azad' Kashmir under the pretext of sealing 'main infiltration or invasion routes' into Indian Kashmir<sup>22</sup>. With its gamble returning such disastrous dividends, i.e. the possible loss of 'Azad' Kashmir, Pakistan responded by launching a major attack by a brigade of tank-led regular troops at Chhamb on 1 September<sup>23</sup>. Faced with the possibility of having its entire garrison in Kashmir (at least 100 000 men) encircled, India attacked



West Pakistan with its own tank-led units in the Punjab. As Indian armour began to smash its way towards the provincial capital of Lahore, a major sub-continental war was initiated, yet the issue of Kashmir was to remain unresolved<sup>24</sup>.

|   |                           |                               |                         |
|---|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY    | SPECIFIC<br>HOSTILE<br>INTENT | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| Feb 1963  | Jul 1963                  | 21 Dec 1964                   | 5 Aug 1965              |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE      |                         |
| 0.4 Years   | 22.6 Weeks                | 32.4 Weeks                    |                         |

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CASE STUDY 30KASHMIR 1965 - INDIAIntroduction

1. Since independence, India has had to tackle a number of challenges to her sovereignty in the north-west of the Indian sub-continent. Upon partition of British India, she had firstly to counter Pakistan's refusal to accept the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union, and then, in 1962, she had to deal with China's capture of the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh. As these two contiguous areas were the object of continued contention, India began to develop considerable concern when Pakistan and China initiated the evolution of a common policy toward the region.

General Hostile Intent and General Capability

2. On 2 March 1963, Pakistan gained China's tacit recognition of her control of 'Azad Kashmir' in return for the recognition of Chinese territorial claims in the area - to be negotiated once Pakistan had settled her dispute over Kashmir with India. For India, this agreement represented an implicit 'trade off' by Pakistan with China; Pakistan was obviously prepared to concede some of the territory she coveted in return for recognition (and support) for her right to most of it. Since India considered Ladakh a strategic threshold against China, and since lines of communication and logistical support to Ladakh were critically dependent on Indian control of Kashmir, India viewed the Sino-Pakistani accords (on her north-western Himalayan frontier) as indicative of a General Hostile Intent. By July 1963, India had come to suspect that the Sino-Pakistani border negotiations had also resulted in secret military agreements. On 17 July, in fact, Z. A. Bhutto, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, fuelled Indian suspicion when he addressed the Pakistan National Assembly as follows:

'... If India were in her frustration to turn her guns against Pakistan the international situation is such today that Pakistan would not be alone in that conflict. A conflict does not involve Pakistan alone. Attack from India on Pakistan today is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia and, therefore, this new element and this new factor that has been brought into the situation is a very important element and a very important factor'.

3. For India, the possibility of combined Sino-Pakistani military action, represented a General Capability. Because of the existing General Hostile Intent of both China and Pakistan towards Kashmir and Ladakh, India entered a Notional Threat Phase. Sisir Gupta summarised the most salient features of India's strategic

concern over Kashmir when he wrote:

'Kashmir's continued association with India is vital for the defence of India's northern border; it is impossible to defend Ladakh except through Kashmir and obviously Pakistan cannot be depended upon to defend the northern boundaries of the sub-continent in view of her anti-Indian collusion with China ...'4.

India's National Interests in Kashmir, however, were more than simply strategic interests precipitated by Peking's actions in 1962. India continued to hold Kashmir for ideological reasons as profound as those behind Pakistan's refusal to accept the former princely state's accession to the Indian Union in 1948.

4. Although a political, linguistic and cultural 'patchwork quilt' India has upheld a staunchly secular constitution as opposed to the Islamic 'raison d'etre' of Pakistan. Nevertheless, India has had to contend with a variety of separatist and communal forces since independence. In the north-east, for example, the stubbornly hostile Naga and Mizo tribals have waged a sporadic guerilla war with active Chinese assistance<sup>5</sup>. In the south, Dravidian resentment of the linguistic and political dominance of the Sanskritised north has led to the emergence of the quasi-nationalist D M K <sup>6</sup>. In Kerala and West Bengal, Indian communism has shown itself to be enduring and successful<sup>7</sup>. While the northern Deccan has spawned extreme right-wing Hindu parties such as the 'Shiv Sena'<sup>8</sup> and the 'Jana Sangh'<sup>9</sup>, they are, however, counterpoised by 100 million 'untouchables' and India's substantial Muslim minority of some 50 million<sup>10</sup>. In short, unless India's secularism and federal integrity is rigidly upheld, there remains the constant threat of ugly communal violence and national disintegration. It is the spectre of such a Pandora's box of communal and separatist politics - being opened up by the loss of Kashmir - which has haunted India since 1948. As Sisir Gupta has argued:

'India's leaders ... did not agree that Kashmir was automatically or would inevitably become a part of Pakistan, just because the State's population was overwhelmingly Muslim. The Indian leaders had never conceded that it was not possible to integrate different religious groups into a single nation-state. They firmly believed that for a large and multifarious state, like India, it was vital to demonstrate that its nationhood was based on secular criteria. It was clear to them that the strength and integrity of new India would largely arise from its capacity to circumscribe sub-national loyalties of caste, language, or religion. It would have been fatal for India to accept religion as the fundamental element of politics: it would threaten not only the welfare of several religious minorities which would continue to remain in India, but destroy the very basis of the state-structure to the building of which the Indian

national movement had been dedicated for over fifty years'11.

5. Given the importance of Kashmir to India it was not surprising that New Delhi should have taken a series of steps to integrate Kashmir into Indian national life - although mindful of the sensitivity of international opinion. In 1951, elections for a constituent assembly had been held, and three years later this same assembly ratified the act of accession. Although afforded provisional status under the Indian constitution, Kashmir maintained its autonomy in a variety of areas; it had a prime minister, a semi-independent judiciary and the right to limit civil and political liberties for security reasons<sup>12</sup>. Within 18 months of the recognition of a Notional Threat to the region, the Indian Government had announced major new political measures to further absorb Kashmir into the Indian Union. On 4 December 1964, the 'special status of Kashmir under article 370 of the Indian constitution' was abolished, and on 21 December 1964, the Indian President assumed the 'powers and functions of both government and legislation'.

6. Whether the timing of these constitutional changes reflected the pace of the bureaucratic processes involved, or whether they reflected India's desire to retaliate against antagonistic Pakistani propaganda is not clear. The provisions for the imposition of President's Rule, however, would appear to have been a reflection of New Delhi's desire to control civil unrest - such as the rioting which ensued after the 'Hair of the Prophet' incident in December 1963 - without major international repercussions<sup>13</sup>.

7. However, these moves to integrate legally Kashmir, also intensified Pakistan's fears that peaceful means to settle the 'Kashmir issue' had been superceded. Combined with the scale and pace of Indian rearmament (in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war), serious tension began to develop between the two nations<sup>14</sup>. As Pakistan actively attempted to keep her disagreements with India within the arena of international concern - by aggressively probing her eastern (India's western) boundary - border incidents began to escalate dramatically.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

8. Although sporadic clashes - not uncommon in high tension regions - had taken place in the 'Rann of Kutch' and in Kashmir from early January 1965, by April it became clear that Pakistan was increasingly prepared to engage Indian forces in isolated areas where, for logistic reasons, India could not take the initiative. On 9 April 1965, Pakistan regular forces launched an attack by two battalions on Indian border posts near Kanjarkot in the Rann of Kutch. The Indian Government was surprised, and ordered in the Indian Army to supplant the border police. Further heavy Pakistani attacks were made in the later part of the month. During which the Indian Army lost ground. The Pakistan attacks were clearly greater than required by the tactical situation; and stood to gain no strategic advantage as the Rann of Kutch was essentially waste land

which became flooded when the monsoon began in May. The Indian Government appears to have concluded that these conflicts were not related to the disputed territory in the Rann of Kutch, but were probably a prelude to some sort of military action against Kashmir. Indian officers saw Pakistan actions as testing Indian moral will and the effectiveness of Pakistan arms. On 28 April 1965 the Indian Prime Minister stated that India would retaliate flexibly to Pakistani aggression if it persisted, by choosing its own location for the operations, (i.e. India would not be constrained by unfavourable battle grounds such as the Rann of Kutch or the mountains of Kashmir). The Indian Government then proceeded to build up strong regular forces opposite the Punjab to threaten exposed areas of Pakistan, particularly Lahore. These measures were grossly excessive if they were only related to the Rann of Kutch. They clearly were not, and represented the Indian Government's recognition of a Specific Hostile Intent from Pakistan to re-open the Kashmir conflict. This took place between 9/28 April 1965<sup>15</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

9. During May, a new monthly record of 339 border incidents in Kashmir occurred between Indian and Pakistan forces. One of these involved the despatch of an Indian battalion across the cease fire line to remove Pakistan observation posts which were harassing the movement of supplies on the vital Srinagar-Leh road. This road was very important for India's defence of Ladakh of which Leh was the provincial capital. Simultaneously, serious riots broke out in Kashmir over the rearrest of the Lion of Kashmir, (Sheik Abdullah) by the Indian Government. The disturbances were put down with difficulty after one week. The Pakistani Press gave great coverage to the events and called for support of Kashmir. The Pakistan Foreign Minister suggested publically that it was incumbent on every moslem to wage war against tyranny and oppression of fellow moslems<sup>16</sup>.

10. The Indian Government did not believe that this threat presaged a Pakistan attack on Indian forces. Despite Pakistani qualitative advantages in tanks, aircraft and artillery, the Indian Army was still large enough to hold successfully the Indian borders, including Kashmir, in a defensive war. Over 100 000 men were already stationed in Kashmir itself. Senior Indian Army commanders during May were convinced that Pakistan for this reason would not launch a general assault. The Indian concentration of armour and infantry opposite the Punjab was designed to remind Pakistan officials of the odds against success from this type of attack<sup>17</sup>. Incidents continued around the borders of Kashmir until the end of June when the Rann of Kutch settlement produced a dramatic decline in such actions.

11. The Indian Government did not believe that this was an end to the conflict. By July 1965 a wide range of Indian senior army officers and government officials had begun to visualize the Specific Capability with which Pakistan would pursue its campaign to acquire Kashmir. While two ordinances had initiated the mobilisation of the Pakistani Army and Air Force reservists in June,

a third ordinance had initiated the formation of 'Mujahid' and 'Razakar' irregular units to be trained in guerrilla tactics. As the process of organisation and training (with Chinese assistance) continued, these irregulars were supplemented with regular Pakistan Army elements, the 'Azad Kashmir' militia and a number of Frontier Scout units (the so-called 'Gibraltar Forces')<sup>18</sup>.

11. In July 1965, with civil unrest growing as a result of Indian political and legal moves to integrate Kashmir permanently into the Indian Union, Pakistan finalised plans for an irregular military campaign which might foment a mass uprising. Thus, instead of employing overt military force over the Kashmir issue, Pakistan had decided upon a programme of covert action which might provide the pretext for regular Pakistani intervention<sup>19</sup>. According to Leiss and Bloomfield, international reactions to fighting in the Rann of Kutch,

'... had indicated that no nation of military or diplomatic consequence would unequivocally support India's position, especially if it were believed that the Kashmiris were in revolt against their Indian imposed government and that Pakistani troops were introduced only to prevent the massacre of Moslems by the Indian Army'.<sup>20</sup>

12. Although the Indian Government may not have been initially aware of the full implications of the call-up of Pakistani reservists, by mid-July 1965 it was most certainly aware of the existence of 'training centres' set up for 'saboteurs and guerillas'<sup>21</sup>. Given Pakistan's previous utilisation of (tribal) irregulars in the Kashmir conflict of 1947, India had every reason to assume that Kashmir would again be the venue for the deployment of such forces. Also during July, Indian intelligence agencies received solid information of a build-up of conventional Pakistan forces along the borders of Kashmir and in the Punjab. The Indian Government realized that the Pakistan Specific Capability would be a guerilla force despatched to take advantage of Kashmiri unrest, and that this would be back-stopped by carefully deployed regular units which would stop Indian counter-strikes in the Punjab, and keep open lines of communication to the guerrillas in Kashmir<sup>22</sup>.

13. India now entered a Specific Threat Phase. In July 1965, the representatives of the Union Home Ministry and of the State Government of Kashmir examined and discussed the likely repercussions, and the conclusion they reached was that a large-scale war did not appear to be Pakistan's immediate intention, but they anticipated sabotage activity by armed guerrillas. Accepting the likelihood of such action, India responded by initiating pre-emptive planning to meet the insurgent challenge<sup>23</sup>.



### Operational Response

14. Thus, on 5 August 1965, when several thousand specially trained and equipped Pakistani infiltrators slipped across the cease fire line and staged ambushes, hit and run attacks, and cut lines of communication and supply, India quickly responded by taking strategic points within 'Azad Kashmir' in order to stem the tide of infiltration<sup>24</sup>. Having failed to spark a revolt among the Kashmiris, and facing the loss of Azad Kashmir (as a result of India's counter-insurgency operations), Pakistan crossed the cease fire line in brigade strength, supported by 70 Patton tanks and F-86 and F-104 fighters at Chhamb, and stood poised on 1 September to trap the entire Indian garrison in Kashmir<sup>25</sup>.

15. India, however, chose not to decide the issue in the rugged north-west, but on the plains of the Punjab. On 6 September 1965, Indian armour thrust towards Lahore, across a recognised international boundary, in what the Indian Government argued was a justified response to an aggressive attack. Free of major logistical problems and well compensated by the size and number of her units, India fought a sharp yet decisive war against Pakistan's smaller armed forces<sup>26</sup>.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 17 Jul 1963   | 9/28 Apr 1965              | Jul 1965                 | 5 Aug 1965              |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 1.8 Years   | 12 Weeks                   | 3 Weeks                  |                         |

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2. As Russell Brines has written: 'By demonstrating the strategic importance of Kashmir in modern warfare, Peking made it impossible for India to give up the state under any condition and this position was solidified by Pakistan's flirtation with Peking. By 1965, Indian implacability over Kashmir was fully demonstrated and combined with other factors, it produced war'. Brines, R., 'Indo-Pakistani Conflict', London, 1968, pp. 86-87.

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Bajit Singh has written, 'Is Kashmir worth it? As far as India is concerned, the answer is yes. Kashmir to India is not merely a piece of real estate or four million people. It is symbolic of Indian secularism. If Kashmir was to be acceded to Pakistan simply because the majority of her population was Muslim, the entire fabric of Indian national unity will be severely endangered. No government in India can afford to allow such a development.' Singh, B., 'Indian Foreign Policy: An Analysis', London, 1976, p. 73.

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

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CASE STUDY 31THE WAR OF ATTRITION 1969-70 - ISRAELIntroduction

1. Israel won an overwhelming victory in the Six Day War. Between 5 June and 10 June 1967, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) destroyed a significant part of the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and also conquered and took possession of portions of Arab territory: the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip (from Egypt); East Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan (from Jordan); and the Golan Heights (from Syria). Thus, in the space of just six days, the strategic situation in the Middle East was radically altered.

2. The reaction in Israel to this extraordinary triumph was one of jubilation. The immediate Arab threat to Israel's existence had been removed; eminently defensible buffer zones and natural obstacles now separated Israel from her Arab enemies. Furthermore, in the Six Day War, Israel had apparently, once again, demonstrated her military superiority over her hostile Arab neighbours. Her future now seemed more assured than it had ever been before.

General Capability and General Hostile Intent

3. Even though the Egyptian Armed Forces had been seriously battered and weakened during the Six Day War, it became clear to the Israeli Government soon after the war that Egypt still retained a General Capability to threaten Israeli National Interests in the long term, although not in the immediate future. A number of developments convinced the Israelis of this fact. The first of these were the moves by the Russians to offer the defeated Arab states assistance in their respective efforts to rebuild their armies and air forces. For example, on 21 June 1967 Russian President, Nikolai Podgorny, led a Russian delegation to Egypt to find out what had happened in the Six Day War and what Russia could do to help Egypt rebuild her armed forces. In early July, Podgorny made similar visits to Syria and Iraq and promised Russian assistance in these countries' efforts to restore their military strength. Meanwhile, Russia had begun supplying Egypt with arms; the first supplies had been sent a week after the end of the war. Russian military advisers were also being sent to Egypt<sup>1</sup>.

4. While Russia was thus committing itself to supporting Egypt's military revival, moves were also being made in the Arab world to provide more aid to Egypt. On 29 August 1967, at an Arab summit conference in Khartoum, the oil-producing states assured Egypt's President Nasser that 'they would continue to provide financial aid by replacing the revenue Egypt would lose by keeping the Suez Canal closed. Saudi Arabia promised \$120 million a year, Kuwait \$132 million, and Libya \$72 million'.<sup>2</sup>

5. The Israeli Government, by this time, was in no doubt

about Egypt's ability to renew some of its military strength over a limited period of time. They had first recognized this General Capability at the beginning of July 1967, when it became clear that the Russians were already sending large quantities of military equipment to Egypt (and Syria) to replace what the latter had lost in the Six Day War.

6. Earlier than this, the Israeli Government had also recognized a continuing Egyptian General Hostile Intent towards the existence of Israel. The refusal of Egypt (and the other defeated Arab States) to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel immediately after the Six Day War, convinced the Israelis that the Egyptians (and other Arabs) remained hostile towards Israel.

7. By the beginning of July 1967, therefore, the Israeli Government had identified both an Egyptian General Hostile Intent and General Capability. Thus, at this time, it entered a Notional Threat Phase.

8. During this phase, Israel's military planners and political leadership do not appear to have had a clear conception of the possible military contingencies which could arise on the Suez Canal front, apart from a vague notion of a major attack by Egypt in the distant future. It was felt that it would take Egypt some years to build up the forces (particularly air forces) capable of re-taking the Sinai and overcoming Israeli air power<sup>3</sup>. President Nasser's declaration that 'what has been taken by force will be restored by force' was seen as a pointer to Egypt's long-term intention of re-taking the Sinai and threatening Israel. Thus, at this stage, Israeli military planning proceeded on the assumption that Egypt would probably launch a major attack some time in the long-term future.

9. After the Six Day War the Israelis set about maintaining their military capability in preparation for the anticipated future war with Egypt (and the other recently defeated Arab states). At first, some new obstacles and difficulties had to be overcome or otherwise negotiated. The first of these were the arms embargos placed on the Middle East after June 1967 by France and the United States(US). Before the war, France had been Israel's main arms supplier and source of Western military technology; after June 1967 Israel was forced to look for a new source. Despite 'the suspension of all American arms shipments to the Middle East' decreed by President Lyndon Johnson, the Israelis turned to the United States for Western arms. For the Israelis, the first objective was to persuade the US to lift the suspension to allow the delivery to Israel of 2 squadrons (48) of Skyhawk A-4H light attack aircraft which had been promised in early 1966 as a replacement for the ageing Mysteres. After a visit to the US by the head of the General Staff Branch in the Israel Defence Forces, Major-General Ezer Weizman, and largely because of internal political pressure, the US Government decided to lift the suspension. The 48 Skyhawks were finally delivered in August and September 1968<sup>4</sup>.



10. Difficulties in obtaining arms from overseas after the Six Day War encouraged the Israeli Government to develop Israel's defence industries. Clearly, there were dangers in depending on others for essential military equipment. After the war, a whole series of equipment development and production programmes were planned and launched. These included programmes for the production of mobile medium artillery pieces, long-range guns, most types of ammunition, Shafir air-to-air missiles, air-to-ground missiles, Gabriel sea-to-sea missiles, various control systems, and a modified version of the Mirage called the Kfir, and also modification and improvement of the Centurion and Patton (M48) tanks. Israel's drive for a measure of self-sufficiency in arms supply was principally for security against a major war. Although it was clear that such a drive would be expensive and that each undertaking would encounter problems, the Government and military leadership nevertheless were convinced that the attempt had to be made, and went ahead with it. By the early 1970s the whole attempt was paying off as many new locally-produced weapons were being, or already had been, absorbed into the armed forces, and some were even being exported<sup>5</sup>. However, not many of these had appeared before March 1969 when the War of Attrition began.

11. More importantly, after the Six Day War, Israel's military planners made the maintenance of Israeli superiority in the air and the armour corps the highest priorities. Allocations to these branches of the fighting services were therefore increased, largely at the expense of the infantry, for it was felt that the June 1967 war had shown that, in the future, the decisive elements in any major war with the Arabs would be air power and armoured strength<sup>6</sup>.

12. Thus, in the Notional Threat Phase which began soon after the Six Day War, a number of new emphases in Israeli defence policy were to be established. At this stage, the next war with the Arabs still seemed a long way off, so Israel's decision-makers felt free to take full account of their country's long-term requirements for the maintenance of her military power.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

13. On 29 August 1967, a summit conference took place in Khartoum between a number of Arab leaders. At this meeting, Egypt and 10 other Arab states committed themselves to four basic principles, which became known as the four noes: 'no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no concessions on the question of Palestinian national rights'<sup>7</sup>. This resolution, which was inspired by Egypt's President Nasser, clearly expressed the hostility of the Arabs towards Israel. It was evident now that the Arabs were not prepared to compromise at all; they wanted Israel to withdraw from the territories she captured in the Six Day War, yet they were not prepared to offer a peace settlement in return. Their long-term aim was still, apparently, the destruction of the state of Israel.

14. According to Golda Meir, Israelis were 'bitterly disappointed' when they heard about the stance taken at the conference in Khartoum<sup>8</sup>. Egypt and the other Arab 'confrontation

states' had evidently not 'softened' their attitude towards Israel, despite the losses they had sustained in the Six Day War. The Israeli Government now recognized that Egypt harboured a Specific Hostile Intent to regain the Sinai and, ultimately, to destroy Israel. Thus, the Arab summit conference at Khartoum marks the beginning of the Perceived Threat Phase for the Israeli Government.

15. In this phase the Israeli Government remained hopeful that the Egyptians might still be persuaded to negotiate, but the latter continued to ignore calls for talks<sup>9</sup>. Meanwhile, international efforts to encourage a political solution were also coming to nothing. These had begun with the discussions in the United Nations (UN) which culminated in the passing of UN Resolution 242 on 22 November 1967. Although both Egypt and Israel supported the resolution, which called for the 'withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict', 'the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East' and 'acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area', they interpreted the text in opposite ways. Whereas the Egyptians laid emphasis on the clause mentioning Israeli withdrawal, the Israelis stressed the sections calling for peace and respect for each state's territorial integrity and 'right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries'<sup>10</sup>. It was clear that in agreeing to the resolution neither side had made any concessions to the opposing viewpoint. In this atmosphere of intransigence, the efforts of the UN Special Representative, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, in 1967 and 1968, to bring the two sides to negotiate were doomed to failure<sup>11</sup>.

16. While diplomatic endeavours were thus failing to achieve results, the Israeli Government was continuing with the armaments self-sufficiency programme. At the same time, the government was making efforts to obtain some major items of equipment from overseas. For example, in January 1968, the Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, travelled to the United States to see President Johnson and persuade him to sell the Phantom F-4 multi-purpose fighter to Israel<sup>12</sup>. Apart from the Phantom, the Israelis were keen to obtain modern artillery pieces, tanks and helicopters. The Israelis' aim was not just to maintain their existing military capabilities, but to develop and improve them by acquisition of new, more advanced equipment and the refurbishment and upgrading of old equipment, and thus maintain a qualitative edge over their Arab adversaries (who were being re-armed by the Russians). At this stage, the Israelis were still thinking only in terms of a major war on the Suez front in the distant future. They had not seriously considered the possibility that President Nasser might try a lesser military option, e.g. limited war, before Egypt's forces were ready for an all-out war.

#### Specific Capability

17. Before September 1968, the Egyptians gave no strong indications that they were intending to launch a limited war on the Suez front in the future. Apart from occasional incidents, such as the sinking of the Israeli Navy's flagship, the destroyer EILAT, by

Egyptian missile boats near Port Said on 21 October 1967, or small-scale artillery duels between Egyptian and Israeli forces stationed along the Suez Canal, there was little to suggest that a limited war was being planned.

18. The first clear indication of this came on 8 September 1968. On this day a massive artillery bombardment was launched by Egyptian artillery along most of the Canal. In the space of several hours 150 Egyptian artillery batteries rained down more than 10 000 shells on the Israeli lines. The Israeli forces were caught unprepared and comparatively unprotected. In the bombardment, 10 soldiers were killed and 18 wounded. The Israelis retaliated by shelling the Suez refineries as well as the cities of Ismailia and Suez<sup>13</sup>. By making no attempt to repair the refineries and then beginning the evacuation of some 400 000 people from the Canal Zone area the Egyptians made clear their determination not to allow such Israeli counter-bombardments to deter them. As Dupuy notes, it was apparent 'that Egypt was willing to pay a substantial price in order to continue artillery harassment of the Israeli-held east bank'<sup>14</sup>.

19. On 26 October 1968 the Egyptians repeated their artillery bombardment, this time killing 13 Israelis. On the same night, two more were killed in an Egyptian ambush. The Israeli reaction was an air strike and commando raid on 31 October against strategic targets deep inside Egypt. In this raid, two Nile River bridges were attacked, an electric transmission station on the high voltage line between the Aswan Dam and Cairo was destroyed, and the Naj Hammadi Dam in Upper Egypt was slightly damaged. This raid stunned the Egyptians. It emphasized the vulnerability of the Egyptian hinterland to attack by mobile Israeli forces<sup>15</sup>.

20. The Egyptian bombardment of 26 October 1968, following as it did only seven weeks after the 8 September barrage, and inflicting even heavier casualties on the Israeli forces along the canal, brought home to the Israeli military and political leadership that Egypt had now regained sufficient of her military strength to be capable of launching, and fighting successfully, a static and contained war of attrition on the Suez front. It was clear that the large Egyptian forces along the canal had a substantial numerical advantage in both manpower and firepower over their Israeli opponents, and, therefore, in a prolonged static and contained war of heavy artillery bombardments and commando raids over the canal, would probably inflict a disproportionate cost on Israeli forces. The Israeli Government now recognized that Egypt had the Specific Capability to threaten seriously Israel's hold over the east bank of the Suez Canal in a static and limited war on the Suez front. Thus, on 26 October 1968, the Israeli Government entered a Specific Threat Phase.

21. The most important problem confronting the General Staff of the Israeli Forces after 26 October was how to provide protection for the Israeli troops along the canal. This problem was just one aspect of a much larger question: how best to defend the east bank of the canal and the Sinai itself. In November 1968 the General Staff began seriously to consider this question.

22. Basically, two quite different schemes for the defence of the cease-fire line and Sinai were suggested. One, advocated by Major-General Ariel Sharon and Major-General Israel Tal, was for a mobile defence of the line based on armoured forces. In this case, the main Israeli armoured forces would be kept concentrated beyond Egyptian artillery range, while the bank of the waterway would be patrolled constantly by small mobile armoured units. In the event of an Egyptian crossing, the main Israeli armoured forces would rapidly move forward to destroy the advancing Egyptian forces. The second scheme, which was advocated by Major-General Avraham Adan and Major-General Yeshayahu Gavish (the General Officer Commanding Southern Command) called for the construction of fortified strongpoints at intervals of a few miles along the east bank of the canal, which would act as observation and warning posts and provide shelter against artillery barrages. The areas in between the strongpoints were to be patrolled by armoured units. The main bulk of the forces would be concentrated a few miles behind the fortifications. Gavish argued for a fixed defensive line rather than a mobile system of defence because he felt that the latter could not prevent a sudden Egyptian move to gain a foothold, however narrow, along the east bank followed by an attempt to achieve an immediate cease-fire by international agreement<sup>16</sup>.

23. In the end, after a series of discussions, the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Chaim Bar Lev decided in favour of the second scheme: the system of fixed fortifications. Construction of the fortified line, which later became known as the Bar Lev Line, was begun in January 1969, and by early March had largely been completed. A major feature of the line was a sand rampart, 20 to 30 feet in height, along the entire east bank of the canal. A 45 degree slope on the water face of this rampart precluded an ascent by any known amphibious vehicle. Each fortification, built into the top of the rampart, dominated about one kilometre on each of its flanks. The fortifications were sited at about nine kilometre intervals. A second sand rampart was constructed 500 metres behind the main fortifications. From the firing ramps on this second rampart, a line of tanks could provide covering fire for the fortifications and the approaches to the canal. Behind the second defence line, a network of roads, underground headquarters, water and communication systems, repair facilities, and stores was constructed. At the rear were the armoured striking forces which would rapidly move forward to the canal in the event of a major Egyptian attempt to cross<sup>17</sup>.

24. In building the Bar Lev line the Israelis, clearly, were preparing specifically for a static, limited war along the Canal. The sheer elaborateness of the line attests to the fact that, after October 1968, the Israelis were expecting more than just isolated artillery bombardments from the Egyptians. They realized that the Egyptians would soon begin a campaign aimed at exhausting, through attrition, their (the Israelis') will to continue the fight. They, thus, prepared themselves for this contingency. Of course, the Bar Lev Line was built not only to meet such a relatively low-level contingency, but also for a possible major war in the future. In the latter case, it would act as a system of warning outposts, and also hold back the enemy advance while the main Israeli forces were

being mobilized and brought to the front.

25. Before, during and after the construction of the Bar Lev Line, the Israeli Government was also undertaking other significant defence preparations many of which had been started in the Notional Threat Phase. Notable amongst these were the programmes for local production of armaments and other items of defence equipment. More important in the short term were the efforts to obtain certain sophisticated items of equipment from the United States, particularly the twin-jet Phantom F-4E multi-purpose fighter. Although Israeli endeavours to persuade the Americans to sell the latter aircraft to them had met with some success in January 1968 when the Israeli Prime Minister had talks with the US President, the deal was not finally cemented until 28 December 1968 when Washington officially announced the sale of the first Phantoms to Israel. After this, things moved more quickly; Israeli pilots, technicians and mechanics arrived in the US in March 1969 to learn about the new aircraft, and then in September the first planes were delivered<sup>18</sup>.

#### Operational Response

26. From November 1968 to early March 1969, while the Israeli Government was planning or initiating many of the defence preparations described above, the Suez Canal front was relatively quiet. This period of calm, however, was suddenly brought to an end on 8 March 1969 by a heavy Egyptian artillery barrage along the entire front, which, as President Nasser indicated, marked the beginning of a 'war of attrition'. In this initial barrage the new Israeli fortifications stood up well. Their effectiveness is reflected in the fact that the barrage resulted in the death of one soldier, whereas before the fortifications were constructed similar barrages had exacted a heavier toll in Israeli casualties<sup>19</sup>.

27. The Israeli Operational Response also began on 8 March 1969 when the Israeli forces along the canal responded to the Egyptian bombardments with counter-bombardments against Egyptian artillery batteries and troop positions<sup>20</sup>. After this date, the War of Attrition gradually developed into a major confrontation. It was to last for 17 months and claim many lives. It was finally brought to an end on 7 August 1970 by a cease-fire agreement proposed by the United States and supported by Russia\*. Israel had fought the war without the need for a war economy<sup>21</sup>. The conflict had been handled within the structure of the standing armed services without the need for expansion or industrial mobilization.

\* For a description of the course of the War of Attrition see Case Study 35.

GENERAL HOSTILE  
INTENT AND  
GENERAL CAPABILITY

Jul 1967

NOTIONAL THREAT  
PHASE

0.2 Years

SPECIFIC HOSTILE  
INTENT

29 Aug 1967

PERCEIVED THREAT  
PHASE

60.3 Weeks

SPECIFIC  
CAPABILITY

26 Oct 1968

SPECIFIC THREAT  
PHASE

19.0 Weeks

OPERATIONAL  
RESPONSE

8 Mar 1969

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CASE STUDY 32THE WAR OF ATTRITION 1969 - EGYPTIntroduction

1. The Six Day War (5/10 June 1967) was a disaster from the Arab, and especially Egyptian, point of view. In the space of six days, Egypt, Jordan and Syria lost a significant part of their respective military capabilities, as well as important pieces of their sovereign territory. Egypt was particularly hard-hit, losing over 350 of its 430 combat aircraft, 700 of its 1300 tanks, and suffering 8000 casualties, while also losing the whole of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip<sup>1</sup>. In Egypt, this massive defeat at the hands of the Israelis 'left in its wake a profound feeling of humiliation and bitterness'<sup>2</sup>.

2. After the war the Egyptian leaders added a new policy objective to their programme of objectives: restoration of the Sinai to Egypt. It was recognised that Egypt could not attain full control of the Suez Canal, a vital economic asset, while Israel occupied the east bank of the canal as well as the rest of Sinai. Thus, recovery of the Sinai from Israel came to be regarded as a National Interest.

3. In the eyes of Egypt's leaders, however, there was one national interest that was more important than the recovery of the Sinai, and this was the security of the Egyptian heartland, i.e. the mainland, including especially the Nile Delta. Ensuring the security of the heartland was the first concern of the leadership immediately after the war.

Specific Hostile Intent and Specific Capability

4. Shortly after the cessation of hostilities on 10 June 1967, Egypt's President, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, began to receive warnings from intelligence sources that Israel was considering crossing the canal and renewing the fighting<sup>3</sup>. The Egyptian leadership took these warnings seriously because they were only too aware that the Israelis had the Specific Capability for an attack on mainland Egypt. Furthermore, the warnings themselves convinced the leaders that Israel actually was harbouring a Specific Hostile Intent towards the Egyptian heartland. At this point, therefore, they entered a Specific Threat Phase.

5. At this stage, the Egyptian Armed Forces, which had been severely battered by the Israeli forces between 5 and 10 June, were in no state to resist a determined Israeli assault across the canal. Thus, the Egyptian leaders were forced to turn to Russia for help. The Russians were quick to appreciate the seriousness of the threat that their most important Arab clients were facing, and by the end of the second week of the cease-fire had begun sending large quantities of arms to Egypt<sup>4</sup>. Soon after, they also began sending technicians.

6. On 21 June 1967, Russian President, Nikolai Podgorny, and a large Russian delegation which included the Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, Marshal Matvei Zakharov, came to Cairo to find out what had happened in the Six Day War and how Russia could help the Egyptians re-build their armed forces. The Egyptians took the opportunity of Podgorny's visit to inform the Russians of their immediate defence needs. Because the Egyptian Air Force had been largely destroyed in the Six Day War, the greatest need was for aircraft, especially fighters. However, the Egyptian leaders realised that it would take the Russians some time to supply them with a sufficient number of planes for successful air defence, during which time they would be vulnerable to the Israeli air threat, so they now asked the Russians to take full responsibility for the air defence of Egypt in the interim. After considering this request the Russian leadership decided to refuse it, but also decided to supply Egypt with enough aircraft and missiles for her to conduct her own air defence<sup>5</sup>.

7. As Russian arms began to pour into Egypt after the middle of June, the defeated Egyptian Army began to re-group along the west bank of the Suez Canal. Soon incidents started breaking out between the Egyptians and the Israeli forces on the opposite bank. One of these, a minor battle for control of Port Fuad and the surrounding area at the far northern end of the canal, which ended in a small victory for the Egyptians, served to convince Nasser and his colleagues that the Egyptian Armed Forces had not lost their fighting spirit despite their defeat in the recent war<sup>6</sup>.

8. By the end of July the Egyptian leadership had come to the conclusion that they no longer faced a Specific Threat from Israel. They now believed that there was no Israeli Specific Hostile Intent to attack the Egyptian heartland. In the weeks since the war it had become increasingly apparent that the Israelis were satisfied with what they had taken during the war. The Israeli Government had, in fact, made it clear that they were ready to begin direct peace negotiations without pre-conditions<sup>7</sup>.

#### General Hostile Intent and Specific Capability

9. After the end of July when the Egyptian leadership concluded that an Israeli specific threat to the Egyptian heartland no longer existed, their attention became focussed on the threat to another Egyptian National Interest (i.e. the recovery of the Sinai). The first constituent element of this threat that they recognised was an Israeli General Hostile Intent towards Egypt's desire to regain the Sinai. This General Hostile Intent had first become apparent to the Egyptian leaders soon after the Six Day War when the Israeli leaders had hinted in various speeches that they were in no hurry to return the Sinai on terms acceptable to Egypt<sup>8</sup>. This hostile intent had been further confirmed in the first few weeks after the war when Israeli forces along the east bank of the Suez Canal began to build make-shift defensive positions. The other constituent element of the threat to be recognised was Israel's Specific Capability (represented by her air power, strength in

armour, and efficient reserve mobilisation system) to defeat any Egyptian attempt to regain the Sinai. Thus, Egypt's leaders had little trouble recognising that Israel posed a perceived threat to their plan for the recovery of the Sinai. They entered a Perceived Threat Phase at the beginning of August in 1967.

10. The first important political event to take place in this phase was the Arab summit conference in Khartoum which was held on 29 August 1967. The purpose of the conference which was attended by the leaders of all the major Arab states except Syria, was to determine a common Arab policy towards Israel. One of the main results of the meeting was the famous 'four noes' resolution to which all the Arab states present committed themselves: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and no concessions on the question of the rights of the Palestinians. The other major results of the Khartoum Conference were an agreement on a formula to end the conflict in the Yemen, and pledges from the oil-producing states of financial support for the states which had suffered from 'Israeli aggression' - i.e. Egypt and Jordan (Syria was not represented at Khartoum)9.

11. While Egypt was receiving promises of economic aid from the Arab oil-producing states, Russia was continuing to assist Egypt in the re-construction of its armed forces by sending large quantities of arms, especially aircraft and tanks, as well as technicians and advisers. With all this aid from Russia, the endeavour in Egypt to re-build the shattered Egyptian forces received a tremendous boost. In fact, as a result of the Russian arms deliveries, the Egyptians were able to restore their army to its immediate pre-war strength within just six months10. Thus, by the end of November 1967 they had created a force capable of adequately defending the Egyptian heartland.

12. Meanwhile, engineers were engaged by the Egyptian Government to build bunkers to protect the new aircraft the Russians were sending, against a possible future surprise air attack by Israel like that which had been launched at the beginning of the Six Day War. The Egyptians were determined to ensure that their air force could never again be destroyed on the ground as it had been in both the 1956 war and the Six Day War. Thus, concrete protective bunkers were built on all of Egypt's airfields.

13. It must be noted here that most of the defence activities undertaken during the first few months of the Perceived Threat Phase were directed towards ensuring the security of the Egyptian heartland - the primary National Interest in the eyes of the Egyptian leadership. It was only after November 1967 when it became clear that the Egyptian Armed Forces were again strong enough to adequately defend the heartland that defence preparations began to be directed largely towards a new purpose which was outside the arena of essential self-defence - viz. creating a force which could secure the return of the Sinai to Egypt.

14. During the last few months of 1967, while many of the defence preparations described above were being carried out, the Suez Canal front was relatively quiet. In fact, apart from a number

of minor artillery duels between the Egyptian and Israeli troops stationed along the canal, only one significant incident took place. This was the sinking of the flagship of the Israeli Navy, the destroyer EILAT, by light Egyptian missile boats, on 21 October 1967. The ship was patrolling along the Sinai coast near Port Said when it was hit by three missiles fired by Russian-made Osa-Class missile boats of the Egyptian Navy. In all, 47 Israeli sailors lost their lives. The Israelis responded by shelling the oil refineries close to the city of Suez and setting aflame the adjoining oil storage tanks. Following this there was an artillery exchange along the entire Suez Canal frontll.

15. Meanwhile the Arab-Israeli problem had been brought before the United Nations(UN). After much debate and discussion in the Security Council, a resolution was finally passed in November 1967 calling for 'a just and lasting peace' in the Middle East and setting out the principles on which such a peace should be based. This was the famous Resolution 242. Among other things it stated that a Middle East peace settlement should include the 'withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied' in the Six Day War, termination of the state of belligerency, full recognition of 'the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries', and 'a just settlement of the refugee problem'12. Although both Egypt (and the Arab states) and Israel indicated their support for this resolution, they both interpreted it in ways that suited their own cases. For example, Egypt emphasised the sections of the resolution referring to withdrawal of Israeli forces, whereas Israel drew attention to the sections referring to full recognition of sovereignty and the right to live 'within secure and recognised boundaries'. It soon became clear that neither side, in accepting the resolution, had made any concessions to the other side. Thus, Egypt continued to demand a total Israeli withdrawal and showed no interest in peace negotiations, whereas Israel indicated that it would only withdraw to 'secure boundaries' when a full peace settlement had been concluded. The gap between the positions of the two sides was not to be narrowed during 1968 despite the efforts of UN Special Representative, Dr Gunnar Jarring, who was assigned the mission of bringing the adversaries to negotiate13.

16. The failure of diplomatic efforts during 1968 to achieve any solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute did not entirely surprise the Egyptian leadership, because they had never seriously believed that the Israelis would freely agree to withdraw from the territory they had captured in the June 1967 conflict. President Nasser, himself, came to the conclusion that the only way to 'liberate' the lost territory was by diplomacy backed up by the latent threat of force from re-equipped armed forces. He was convinced that Israel would show no inclination to make concessions while Egypt remained militarily inferior to it. Therefore, according to Nasser, the first problem was to build up Egypt's military strength until she was at least on an equal footing with, if not superior to, Israel. Only then would she be in a position to confront Israel on the question of the return of the occupied territory.

17. In July 1968, President Nasser travelled to Moscow to discuss delays that had begun occurring in arms deliveries and to urge once again the need for a fighter-bomber capable of matching the American Phantom F-4 that Washington had apparently decided to provide to Israel<sup>14</sup>. After agreeing to speed up delivery of arms already promised, the Russian leaders undertook to re-consider the request for a Russian fighter-bomber equal to the Phantom.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

18. In the late winter of 1968, some weeks after Nasser had returned from his trip to Moscow armed with promises from the Russians of further arms deliveries, the Egyptian leadership began to seriously consider the options open to them in their dispute with Israel. Diplomatic initiatives, it seemed to them, had failed. They felt that neither the Jarring Mission nor the contacts between the superpowers were now likely to produce a political solution acceptable to Egypt (i.e. one that brought about a general Israeli withdrawal without Egypt having to sign a peace treaty with Israel). They, thus, concluded that Israel would not be persuaded to change its stance (i.e. refusing to withdraw unless a full peace settlement providing for secure boundaries was reached by direct negotiations) by purely diplomatic means. They decided that military means now had to be used.

19. In reaching their decision at the end of August 1968 to use the military option the Egyptian leadership had recognised an Israeli Specific Hostile Intent to frustrate any non-military plan for the restoration of the Sinai. Thus, at this time, they entered a Specific Threat Phase.

20. Before deciding on military action the Egyptian political and military leadership had come to the conclusion that on the Suez Canal front their forces were now equal to the Israelis forces. Indeed, in three areas the Egyptian forces were clearly superior: manpower resources, armour and artillery<sup>15</sup>. Thus, the leadership decided to launch a military campaign that would allow their forces to make full use of these advantages, and yet would not allow the Israelis to bring their air power or overall strategic superiority into play. They also decided that before they began such a campaign in earnest they would have to test out the basic concept in 'trial runs'. The first of these, was soon to follow.

21. On 8 September 1968 Egyptian artillery along the Suez Canal pounded Israeli positions on the east bank for several hours. In all, over 10 000 shells were fired by the 150 Egyptian artillery batteries along the canal. This 'planned shoot' took the Israeli forces by surprise. 10 Israeli soldiers were killed and 18 wounded<sup>16</sup>. This Egyptian barrage was the first 'trial run' for the forthcoming 'War of Attrition'.

22. More than a month later, on 26 October, the Egyptians repeated the 'dose'. This time 13 Israeli soldiers were killed. Two more were to die in an Egyptian ambush that night. The Israeli response was an air strike and commando raid on strategic targets

deep inside Egypt on 31 October. In this raid, the targets were two Nile River bridges, an electric transmission station on the high voltage line between Aswan Dam and Cairo, and the Naj Hammadi Dam in Upper Egypt. Significant damage was done in the raid and the Israeli commandos and airmen who carried it out suffered no casualties<sup>17</sup>. The raid stunned the Egyptian leadership and brought home to them that Egypt was not yet ready to begin a campaign to apply military pressure to Israel. Clearly, the Egyptian hinterland was still vulnerable to raids by mobile Israeli forces.

23. In early December 1968 the Egyptian leaders received clear confirmation of their assessment of Israeli intentions regarding the Sinai when the Israeli Army began construction of a fortified line (which was later to be called the Bar Lev Line) on the east bank of the Suez Canal. The sheer size of the construction effort convinced the Egyptians that what Israel had in mind was a permanent defensive line along the canal which would secure the Sinai against Egyptian attacks and help to fix the line of the canal as the political border between Egypt and Israel.

24. The problem for Egypt's leaders now was how to meet and defeat this new Israeli threat to Egypt's plan to regain the Sinai. First, arrangements had to be made to ensure the protection of strategic installations and other possible targets in Egypt from Israeli retaliatory commando and air raids like the one on 31 October. Civilian defence units were now set up for this purpose<sup>19</sup>. When this task was completed the Egyptian leaders returned to consideration of the range of military options open to them in their dispute with Israel.

25. For a start, it was clear to the Egyptian leaders that their country was not in a position to launch a general attack on Israel because the overall strategic balance still favoured Israel. Furthermore, Israel's acknowledged superiority in mobile warfare and lightning campaigns ruled out both the 'war of movement' option and the blitzkrieg option. Thus, Egypt's leaders found that they really only had one option left, and that was a prolonged static limited war along the Suez Canal. It was believed that only in this kind of contingency would Egypt hold a definite advantage: she would be superior in both artillery fire-power and manpower resources and would thus be able to out-last the enemy. Egypt's aim in such a campaign would be to cause the Israeli forces on the static front-line heavy losses and thus wear them down. By this process of attrition, the Egyptian leadership, expected to erode Israel morale and military strength to the point where the Israelis would be forced to make concessions in the political sphere (e.g. surrender part or all of the Sinai) in order to forestall a breakdown or collapse<sup>20</sup>.

26. In the first three months of 1969, Egypt began to prepare itself for the planned limited 'war of attrition' on the Suez Canal front. The air defence system based on Russian-made SA-2 surface-to-air missiles was completed. Commando units trained for limited raids on Israeli positions on the east bank.

#### Operational Response

27. On 8 March 1969 Egypt launched the War of Attrition. Egypt's main military aims in the war were: '(1) to destroy the Bar Lev Line fortifications [completed by the Israelis on 15 March 1969]; (2) to prevent the Israelis from reconstructing fortifications after they were destroyed; (3) to make life intolerable for Israeli forces on the east bank of the canal; (4) to inspire offensive spirit in Egyptian troops; and (5) to carry out practice Canal crossing operations'<sup>21</sup>.

28. This war was to last for 17 months, result in many casualties to both sides (especially Egypt) and end in a stalemate<sup>22</sup>. At the finish, Israel had not been worn down and continued to occupy the whole of the Sinai. Thus, when a cease-fire brought the fighting to an end in August 1970, the Arab-Israeli dispute remained unresolved.

|                           |                               |                         |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY    | SPECIFIC<br>HOSTILE<br>INTENT | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| Jul-Aug 1967              | Aug 1968                      | 8 Mar 1969              |
| PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE      |                         |
| 56 Weeks                  | 27 Weeks                      |                         |

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CASE STUDY 33EAST PAKISTAN 1971 - PAKISTANIntroduction

1. East Pakistan had not featured as a strategic objective during the 1948 and 1965 Indo-Pakistan wars, all of which had been concerned primarily with Kashmir. This was to change in 1971. On 25 March the President of Pakistan (Yahya Khan) ordered the Pakistan Army to repress the Awami League which he accused of fomenting East Bengal nationalism to the detriment of 'United Pakistan'. Since the Awami League - led by Mujibur Rahman - enjoyed heavy public support in East Pakistan, Yahya Khan's orders also required the repression of large sections of the Bengali population. This initiated a civil war in East Pakistan, with the complete breakdown of political and social organisation.

General Hostile Intent

2. The Pakistan Government was aware before it entered into this operation, that opportunities might be created, temporarily, for interference by other foreign powers. The first doubts in the minds of the Pakistan Government in regard to Indian involvement in the growing political crisis, appear to have arisen in January 1971. During this month an Air India Fokker Friendship was hijacked to Lahore airport in Pakistan and blown up. The Indian Government reacted by banning overflights of Indian territory by Pakistan aircraft. This more than doubled the length of the flight from West to East Pakistan. The Indian Government also carried out a precautionary predeployment of some regular forces on the West Pakistan border. This action was relaxed in early March, but the ban on overflights remained. The Pakistan Government appears to have recognised a General Hostile Intent from India towards East Pakistan in January 1971. The government had been receiving evidence of minor Indian involvement in the politics of East Pakistan from late 1970, and the current events now seemed to bear this out.

General Capability

3. The question of India's military capability became relevant to East Pakistan once the Pakistan Government had decided that it might have to take military action against the Awami League. The possibility of great social and political disruption as a consequence of such action would then provide the environment for possible Indian involvement. The ruling junta of generals decided to prepare the necessary contingency plan in mid-February 1971. At this time Indian forces around East Pakistan totalled four divisions, whereas the normal regular Pakistan garrison was one division of four brigades. However, the Indian forces represented only a General Capability as they were all tied down in controlling civil disturbances and rebellions in Nagaland, the Mizo Hills and West Bengal. None had any heavy equipment. The Pakistan Government

(the ruling junta of generals) planned to introduce more divisions with heavy equipment into East Pakistan before any military crackdown was initiated<sup>2</sup>. The Pakistan Notional Threat Phase of Indian military intervention in East Pakistan began in mid-February 1971.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

4. On 25 March 1971, Yahya Khan accused Mujibur Rahman of treason, banned his Awami League, and commanded the Pakistan Armed Forces, 'to do their duty and fully restore the authority of the Government'. On 31 March both houses of parliament in New Delhi expressed their profound 'sympathy' and 'solidarity' with the freedom struggle of the East Bengalis against the Pakistan Army. In the first week after the crackdown, India began to give sanctuary to refugees. This was particularly significant as the first wave of refugees were the leading cadres of the Awami League and members of the indigenous Bengali military units, the East Bengal Rifles, and the East Pakistan Rifles. If the Indian Government had refused entry and sealed its borders, all resistance to the Pakistan Army would have rapidly collapsed<sup>3</sup>. In the first week of April, the Indian Prime Minister ordered Indian border security forces to aid and succour fleeing Bengali military remnants which were seeking to escape Pakistan regular forces. The Awami League was not only given sanctuary, but allowed to form a government in exile (14 April) on Indian soil. This body made a declaration of independence for Bangla Desh on 17 April<sup>4</sup>.

5. None of these actions were ignored by the Pakistan Government. On 5 April the President of Pakistan (Yahya Khan) requested Russia to use its influence to prevent India from meddling in Pakistan internal affairs. On 7 April, the Pakistan Ambassador to the United Nations stated, to the Secretary General, that India was plotting to undermine the national solidarity and territorial integrity of Pakistan<sup>5</sup>. Whatever lingering doubts the Pakistan Government had of an Indian Specific Hostile Intent must have been removed with the formation of the Bangla Desh Government in exile. Pakistan's Perceived Threat Phase began no later than 14 April and probably as early as 31 March 1971. This conclusion appears to have been followed by the deliberate eviction of Hindus from East Pakistan in the second half of April. They were seen to be unreliable in a possible confrontation with India, and their eviction might cause such political and social problems for the Indian authorities in West Bengal and other border provinces, that the Indian Army would continue to be tied down in aid to the civil power duties. This started the flood of refugees which at the end of April numbered 1.25 million, by the third week in May was 3.4 million, and by mid-June was 6 million<sup>6</sup>.

#### Specific Capability

6. Despite the deterioration in relations with India in April, the Pakistan Government still had no cause to fear an Indian Specific Capability. The Chinese were still Pakistan's allies, thus

helping to divide Indian armed strength between East Pakistan and West Pakistan, the Sino-Indian border, and various internal insurrections (Nagaland and the Mizo Hills) which received aid from Pakistan and China (see Case Study 31). India was unlikely to be able to create a Specific Capability to interfere in East Pakistan as long as this situation continued. In fact the only elements of the 26 division Indian Army which were not committed to West Pakistan, Kashmir and the Sino-Indian borders in the North, were the four divisions engaged in internal security operations around East Pakistan. This was unlikely to change in the short term as the Chinese Government had been quick to support in April Pakistani charges of Indian 'meddling', and engaged in a radio propaganda war during May/June which was calculated to create uncertainties in the minds of Indian decision makers in regard to Chinese responses. Pakistan also received the tacit support of the United States(US) which declined to halt arms deliveries to the Pakistan Armed Forces<sup>7</sup>.

7. Given the impasse the Indian Government was seen to be in, the Pakistan Government decided that its strategy was to clear up the Bengali rebellion as quickly as possible, so that the pretext for Indian intervention would be removed. The government thought that it had achieved this aim in May 1971. Bengali rebel groups had been routed and driven over the Indian border, and most armed resistance had collapsed. Furthermore, the monsoon began, which further reduced the prospect of conflict with India by making the delta terrain impassible for any mobile operations until mid-November. On 24 May the President of Pakistan was confident that the probability of war with India was declining, despite Pakistani actions towards Hindu refugees<sup>8</sup>.

8. However, the Pakistan Government misjudged the degree of national unity against Pakistan which existed within Bangla Desh. Although they had been beaten militarily, the loyalties of the Bengalis were still with the Awami League and other insurgents, across the Indian border. This provided the environment in which Indian forces could retrain and rearm insurgents and send them back over the border, where they would be supported and hidden by the local population. Slowly, but surely, organised insurgency spread throughout the country of East Pakistan. The true extent to which the Pakistan Army had begun to lose control was not clear to the Pakistan Government until late July/early August<sup>9</sup>. At the time that this information was being received, the Pakistan Government was informed, by a friendly great power, that the Indian Armed Forces had begun to prepare for an armed confrontation<sup>10</sup>. This was ominous in the circumstances of the Pakistan failure to crush the Bengali rebellion; but it did not constitute a Specific Capability. As long as India remained in the strategic straight-jacket of East and West Pakistan and China, it could do no more than aid Mukti Bahini guerillas in hit and run attacks.

9. In July 1971, Kissinger announced that President Nixon would visit China. Since the US had been the major proponent of the view of China's unsuitability for membership of the United Nations,

this development promised a change in US attitude, and a future role for China in international forums commensurate with its global importance. China became unwilling to risk being drawn into any conflict on the eve of her admission to the United Nations. While supporting Pakistan in the previous three months, the Chinese Government had been careful not to threaten India with actual physical intervention as it had done in 1962 and 1965. Criticism of India had tended to be on a moralistic level rather than on specific political issues. China was now advising Pakistan to find a political solution to the East Pakistan question<sup>11</sup>. There is no evidence that the Pakistan Government took this advice, despite the erosion of their strategic position. The final jolt came on 11 August with the signing of a treaty between the Indian Government and Russia. This outlined an obligation between the two nations to consult in case of attack or threat of attack. This major international realignment largely eliminated any possibility of Chinese military intervention on the side of Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops were committed to the Sino-Russian border while negotiations on border disagreements dragged on with occasional armed clashes. China in this circumstance could not afford another conflict in the distant Tibet border with India; particularly when Russia had so clearly declared its interest with India<sup>12</sup>. The strategic straight-jacket on India was now largely released, and the significant redeployment of forces from the northern frontier could begin.

10. The Pakistan Government appears to have recognised during early August 1971 that India had now gained the Specific Capability to interfere momentarily in the East Pakistan crisis. The confluence of events in the preceding weeks all point to this conclusion; as well as the fact that Yahya Khan began in August, to make frantic attempts to begin a dialogue on a political settlement with Mujibur Rahman (who was in a West Pakistan jail) and the Bengali Government in exile, in Calcutta. This was conducted with the help of US officials<sup>13</sup>.

11. The beginning of the Specific Threat Phase for the Pakistan Government was accompanied with the beginning of feverish defence preparations. By September and October large scale construction of pill boxes, bunkers and observation towers, and the laying of large minefields, was begun along the West Pakistan border with India. By 12 October 80 percent of Pakistan regular forces stationed there were in forward positions. Similar scales of preparation were also launched in East Pakistan where regular forces were rapidly built up to four and a half divisions<sup>14</sup>.

#### Operational Response

12. Despite the Pakistan Government's preparations, and attempts to initiate a new dialogue with the Awami League, events continued to turn against Pakistan. A joint communique from the Indian and Russian Governments on 29 September, indicated the continued drawing together of the two nations, and the possibility of impending action. Despite public statements by the President of Pakistan that his country enjoyed Chinese support, the Chinese would

make no military commitment. In a last attempt to shore up the alliance a very high level Pakistani delegation was sent to China on 5/7 November. This was also a failure and no joint communique was signed at the end of the mission. Meanwhile, the Secretary General of the United Nations wrote to both the Pakistan and Indian Governments on 20 October 1971, offering his services as a mediator. Pakistan eagerly accepted, but the Indian Government did not<sup>15</sup>.

13. By late October the monsoon floods began to subside making military operations (by the Indians) in many parts of the Indian subcontinent more feasible. By early November the delta region of East Pakistan was also dry enough for mobile operations. During the monsoon, the Mukti Bahini had, under Indian guidance, steadily increased the scope of its guerilla operations, forcing the Pakistan Army to engage in more provocative attacks on rebel bases in Indian territory. To counter this development, the Indian Government on 21 November 1971 approved 'hot pursuit' operations over the border into East Pakistan for Indian regular forces. Two days later Yahya Khan made an urgent appeal to the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) protesting the new Indian actions and requesting urgently the insertion of UN observers along the Pakistan and Indian border. On 24 November the Pakistan Government declared a state of emergency and began to mobilise its reservists. Nine Indian divisions were now concentrated around East Pakistan opposing four and one half Pakistan divisions, and the Indian Army was deployed in full strength on the borders with West Pakistan<sup>16</sup>.

14. Ultimately, however, Pakistan must have known that, in the event of an Indian invasion of East Bengal, its defeat (in the East) was only a matter of time. Yahya Khan's operational response to the specific threat posed by India was almost one of resignation. By launching, on 3 December 1971, a pre-emptive air attack in the West, he appeared to have written off East Pakistan, and sought consolation in the possibility of a surprise grab for disputed territory in Kashmir and the Punjab. Since India had four divisions in Kashmir (just as Pakistan had in East Bengal) there remained the possibility of Pakistan capturing what Kalim Siddiqui has called a 'major bargaining counter' with which to extract its besieged forces in the East. In the ensuing conflict, however, India effectively held Kashmir and the Punjab and ultimately breached Pakistan's 'soft belly' along the Rajasthan border, capturing large areas of Sind<sup>17</sup>.

GENERAL HOSTILE  
INTENT AND  
GENERAL CAPABILITY

Feb 1971  
NOTIONAL THREAT  
PHASE  
0.1 Weeks

SPECIFIC HOSTILE  
INTENT

Apr 1971  
PERCEIVED THREAT  
PHASE  
18 Weeks

SPECIFIC  
CAPABILITY

Aug 1971  
SPECIFIC THREAT  
PHASE  
15 Weeks

OPERATIONAL  
RESPONSE

3 Dec 1971

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CASE STUDY 34EAST PAKISTAN 1971 - INDIA

1. Despite long standing antipathy between India and Pakistan over the status of Kashmir, the 1971 conflict had its origins in Pakistan's domestic politics and their impact on East Pakistan. In the elections of December 1970, the East Pakistan-based Awami League emerged as the largest single party in the Republic of Pakistan; thus for the first time, the long standing domination of the Bengalis (of East Pakistan) by the less numerous Punjabi-Sindi elite (of West Pakistan) was challenged seriously. The Pakistan President (General Yahya Khan), who had announced the legal framework for the elections, soon became convinced through the intransigence of the Awami League leader (Mujibur Rahman) that the secret purpose of the Awami League was the destruction of united Pakistan and the independence of East Bengal<sup>1</sup>. Within a deteriorating domestic situation, in which the major political party in West Pakistan (led by Bhutto) was increasingly critical of concessions given to the Awami League, Yahya Khan concluded that his only option was the military suppression of East Pakistan, and the Awami League in particular. This operation began on the 25 March 1971.

2. The Indian Government was prepared to consider that threats could emerge from Pakistan to its National Interests in Kashmir at short notice, and was prepared to act. Indeed, it had thought that one was emerging at the end of January 1971 when an Air India Fokker Friendship had been hijacked to Lahore in Pakistan by two Kashmir 'freedom fighters'. Bhutto had taken over negotiations at Lahore airport where from the Indian view, he contrived to have the hijackers greeted as heroes, and connived at the blowing up of the aircraft. The Indian Government retaliated by banning Pakistan overflights of Indian territory, increasing the air distance to East Pakistan by a factor of over two. Following the increased tension, the Indian Government towards the end of February, conducted some precautionary military deployments on the West Pakistan border, with regular forces. Since the situation did not develop further, most forces were returned to peace stations during March<sup>2</sup>.

3. However, the Indian Government had not conceived of any threat to Indian National Interests emanating from the political chaos in East Pakistan. The National Interests most closely associated with Eastern India were the maintenance of social and political stability in the states bordering East Pakistan, and the maintenance of their security from intervention by China, and internal subversion. The Indian Government had been alert to the threat from the Chinese since the military debacle of 1962, and kept forces on the border in Northern Assam. It also was meeting two significant insurgencies by aboriginal tribes in the Naga and Mizo Hills in far eastern India. Furthermore, extensive poverty and unemployment in West Bengal had led to a fragile political and social situation which was being exploited by such left wing groups as the Naxalites. It was difficult to see how these diverse factors would all become united through the political disintegration in Pakistan.

### General Hostile Intent

4. In the days immediately following the military crackdown in East Pakistan, the Pakistan Armed Forces systematically sought out the intellectual and political leadership of the East Bengalis and attempted to exterminate it, plunging East Pakistan into civil war<sup>3</sup>. These acts generated great sympathy in favour of the East Bengalis in the Indian state of West Bengal and other surrounding Indian states. This stemmed initially from the common culture and language which existed between all Bengalis despite their religious differences. However, it was not long before this sympathy spread to other parts of India and to the Indian Parliament itself. In its emphasis on individual rights and democracy, the Indian political system identified itself readily with the Awami League against what it regarded as the antithesis of these values - West Pakistan militarism. On 31 March 1971 both Houses of Parliament in New Delhi expressed their profound 'sympathy' and 'solidarity' with the freedom struggle of the East Bengalis against the Pakistan Army<sup>4</sup>. This was a clear indication, amongst other things, that the Indian Government and people had recognised a General Hostile Intent stemming from the actions of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan.

### General Capability

5. With these sympathetic attitudes, the Indian Government could hardly refuse sanctuary to fleeing members of the Awami League and members of the indigenous Bengali military units, the East Bengal Rifles, and the East Pakistan Rifles, all of which were special targets of the Pakistan Army. Indian border security forces were ordered, by the government during the first week of April 1971, to actively aid and succour the fleeing remnants. At about the same time the decision was taken to extend some limited military aid and training to the Bengali military elements<sup>5</sup>. This was no more than Pakistan and China had done to a limited extent in previous years in regard to the Naga rebels, and was considered part of the 'game'<sup>6</sup>. However, the risk it carried was that should the Pakistan Army succeed in establishing itself throughout East Pakistan, it would turn its operations against the rebel pockets on the border, and thereby begin to engage in interference in the affairs of the unstable Indian border states. There perhaps was little choice in this policy for the Indian Government, given its declared sympathies. Yet little real risk was seen as the Pakistan Army was not expected to be able to assert itself effectively following the massive national uprising in East Pakistan after 25 March<sup>7</sup>. On the 14 April the Indian Government felt confident enough of this situation to allow the formation of an Awami League government-in-exile in Calcutta.

6. By the last week in April, the realisation was dawning that the Pakistan Army would establish itself in East Pakistan, and that resistance was rapidly crumbling. The army had regained control of all major towns, and was now fanning out over the

countryside<sup>8</sup>. It was at this time that the Indian Government realised that the Pakistan Army would have the General Capability to interfere in Indian border regions with East Pakistan.

7. The onset of the Notional Threat Phase did not find the Indian Armed Forces well prepared to face the possibility of operations on the East Pakistan border. The only forces of the 26 division Indian Army which were not committed to the West Pakistan/Kashmir border, and the Sino-Indian borders, were four to five divisions around East Pakistan. Two of these were engaged in counter insurgency in the Naga and Mizo Hills and were only equipped for light operations. Between two to three divisions had been sent to West Bengal to assist in keeping the peace for elections in mid-March. They were subsequently retained in that state according to Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, to aid the civil power against Naxalite violence. Such forces lacked all heavy equipment and were deployed to stabilise the internal situation in West Bengal. The air force also was unprepared, for air bases had not been developed for operations in East Pakistan<sup>9</sup>. Major General Lachman Singh, who commanded a division on the East Pakistan border, summarised the situation in the following terms:

'The Indian Government had apparently been taken by surprise at the suddenness and magnitude of the uprising in East Pakistan.... The Government was occupied with the Naxalite movement, particularly in Bengal and the neighbouring states, and so intelligence reports on East Pakistan were not perhaps given due attention in New Delhi ... Nevertheless, it would appear that intelligence failed to forecast the scope and dimension of the popular struggle in East Pakistan'<sup>10</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

8. The stability of the border regions was to quickly deteriorate, largely because of a policy adopted in late April 1971 by the Pakistan Army. The first wave of refugees in early April had been predominantly the leading cadres of the Awami League and members of the two indigenous Bengali military regiments. During the second half of April, increasing numbers of Hindus were displaced. By the end of May the Hindu refugee torrent had become a flood, as the Pakistan Army began to evict and terrorise Hindu residents of East Pakistan. The main reason for this action appears to have been that the Pakistan Army regarded all Hindus as potential civil enemies of the West Pakistan Government, and possible allies of India. The army disliked the risk they might represent to its lines of communication in any future confrontation with India and the Awami League<sup>11</sup>. By the end of April the total number of refugees was 1.25 million, whereas on the 17th of that month it had only been 120 000. By the end of May the total had leapt to 3.4 million, and the huge majority were Hindus<sup>12</sup>. Hundreds of thousands of Hindu refugees continued to flood into India in succeeding months until by 16 August the total figure was 7.5 million of which 6.97 million were Hindus<sup>13</sup>.

9. Apart from the huge financial burden this flood of refugees soon presented to the Indian Government, it also represented a grave threat to political and social stability in the Indian states surrounding East Pakistan, particularly for the largest and most populous - West Bengal. Communal violence had often flared in this state in the previous 25 years, particularly when there were influxes of refugees from East Pakistan. The greatly increased numbers of May 1971 held the same risk, particularly in their adverse effect on local prices, wages, rents and amenities. Such conditions were likely to be aggravated further by prevailing high unemployment in West Bengal<sup>14</sup>.

10. Established left wing extremist political groups were quick to attempt to take advantage of the disruption caused by the refugees. While the Indian Government had snuffed out Naxalite (Maoist) guerilla activity in the Midnapore district of West Bengal by early 1970, by mid-1971 it found itself combating urban guerillas in Calcutta and a renewed rural insurgency in the district of Birbhum<sup>15</sup>. Political murders began to soar in numbers. The situation threatened the industrial heartland of India. One can gain some understanding of the significance of this area to the Indian military-industrial complex when it is realised that at the time:

'Over half of India's joint stock companies engaged in manufacturing, tea plantations and coal-mining industries were located in Bengal, and they accounted for over 55 per cent of the total paid-up capital in large-scale industries of the country'<sup>16</sup>.

11. Further, within a radius of 300 miles from Calcutta, almost 'the whole of India's iron and steel industry' was concentrated. It was into this area, containing 'India's greatest single concentration of productive capacity'<sup>17</sup> that millions of refugees poured. As Major General D.K. Palit put it:

'The presence of these millions of refugees aside from imposing an intolerable economic burden, would create unbearable tensions in West Bengal and Tripura - states in which accentuated social disparities had already caused a near break-down of the administration and where there already existed the danger of revolutionary strife.... The mass eviction of refugees was a deliberate act of demographic aggression. It constituted a clear threat to India's national security'<sup>18</sup>.

12. This point was appreciated during early May 1971 by the Indian Government when it realised that the Pakistan Government had no serious intention of taking back the refugees. Indeed the refugees had no desire to go back while the military and political situation in East Pakistan remained so threatening.

13. On 24 May 1971 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi went so far as to state:

'What was claimed to be an internal problem of Pakistan, has also become an internal problem for India. We are, therefore, entitled to ask Pakistan to desist immediately from all actions which it is taking in the name of domestic jurisdiction, and which vitally affect the peace and well-being of millions of our citizens. Pakistan cannot be allowed to seek a solution of its political or other problems at the expense of India and on Indian soil'<sup>19</sup>.

14. It seems clear that by early to mid-May 1971, the Indian Government had drawn important conclusions from the influx of refugees in relation to its own social and political problems in Eastern India. The government had recognised a Specific Hostile Intent from Pakistan through the Pakistan Army's expulsion of refugees into India.

15. The onset of the Perceived Threat Phase found the Indian Armed Forces still only partially through a 10 year program of moderate expansion and large scale equipment replacement. The program had begun shortly after the 1965 war with Pakistan, and aimed to take the Indian Armed Forces into the era of sophisticated technology. A substantial measure of self sufficiency in complex-equipment production was also being acquired. Many of these schemes were now converted to crash programs so that the frontline units of the armed forces could receive their complements of new equipments before the situation deteriorated further<sup>20</sup>. Few attempts were made at this stage to improve support and logistic infrastructure around East Pakistan, and the operational readiness of units in the region for full scale war remained low.

16. There were several reasons for this policy. The first was that the Indian Government was still hopeful in May/June that the Pakistan Government could be induced to seek a political settlement in East Pakistan without the need for a full scale armed confrontation. A second reason was that support units could not be withdrawn from other border areas (i.e. West Pakistan/Kashmir, and Sino-Indian). There was a prospect of reducing the number supporting the Sino-Indian border regions, but only when the prospect of Chinese action in support of Pakistan was remote. Chinese statements in support of Pakistan during April/May had been calculated to create uncertainty in the minds of Indian decision makers on this matter<sup>21</sup>. A further reason was that the monsoon was beginning in Eastern India, and would soon make all conventional mobile operations in East Pakistan impractical for five to six months<sup>22</sup>.

17. Given these difficulties the Indian Government sought to exert pressure on Pakistan through diplomatic channels, and through increased support for the East Pakistan resistance movements, now termed collectively the Mukti Bahini. Guerrilla operations were the only practical option to avoid provoking the Chinese, and to cope with the monsoon conditions. Indian authorities hoped that through better training and equipment, the Mukti Bahini could mobilise the

East Pakistan population and impose high and steady military and financial attrition on the Pakistan Army and Government, forcing a political settlement<sup>23</sup> as in the French experience in Vietnam and Algeria.

### Specific Capability

18. By July 1971 the Indian Government had realised that its guerrilla strategy was too optimistic and would not have any appreciable effect on Pakistan forces for many months (if not years). Even though the Mukti Bahini was inflicting losses on the Pakistan Army, these were not serious enough to weaken the Pakistan hold in the short term. Through its superior mobility, organisation and firepower, the Pakistan Army controlled all major towns, villages and lines of communication. The Mukti Bahini could only maintain itself in any strength in border regions, where it could escape over the Indian border. The internal areas it controlled were strategically unimportant in threatening Pakistan control and were largely ignored by the Pakistan Army which at this time numbered about 4.5 divisions. The inherent weakness of this situation was that the Pakistan Army would seek to pursue the Mukti Bahini onto Indian soil. What was needed was time to organise guerrilla cadres throughout the towns and countryside of East Pakistan, so that the people could be properly organised to take advantage of their superior numbers<sup>24</sup>.

19. But time was not on the side of the Indian Government. The presence and policy of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan meant that refugees would continue to flow into the eastern states of India at the rate of 40 000 per day<sup>25</sup>. The huge financial burden these represented, and the increasing risk of communal violence and social breakdown the influx was causing, have been described. The Indian Government regarded the actions of the Pakistan Army as demographic aggression. Yet the problem which began to draw the governments attention even more was the continued and increasingly successful attempts of left wing revolutionary groups to use the social disruption in West Bengal and other states, to undermine the established political order.

20. On 4 July 1971, the situation in the Birbhum region of West Bengal had become so aggravated that a battalion was sent to the district solely for counter insurgency purposes<sup>26</sup>. While no formal alliance existed between Maoists in East and West Bengal, the Naxalites had sufficient men under arms to render much of the area a revolutionary hinterland<sup>27</sup>. Combined with other (Chinese) supported insurgencies in the area, particularly the protracted Naga and Mizo<sup>28</sup> guerilla movements, the eastern wing of the sub-continent faced an axis of rebellion from the plains of Bengal to the Himalayas. Major General D.K. Palit has written that at the time it:

'.... was becoming increasingly evident that if there was to be no political and military reaction from India to support the uprising in Bangla Desh, the nature of the insurgency which had so far been entirely nationalistic,

would become more and more extremist-oriented - and thus have long-term repercussions on the situation in West Bengal and elsewhere',<sup>29</sup>.

21. A prolonged war of attrition in East Pakistan would lead to the creation of revolutionary conditions in East Pakistan itself, in which the role and influence of moderate democratic groups, such as the Awami League, would be undermined, and the Mukti Bahini penetrated by left wing extremists. Kalim Siddiqui argued that:

'The longer the struggle went on the stronger would grow the Muktis and the weaker would become the Awami League. Mrs Gandhi of course could not organise an election as Yahya had done. She was having trouble enough with her own revolutionaries who had managed to commit 400 political murders in West Bengal inside six months. The situation had never been so bad even in East Pakistan before March. The only way to stop the revolutionaries from taking control of Bangladesh in exile and eventually in East Pakistan was for the Indian Army to transplant the Awami League Government from Calcutta to Dacca',<sup>30</sup>.

22. Subsequent events were to show that these fears were well based. Left wing extremists on both sides of the East Pakistan border began to make common cause against the Indian and Pakistan Governments. Neither Government had control of arms flow over the East Pakistan border to revolutionary groups. In the long term, the rise of a left wing state in East Pakistan could only benefit China, and not India. Although the Naxalites followed the Peking line and thus condemned India's assistance to the Mukti Bahini as China did - many could not for long ignore the popular upsurge in East Bengal. By August/September 1971, in fact, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) had split into two factions over the issue. While both factions 'supported China's denunciation of Indian intervention in East Bengal, and condemned the Awami League, they differed bitterly in their attitudes to Yahya Khan'. One group, led by Asim Chatterjee, held that communist revolutionaries in both East and West Bengal should support Yahya Khan as a representative of an 'anti-imperialist national Bourgeoisie',<sup>31</sup>. The other, led by Charu Mazumdar refrained from supporting the Bengali nationalists but castigated Yahya Khan as a brutal reactionary. Because Chatterjee was captured before he could convert the West Bengal-Bihar Border Region Committee of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) into a separately functioning party, the Indian Government still had a reason to fear that Mazumdar's group might, without offending China, eventually find common ground with a number of Maoist-leaning Mukti Bahini groups. By November, in fact, it became clear that the Awami League had been unable to crush or curtail the influence of these radical factions and that they had become extremely powerful. On 20 November 1971, for example, it was reported that,

'.... the biggest anxiety the Mukti Bahini fighters have is caused by the attempts of local Maoist extremists to assume the leadership of the liberation movement. Such a struggle within the struggle had been forecast by many

observers even in the early stages of the crisis. Now it appears that the 'Naxalites' have become influential in some districts; in Noakhali near Chittagong they are said to be in command. Eye witnesses say the fight between the Naxalites and the Awami League elements in the Mukti Bahini is even more fierce than that between the Bengalis and the West Pakistanis. The Naxalites denounce the Awami League in ideological terms. While the Awami League is bent simply on driving the West Pakistanis out of Bangla Desh, the Naxalites seem to be looking further ahead to an ideological dawn over East Bengal'<sup>32</sup>.

23. By mid-July 1971 there can be little doubt that in the wake of the restricted success of the Mukti Bahini, the Indian Government had accepted that the Pakistan Armed Forces in East Pakistan had the Specific Capability to begin border operations against Bengali rebels, and to continue demographic aggression to the point where it would cause total political and social breakdown in West Bengal and other border states, and also cause the rise of a powerful and well armed left wing revolutionary force on both sides of the border. The Pakistan refusal to develop a political solution to the strife in East Pakistan threatened to plunge all of the north eastern portion of the Indian subcontinent into total chaos to the advantage of social and political revolutionaries, from which China was likely to be the ultimate beneficiary.

24. The Indian Government now began to search for a viable military option for its problem. By placing a neutral moderate government in East Bengal, India could deny existing Pakistani-sponsored bases to the Mizos, pursue retreating Naxalites with impunity, and be further assured of preventing an arms funnel to the Naxalites in West Bengal<sup>33</sup>. Thus, even if the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) maintained its support for China (and implicitly, for Chinese foreign policy) and forestalled an alliance with the radical East Bengali Left, India could only gain by stabilising the region, through the dismemberment of Pakistan and the installation of an Awami League government. As Major General Lachman Singh succinctly put it:

'The sudden strife in East Pakistan posed serious problems as well as gainful opportunities to India. It imposed a heavy burden on the Indian economy but also promised to permanently weaken Pakistan militarily. Separation of East Pakistan from the west wing would give India pre-eminence in the subcontinent and also seemed to offer an end to the periodic armed confrontations if Pakistan could be cut to size. It also offered the possibility of reducing interference by outside powers who might abandon their policy of arming a weaker Pakistan to achieve borrowed military parity with India. A friendly government in Dacca could be an asset to New Delhi which could then set itself the task of solving the counter-insurgency problems in the eastern region without the insurgents getting aid from and sanctuary in East Pakistan'<sup>34</sup>.



25. The defence preparations of the Specific Threat Phase were initially constrained to stepped-up counter-insurgency operations in West Bengal, and attempting to maintain the Awami League's military and political credibility with further arms and training<sup>35</sup>. Further preparations could not be pursued until there was some assurance that China had been neutralised. There was always the danger during this period that Pakistan and her ally China would choose to interpret Indian border operations, as acts of aggression - and attack India from the northern and western frontiers. India had little international support for her actions, and even less understanding of her problems with Pakistan. In this climate a Sino-Pakistan assault could not be dismissed. India chose to neutralise this threat to her national survival by accepting an offer extended in 1969 from Russia for a Russian-Indian alliance. On 11 August 1971 India and Russia signed an agreement which outlined an obligation between the two nations, to consult in case of attack or threat of attack. Already involved in border disputes with Russia, the Chinese could not afford to worsen them through an attack on Russias new ally India<sup>36</sup>. This area of operations was too far away from the critical Sino-Soviet border.

26. This step by India had been taken reluctantly because it undermined its cherished policy of non-alignment. But it now freed support and frontline units from the Sino-Indian border for deployment around East Pakistan. A new interservice command system was created. Hitherto it had been oriented towards the Sino-Indian border of operations in the Himalayas. The army regional headquarters had been situated at Calcutta, and the air force at Shillong (Assam) being separated by East Pakistan. A joint headquarters was now established at Calcutta and included the navy<sup>37</sup>. The army and air force now began to develop the necessary support infrastructure which included airfields, sealed roads, and new army corps. Sufficient artillery was scrounged from the West Pakistan/Kashmir and Sino-Indian border regions. A limited amount of armour was also transferred. Similarly the logistic support and transport requirement for operations in the riverine environment of East Pakistan was also developed for the first time in the East. By the beginning of November, the Indian forces around East Pakistan had been built up to three army corps totalling about seven divisions, and the air force was ready on its reactivated airbase at Kumbigram<sup>38</sup>.

#### Operational Response

27. As India's (selective) assistance to the Mukti Bahini became more and more overt - including air and artillery support, together with weapons, bases and training - border skirmishes with Pakistan became increasingly regular. On 3 December 1971, Pakistan launched a pre-emptive air strike in an attempt to capture Kashmir in compensation for the expected loss of East Pakistan. In the brief but bloody war that followed, the Pakistani state was dismembered and the State of Bangla Desh was born<sup>39</sup>.

|   |                            |                          |                         |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| GENERAL HOSTILE<br>INTENT AND<br>GENERAL CAPABILITY | SPECIFIC HOSTILE<br>INTENT | SPECIFIC<br>CAPABILITY   | OPERATIONAL<br>RESPONSE |
| 23 Apr 1971   | 5/15 May 1971              | 15 Jul 1971              | 3 Dec 1971              |
| NOTIONAL THREAT<br>PHASE                            | PERCEIVED THREAT<br>PHASE  | SPECIFIC THREAT<br>PHASE |                         |
| 0.04 Years  | 9.4 Weeks                  | 20 Weeks                 |                         |

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REFUGEES

|     |             |   |           |   |           |         |
|-----|-------------|---|-----------|---|-----------|---------|
| (1) | Week ending | - | 17-4-1971 | - | 119 556   | persons |
| (2) | Week ending | - | 24-4-1971 | - | 536 308   | persons |
| (3) | Week ending | - | 1-5-1971  | - | 1 251 544 | persons |
| (4) | Week ending | - | 7-5-1971  | - | 1 572 220 | persons |
| (5) | Week ending | - | 14-5-1971 | - | 2 669 226 | persons |
| (6) | Week ending | - | 21-5-1971 | - | 3 435 243 | persons |

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In 1969, Ravi Kaul summarised India's view of the danger of this frontier subversion when he wrote:

'In the east, while an independent and neutral Burma is vital, the Sino-Pakistan conspiracy to train and aid all the Naga and Mizo hostiles who can be persuaded to further their nefarious designs is a problem which should be tackled urgently with all the various factors being carefully weighed, for time is not on our side. The imposing and rugged mountain chain running from Nagaland southwards, through Manipur to the Mizo hills are both a source of strength and of weakness for India. They could, as friendly sentinels, make it impossible for an enemy to mount an attack through the vulnerable eastern region or as hostiles force a continuous threat of subversion and the furtherance of enemy designs'.

Significantly Kaul argued that the problem could only be tackled by 'viewing the area as a single entity'.

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CASE STUDY 35THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, OCTOBER 1973 - ISRAELIntroduction

1. On 8 March 1969, the Egyptians launched the War of Attrition against the Israeli forces along the Suez Canal. This war was Egypt's first attempt after the Six Day War (5/10 June 1967) to dislodge the Israelis from the east bank of the canal and from the Sinai Peninsula by military means<sup>1</sup>. As such it was unsuccessful. When a cease-fire agreement brought the whole confrontation to an end in August 1970 the Israelis were even more firmly entrenched on the east bank and in Sinai than they had been before the War of Attrition began.

2. The war itself, in the opening phase, was a contest for fire superiority on the ground. At this stage, the Egyptians, with a far larger number of artillery pieces than the Israelis, held a significant advantage. Their aim in this phase was to destroy as much as possible of the Israeli fortified line on the east bank (the Bar Lev Line) by artillery bombardment. Throughout March and April 1969 the Egyptians carried out frequent and heavy artillery barrages along the length of the line, and although these inflicted much damage, the line survived. In mid-April 1969 the Egyptians began launching commando raids across the canal. In response to these raids and the continued shelling, the Israeli forces carried out counter-bombardments and their parachute and commando units mounted reprisal raids on the Egyptian line. As the fighting escalated, casualties on both sides began to rise<sup>2</sup>.

3. By July 1969 Israeli casualties on the Suez Canal front were causing some alarm in Israel. Fears were expressed that unless something was done to change the situation on the front, Israeli losses would rise to an intolerable level. In this climate of anxiety, the Israeli Government was spurred to commit the air force to the War of Attrition. The first air attacks on Egyptian positions along the canal were made on 20 July 1969. With the introduction of Israeli air power, the War of Attrition entered a new stage<sup>3</sup>.

4. Between July and December 1969 the Israeli Air Force (IAF) attacked Egyptian anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, road convoys and artillery batteries. By October the IAF had succeeded in destroying most of the Egyptian SAM system in the canal area, and Israeli aircraft were able to roam at will over the canal zone, although they still had to take account of anti-aircraft gun fire. After July, Israeli tactical bombing began to inflict heavy losses on the Egyptian forces and also gradually contained their fire power. As a result, the Israel casualty rate began to decline<sup>4</sup>.

5. In January 1970 the Israeli Government decided to expand the war and bring pressure on Egypt. On 7 January the IAF began

deep-penetration air raids. The targets for these raids were military bases and supply depots, many of them close to major cities. The effectiveness of the raids and the destruction of Egypt's SAM system indirectly brought about a limited Russian intervention in the War of Attrition. On 22 January Egypt's President Nasser secretly travelled to Moscow to request direct Russian assistance in re-building Egypt's air defences. After some initial hesitation, the Russian response was positive, and from February onwards, Russian advisers, vast amounts of Russian equipment, including SAM-3 surface-to-air missiles and MIG-21J aircraft, began to pour into Egypt. A new air defence system was steadily established with the Russian forces assuming considerable responsibility for its operation<sup>5</sup>.

6. Wishing to avoid any sort of confrontation with Russia, the Israeli General Staff decided in April to suspend deep-penetration raids. At the same time, they made it clear that they would resist any attempts by the Egyptians and Russians to extend the new missile system (then covering the Egyptian heartland in the Nile Valley) into the Canal Zone<sup>6</sup>.

7. Over the next two months no major attempt was made to move the missile system forward. In this period Egyptian air and land attacks became more intense, while Israeli air attacks along the canal also increased. Israeli Skyhawk A-4 aircraft and other fighter bombers dropped large tonnages of ordnance on the Egyptian ground forces menacing the Israeli strongholds along the canal.

8. On 30 June 1970, two Israeli Phantom F-4 fighters were shot down by new missile batteries only 25 kilometres from the canal, and therefore well within the Canal Zone. This was to mark the beginning of determined efforts by the Egyptians and Russians to edge the missile system forward to the banks of the canal, and corresponding Israeli air attacks to hold them back.

9. Through July, a struggle between aircraft and missiles went on. The Egyptians lost many men while attempting to move the missiles forward. At the same time, the Israelis lost nearly 20 aircraft. Meanwhile Egyptian artillery attacks and Israeli tactical bombing of the Egyptian lines continued<sup>7</sup>.

10. Towards the end of July President Nasser announced his acceptance of a cease-fire proposed by the United States. Soon after this, Israel also declared its acceptance of the cease-fire, and 7 August was set down as the date on which the agreement would take effect. It provided for a total military stand-still over a 50 kilometre belt on either side of the canal. Soon after the cease-fire came into effect, the Egyptians and Russians violated it when their troops moved the missile system right up to the banks of the canal<sup>8</sup>.

11. Thus, the War of Attrition was brought to an end without the Egyptians having achieved their main goals. They had not managed to grind Israel down and break her spirit, or dislodge her troops from the east bank of the Suez Canal; they had not even



destroyed the Bar Lev Line. Furthermore, the Israeli air attacks had inflicted many casualties and much suffering and destruction. All in all, this static limited war had been a costly venture for Egypt.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

12. After the War of Attrition, the Israeli Government continued to recognize an Egyptian Specific Hostile Intent. It was clear that the war had not weakened the Egyptians' determination to re-take the Sinai by force. The Israelis became convinced of this after the Egyptians moved their surface-to-air missile system forward to the banks of the Suez Canal immediately after the cease-fire came into effect in August 1970. This move by the Egyptians was clearly meant to facilitate a future Egyptian crossing of the canal and invasion of the Sinai.

13. Although the Israeli Government was able to identify a continuing Egyptian Specific Hostile Intent towards the Israeli occupation of the Sinai after the War of Attrition, they did not recognize that the Egyptians had acquired or would soon acquire the Specific Capability to re-take the Sinai in an all-out war. They believed that Egypt would not be in a position to launch a general attack until she had acquired or created an air force capable of overcoming Israeli air power and striking at Israel in depth (and at Israeli airfields in particular). It was estimated that Egypt would not reach such a position until 1975-76.<sup>9</sup> In their estimates of Egyptian capabilities the Israelis made no allowance for the ability of the Egyptian surface to air missile system to neutralize Israeli air power over the actual battle zone. In discounting the Egyptian missiles and anti-aircraft guns as factors in the context for control of the skies, the Israelis were ignoring the lesson of the War of Attrition which was that missiles were a very effective counter to aircraft within a limited battle zone.

14. At the end of the War of Attrition, therefore, the Israeli Government believed that the Egyptians possessed only a General Capability to implement their strategic goals. At the same time, however, they recognized that the Egyptians still harboured a Specific Hostile Intent towards the Israeli occupation of the Sinai. Thus, the end of the War of Attrition marks the beginning of a new Perceived Threat Phase for the Israeli Government.

15. During this phase of threat perception, Israel's political and military leadership did not expect the Egyptians to begin a second War of Attrition in the near future. In fact, they felt that Egypt's leaders would now turn to a new strategy to bring about the return of the Sinai, because the attrition campaign had obviously failed. Although they hoped that Egypt would eventually be persuaded to adopt a peaceful strategy, they based their military planning on the expectation that Egypt would launch a general attack across the Sinai when it had built up the necessary capability for such an operation, i.e. after 1975.

16. After the August 1970 cease-fire the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) maintained their static defensive posture on the Suez Canal front and on the Golan front. Most of the General Staff of the IDF and Israel's political leaders, remained convinced that fortified lines backed by mobile armoured forces provided the best defence of the cease-fire lines. Such fixed defensive systems had proved to be effective against minor assaults and attrition campaigns and were believed to be effective also against major attacks. In line with this thinking the Israeli leadership ordered improvement to the Bar Lev Line along the Suez Canal soon after it was learnt that the Egyptians had moved their surface-to-air missile system forward to the banks of the canal. The improvement plan involved the heightening and strengthening of the sand rampart on the Israeli side of the canal, the repairing of damaged fortifications, the construction of a second line of fortifications some five to seven miles to the rear of the main line to provide cover for tanks and artillery, and the building of roads, artificial barriers and obstacles. In all, a total of approximately 150 million Israeli pounds (equivalent to \$US40 million) was spent on these improvements to the Bar Lev Line<sup>10</sup>.

17. Apart from this construction effort on the east bank of the Suez Canal, the Israelis also engaged in a number of other significant defence activities after the War of Attrition; some of these had been initiated before that war began. For example, the armaments self-sufficiency programme, which had been launched in earnest soon after the Six Day War, was carried on without interruption both during and after the War of Attrition. The aim of this endeavour was to reduce Israel's dependence on foreign countries for the supply of essential armaments and weapon systems. The drive for defence self-sufficiency was undertaken in response to uncertainty in arms supplies from major suppliers at critical moments in Israeli history, and did not necessarily constitute a specific response to any particular emerging military contingency. Both before and after the August 1970 cease-fire the Israeli Government continued to invest large sums of money in weapons research and development, specialized machinery, imported know-how and construction. As a result of this, 'by the October (1973) war Israel was producing a wider range of artillery and infantry weapons, of missiles and electronic equipment, of aircraft and battle tank and gun conversions, than any country in the world except for Sweden and the Great Powers'<sup>11</sup>. Amongst the items being produced by Israel by then were the 155 mm Soltam L-33 self-propelled howitzer, the Galil automatic rifle, the Shafrir air-to-air missile, the Gabriel sea-to-sea missile, the RESHEF class of long-endurance missile boats, the Kfir attack plane, and re-engined Patton M-48 and Centurion tanks fitted with 105 mm guns.

18. While the Israeli Government continued, after the August 1970 cease-fire, to invest large sums of money in the effort to boost local production of armaments and weapons systems, they remained quite aware of the fact that Israel would go on being dependent on overseas sources (principally the United States) for the most sophisticated items of defence equipment, at least, for the foreseeable future. In fact, after that cease-fire, the government continued to make regular approaches to the Americans for arms, and,

indeed, missed no opportunity to inform the latter of their defence needs. Following the breaking of the War of Attrition cease-fire by Egypt and Russia in moving their SAM system to the Suez Canal, the US approved extensive sales of military equipment to Israel in September 1970<sup>12</sup>. Starting with the large arms delivery (including Phantom F-4 aircraft) in September 1970, the United States had, by October 1973, supplied Israel with more than 200 jet fighters (Phantom F-4, Skyhawk A-4), more than 100 helicopters and transport aircraft (CH-53, AB-205 helicopters, C-130, C-47, C-97 planes), some electronic warfare and radar devices, maintenance rigs and repair equipment, intercept and anti-radar missiles, many artillery pieces (M-109 and M-107 self-propelled howitzers), and tanks (Patton M-60A1)<sup>13</sup>.

19. The purpose behind the Israeli Government's efforts after the War of Attrition to obtain American arms and equipment was to maintain and, indeed, improve the capabilities of the IDF. The old equipment of the IDF was either to be replaced by new, more advanced equipment from the United States, or refurbished and upgraded by Israeli industry. By these means, the Israelis hoped to be able to maintain their edge in military power over the Arabs, who were being supplied with large quantities of arms by Russia. The Israeli leadership believed that as long as the military balance rested in Israel's favour, the Arabs would be deterred from attacking.

20. The IAF and the armour corps were the two military assets of the IDF that were to be expanded and developed significantly after August 1970. Israel's military planners continued to hold to the belief, after this time, that air power and armoured strength would be the decisive elements in any large-scale war with the Arabs. Accordingly, they allocated proportionately a greater share of the available funds to these two arms of the services than to the other arms<sup>14</sup>. Furthermore, the IAF and the armour corps were also clearly favoured in the allocation of manpower.

21. In contrast to the amount of effort and money spent to develop the IAF and the armour corps, relatively little, after August 1970, was put into the development of support and infrastructure on the two main fronts - the Sinai-Suez Canal front and the Golan Heights. In the Sinai and along the canal, for example, only enough infrastructure and support was developed to support a limited war like the War of Attrition. Thus, a number of new roads were built, existing airfields in the Sinai improved, and fuel tanks added<sup>15</sup>. However, the work done fell short of what would be needed in a full-scale war on this front. Similarly on the Golan Heights, the facilities established were sufficient to support only limited operations. Furthermore, towards 1973 stocks of ammunition and spare parts were actually reduced on the assumption that any future major war involving Israel would only require a few days of fighting. Thus, as a result of this move and the failure to develop sufficient logistic support elements and infrastructure for a major war, the IDF found itself by the end of the first stage of the Yom Kippur War to be not only dangerously short of ammunition and spares, but also hampered in its operations by over-extended supply lines<sup>16</sup>.

22. In the three years between the end of the War of Attrition and the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 Israel's defence budget declined in size. In 1970-71 the budget hit a post-1950 peak of 26 percent of GNP; by 1972-73 it had been reduced to about 20 percent of GNP<sup>17</sup>. The relative absence of fighting on Israel's borders and the growing mood of confidence in Israel's strength and security after 1970 were probably the main factors which influenced the Israeli Government's decisions to reduce defence expenditure in 1971-72 and 1972-73.

23. In the months after the August 1970 cease-fire, while many of the defence preparations described above were being initiated or carried on by the Israeli Government, a number of events took place in the Middle East which were to affect the thinking of the Israeli leadership. First, there was the civil war in Jordan which began in September 1970. This was a major confrontation between King Hussein's Army and the Palestinian guerillas who had been using Jordan as a base for their operations against the occupied West Bank region and Israel. Since the June 1967 war the Palestinian guerillas had established bases on Jordanian territory and had gradually become an independent power challenging the authority of King Hussein's regime. In mid-September 1970 the King decided that their power had to be contained. A civil war between the guerillas and the Jordanian Army was the result of the moves he then made. A few days after the war began, the Syrian Government under President Nureddin al-Atassi, which had always supported the guerillas, decided to intervene on their behalf. On 20 September the Syrian Army invaded Jordan. The Syrian intervention and the subsequent widening of the conflict in Jordan caused the US Government some concern, because it seemed to threaten American interests in the Middle East. In late September they ordered some of the major warships in the US 6th Fleet to move towards the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. This was a clear warning to the Syrians that the US was ready to protect its interests in Jordan. At the same time, the Israeli Government, with American encouragement, threatened to intervene on Jordan's side. These threats and the subsequent defeat of the invading Syrian forces by the Jordanian Army encouraged the Syrian Government to attempt no further intervention or escalation and to remove all its forces from Jordan. Meanwhile, King Hussein and some of the guerilla leaders reached an agreement which brought a halt to the fighting between the Jordanian Army and the guerillas. Thus, the Jordanian crisis was de-fused<sup>18</sup>.

24. The worst had only just passed in Jordan when another major event shook the Arab world. On 28 September 1970 Egypt's President Nasser collapsed and died of a heart attack. For over 15 years Nasser had ruled Egypt. He was the architect of the Arab anti-Israel policy, the charismatic leader who had struggled for Arab unity and who had won Russian support for the Arab cause. With his passing, the Arab world found itself without a leader in its struggle against Israel. Nasser's successor was his senior vice President, Anwar el-Sadat, a man who did not appear to have Nasser's charisma<sup>19</sup>.

25. The events of September 1970 contributed to a strengthening of the widely-held feeling in Israel that the Arabs would remain disunited and would not be capable of attacking Israel for quite a long time. Most Israelis felt that for the foreseeable future their country was secure. Furthermore, Israel's situation, if anything, seemed to be getting even better.

26. In early 1971, the search for a diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israel question was begun anew. The way was opened for the renewal of diplomatic activity by the decision of the Israeli leadership in January 1971 to change their position on the question of negotiations. Since the middle of August the Israeli Government had declined to resume talks with Egypt (and Jordan) under the auspices of UN Special Representative, Dr Gunnar Jarring, as the August 1970 cease-fire agreement provided, because they argued that Egypt had violated that agreement by moving surface-to-air missiles up to the banks of the Suez Canal after the cease-fire had come into effect, and that, therefore, no talks should occur until the military status quo along the canal had been restored. In January 1971, the Israeli Government decided to change their position and opted for an unconditional return to negotiations<sup>20</sup>.

27. Before Dr Gunnar Jarring resumed his mission to promote negotiations between Israel and the front-line Arab states of Egypt and Jordan for a political settlement (on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242)<sup>21</sup> in early February 1971, the question of a partial settlement or interim agreement on the Israeli-Egyptian front had been raised. The first person to propose an interim agreement was the Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, and he did so in December 1970, at about the time Egypt's President Sadat agreed to a renewal of the August 1970 cease-fire for a further three months. Dayan suggested that Israel could withdraw to a line along the western edge of the strategically important Sinai passes (Gidi and Mitla) in return for which Egypt would agree to thin out its forces on the west bank of the Suez Canal, revive the devastated canal cities and re-open the canal itself, while undertaking not to move any military forces into the territory on the east bank surrendered by Israel. Egyptian civilian personnel necessary for the operation of the canal, however, would be permitted on the east bank. In the early weeks of 1971 Dayan continued to develop his idea for an interim agreement on the Suez Canal front. Discussions on the idea were held with the US Government. At this time the US Government was also holding discussions with the Egyptians on the same question<sup>22</sup>.

28. On 4 February 1971, President Sadat announced his proposal for a partial settlement. It had a number of elements in common with Dayan's proposal, but on two important issues, it differed noticeably. First, on the question of the relation of the partial settlement to a final settlement, Dayan and the Israelis maintained that the former should be a separate agreement in itself without prejudice to further negotiations for the latter, whereas Sadat maintained that the former should be part of the latter and include an advance undertaking on Israel's part to withdraw completely from Sinai. Second, on the issue of what Egyptian personnel should be

allowed to cross to the east bank, Dayan had stated that no military personnel would be allowed to do so, whereas Sadat proposed that a limited number of such personnel be so permitted<sup>23</sup>.

29. On 8 February 1971, while the Israeli Government was still considering Sadat's proposal, Dr Jarring presented Israel and Egypt with his proposal for an overall settlement. In this he suggested that Egypt should fully recognize Israel and make peace with her, while Israel should withdraw her forces to the previous international boundary. In their respective replies to Dr Jarring, the two sides indicated that they could not entirely accept such a formula for an overall settlement. On the one hand, Egypt implied that she would only agree to make peace with Israel if the latter also undertook to withdraw to the 4 June 1967 lines (i.e. pre-Six Day War lines) on all the other fronts, as well as to solve the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with all relevant UN resolutions on that subject. Israel, on the other hand, stated that she was ready to enter into peace negotiations with Egypt without pre-conditions, but would not withdraw to the pre-Six Day War frontiers. For a few weeks, Jarring struggled to narrow the gap between the positions of the two sides, but was unsuccessful. In the end, he abandoned the attempt<sup>24</sup>.

30. In May 1971 the US decided to step in and explore the possibilities for an interim agreement on the Suez front to permit the re-opening of the canal. First, the Secretary of State, William Rogers, and the Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco, went to Cairo to find out the views of the Egyptian leaders. From there they moved on to Jerusalem to speak to the Israeli leaders. They soon discovered that even on the issue of a partial settlement there was quite a gap between the positions taken by the two sides. For example, the Israeli Government was only prepared to pull back their forces a few kilometres to permit the re-opening of the Suez Canal, and in return they wanted Egypt to undertake not to renew fighting and agree to the de-militarization of the area evacuated by Israel. On the other hand, the Egyptian Government wanted a more extensive Israeli withdrawal, as well as an advance undertaking from Israel to withdraw to the pre-Six Day War frontier in the context of a final settlement. Furthermore, the Egyptians could not agree to the complete de-militarization of the area evacuated by the Israelis. Between May and September, Rogers and Sisco tried to reconcile the views of the two sides, but without success<sup>25</sup>. Their attempt, like all the other attempts between August 1970 and 6 October 1973 to promote a political settlement of whatever scope, of the Arab-Israel problem, was to end in failure.

31. In December 1971, Israeli military intelligence noticed extensive military moves and activities taking place in Egypt. In reports to the General Staff of the IDF they noted that a large-scale mobilization had taken place in Egypt and that all Egyptian field forces were engaging in manoeuvres. In addition, they stated that general formations of tanks were advancing to the Suez Canal, bridging and crossing equipment was being brought forward, positions were being prepared for tanks and artillery, and the Egyptian Army was generally being deployed for offensive

action<sup>26</sup>. Despite these military activities, and the fact that President Sadat had already stated in March (when he had refused any further renewal of the August 1970 cease-fire) that 1971 was to be a 'Year of Decision' on the Arab-Israel question, Israel military intelligence considered an Egyptian attack on Israel unlikely. To justify this assessment, military intelligence advanced the argument that the Egyptians would be deterred from attacking by the fact that they still had no answer to Israel's air power. After considering the intelligence reports, the Chief of Staff, Chaim Bar Lev, delayed his scheduled retirement, put the IDF on alert, and reinforced Israeli units on the front line, but he did not request the government to authorize any mobilization of reserves, and thus none took place<sup>27</sup>. The government, for its part, accepted the intelligence assessment that an attack was unlikely, and continued to adhere to the belief that the Egyptians did not have the Specific Capability to launch a successful general attack, and that they would not attack until they had acquired that capability. Thus, the government remained in the Perceived Threat Phase.

32. On this occasion, as on several other similar occasions between late 1971 and the summer of 1973, the large-scale mobilizations in Egypt and the re-deployment of the Egyptian Army for offensive action were not followed by any military action by Egypt. The Suez front remained peaceful.

33. Throughout 1972 neither Israel nor Egypt were to soften their respective positions regarding an interim or a final settlement; the political deadlock was thus to continue. In May, US President, Richard Nixon, his National Security Adviser, Dr Henry Kissinger, and other senior US Government officials travelled to Moscow for a summit meeting with Leonid Brezhnev and the other Russian leaders. At this summit, the Middle East situation was discussed along with other subjects of interest to the two super powers. An announcement issued after the meeting referred, among other things, to a mutual agreement to achieve 'a military relaxation' in the Middle East to be followed by a freezing of the situation<sup>28</sup>. Many Israelis welcomed this development because they believed that with 'detente' now being established between East and West, Russia would, in the future, seek to discourage its Arab clients from launching an attack on Israel. The Egyptian response was to expel all Russian forces and advisers in July 1972, leaving Egypt, in the Israeli view, isolated and much weaker<sup>29</sup>.

34. In December 1972 Israeli military intelligence again noticed threatening military moves taking place in Egypt. This time, there was a large mobilization of Egyptian forces, then manoeuvres began involving all the field forces, while along the west bank of the Suez Canal the construction of ramps and fortifications was accelerated. Again, despite all the military activities taking place in Egypt, Israeli military intelligence assessed an Egyptian attack as unlikely. After considering the intelligence reports, new Israeli Chief of Staff, David Elazar, put the army on alert, reinforced front lines with armour, and postponed for six months a plan to shorten conscript service (from 36 months to 33 months). There was no mobilization of Israeli reserves<sup>30</sup>. The government did

not change its general assessment of the threat from Egypt. Again, an Egyptian attack did not materialize.

35. Apart from a few minor military engagements between Israeli and Syrian forces on the Syrian front in January, Israel's borders were relatively peaceful during the first half of 1973. However, during this time, the armed forces of Egypt and Syria were either being strengthened by mobilisations, training and exercising, or engaging in other preparations for war. In Spring, the stepped-up activities of the Egyptian forces on the west bank of the Suez Canal and to the rear began to cause some alarm in Israel. First, in April, Israeli intelligence observed the assembly of Egyptian brigades of several types and marked closely their movement up to the west bank of the canal. At the same time, the observation posts in the Bar Lev line noted that defence works opposite were being extensively modified. Aerial photography soon confirmed that new tank ramps were being built in the main rampart (by mid-May, 65 had been added), new bunkers were being built and others strengthened, and roads were being re-surfaced. In addition, it soon became clear that the main Egyptian rampart was being elevated to overlook the Israeli one on the east bank. Parallel to these activities along the canal, other defence preparations were being initiated in the rest of Egypt. For example, the civil defence was being mobilized, bridges were being protected, a call had gone out for blood donors, and a black-out had been declared in the cities. Furthermore, war-like declarations were being published in the Egyptian media, and President Sadat was speaking of the 'phase of total confrontation'. These developments in Egypt, and some similar developments in Syria began causing concern in Israel<sup>31</sup>.

36. In mid-May 1973, Israeli military intelligence presented their assessment of the situation on Israel's borders. Their view was that the probability of an attack on Israel by Egypt and/or Syria was low, despite the extensive war preparations that these states had undertaken in the preceding five weeks. military intelligence argued that Egypt would not attack because she still had no real answer to Israeli air power. On the other hand, they felt that Syria would not attack by itself for fear of having to face the vast bulk of Israel's forces. They advanced the view that President Sadat was just engaging in brinkmanship; he would move to the brink and then withdraw as he had done more than once before<sup>32</sup>.

37. The Chief of Staff, General Elazar, and the Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, did not accept this estimate. As early as July 1972 the former had indicated that he thought the Egyptians and Syrians might launch a major attack on Israel in 1973. He felt that as a result of frustration at their failure to break the political deadlock in the Middle East, or re-awaken the interest of the super powers, the Egyptians and Syrians would decide to go to war to break the status quo. Now in May 1973, it seemed to him that there was a real danger of a co-ordinated Arab attack. He believed that Egypt and Syria would aim to achieve a small military gain on their respective fronts, which could be used to achieve significant political gains by diplomatic means when a UN cease-fire had been imposed and the new military situation had been frozen<sup>33</sup>. Dayan,



for his part, saw the Arab motive for war as a desire to avenge the June 1967 defeat<sup>34</sup>. To him it must have seemed that Egypt and Syria now believed themselves to be in possession of the necessary Specific Capability for a major attack on Israel. He remained convinced that the IDF would be able to totally defeat such an attack.

### Specific Capability

38. At this point the Chief of Staff put the army on alert, advanced the date of previously scheduled manoeuvres, and began large-scale exercises. He also recommended and received the approval of the government for a partial mobilisation of reserve forces. On 21 May 1973 Dayan issued orders to the General Staff to prepare the IDF to meet an all-out attack by Egypt and Syria 'in the second half of the summer'<sup>35</sup>.

39. It is clear that in accepting in mid-May 1973 that Egypt and Syria might launch an all-out attack, the Israeli Government had changed its assessment of Egypt's and Syria's military capability. Whereas previously they had believed that these Arab states did not possess, nor saw themselves (the Arabs) as having the Specific Capability to overcome Israeli air power and carry out a major attack on Israel, the Israeli Government now concluded that the Arabs might have changed their minds and did have a Specific Capability to, at least, start a war. Thus, in mid-May 1973, the government entered a Specific Threat Phase.

40. This phase, however, was relatively short-lived. By mid-June it had become clear that Egypt and Syria were not going to attack: their forces on the front-lines were thinned out and emergency measures ceased to operate. The fronts settled down. It now seemed to the Israeli Government that military intelligence was correct in its estimate of the Arab threat to Israel. Consequently, the government reverted to its earlier assessment of Arab capability and thus slipped back into a Perceived Threat Phase again.

41. For the next two and a half months there was not a great deal of activity on Israel's southern and northern borders. Then in September, after an air clash between Israeli and Syrian aircraft, Egypt and Syria began another military build-up. The air clash took place on 13 September over the eastern Mediterranean near the Syrian port of Latakia. In the clash, 13 Syrian MIG fighters were downed whereas only one Israeli fighter was brought down<sup>36</sup>. The Syrians did not react to this incident in the way that they had reacted to lesser incidents up till this time. Instead of immediately launching a limited retaliatory attack on Israel forces on the Golan Heights the Syrians began to build-up their forces on the border. Within a few days, they had strengthened these forces considerably in tanks, artillery and mechanised infantry. By 24 September they had three infantry divisions in the line in defensive dispositions. In addition they had about 670 tanks and 100 artillery batteries in the frontier area<sup>37</sup>.

42. On 26 September 1973 Dayan visited the Golan Heights to view the situation on the border for himself. He was concerned enough by what he saw to order the strengthening of Israeli forces in the Golan Heights by the addition of the 7th Armoured Brigade, and some heavy artillery units. As a measure of precaution, anti-tank positions, ditches, and mines were added and strengthened. A higher level of alert for Israeli forces on all fronts was also introduced<sup>38</sup>.

43. On 28 September 1973 an event occurred that was to absorb for a while a considerable amount of attention of the Israeli Government and thus divert its attention from regional developments. This event was the hold-up by Palestinian terrorists of a train taking Jewish immigrants from Russia to Vienna (from whence they would be brought to Israel). The terrorists demanded the closing down of the Jewish transit immigration centre at Schoenau in return for the release of the hostages. The Austrian Government met this demand - an action which outraged Israelis. On 2 October, Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, flew to Vienna from Strasbourg (where she had attended a Council of Europe meeting) in an abortive attempt to persuade Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, to re-open the transit centre<sup>39</sup>.

44. Meanwhile, Egypt had mobilised its reserve forces and a very extensive military exercise had begun. The amount of activity on the west bank of the Suez Canal increased. Reports came in from observation posts on the Bar Lev line of artillery being moved into forward positions, unoccupied missile positions being occupied, minefields being cleared, and mines being laid in other places. The reports also described improvement works on the various descents to the water, earth-moving activity, preparation of areas for crossing and for bridges and pontoons. At the same time, night observation devices detected the unloading of stores. There was also a great deal of troop movement on the Egyptian side of the canal during this period<sup>40</sup>.

45. On 1 October at a meeting of the General Staff of the IDF, the Chief of Intelligence, Major-General Eliyahu Zeira, presented an evaluation of the situation on the northern and southern fronts<sup>41</sup>. After detailing the Syrian troop concentrations in the north and giving a run-down of the activities taking place on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal, Zeira proceeded to explain the former as a defensive deployment, and the latter as part of an extensive training exercise. He stated that, in his opinion, the probability of war on both fronts was low.

46. In the north at this moment, the Syrian forces on the Golan front were being reinforced by troops re-deployed from the Jordanian border. At the same time other Syrian units were also being brought forward to the front from rear concentration areas and bases. On 2 October 1973 Israeli air reconnaissance photographs showed a concentration of over 800 Syrian tanks and 108 artillery batteries on the border, apparently still in defensive dispositions<sup>42</sup>. Israeli military intelligence continued to explain

the Syrian build-up on the frontier as the result of a Syrian fear that Israel would launch an attack.

47. Soon after Golda Meir returned from Vienna on 2 October a special meeting of the cabinet was held. During this meeting only the terrorist incident in Austria was discussed and no mention was made of the situation on the borders<sup>43</sup>.

48. On 3 October, however, a Cabinet meeting was called, at Defence Minister Dayan's request, to discuss the situation along the canal and on the Syrian border. At this meeting the head of Intelligence Research in the military intelligence Branch, Brigadier-General Aryeh Shalev, briefed the cabinet on developments on the two frontiers. Again the explanation offered by military intelligence was that the Egyptians were just engaging in annual manoeuvres whereas the Syrians were taking precautions against a possible Israeli attack. The re-deployment of Syrian troops from the Jordanian border to the Golan was described as a gesture of goodwill towards Jordan. Shalev reiterated the intelligence assessment, which was endorsed by the Chief of Staff, Elazar, that a war was unlikely. None of the cabinet members present objected to this conclusion<sup>44</sup>. Thus, they accepted military intelligence's 'concept' of Arab intentions which argued that neither Egypt nor Syria would consider launching a major attack on Israel until they had developed the necessary Specific Capability to deal with Israeli air power, i.e. not until, at least, 1975 (in the Israel estimate).

49. On 4 October the partial alert at the Israeli Southern Command which had been ordered on 2 October, was relaxed by order of the General Staff, who were apparently keen not to alarm the Egyptians and cause a general escalation along the Suez Canal<sup>45</sup>. On the same day, reports of unusual earth removal operations carried out by the Egyptians at night along the northern sector of the canal were received at Southern Command intelligence section. A special air reconnaissance flight over Egyptian territory was now ordered and carried out. The photographs taken during this mission revealed a considerable strengthening of Egyptian troops along the canal which was of an offensive nature and appeared threatening<sup>46</sup>.

50. Late on 4 October large Russian transport aircraft arrived at Cairo and Damascus, apparently to evacuate Russian advisers and technicians and their families. This new development along with the general military situation was discussed by the members of the Israeli Cabinet residing in Tel Aviv at a special meeting on 5 October. No-one was certain why the Russians had taken this action. At this meeting, the Chief of Staff and Chief of Intelligence gave the ministers a detailed briefing on developments on the borders. In the course of their talks both Elazar and Zeira emphasised that the unprecedented Arab deployment could mean either attack or defence. The intelligence estimate was still that the probability of war was low. It was noted that while 10 days earlier the US intelligence agencies had regarded war as inevitable, their opinion now was the same as that of Israeli intelligence. The ministers were informed by Elazar that he had placed the standing forces on the full 'C' alert (the highest possible alert). Golda

Meir then asked the ministers to authorise her and Dayan to mobilise, if necessary, the Israeli reserve forces during Yom Kippur (the Jewish 'Day of Atonement'; from the evening of 5 October to the evening of 6 October). The ministers present approved this request by the Prime Minister<sup>47</sup>.

51. As one commentator has stated: 'That night [5-6 October] the political and military leaders of Israel went to sleep with an uneasy feeling, but few dreamt that the country was facing an imminent attack'<sup>48</sup>.

52. Early in the morning of 6 October Zeira telephoned Dayan to tell him of a definitive report on the Egyptian and Syrian intention to attack which had just been received at IDF intelligence headquarters. This report stated that the war would begin at 1800 hours on that day. Dayan immediately informed Golda Meir. A few hours after the receipt of the report, Golda Meir, after considering recommendations from Dayan and Elazar, decided on the mobilisation of 100 000 reserves<sup>49</sup>.

53. With their recognition in the morning on 6 October that the Arabs would attack, the Israeli leadership (i.e. Meir and Dayan) again changed their assessment of the Arab capability and decided that the Arabs did have the necessary Specific Capability to launch a major attack on Israel. Thus, they entered a Specific Threat Phase. This one was to be very short-lived.

#### Operational Response

54. The war actually began on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts at about 2.00 pm, 6 October 1973 with the Israeli mobilisation less than half complete and the front line positions on the Golan Heights and Suez Canal grossly undermanned for repelling a full-scale attack. Since the definitive information of the forthcoming attack was received by the Israeli Government at 0330 on 6 October, and the Arab attack began at 1355 the same day, the Specific Threat Phase lasted 10 hours and 25 minutes<sup>50</sup>.

55. This very short warning, and its disastrous aftermath, led to an enquiry into the reasons for the so-called 'intelligence failure'. Much of the Agranat enquiry, however, has remained classified in Israel, but it is reasonably clear what happened from the events preceding the outbreak of the war. The essential problem was that the Israeli Government, under the dominant influence of military intelligence<sup>51</sup>, failed to recognise that the Arab states of Egypt and Syria had developed the Specific Military Capability to initiate a major war.

56. Hitherto the Israeli Government had considered three types of military contingency:

- a. terrorist raids on Israel;
- b. punitive retribution raids undertaken by Israel; and
- c. full-scale war.

Terrorist raids were accepted as very likely occurrences and seen to be fundamentally a problem of internal and border security. The need for punitive retribution raids was also accepted in order to destroy Palestinian terrorist camps in border areas, and to punish Arab nations for harbouring the terrorists, and for committing other spiteful political and military acts seen to be detrimental to Israel. The War of Attrition was seen to be in the second category but the Israeli Government did not at first expect any renewal of this war following what it regarded as its decisive defeat of the Egyptians. The Israeli Government felt that its Arab enemies were more likely to stage occasional incidents than deliberately renew the War of Attrition.

57. The Israeli Government did not believe (prior to the 6 October 1973) that another major conflict like the Six Day War of 1967, was likely to occur before 1975-76. An Arab renewal of full-scale war was synonymous in Israeli thinking with an attempt to annihilate the state of Israel<sup>52</sup>. Israeli military intelligence correctly concluded that for this end to be achieved, Egypt and Syria would first have to gain general air superiority and then acquire an effective medium-range bomber force for strikes deep within Israeli territory. Military intelligence concluded that the front-line Arab states would not acquire the necessary medium bomber capability before 1975-76<sup>53</sup>. Nor did the Israelis believe that the Arabs could challenge Israeli air superiority until the late 1970s<sup>54</sup>. Supporting these assessments were a set of firm beliefs about the general ineffectiveness of the Syrian and Egyptian armed forces. Israeli military intelligence knew that large quantities of Russian arms were being delivered to Egypt and Syria, but drawing from observations about Arab performance in the Six Day War, intelligence expected that the Arabs would not effectively use, or properly maintain these Russian weapons in battle conditions<sup>55</sup>. Israeli confidence in Arab incompetence was such that the Defence Minister, Dayan, thought that Israel could safely suffer a surprise attack, and yet still within two days resume the offensive and recapture any territory lost<sup>56</sup>.

58. The preceding amalgam of beliefs was termed 'the Concept' by the Agranat Report. The major flaw in 'the Concept' was its insistence that Egypt and Syria would only fight a full-scale war for the purpose of annihilating the state of Israel. In fact the Arab states actually launched the Yom Kippur War with relatively limited aims in mind, such as the control of the Suez Canal and the Sinai Passes and Golan Heights. Having achieved these objectives by surprise, the Arab Governments expected that the super powers would seek to impose a cease-fire, which would be followed by a new search for diplomatic solutions<sup>57</sup>. These modest objectives did not require the development of an effective medium bomber force, nor did they require general air superiority as long as air superiority could be denied to the Israeli Air Force over the forward edge of the battlefield. Egypt and Syria planned to create these battle conditions by use of an integrated air defence system consisting principally of SAMs and anti-aircraft guns<sup>58</sup>. Thus, Israeli military intelligence was judging the emerging contingency in October 1973 according to criteria which were relevant to a

different contingency. In other words, Israeli intelligence did not envisage that another variant of full-scale war was possible, and failed to develop appropriate test criteria.

59. The second flaw in 'the Concept' was that it did not allow that the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces might prove capable of absorbing the new equipment from the USSR and maintaining and operating it effectively under battle conditions. Israeli intelligence were quite convinced that the Arabs would not prove capable of effectively operating, in particular, the more advanced equipments (some of which, such as the SA-6 missile and the ZSU23-4 radar-controlled anti-aircraft gun, had not even been correctly evaluated by military intelligence). In the event, the Arabs were able to perform at a much higher level in the engineering, anti-air and anti-tank roles than had been assumed by the Israelis<sup>59</sup>.

60. The early course of the war indicated that the Israeli Armed Forces, contrary to Dayan's expectations, were not able to absorb the effect of surprise and quickly return to the offensive. The Arab forces were able to capture most of the Golan Heights and all of the Suez Canal and to hold their gains against repeated air attacks which initially were very costly to the Israeli Air Force. Effective Israeli land counter-attacks were greatly delayed by the inadequate development of support units and infrastructure in the Sinai and to a lesser extent on the Golan Heights. Originally, the support units and infrastructure to sustain a full-scale war had been developed in the Israeli heartland (i.e. pre-1967 Israeli borders). During the 1967 War, the close proximity of civil infrastructure and short lines of communications greatly aided the Israeli logistic effort. On the eve of the October 1973 War, the Israeli lines of communication to the major fronts on the new borders were often two or three times longer, and there was little civil infrastructure in the Sinai or on the Golan Heights to supplement the logistic effort. Israel had the necessary support units, stockpiles and infrastructure in these regions for a renewal of the War of Attrition, but had not developed them to the extent of supporting a full-scale war because of the expense involved, and also because such an all-out war was not considered to be likely to happen until 1975-76 or even later.

SPECIFIC HOSTILE  
INTENT

7 Aug 1970

PERCEIVED THREAT

PHASE

164.5 Weeks

SPECIFIC

CAPABILITY

6 Oct 1973

SPECIFIC THREAT

PHASE

0.06 Weeks

OPERATIONAL

RESPONSE

6 Oct 1973

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CASE STUDY 36THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, OCTOBER 1973 - EGYPTIntroduction

1. When Egypt's President Nasser decided in July 1970 to accept the cease-fire proposal<sup>1</sup> put forward by US Secretary of State, William Rogers, he was not admitting that Egypt had failed in the War of Attrition. On the contrary, he believed that in this war Egypt had improved her strategic and political position; he agreed to a cease-fire then purely to preserve the 'gains' Egypt had made and give her a chance to recover and strengthen her defences (especially the surface-to-air missile 'wall')<sup>2</sup>.

General Hostile Intent, and Specific Capability

2. At the end of the War of Attrition, Egypt's leaders felt that the strategic situation in the Middle East was now quite different from what it had been when the war began. They were convinced that in the latter part of the confrontation<sup>3</sup> Egypt, by securing a limited Russian intervention, and using more advanced surface-to-air missiles against the Israeli aircraft, had neutralised and effectively overcome Israel's previously unchallenged strategic superiority. Thus, they believed that Egypt could now negotiate from a position of relative military strength when diplomatic discussions were renewed.

3. Furthermore, it seemed that the change in the strategic balance had even convinced the Israelis to change their political stance. Before July 1970 the Israelis were giving indications that they did not want to return all of the Arab territory that they had captured in the Six Day War, however, in early August 1970, when they accepted Rogers' cease-fire proposal they effectively bound themselves to the principle of withdrawal from the occupied territories<sup>4</sup>. This apparent change was interpreted by Egypt's leaders as a hopeful sign. They now came to the conclusion that Israel no longer harboured a Specific Hostile Intent to prevent the restoration of Sinai to Egyptian control. However, at the same time, they continued to recognise an Israeli General Hostile Intent towards Egypt - a legacy of the recent war. In addition, they were well aware that Israel still possessed the Specific Capability to resist any Egyptian attempt to 'liberate' the Sinai by force. Thus, at the end of the War of Attrition, Egypt's leaders, in effect, re-assessed the Israeli threat to the 'liberation' of the Sinai, and concluded that it was now no more than a perceived threat. On 7 August 1970, therefore, the Egyptian leadership were in a Perceived Threat Phase.

4. At the beginning of this phase, the leadership ordered the resumption of the effort to establish a surface-to-air missile system on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Soon many new missile sites were built. The aim was to improve Egypt's air defence capability along the cease-fire line. It was believed that the

missiles, which had been very effective in the last month of the War of Attrition, would be key assets in any possible future conflict or negotiations with Israel. The Israeli reaction to this Egyptian move was to accuse Egypt of violating the standstill provisions of the cease-fire. The Americans soon made the same accusation, and shortly after, as punishment for Egypt, 'ostentatiously' concluded a large arms deal with Israel<sup>5</sup>. At about this time, Israel also began to re-construct those parts of the Bar-Lev Line<sup>6</sup> which had been damaged in the War of Attrition and to strengthen it.

5. On 28 September 1970 Egypt's President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, died. His death came as a shock to the Arab world, because he had been its most charismatic leader. He was the man who had guided and developed the struggle against Israel since 1952. With his passing, the struggle seemed to lose an important element - effective leadership. In Egypt he was to be succeeded by Vice-President Anwar el-Sadat, who promised to continue the late leader's policies.

6. At the beginning of November both Egypt and Israel agreed to extend the cease-fire for a further three months. At this time Israel was (still) refusing to resume diplomatic negotiations with Egypt under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) Special Emissary, Dr Gunnar Jarring, unless Egypt withdrew the surface-to-air missiles that had been moved up into the standstill zone (as defined in the cease-fire agreement). Despite Israel's insistence on the removal of the missiles, the UN General Assembly was not to be persuaded and in December voted for the unconditional resumption of the Jarring Mission to the Middle East<sup>7</sup>.

7. December 1970 was also the time when the idea of an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel was first given expression. It was Israel's Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, who was the first to suggest the need for such an agreement for the purpose of re-opening the Suez Canal (which had been closed since the Six Day War). His formula called for a partial withdrawal by Israeli forces in Sinai to a line some distance to the west of the strategically important Sinai passes (Gidi, Mitla etc.) in return for which Egypt would agree to the de-militarization of the territory evacuated by Israel and would thin out its forces on the west bank of the canal. Egypt could then re-open and operate the canal<sup>8</sup>.

8. The Egyptian leadership did not immediately respond to Dayan's suggestion for an interim solution. However, soon after it was made, President Sadat met with an unofficial representative of the US Government to discuss the question of a peace settlement between Egypt and Israel. In January 1971 an Egyptian representative went to Washington in order to develop the idea of a peace in stages. In late January 1971 while contacts between Sadat and the Americans were continuing, the decision was taken in Cairo to extend the cease-fire for thirty days more<sup>9</sup>.

9. On 4 February 1971 President Sadat launched his own 'peace initiative'. In an address to the Egyptian National Assembly he stated that if Israel immediately withdrew her forces in Sinai to

the passes, he would be willing to re-open the Suez Canal, extend the cease-fire by six months and negotiate a peace agreement with Israel under the auspices of Dr Jarring<sup>10</sup>. In his view the initial withdrawal would be the first phase in a process towards a final settlement according to UN Security Council Resolution 242<sup>11</sup>. Although Sadat's 'initiative' had much in common with Dayan's earlier suggestion for an interim solution, there were several important differences between the two proposals. First, whereas Dayan had proposed that no Egyptian military forces be allowed in the territory evacuated by Israel, Sadat indicated that he would move forces onto the east bank immediately following the Israeli withdrawal. Second, while Dayan had indicated that the interim agreement should be a separate arrangement in itself, Sadat made it clear that what he was proposing would be part of a final settlement and must include an advance undertaking on the part of the Israelis to withdraw completely from Sinai. It also became clear later, that Sadat was proposing a far more extensive Israeli withdrawal for this first-stage agreement than Dayan had envisaged<sup>12</sup>.

10. Four days after the Egyptian President announced his 'peace initiative' in the National Assembly, the UN Special Emissary, Dr Gunnar Jarring, resumed his mission to the Middle East. His opening move was to present Egypt and Israel with a 'questionnaire' on the issue of an overall peace settlement. On the one hand Egypt was asked whether it was prepared to conclude a peace agreement with Israel in return for an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-Six Day War frontier. On the other hand Israel was asked whether it was willing to withdraw to the pre-Six Day War boundary in return for peace with Egypt. In its reply to Jarring, Egypt implied that it would only make peace with Israel if the latter also agreed to withdraw to the former international borders on the other fronts as well as to solve the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions. Israel, for its part, told Jarring that the extent of its withdrawal should be the subject of negotiations between Israel and Egypt, but added that it was not prepared to withdraw as far as the previous international boundary. The responses of the two sides to the 'Jarring questionnaire' only emphasised the gap between their respective positions on the question of a final peace settlement. Jarring, himself, tried for several weeks after receiving the replies to narrow the gap between the sides, but was unsuccessful<sup>13</sup>.

11. Meanwhile, in early March 1971, President Sadat announced that the cease-fire which was due to expire on 6 March would not be extended. However, shortly after this, he let the Americans know that it would be maintained de facto<sup>14</sup>. His purpose in making the announcement appears to have been to put pressure on Israel, and also to indicate to the Arab world that Egypt was still firmly committed to regaining the Sinai and the Gaza Strip.

12. On 1 and 2 March, 1971 before he made this announcement, Sadat had been in Moscow to discuss arms deliveries. There were certain items of equipment and weaponry that had not yet been delivered to Egypt which the Russians had promised to supply in arms deals signed in January and July 1970. Among these were TU-16 bombers, certain surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems (to add to the

anti-aircraft system based on SAM-2 and SAM-3 missile systems already established in Egypt) various types of ammunition, and some items of bridging equipment. In Sadat's eyes, what was most needed was a weapon that could deter Israeli deep-penetration air raids in a future war with Israel. He felt that a large force of one of the modern Russian long-range bomber aircraft which could bomb Israel in-depth and attack her air bases, would be the best deterrent. Accordingly, while he was in Moscow in March 1971 he pressed upon the Russians the need to supply Egypt with a suitable bomber. In response the Russian leaders indicated that they would be prepared to offer a missile-launching Ilyushin aircraft (to be crewed by Russians until sufficient Egyptian pilots were trained) on the condition that it could not be used without prior approval from Moscow. Sadat angrily responded that he could not accept such a condition and therefore refused the aircraft<sup>15</sup>. Despite this disagreement, an arms arrangement was later signed in which the Russians promised to supply more tanks and SAM systems. In addition, they agreed to deliver the armaments due to Egypt under earlier arrangements.

13. The continuing effort by the Egyptian leadership to obtain sophisticated equipment and weaponry from the Russians after the War of Attrition was just one aspect of their overall endeavour to expand and develop the Egyptian Armed Forces in preparation for a possible future major war with Israel. During the Perceived Threat Phase, which began after the August 1970 cease-fire agreement was signed, the Egyptian military leadership concentrated on manpower and equipment expansion. At this stage, the creation of engineer units was the top priority, for it was clear that in a future conflict with Israel a large-scale Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal would have to be attempted and for this engineers would be vital<sup>16</sup>. At the same time, the development and expansion of Egypt's air defence capability (i.e. SAM, anti-aircraft guns, associated radar and electronic equipment, and trained operators)<sup>17</sup>, armoured forces and infantry was continued.

14. Against this background of defence preparation, the search for a political solution to the Arab-Israel problem was proceeding. In early May 1971 it was the Americans who took the initiative. First, the Secretary of State, William Rogers, and his Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco, came to Cairo to discuss the idea of an interim settlement. From there they moved on to Tel Aviv<sup>18</sup>. It soon became clear to the two Americans from their meetings with Egyptian and Israeli leaders that the respective stances of the two sides on the question of an interim settlement had not changed since the idea of such a settlement had first been raised (i.e. back in December 1970). Despite this, Rogers and Sisco remained optimistic about the chances of an interim agreement being achieved in the not-too-distant future.

15. Meanwhile, about a week after Rogers and Sisco had first been in Cairo, President Sadat moved to destroy a pro-Russian faction in the Egyptian leadership that was conspiring to overthrow him in a coup. The conspirators, led by the former Vice-President, Ali Sabri (sacked by Sadat on 2 May), were formally arrested on 16 May. They were later brought to trial and sentenced to long prison terms. Three days before he ordered the arrest of the

plotters, Sadat had accepted the resignation of the Minister of War, General Fawzi, who had fallen under the influence of the former group, and appointed General Mohamed Sadek in his place. At the same time, General Saad el-Shazly was appointed the new Chief of Staff (to replace General Sadek). With all these moves Sadat greatly strengthened his grip on the national leadership. He now became the undisputed ruler of Egypt<sup>19</sup>.

16. On 25 May 1971 Russian President, Nikolai Podgorny, came to Cairo. The downfall of the most pro-Russian group in the Egyptian leadership had caused the Russians some concern. Although the ostensible purpose of Podgorny's trip was to meet Sadat to discuss a possible Russian-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation (an idea that Sadat had put forward some time earlier), there is reason to believe that he also came to find out whether the removal of the Ali Sabri faction would affect Russia's position in Egypt. In the event, two days after his arrival a formal Treaty was signed. In this treaty both sides undertook to co-operate with each other in the event of any threat to the peace, and not to enter in alliance or to take any action directed against the other party. Significantly, in another section of the treaty, Russia 'pledged itself to supply Egypt with the equipment needed to undo the aggression against her (i.e. Israel's capture of the Sinai and Gaza Strip in the Six Day War of 1967)'<sup>20</sup>. Soon after the signing of the treaty Podgorny returned to Moscow.

17. On 6 July 1971 two US Government representatives, Donald Bergus and Michael Sterner (Chief of the Egyptian desk at the US State Department), came to Cairo to present for discussion new American ideas on the question of a peace settlement. Basically, their main purpose was to express the view of the US State Department that there would soon be some positive movement on the diplomatic front in the Middle East. In addition, they also wanted to know whether the recently concluded Russian-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation had changed anything in the Egyptian position. Sadat assured them that nothing had changed and that he was still willing to negotiate a peace on the terms that he had outlined a few months earlier. Shortly after this meeting the US State Department sent Joseph Sisco to Israel to discuss the question of an interim peace settlement<sup>21</sup>.

18. Later in July 1971, President Sadat proclaimed 1971 a 'year of decision' for Egypt in its struggle with Israel<sup>22</sup>. This dramatic statement was meant to highlight Egypt's dissatisfaction with the current political situation in the Middle East and the lack of progress towards changing it. Sadat's main purpose in making such an announcement was to put pressure on the Israelis, and also the US (whom he felt were not trying hard enough to bring about an early Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai). At this stage, the Egyptian leadership still believed that an Israeli withdrawal could be secured by diplomatic means.

19. Towards the end of September 1971 William Rogers, Joseph Sisco and other American officials had a meeting in the US State Department with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmond Riad, Egypt's



permanent representative at the UN, Dr Mohammad Hassan el-Zayyat, and her Ambassador in Washington, Ashraf Ghorbal. The subject was the question of a possible interim peace settlement. In these discussions the Americans stated that they did not think that a final plan for peace could be drawn up at this stage, but they considered that an interim agreement was now possible and desirable. They felt that such an arrangement would be a practical way of starting the process towards peace. In response, the Egyptians indicated that their main aim was to secure the complete withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territory, and that, therefore, their position was that even the first step in the process towards peace (an interim arrangement to permit the re-opening of the canal) must include an Israeli undertaking to completely withdraw within a specified period. Rogers countered by saying that the United States had no means of convincing the Israelis of the need to give such an undertaking or of imposing such an obligation on them. In reply the Egyptians made it clear that they could not accept anything less. After this, there was disagreement on other points. All in all, nothing positive was achieved at this meeting<sup>23</sup>.

#### Specific Hostile Intent

20. It had become clear now to the Egyptian leadership that the US peace endeavour would not bring about a solution of the Egypt-Israel dispute that would be acceptable to Egypt. This was because Israel was now clearly not prepared to return all of the occupied territory and was determined to resist any pressure exerted on it by its patron, the United States, to change its stance. After the unproductive meeting in the US State Department in late September, Egypt's leaders became convinced that Israel was harbouring a Specific Hostile Intent to prevent any Egyptian attempt to regain the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Thus they entered a Specific Threat Phase.

21. The Egyptian leadership now began to re-consider the options open to them. It seemed that some form of military action would now have to be taken. It was felt that diplomatic initiatives alone would not produce a solution acceptable to Egypt. Therefore, military preparations had to be accelerated. The first objective was to obtain more arms and equipment from Russia, the second to continue the expansion and development of the armed forces, and the third to seek support from other Arab states.

22. On 8 October 1971 General Mohamed Sadek, Egypt's Minister of War, flew to Moscow to discuss and arrange an arms deal. A few days after he arrived a large deal was signed in which Russia promised to supply Egypt with, among other things, 10 TU-16 medium bombers with stand-off air-to-surface missiles, 100 MIG-21FM fighters (50 to be delivered before the end of 1971), 20 MIG-23 fighters (to be flown by Russian pilots until enough Egyptian pilots had been trained), one brigade of SAM-6 missiles, and three PMP bridges. On top of this, the Russians agreed to assist Egypt's own armaments industry. For example, they promised to help the Egyptians produce the D-30 122 mm gun, the 23 mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft gun, the AKM automatic rifle, the RPG anti-tank rocket

launcher, and many different types of ammunition<sup>24</sup>. On 16 October, after signing one of the largest arms agreements ever concluded between Egypt and Russia, General Sadek returned to Egypt.

23. On 11 and 12 October, President Sadat was also in Moscow. In his talks with the Russian leaders his first purpose was to allay any suspicions about him that the latter had come to harbour as a result of his actions in the preceding six months (e.g. his contacts with the Americans, his elimination of the pro-Russian Ali Sabri group, his clear condemnation of the unsuccessful communist coup in the Sudan). His second and main purpose was to make it clear to them that all he was asking Russia to do was to put Egypt on an equal footing with Israel in terms of military strength<sup>25</sup>. During the discussions the Russian leaders promised to supply the weapons and equipment mentioned above, and, of course, it was after these talks that the abovementioned arms deal was signed. Meanwhile, at the end of his talks with the Russian leadership, Sadat expressed the hope that the promised weapons would be sent as soon as possible so that Egypt could be in a position, before the end of 1971, to break the existing deadlock<sup>26</sup>.

24. At this stage President Sadat was planning to launch an air strike in December against Israel's military installations in Sinai to be immediately followed by a landing of paratroopers<sup>27</sup>. However, by December it had become clear that the Egyptian Armed Forces would need quite a lot more time to prepare themselves properly for such an operation. The Egyptian Air Force still lacked sufficient trained aircrews. Sadat decided to cancel the operation and blamed the Russians for his failure to take military action in the 'year of decision', saying that their failure to supply in time the weapons they had promised had effectively tied his hands. In truth, even if all the promised weapons had arrived in time, the Egyptian Armed Forces still would not have been ready for the planned operation in December because they would not have had enough time to absorb the new equipment<sup>28</sup>.

25. One other factor that contributed to Sadat's decision to postpone military action in late 1971 was the outbreak of the third Indo-Pakistan War on 3 December 1971. Sadat realised that any limited war he might launch in the Middle East would not receive the undivided attention of the world while such a major battle was raging in South Asia<sup>29</sup>. Furthermore, he did not want to have to compete with India for Russian arms under these conditions. Thus, as a result of this and the more compelling factor of Egypt's relative military unpreparedness, Sadat was forced to cancel the planned operation against Israeli installations in Sinai. At the end of 1971, therefore, the political deadlock in the Middle East remained unbroken.

26. On 2 February 1972 President Sadat went to Moscow again to discuss arms deliveries. In talks with the Russian leaders, he was given assurances that Russia would meet its obligations under the arms agreement signed in October 1971. In addition, the Russian leaders promised to supply 200 T-62 tanks, 20 TU-22 bombers,

25 MIG-17 fighter-bombers, and a number of items of equipment to improve Egypt's electronic warfare capability. Unfortunately, about one month after Sadat returned to Egypt, Russia informed Egypt that it wanted to be paid in full and in hard currency for the T-62 tanks and TU-22 bombers - a demand that effectively put the eventual acquisition of these items in doubt<sup>30</sup>.

27. In April 1972 the Russian leadership invited President Sadat to return to Moscow for further discussions. There was an ulterior motive behind this sudden invitation to Sadat: with a summit between Nixon (US President) and Brezhnev (the Russian Communist Party chief) scheduled to begin on 20 May 1972 the Russians had decided to arrange meetings that would demonstrate to the United States the strength of their (the Russians') position in the Middle East. Realising that this was the reason for the Russian invitation, Sadat, nevertheless, felt that it would provide him with another opportunity to develop an understanding with the Russians on the question of further arms deliveries, and so he accepted it and flew to Moscow on 27 April. On this visit, Sadat told the Russian leaders that the existing stalemate in the Middle East would only be broken by military action. He felt that the best time for this would be after the US presidential elections in November, when the White House would feel relatively free in its actions, and would not be afraid to undertake bold changes of policy. Consequently, he suggested that, after the Moscow summit in May, Russia should take advantage of the period up to the Presidential Elections (when the US would be shrinking from making new foreign commitments) to supply Egypt with all the arms that had been promised in the old contracts. The Russians accepted the need to strengthen Egypt's military potential, and agreed to supply the promised arms according to the timetable set by the Egyptian President. Amongst the weapons and equipment to be delivered according to this plan were 16 SU-17 bombers (to replace the 20 TU-22 which had originally been included in the February arms deal), eight SAM-3 battalions, 200 T-62 tanks (half to be delivered in 1972 and the remainder in 1973), and one SAM-6 brigade (to be delivered in 1973)<sup>31</sup>.

28. After September 1971, Egypt's leaders spared little effort and made use of every opportunity, such as the one described above, to maintain and even increase the supply of arms and equipment from Russia. The aim of this continuing endeavour was, of course, to ensure that the Egyptian Armed Forces had all the weaponry and other materiel that they would need in the future 'battle' against Israel. This quest for arms was not free of frustrations: on a number of occasions the Russians failed to deliver what they had promised or were unduly slow in sending arms. More often than not the delays were related to new developments on the international scene. The Egyptians realised that they would have to put up with these irritations because no other major nation was willing or capable of meeting Egypt's equipment needs.

29. Apart from this effort to obtain arms from the Russians, much was being done in Egypt itself after September 1971 to prepare for the future battle for the liberation of Sinai. For example, many new units were being created in the armed forces; among these were air defence units, armoured units, mechanised infantry units,

and engineer units. At the same time, these newly created units and the established units were undergoing intensive training in their particular areas of specialisation. Many were learning how to use the new Russian equipment, e.g. ZSU 23 four-barrel anti-aircraft guns, SAM-3 (and later SAM-6 and SAM-7) missiles, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, Sagger anti-tank guided missiles, MIG 21FM fighters, and sophisticated radar and electronic gear. In addition to this continuous specialised training, major exercises involving large sections of the armed forces were frequently being held. These exercises (known as the 'liberation' series) were designed to test either individual commands (e.g. Second Army, Third Army, Paratroops, Air Defence, Air Force, Navy, Rangers etc.), or several commands in co-ordination, in conditions that were meant to approximate those expected in the future war against Israel<sup>32</sup>.

30. After June 1972, as part of the preparations for the future war, Egypt's reserve mobilisation system was re-organised and then tested out on several occasions. In these test runs the re-organised system proved to be efficient. The aims of the trial runs after June 1972 were to perfect the mobilisation system and to encourage the idea in Israel that mobilisation in Egypt was just a routine measure and not a preparation for war<sup>33</sup>.

31. Meanwhile, in mid-1972, against the background of defence activities described above, a dramatic political move was made. This was President Sadat's decision on 8 July to request Russia to remove from Egypt all the military advisers and technicians that it had sent to the country. Several developments spurred the Egyptian President to make this move. One of these was the communique which came out of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks in mid-May 1972 which, among other things, referred to a mutual agreement to achieve 'a military relaxation' in the Middle East to be followed by a freezing of the situation<sup>34</sup>. This, to Sadat, meant an agreement between the super-powers, to maintain Egypt's military inferiority. Another factor contributing to Sadat's decision in July was the failure of the Russians to speed up the delivery of arms and also provide Egypt with a detailed report on the Nixon-Brezhnev meeting as they had promised in April. A further factor was the detente now being established between East and West. All these developments combined to convince Sadat that Russia did not want a war in the Middle East and was now committed to maintaining an overtly peaceful approach in international matters. He now concluded that Egypt could not go to war while there were Russian military advisers on her soil<sup>35</sup>. So, on 8 July, he decided to request the removal of the latter.

32. This act, naturally enough, soured relations between Egypt and Russia. There was a noticeable lack of cordiality in their dealings with each other during the second half of July and through August 1972. For example, Egypt refused a request by the head of the Russian military mission in Egypt, General Okunev, that an office be retained in the Egyptian Ministry of Defence for the chief Russian expert only<sup>36</sup>, while the Russians refused Egyptian requests for the retention in Egypt of certain items of Russian-owned and

operated equipment, e.g. four MIG-25 reconnaissance aircraft, a brigade of SAM-6 missiles protecting the Aswan High Dam, and an electronic reconnaissance and jamming squadron<sup>37</sup>. In September, however, things began to improve. It was in this month that the Russians agreed to receive the Egyptian Prime Minister, Dr Aziz Sidki, in Moscow in October.

33. Dr Sidki arrived in Moscow for this visit on 16 October. The aim of his mission was to arrest the process of deterioration in the relationship between Egypt and Russia; a further purpose was to remind the Russian leaders of their agreement in April to place Egypt in a position of relative military strength (i.e. by sending Egypt all the arms they had promised but not yet delivered) by the time of the US presidential elections. During his visit, Dr Sidki succeeded to some extent in reassuring the ever-suspicious Russian leadership that his country had no intention of rushing into the arms of the United States in order to prejudice the position of Russia. After this, a mutual agreement was reached to work for an improvement in Russian-Egyptian relations. In addition, the Russian leaders promised to supply Egypt with one squadron of MIG-23 and one of SU-20 aircraft (to arrive in the last quarter of 1973), and a brigade of R-17E ground-to-ground missiles (known in the West as SCUD)<sup>38</sup>. The relative success of the Egyptian Prime Minister's mission to Moscow showed that both Egypt and Russia were keen to patch up their alliance in the wake of the departure of the Russian military experts from Egypt.

34. On 24 October 1972, six days after Dr Sidki returned from his mission to Moscow, an important meeting of the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces was held at President Sadat's house in Giza. The subject under discussion was the state of the armed forces and their readiness for military action. Three months before this, Sadat had told the War Minister, General Sadek, that he wanted the armed forces to be ready to launch an attack soon after the US presidential elections in November. He was now expecting the senior military commanders to declare their readiness to launch a limited attack across the Suez Canal at that time. Instead, he was very surprised and annoyed to hear many of them, including General Sadek and the Vice-Minister of War, General Hassan, arguing against a limited operation in mid-November on the grounds that Egypt still lacked an adequate offensive capability in the air and did not have the means to deter Israeli air strikes against her interior<sup>39</sup>.

35. Two days after this meeting President Sadat decided to dismiss General Sadek, General Hassan, the Commander of the Navy, the General Commanding the Central Military Area, and the Director of Intelligence. He felt that he could not work with military leaders who did not accept his view that even a limited military operation would lead to an improvement in Egypt's political position. As the new Minister of War he appointed General Ahmed Ismail, a dedicated professional soldier, and a man who had no interest in politics. Ismail's task was to develop a military strategy that would compensate for Egypt's strategic weakness<sup>40</sup>.

36. Soon after Ismail's appointment, the Egyptian General

Staff began planning in earnest for a major operation with limited objectives: a crossing of the Suez Canal, followed by the destruction of the Israeli Bar Lev Line and the seizure and holding of a narrow strip of land along the length of the east bank of the canal. At this stage, it was anticipated that the Egyptian Armed Forces would be ready to launch such an attack by May 1973<sup>41</sup>.

37. In the meantime, it was hoped that Russia would speed up its arms deliveries to Egypt. In December 1972, President Sadat decided to make another conciliatory gesture towards the Russians. He sent General Ismail to the Russian Embassy in Cairo to tell the military representatives there that Egypt had decided to grant a five-year extension of the Russian-Egyptian naval facilities agreement which was due to expire in March 1973. Under this agreement which had been concluded between the two countries in 1968, the Russian Mediterranean Fleet was afforded the use of certain facilities in Egyptian ports<sup>42</sup>.

38. In January 1973 Sadat's National Security Adviser, Hafez Ismail visited Russia. His trip was followed in February by one by the Minister of War, General Ahmed Ismail. As a result of these trips relations between Egypt and Russia were to greatly improve. In February 1973 also, a high-level Russian military delegation headed by General Lasinkov, the former head of the Russian military mission in Egypt, arrived in Cairo to discuss arms supplies. After a series of discussions, the delegation left with an agreed list of Egypt's armament needs. In March General Ismail went to Moscow to sign a new arms agreement based on that list. Under this agreement, Egypt was to receive, among other things, one squadron of MIG-23, one brigade of R-17E (SCUD) surface-to-surface missiles (to be delivered in the third quarter of 1973), about 200 BMP (mechanised infantry combat vehicles), some 50 SAGGER anti-tank guided missile systems, and one brigade of SAM-6 missiles<sup>43</sup>. This time the Russians began their arms deliveries promptly. In fact, in the first eight months of 1973 they not only delivered on schedule what had been promised in that year, but also shipped much of what had been promised in contracts signed in 1971 and 1972. This led President Sadat to comment to Mohamed Heikal (editor of the Cairo newspaper, Al Ahram) at one point: 'They are drowning me in new arms'<sup>44</sup>. It appeared that the Russians were out to improve their standing in Egypt.

39. Meanwhile, the leaders of Egypt and Syria had been meeting to discuss the question of co-ordinated military action against Israel. The first serious discussions on this matter had taken place in February 1973 when General Ismail went to Damascus. Then, in April, during a secret visit to Egypt by Syrian President, Hafez al-Assad, it was agreed that a co-ordinated attack on Israel should be launched that year. At this stage, three possible dates for action (suggested in a report to Sadat by Egyptian Director of Operations, General el-Gamasy) were under consideration: mid-May, late August-early September, and early October<sup>45</sup>. In late April the first alternative - mid-May - had to be ruled out, for it had become clear that an attack launched then would coincide with the second

Russian-American summit conference which was to be held in Washington, and also because Syria would not have finished setting up a surface-to-air missile system for her front by then.

40. February 1973 saw the last attempt by Egypt to break the political deadlock in the Middle East by peaceful means. In the second half of this month Sadat's National Security Adviser, Hafez Ismail, flew to Washington for discussions with President Nixon and Dr Henry Kissinger to find out whether the Americans were prepared to apply pressure on Israel to make concessions. In his meetings with Kissinger, Ismail gained the impression that not only were the Americans unwilling to put pressure on Israel but they also wanted Egypt to make the major concessions<sup>46</sup>. Ismail returned to Egypt convinced that no acceptable settlement could be worked out via the Americans while they maintained such a stance. Soon after the failure of this mission to Washington, President Sadat made the final decision to take military action in 1973 to break the existing deadlock.

41. In late April 1973, as part of an overall plan to deceive Israel, the Egyptian leadership created a war scare by raising the level of overt military activity and preparation in Egypt, and particularly on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Originally, it had been planned that an attack on Israel would be launched in May, but for the reasons mentioned above (see Paragraph 39) the attack had been postponed to early September or early October. Despite this decision to postpone action, Egypt's preparatory mobilisation and military build-up for war was allowed to proceed as if an attack really was about to be launched. All this activity fooled the Israelis, who, in May, began a partial mobilisation in anticipation of an attack by Egypt (and possibly also Syria). Towards the end of May the Egyptians released the reserves they had called up in April and early May and wound down their military activities. Realising that they had over-reacted, the Israelis also de-mobilised the reserves that they had recently summoned. Thus, the temporary crisis passed<sup>47</sup>.

42. The deception plan used by Egypt in 1973 to convince Israel that Egypt was neither willing nor ready to launch a war in that year was designed both to boost Israeli over-confidence and lull the Israelis into a false sense of security. On the one hand, false reports detailing Egypt's military unpreparedness, or the inability of her forces to master and maintain sophisticated Russian military equipment were 'leaked' to the foreign press. On the other hand, obvious war preparations were disguised as ordinary training exercises or hidden from view. At the same time, there were frequent mobilisations of sections of the reserves<sup>48</sup>. The latter moves were designed to accustom the Israelis to Egyptian mobilisations and encourage them to believe that a mobilisation in Egypt was a routine event and no real cause for alarm. Of course, the reason why the Egyptian leadership chose to pursue such an elaborate overall deception strategy was that they wanted to ensure that the Egyptian attack on Israel, when it was finally launched, would come as a surprise.

43. In the second half of August 1973, as the deception effort began to move into high gear, a number of important decisions regarding the imminent 'battle' were taken in meetings between the political and military leaders of Egypt and Syria. The first meeting took place in Alexandria between 21 and 27 August. This was the Supreme Joint Council of the Egyptian and Syrian Armed Forces - a group comprised of the most senior military commanders in the two countries. At this meeting, it was decided that Egypt and Syria were ready to go to war along the lines defined in their existing plans, and that the most suitable periods in the coming months for launching the war were 7/11 September and 5/10 October. The matter of choosing a specific D-Day for action was referred to Presidents Sadat and Assad. All military leaders asked of their presidents was that they should tell the former of their decision at least 15 days before the date of action so that a count-down could be put into effect. On 28 and 29 August, the two Presidents met in Damascus and decided that the war should be launched during the period 5/10 October<sup>49</sup>. Three weeks after this, 6 October 1973 was selected as D-Day. This decision was then communicated to the senior military commanders.

44. On 13 September 1973 an Israeli air patrol flying over the eastern Mediterranean in the area of the Syrian port of Latakia tangled with Syrian fighters which attempted an ambush. In the ensuing dogfights 13 Syrian MIG fighters were shot down for the loss of only one Israeli aircraft<sup>50</sup>. This air battle was to be used by the Syrians as a convenient cover for the beginning of their military build-up on the Golan front in preparation for the forthcoming war. Several days after this, the Egyptians also began their military build-up along the west bank of the Suez Canal. It had already been decided in Egypt that the final dispositions to the troops should be made under cover of preparations for the annual autumn strategic exercise (that had been taking place regularly since autumn 1968)<sup>51</sup>. It was announced that this year, 1973, the exercise would begin on 1 October and last until 7 October. This 'exercise' was to become an important part of Egypt's deception plan.

45. On 27 September the Egyptians announced another mobilisation, the 23rd in nine months. It was stated that the reservists called up this time would be released on 7 October. On 30 September, another batch of reserves was called up. Later, on 4 October, to lull suspicion, some of the 27 September intake were released<sup>52</sup>.

46. Meanwhile, President Sadat and Egypt's military leaders went about their normal business, acting as if nothing untoward was about to happen. On the anniversary of Nasser's death, 28 September, Sadat delivered a deliberately low-key speech, in the course of which he ignored almost completely the subject of Israel, the main theme on previous occasions<sup>53</sup>. Clearly, the aim of Sadat and the military leaders was to create an atmosphere of calm and 'business as usual' to lull any suspicions the enemy might have been developed.



47. The scheduled annual 'exercise' began on 1 October 1973. Under this disguise, preparations for the coming offensive began to move into high gear<sup>53</sup>. On 1 October, too, the last meeting of the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces was held. At this meeting, President Sadat signed the operational order and declared himself to be responsible before history for the decision to go to war.

48. On 3 October General Ismail flew to Damascus. He and the Syrian Minister of Defence, General Mustafa Tlas, agreed that the H-Hour (moment when action was to begin) should be 1400 hours on 6 October<sup>55</sup>. On this same day, the two Presidents, Sadat and Assad, informed the Russian Ambassadors to their respective countries, in vague terms, of the Syrian-Egyptian decision to launch a co-ordinated attack on Israel. No date was mentioned in these two meetings. The next evening large Russian transport aircraft arrived in Cairo and Damascus to evacuate Russian military advisers and their families from the two countries<sup>56</sup>. This Russian response caused the Egyptians and Syrians some anxiety because they were afraid it might alert the Israelis to the Arabs' intentions. In the event, there was no immediate reaction in Israel.

#### Operational Response

49. At about 1400 hours on 6 October 1973 the Syrian-Egyptian attack on Israel began. The Israelis were to be taken almost entirely by surprise. For the first three days this was to prove a great advantage to the attacking forces. However, after that, the Israelis gradually began to recover and fight back. The war was eventually brought to an end on 24 October 1973 with Israel on the verge of total victory. In this war the Arab forces won back their military self-respect. Their achievements in the first three days of the war wiped away the humiliations that they had suffered at the hands of the Israelis in the June 1967 war. The war achieved Sadat's purpose of restarting genuine negotiations, and led directly to the restoration of Egypt's lost territory. In this sense the war was a political victory for Egypt although a military victory for Israel.

SPECIFIC  
CAPABILITY

7 Aug 1970

PERCEIVED THREAT  
PHASE

59 Weeks

SPECIFIC  
HOSTILE  
INTENT

Sep 1971

SPECIFIC THREAT  
PHASE

105.4 Weeks

OPERATIONAL  
RESPONSE

6 Oct 1973

NOTES

1. This cease-fire proposal provided for a three month truce and a total military standstill within a zone extending 50 kilometres from either bank of the Suez Canal. It also bound the signatories (Egypt and Israel) to begin negotiations under the auspices of the UN Special Representative, Dr Gunnar Jarring, on the basis of UN Security Resolution 242. For details of the latter see Case Study 31: The War of Attrition 1969 - Israel.
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3. For a description of the course of the War of Attrition see Case Study 35: The Arab-Israeli War, October 1973 - Israel.
4. Bar-Siman-Tov, Y., op. cit., pp. 180-181.
5. Heikal, M., op. cit., p. 94.
6. For a description of this line and its construction see Case Study 31: The War of Attrition 1969 - Israel.
7. Eban, Abba, 'Abba Eban: An Autobiography', Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1978, p. 470.
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17. ibid., p. 20.

18. Rabin, Y., op. cit., pp. 200-201.

Heikal, M., 'The Road to Ramadan', pp. 131-132.

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19. Heikal, M., 'The Road to Ramadan', pp. 130, 132-136.

el-Sadat, A., op. cit., pp. 223-224.

Herzog, C., op. cit., p. 19.

20. Heikal, M., 'The Road to Ramadan', p. 137.

21. ibid., pp. 139-140.

22. Gross Stein, Janice, 'Military Deception, Strategic Surprise, and Conventional Deterrence: A Political Analysis of Egypt and Israel, 1971-73', in Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 5, No. 1, March 1982, p. 99.

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24. el-Shazly, S., op. cit., p. 78.

25. Heikal, M., 'Sphinx and Commissar', pp. 233-238.

26. el-Sadat, A., op. cit., p. 226.

27. Gross Stein, J., op. cit., p. 99.

28. el-Shazly, S., op. cit., pp. 26, 87.

el-Sadat, A., op. cit., p. 227.

29. Herzog, C., op. cit., p. 27.

Gross Stein, J., op. cit., p. 99.

30. el-Shazly, S., op. cit., pp. 94, 97-99.

31. el-Sadat, A., op. cit., pp. 228-229.

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el-Shazly, S., op. cit., pp. 105-107, 118.

32. el-Shazly, S., op. cit., pp. 33, 40.

33. ibid., pp. 52-55.
34. Herzog, C., op. cit., p. 21.
35. el-Sadat, A., op. cit., p. 230.  
Heikal, M., 'The Road to Ramadan', pp. 172-174.
36. Heikal, M., 'The Road to Ramadan', p. 175.
37. el-Shazly, S., op. cit., pp. 112-114.
38. ibid., p. 117.
39. Gross Stein, J., op. cit., pp. 101-102.  
Heikal, M., 'The Road to Ramadan', pp. 180-181.
40. Gross Stein, J., op. cit., p. 102.
41. el-Shazly, S., op. cit., p. 27.
42. Herzog, C., op. cit., p. 23.  
el-Sadat, A., op. cit., pp. 237-238.
43. el-Shazly, S., op. cit., pp. 133-134.
44. Heikal, M., 'The Road to Ramadan', p. 180.
45. Herzog, C., op. cit., pp. 28-29.  
el-Sadat, A., op. cit., p. 241.
46. Heikal, M., 'The Road to Ramadan', pp. 199-203.
47. See Case Study 35: The Arab-Israeli War, October 1973 - Israel for more details about the Egyptian military build-up in April and May 1973.
48. From January to 1 October 1973 the Egyptians summoned and then released their reservists 22 times - sometimes for a few days, sometimes for two weeks.  
el-Shazly, S., op. cit., p. 55.  
Herzog, C., op. cit., pp. 32-34.
49. el-Sadat, A., op. cit., p. 242.  
el-Shazly, S., op. cit., pp. 136-137.  
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50. Herzog, C., op. cit., p. 60.
51. Heikal, M., 'The Road to Ramadan', p. 40.

52. el-Shazly, S., op. cit., p. 139.
53. Herzog, C., op. cit., p. 38.
54. See Case Study 35: The Arab-Israeli War, October 1973 - Israel for details of these preparations.
55. Heikal, M., 'The Road to Ramadan', pp. 27-29.
56. el-Shazly, S., op. cit., pp. 143-144.

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